2. Concealed Fraud, 121. 3. Payment on Account. a. What amounts to, 125. b. By and to Agents, Representatives, e. After Action, 139. d. Proof of, 139. 4. Agreements to Waive the Statute, 143. VIII. PLEADINGS AND PROCEDURE, 144. A. ACTIONS ON SIMPLE CON- By 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3, actions of account, and on the case (other than slander), actions of debt on lending, or contract without specialty, or for rent arrear, are to be brought within six years after the cause of action. By 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 3, actions of debt on an award (where the B. ACTIONS RELATING TO LAND AND submission is not by specialty), or for copyhold ACTIONS ON SPECIALTIES AND 1. CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTES AND SUB- II. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES TO PAR- 1. Landlord and Tenant. b. Lessees for Lives, 155. c. Lessees for Years, 156. d. Yearly Tenants, 161. e. Tenants at Will, 162. fines, or an escape, or money levied on a fi. fa., are also to be brought within six years. By 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3, actions of assault, battery, wounding, or imprisonment, are to be brought within four years; and actions on the case for words within two years. 1. CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF STATUTES. See also post, B, I., col. 148. Barring of Remedy, not Right.]—In actions for debts, the statute bars the remedy only, not 2. Joint Tenants and Tenants in Common, the debt. Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 413; 9 164. 3. Tenants for Life, 167. 4. Tenants in Tail, 170. 5. Remaindermen, 174. 6. Reversioners, 178. 7. Trustee and Cestui que Trust, 180. 8. Principal and Agent, 204. 9. Mortgagor and Mortgagee, 206. 10. Vendor and Purchaser, 228. 11. Executors, Administrators, Legatees and Heirs, 232. 12. Persons claiming under Lands and other Acts, 243. 13. Persons under Disabilities, 243. 14. Crown, 248. 1. Generally, 249. III. POSSESSION. 2. Consecutive, 256. 3. Adverse, 257. 4. Discontinuance of, 267. IV. ENTRY. 1. Right of, 269. 2. Effect of, 270. V. CHARGES ON LAND, 273. VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENT, 282. VII. COPYHOLD LAND, 300. VIII. ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY, 304. AND IX. CONCEALED FRAUD, 306. Devisees, Clauses L. J. (0.s.) K. B. 262. Wainford v. Barker, 1 Ld. Raym. 232. Spears v. Hartly, 3 Esp. 81. Where a foreign statute of limitations requires proceedings to be taken within a shorter period than that prescribed by the English statute, but like the English statute does not affect causes of action, but only the remedy in respect of them, a foreign judgment declaring that a claim is barred by the local statute of limitations is no bar to an action in this country for that same claim within the period prescribed by the English law. Harris v. Quine, 10 B. & S. 644; 38 L. J., Q. B. 331; L. R. 4 Q. B. 653; 20 L. T. 947; 17 W. R. 967. A firm of attorneys in the Isle of Man was retained by the defendant, in 1858, to conduct a suit in one of the Manx courts in which he was defendant. The suit was dismissed in April, 1861; in September, 1861, the plaintiff in the suit appealed to a superior court, and the attorneys continued to act for the defendant, and conducted the appeal on his behalf up to the 1st of October, 1862. By the Manx statute law an action on a simple contract brought in the temporal courts of the island must be commenced within three years of the accrual of the cause of action. The attorneys brought an action in one of the Manx courts more than three years after October, 1862, and the court decided that the action was barred by the statute. They afterwards commenced an action in this country in January, 1868, to which the defendant pleaded, first, the judgment of the Manx court, and, secondly, the English Statute of Limitations :Held, first, that, as the Manx statute barred the CHARITABLE remedy only, and did not extinguish the debt, the judgment of the Manx court was no bar; and, secondly, that, under the circumstances, there was a continuous employment of the attorneys, and that therefore none of the items X. JUDGMENT AND SPECIALTY DEBTS, 311. were barred by the statute. XI. ARREARS OF RENT AND INTEREST, 322. XII. PLEADINGS AND PROCEDURE, 331. Ib. Open Account.]