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MR. N. WILLIAMS said, he had not troubled the committee with any remarks on the appointing power, except in expressing his dissent to the principle of electing justices, and he was glad to find that plan discarded by the Convention. But we are now presented with one which, although not quite so odious, is to the full as objectionable in many prominent points. He would not be suspected, he thought, of withholding from the people the privilege of electing any officer, properly eligible by the people, upon those plain and clear republican principles which were compatible with good government; but it must be admitted, that in every well organized government certain officers should not be subject to popular elections, but be thrown upon some appointing power at a distance from the people. He would adopt this distinction on account of the peace and safety of the community. The chief magistrate of the state, and the legislative bodies, who were principally engaged in making laws, and in superintending their execution, with a jurisdiction co-extensive with the whole body politic, should undoubtedly be elected by the people; but those officers who were to execute important duties in immediate contact with the people, and frequently in hostility with their feelings and interests, ought never to derive their power directly from their hands. Such are the judges of every grade, and the high executive officers in the counties. Officers, whose duties and functions touch so nearly the business and bosoms of men, ought not to be dependant on these very men for their commissions. It did not alter the case much, he said, that by this plan sheriffs were to be appointed by the supervisors and judges for it was evident, that if these bodies were to make the appointment, the election of supervisors would throw the whole people into commotion. And when elected, an excellent board, with these new duties, would be divided into factions. [Here Mr. Root informed Mr. W. that the proposition was to elect sheriffs by the people.] So much the worse, said Mr. W. By these elections party and faction would prevail more among the people, in a tenfold degree, than it now does. You cast among them the apple of discord, and much shall we lament it.

Gentlemen, he said, had expressed a strong desire to cut up by the roots all motive to party feelings. He was as anxious as any one to eradicate such feelings, and indeed they ought not to be spoken of by, or influence, any member of this Convention. An honourable gentleman from Albany, (the Chancellor) for whom he entertained the highest respect, had even gone so far as to express his fears lest our progress hereafter would be rapid towards the tempestuous sea of corruption. But was this the way to allay party feelings, or stop our career? Every gentleman acquainted with the country, must know, that, although the sheriff was to be eligible for only one term, yet the object was worth contending for by the most powerful men in the country; and his numerous deputies, with their retainers, would be for months engaged in making interest and forming parties in support of their several pretensions to be his successor. this way, heat and contention, and petty intrigue would be made the order of the day, and every county in the state would be thrown into convulsions.

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But the evil would not stop here. The sheriff would enter on the execution of his office, warm from the contest with the friends and opposers of his election under his eye, and with his pocket full of paper and parchment sins of the peo ple, which he might visit upon his unfortunate enemies with a most cruel and destructive vengeance. While, on the other hand, he would be apt to execute the functions of his office against his friends with so lenitent a hand, that no monies would be collected from them, except through rules and attachments almost without end. This, he contended, would be the natural course of things, under such a system. Indeed, we had before us in one state, as he was inform ed, an example of this scheme once tried, and found so fraught with evils that it was laid aside, He alluded, he said, to New-Jersey.

But, sir, there is one great principle of government, which some of the wise and learned gentlemen who have spoken on this subject, seem wholly to have overlooked or neglected. It was one which the greatest writers and statesmen have ever deemed essential to the permanence of every government; indeed, a principle, without which no government could well carry on its plans or enforce its laws. It was this:-That there should be some channel through

which the remotest parts of the state would feel the influence of the central administration. Was it so, or not? Could it be expected, he asked, that without a community of feeling, without a single tie of interest, any government would long hang together? What ligament, what cement, would there be to bind the head and the remote parts together? Without this, the government would be like a rope of sand. By this plan of electing judges, justices and she. riffs, which some gentlemen seem to dwell upon with rapture, but which, he said, appeared to him so preposterous and dangerous, you allow none of this influence to exist. What better channel of influence can be found, than that of the magistrates and executive officers of the counties? The chief executive of the state was bound to have the laws enforced, and it must be done through these offi cers; not that they were to be subject to his commands, but they ought to feel an interest in complying with his reasonable requests. The time might come, when it would be necessary to call in aid some other principle in support of government than that of patriotism, which, alas! had been found, in some cases, rather weak among us. The plan proposed would make our government no better than a confederacy of counties; by which we shall have a wheel within a wheel, or rather a wheel without, not in the least moved or influenced by any mainspring or machinery within. It would be somewhat like the confederacy of these United States, that existed before the present constitution was formed, and was found so deficient in this sound principle of government.

He did not wish to enlarge upon this subject; and he was thankful that the committee had indulged him thus far. He considered this a most important subject, and apprehended that some gentlemen, by avoiding one mischief, were running directly into another.-He wished to treat every gentleman with delicacy; but said he could not forbear to observe, that he thought, from the observations he heard delivered the other day by a wise and experienced statesman, for whom he felt the highest respect and veneration-he alluded, he said, to the honourable gentleman from Queens-that the high and elevated sphere in which that gentleman had acted for many years, had rendered him less qualified than many men of far less talents, to judge of the regulations necessary and proper to be adopted for our country towns and counties. Information of this sort did not so much depend on great talents as practical experience. He intended nothing disrespectful; and concluded by expressing a strong hope that the motion of the gentleman from Delaware would be rejected.

MR. KING stated, that although with regard to justices of the peace he had thought it proper to vest their election in the people, it did not, therefore, follow, that sheriff's were to be appointed in the same manner. Very different considerations were applicable to the two subjects. In the election of the magistracy in the different towns of this state, the capacity of the people to choose, was alone drawn in question. There was no unfitness, in the nature of things, in making the appointment in that mode; although he was perfectly satisfied with the plan which had been adopted by the Convention; the great object being to dissever and disconnect the magistracy from the central power at the seat of government, and to destroy this extensive means of patronage which might be improperly employed, and was not necessary to sustain the government.

But the case of the sheriffs was far different.

In all the free governments of this country, it had been determined to divide political power into great departments, one of which was the executive. He was charged by the constitution with the faithful execution of the laws. He was responsible to the people for the performance of this trust. If there was any power which in its very nature required to be indivisible, it was the executive. The unity of the executive was a quality indispensable to the perfection of that department of the government. To divide that power, is to weaken and destroy it. The legislative and judicial departments may be wisely divided and subdivided; but all experience shews, that the unity of the executive must be preserved, in order to preserve its strength and its efficacy. All schemes, by which the executive was attempted to be divided, had failed: and that of the Directory in France was a signal failure, attended with disgrace and disaster. The same might be expected from any plan of a council, presided over by the

supreme executive magistrate; or of any other, by which he was attempted to be deprived of the ordinary means of executing the laws.

The appointing power is not in general necessarily connected with the executive department. Portions of it may safely and discreetly be given to other departments. But that portion of the appointing power which is executive in its very nature, must be given to the executive department. Such is the power of appointing to the office of sheriff. The magistracy is not necessarily connected with the execution of the laws by the executive department. It is the lowest order of the judiciary. But the sheriffs are ministerial officers, directly connected with the supreme executive. He is responsible for the execution of the law, and they are the agents and the instruments with which he is to execute them. How can he be responsible for the faithful performance of this important trust, if you deprive him of the only means by which he can execute it? As to executive offices, you must therefore re-embody and re-unite them with the executive power, or destroy it by rendering it utterly incapable of performing its high functions.

The sheriffs should be responsible to the executive, and derive their authority from that source. What is the analogy of the federal government? The marshals of the districts-are they appointed by the states, or by the people in the respective districts? No, sir; they are appointed by the supreme executive of the union-by the president and senate. Why are they thus appointed? Because the president is responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the union, and for the supremacy of its power in the several states where the marshals are stationed. And if true in the United States, is not the same thing true in the several counties of this state? How can the governor be justly held responsible for the faithful execution of the laws, if he has no control over those by whom all processes, civil and criminal, are to be executed; who may command the power of the county and of the neighbouring counties to their aid in case of resistance? Suppose a peculiar state of property in particular districts of country-suppose a spirit of insubordination and discontent to exist in certain counties, which it was a part of the appropriate duty of the executive to repress and subdue would you furnish him beforehand with the excuse, that though he had the best disposition to perform his duty, you had deprived him of the means of doing it, by vesting in other hands the nomination of the agents through whom alone he could enforce obedience to the laws? Is it not risking the good order and harmony of society thus to weaken the responsibility of the executive? In order to secure this responsibility, the executive power must be united, consolidated, and connected in all its ramifications with the supreme government of the state. He did not mean by this, that the appointment of every subordinate, local, and municipal officer, was to be made by the central authority here. He had, on a former occasion, expressed his opinion that all such officers and magistrates, might safely be elected in the respective cities, towns, and counties; and he had still the same desire that this great mass of patronage and power might be broken up into minute fragments, and disposed throughout the land: but he trusted the Convention would not misapply this idea, and extend it to officers who were directly connected with the supreme executive, and essential to preserve its unity-to secure its responsibility, and the faithful and energetic execution of the laws.