-The Statute of Limitations is no plea in bar to an open account. Scudamore v. White, 1 Vern. 456. Equitable Assignee of Leaseholds.] — The | Where a note was payable after sight, with liability of, is by simple contract, and subject to the limitation of six years. Sanders v. Benson, 4 Beav. 350. "Three Months after Demand."] - In May, 1857, J. R. gave to R. R. a promissory note for payment of 150l. three months after demand, no interest being reserved. J. R. died in 1869, and R. R. in 1878. The note was in R. R.'s pos session at his death, and he had indorsed upon it receipts in November, 1857, and August, 1858, each for half a year's interest. It appeared that no other interest had ever been paid. J. R.'s estate being administered by the court, R. R.'s executor claimed to prove on the promissory note: Held, on appeal, that the admissions by the payee of the payment of interest were evidence of a demand having been made in 1857 so as to make the 1507. immediately payable, and that the Statute of Limitations was a bar to the claim. Rutherford, In re, Brown v. Rutherford, 49 L. J., Ch. 654; 14 Ch. D. 687; 43 L. T. 105; 28 W. R. 802—C. A. Semble, that apart from the Statute of Limitations the claim ought to have been rejected as a stale demand. Ib. "Five Years after Date."]-A promissory note given by a defendant to the plaintiff, payable five years after date, for value received, is evidence of an account stated, against which the statute does not commence running until the maturity of the note. Fryer v. Roe, 12 C. B. 437. "After Sight."]-The statute is no bar to an action on a note payable after sight, unless a presentation for payment six years before the action is proved. Holmes v. Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323; 11 R. R. 594. interest thereon, and the interest was duly paid for several years :-Held, that the note must be taken to have been acted upon, according to its form and tenor, and, therefore, that the presentment for sight must have been made before the interest was paid, and that the payment became due upon the note at the prescribed date after such presentment, and that the statute would begin to run from the time the payment so became due. Way v. Bassett, 5 Hare, 55; 15 L. J., Ch. 1; 10 Jur. 891. Payable at Future Period.]-Where a bill of exchange is drawn payable at a certain future period, for the amount of a sum of money lent by the payee to the drawer the time of drawing the bill, the payee may recover the money, although six years have elapsed since the time when the loan was advanced; the statute beginning to operate only from the time when the money was to be repaid, i.e. when the bill became due. Wittersheim v. Carlisle (Countess), 1 H. Bl. 631. Non-Acceptance.]-A holder of a bill of exchange, on non-acceptance, and protest, and notice thereon, has an immediate right of action against the drawer, and does not acquire a fresh right of action on the nonpayment of the bill when due, and the statute, therefore, runs against him from the former, and not from the Blank Bill.]-A defendant, in 1840, gave A. for value his acceptance in blank on a 58. stamp. A., in 1852, filled in his own name as drawer for 2007., at five months. The defendant being sued on the bill by an innocent indorsee for value, pleaded the statute :-Held, that the statute ran from the time the bill became due as filled up, and not from the time it would have become due if completed when it was accepted in blank, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Montague v. Perkins, 22 L. J., C. P. 187; 17 Jur. 557; 1 W. R. 437. latter period. Whitehead v. Walker, 9 M. & W. | of two bills of exchange, accepted by A., deceased, 506; 11 L. J., Ex. 168. and due and unpaid at the time of his death; and of the costs and expenses incurred by the plaintiff as administrator of A. down to the time when the grant of administration was revoked; and that the amount of the bills due to the plaintiff as a creditor of A., and of the plaintiff's expenses as administrator, might be paid out of A.'s personal estate. It appeared that A. had no real estate. The expenses, &c., consisted nearly altogether of the plaintiff's costs in a cause instituted by him as administrator in 1838, for discovery of assets, which, after issue joined and publication passed, was frustrated by the present defendants, who were also defendants in that cause, and who, being A.'s next of kin, and in possession of his assets, for the purpose of avoiding a decree, lodged in the Prerogative Court the will of A., which they had previously suppressed, and procured a revocation of the grant of administration to the plaintiff, and a new grant to themselves cum testamento annexo. They now pleaded the Statute of Limitations as to the bills of exchange :-Held, that the plea should be allowed, as the plaintiff did not appear to have been under disability, and had not proceeded for his demand within six years after the right of action accrued. Howlett v. Lambert, 2. Ir. Eq. R. 254. Dishonour of.]