GEN. ROOT would not make use of such arguments as had fallen from his honourable friend from Oneida, to oppose the proposition. This gentleman, together with a gentleman from Albany, had expressed great fears that we were about to launch our political barque into a tempestuous sea of civil liberty. I have no such fears for our political barque. I can unite with the illustrious Jefferson in saying, that I prefer a tempestuous sea of political liberty, to a calm of despotism. We are told by the gentleman from Oneida, and by the gentleman from Queens, that it is necessary to have a connexion between the executive and these great county officers; it is necessary there should be some ligament or cement to bind them together: and by whatever other bonds of union they would have them bound, they have not conde scended to inform us. Some ligament or cement to bind these parties together, as the old council bound its dependants to cement the sheriff to the car of the executive. I should prefer

some of the newly invented hydraulic cement, to this kind that the executive is to furnish through his high appointing authority. But we are told that the sheriff is an executive officer, and should therefore be under the direction of the executive of the state, whose duty it is to see the laws executed. Is the sheriff to be a humble tool in the hands of the executive, as an axe or a hammer in the hands of the carpenter? The old council of appointment have sometimes undertaken to appoint sheriffs that were not very agreeable to the feelings of the governor; and have not these sheriff's done as well as the humblest tool of the executive? Have not the sheriffs appointed the last winter, discharged their duty as well as if they had been thus cemented to the governor? The gentleman from Queens has told us, that the sheriffs should not be appointed by the people, because the marshals of the different states are not appointed by the individual state where they have jurisdiction. The gentleman is well acquainted with the confederation of the United States, and the principles of government; but would the gentleman compare the counties in our state, with the states in the union as they respect the general government? Have we, then, fifty-twa independent republics in this state, all combined in one great confederated republic? Are people to be informed, that because the marshals of the different states are appointed by the president of the United States, the sheriffs in the different counties of this state must be appointed by the executive? The bo nourable gentleman from Oneida tells us, that if the sheriffs are elected, they will visit the sins of their pockets upon the people, which of all others are the most terrible to a man that is in debt-they will collect the seven phials of wrath into one great bottle, to pour out upon the heads of those who may oppose their election. Would he be any more likely to wreak his fury on those who opposed his election, than on those who might oppose his appointment by a council? I think not. It is proposed that the sheriff shall hold his office for a given time, and then be ineligible for a time, by which means he cannot turn his influence, while in office, to the purpose of a re-election.

The gentleman from Oneida is fearful that this method will stir up commotion at the elections; and I don't know but fighting, and every thing else that is direful.

The little commotion that would be excited, would be only that healthful excitement which warms and invigorates. It is necessary that there should be a little warmth and bustle occasionally, if it does not amount to boxing matches. It keeps the political blood in a genial circulation, and prevents it from running cold, and the heart from ceasing to palpitate. If your sheriff and clerk are elected by the people, they will feel a greater duty imposed on them, to discharge their office with fidelity. They will not be necessarily drawn into the political cabals at the seat of government. They will not be looking to party divisions, and sub-divisions, and waiting with painful anxiety to see which party is to predominate, that they may not be found in the minority, as the gentleman from New-York, (Mr. Edwards) has told us he was, in the assembly, there being but twenty-six of the party to which he belonged, and be had to wait three or four years before his party prevailed. They will look to the people for patronage, and I am unwilling to place them in such a situation, that when their political party may bappen to be the minority, they will be compelled to surrender all, and begin a warfare to build up a new party, and stand in confusion, wondering which way a political party will shape itself before they know which way to go. If they are elected by the people, they will know where to look for their support, and how to merit it.