-K. being indebted to the plaintiff and to the defendant, and also to a banking company, it was agreed between all the parties that, to secure K.'s debt to the company, the defendant should draw upon K. three bills of exchange, payable to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff should indorse them to the company. The bills became due in 1843, and were dishonoured. In 1847 the company sued the plaintiff on the bills, and the plaintiff, in 1851, paid the amount-Held, that the plaintiff was barred by the statute from suing the defendant as drawer. Webster v. Kirk, 17 Q. B. 944; 21 L. J., Q. B. 159; 16 Jur. 247. Presentment and Dishonour of Delay.] -B. was possessed of considerable funds invested in consols. In consequence of doubts having arisen as to whether B. was married or not, her bankers refused to receive and pay the dividends on those funds to her until they were satisfied of the fact of her not being married. In August, 1872, in order to raise money, B., who was living in France, drew a document purporting to be a bill of exchange, payable on demand, for 7,000l. in the Bank of England " on account. of the dividends and interest due on the capital and dividends registered in the books of" the Bank of England. B. had no account with the bank. The document was in April, 1873, indorsed to G., with whom B. was living, and by him was indorsed in August, 1876, to the claimant. These indorsements purported to be for value, and the claimant, who was not cross-examined, deposed that the indorsement to him had been made to guarantee the payment of loans and advances made by him. B. died intestate in France in 1878. On the 2nd February, 1884, the document was presented on behalf of the claimant to the Bank of England, and on payment being refused it was duly protested. A claim in respect of the amount due under the document was made upon B.'s estate, which was being administered by the court-Held, that the claim was not barred by the Statute of Limitations, as the time only began to run from the presentment and dishonour, but that G. had no right to deal with the bill, and that the lapse of time between the indorsement to G. and that to the claimant, and before presentment, and other circumstances of suspicion, were such as to affect the claimant with the equities between B. and G., and to disentitle him to receive payment. Boyse, In re, Crofton v. Crofton, 56 L. J., Ch. 135; 33 Ch. D. 612; 55 L. T. 391; 35 W. R. 247. Action against Administrator of Acceptor.]—Where the bill prayed an account on foot In case of Bill accepted after Death of Payee, Time runs only after Letters of Administration granted.]-See Murray v. E. India Co., col. 49. Action for not Accepting.]-The Statute of Limitations, in an action by drawer against drawee for not accepting, does not begin to run from the time of refusal to accept or pay the bill, but from the time when the plaintiff sustainsany damage from the breach of the implied promise to indemnify him. Huntley v. Sanderson, 1 C. & M. 489; 3 Tyr. 469; 2 L. J., Ex. 204. On Contract to indemnify Accommodation Acceptor.]-See Reynolds v. Doyle, col. 9. When Acceptor of Foreign Bill is here when Bill due, Time runs from then.]-See Don v. Lippmann, col. 38. Undated Cheque.]-An undated cheque was given by C. B. to A. J. P. in March, 1878, and accepted by the latter in discharge of a larger sum. C. B. went abroad in March, 1878, and died there in 1884. At the time of drawing the cheque C. B. had not sufficient moneys at his bank to meet it, and was negotiating a loan, which he expected shortly to complete, out of which the cheque would be paid. The loan was not completed. A. J. P. was informed of that fact. The cheque remained undated, and was never presented for payment. In 1885 A. J. P. commenced proceedings upon the cheque :Held, that the Statute of Limitations barred the claim, as the six years began to run when the letter was received stating that the loan would not be completed, and had long since elapsed. Bethell, In re, Bethell v. Bethell, 56 L. J., Ch. 334; 34 Ch. D. 561; 56 L. T. 92; 35 W. R. 330. Money Lent in Form of Cheque.]-The plaintiff, in pursuance of an agreement to lend money to the defendant, sent him a cheque on the 14th |