I have no opinion of having sheriffs and clerks in the country, appointed aud removed at the will of individuals in great cities. In the county where I reside, there have been sheriffs and clerks that could not obtain a majority of votes in the county. The people were justly displeased, and I am anxious that they should be satisfied.

A division having been called for on the first part thereof, relating to sheriffs, the same was decided in the affirmative as follows:

AYES.-Messrs. Bacon, Baker, Barlow, Bowman, Briggs, Brooks, Burroughs, Carpenter, Carver, D. Clark, R. Clarke, Collins, Cramer, Day, Dubois, Duer, Dyckman, Edwards, Ferris, Fisher, Frost, Hees, Humphrey, Hunt, Hung

ter, Hunting, Huntington, Hurd, A. Livingston, M'Call, Moore, Park, Pitcher, Price, Pumpelly, Radcliff, Rhinelander, Richards, Root, Rose, Sage, N. Sanford, R. Sandford, Schenck, Seeley, Sharpe, Sheldon, I. Smith, R. Smith, Spencer, Stagg, Starkweather, Steele, D. Southerland, Swift, Sylvester, Tallmadge, Taylor, Townley, Townsend, Tuttle, Van Fleet, Van Horne, Van Ness, Ward, E. Webster, E. Williams, Woodward, Wooster, Young-71.

NOES.-Messrs. Beckwith, Birdseye, Breese, Brinkerhoff, Buel, Child, Eastwood, Fairlie, Hallock, Hogeboom, Howe, Jay, Jones, Kent, King, Lansing, P. R. Livingston, Munro, Nelson, Paulding, Platt, Porter, Reeve, Rockwell, Ross, Russell, Seaman, Ten Eyck, Van Buren, J. R. Van Rensselaer, Van Vechten, A. Webster, Wendover, Wheaton, N. Williams, Woods, Yates. -36.

The residue of the section relative to county clerks, was then taken and carried without a division.

Mr. Munro offered an amendment as follows: "But the county shall never be made surety for the sheriff, nor responsible for his acts." Carried.

GEN. ROOT then moved that the word "including" be stricken out of the 3d section, and the word "except," be inserted. Carried.

MR. N. WILLIAMS moved to insert the words "cities and" next preceding the word "counties", in reference to the offices of the sheriffs and clerks, and after some debate thereon, he modified the same by proposing to insert after the words county clerks, "the sheriff, register, and county clerk of the city of New-York."

But before any question was taken thereon, the committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again; and the Convention adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1821.

The Convention assembled as usual. Prayer by the Rev. DR. CHESTER' The minutes of yesterday were then read and approved.

THE APPOINTING POWER.

On motion of MR. N. SANFORD, the Convention resolved itself into a comwittee of the whole on the appointing power. Mr. Lawrence in the chair. MR. N. WILLIAMS. I had the honour to make a motion yesterday, to insert, after the words, "county clerks," the words, "the sheriff, register, and county clerk of the city and county of New-York; but really, sir, having no wish to embarrass the plans of the honourable gentlemen who represent the city of New-York for its municipal government; and much less to entail upon the citizens of New-York a principle that will prove so destructive, in my opinion, to its future peace and happiness, as well as to every part of the country where it is adopted, I will take the liberty of withdawing the motion.

MR. EDWARDS renewed the motion which the gentleman from Oneida had just withdrawn. Carried.

MR. TOMPKINS offered the following amendment :

"And the governor may remove any such sheriff, clerk, or register, at any time within the said three years for which the said sheriff, clerk, or register, shall be elected, giving to such sheriff, clerk, or register, a copy of the complaint or charge against him, and an opportunity of being heard in answer thereto before any decision or removal shall be made."

JUDGE VAN NESS said, he believed it was agreed on all hands, that it was necessary to have a power somewhere sufficient to remove sheriffs in case of incapacity to discharge the duties of that office with propriety; and in cases of mal-conduct; although a man might be worthy and well qualified, when he was appointed, he might. before his term expired, become bankrupt, or lose

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