"If at any time the public safety should the suspension of the powers vested by this the Courts of the United States, it is for the lature to say so. That question depends on cal considerations, on which the Legislature decide. Until the Legislative will be exp this Court can only see its duty, and must ob law."

I can add nothing to these clear and em words of my great predecessor.

But the documents before me show that the tary authority in this case has gone far beyon mere suspension of the privilege of the Writ beas corpus. It has, by force of arms, thrust the judicial authorities and officers to who Constitution has confided the power and duty terpreting and administering the laws, and sub ted a military government in its place, to be ministered and executed by military officers at the time these proceedings were had ag John Merryman, the District Judge of Mary the Commissioner appointed under the act of gress, the District Attorney, and the Marshal resided in the city of Baltimore, a few miles from the home of the prisoner. Up to that there had never been the slightest resistance or struction to the process of any Court or jud officer of the United States in Maryland, except the military authority.

And if a military officer, or any other person, reason to believe that the prisoner had commi any offense against the laws of the United Sta it was his duty to give information of the fact the evidence to support it, to the District Attorn and it would then have become the duty of t

officer to bring the matter before the District Judge or Commissioner, and if there was sufficient legal evidence to justify his arrest, the Judge or Commissioner would have issued his warrant to the Marshal to arrest him; and upon the hearing of the party would have held him to bail, or committed him for trial, according to the character of the offense as it appeared in the testimony, or would have discharged him immediately, if there was not sufficient evidence to support the accusation. There was no danger of any obstruction or resistance to the action of the civil authorities, and therefore, no reason whatever for the interposition of the military.

And yet, under these circumstances, a military officer stationed in Pennsylvania, without giving any information to the District Attorney; and without any application to the judicial authorities, assumes to himself the judicial power in the District of Maryland; undertakes to decide what constitutes the crime of treason or rebellion; what evidence (if indeed, he required any) is sufficient to support the accusation and justify the commitment; and commits the party, without having a hearing, even before himself, to close custody in a strongly garrisoned fort, to be there held, it would seem, during the pleasure of those who committed him.

The Constitution provides, as I have before said, that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." It declares that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." It provides that the party accused shall be entitled to speedy trial in a Court of justice.

And these great and fundamental laws, which Congress, itself, could not suspend, have been disregarded and suspended, like the Writ of habeas corpus, by a military order, supported by force of arms. Such is the case now before me, and I can only say that if the authority which the Constitution has confided to the judiciary department and udicial officers may thus, upon any pretext or under any circumstances, be usurped by the military power at its discretion, the people of the United States are no longer living under a government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he may happen to be found.

In such a case my duty was too plain to be mistaken. I have exercised all the power which the Constitution and laws confer on me, but that power had been resisted by a force too strong for me to overcome. It is possible that the officer who has incurred this grave responsibility may have misunderstood his instructions, and exceeded the authority intended to be given him. I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case, with my opinion, to be filed and recorded in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland, and direct the Clerk to transmit a copy, under seal, to the President of the United States. It will then remain for that high officer in fulfilment of his constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected and enforced. R. B. TANEY,

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, U. S.

OTHER AUTHORITIES AND PROOFS TO SHOW THAT THE RIGHTFUL POWER IS NOT IN THE PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, OR TO ARREST A CITIZEN OTHERWISE THAN AS THE LAWS PRESCRIBE.

UNDER ordinary circumstances it would not be necessary to add any weight to the decision of the Chief Justice of the United States in a question between him and Abraham Lincoln involving a principle of constitutional law, but as unfortunately the American public mind is as much if not more affected in these times by the mere acts of will of the President as it is by the judgment of a learned, enlightened and illustrious jurist, I have thought it becoming the object in view to add the weight of historical facts, and the opinions of other eminent jurists, to the decision of Judge Taney.

English authorities, legal and historical, Blackstone and Hallam have been quoted by the Chief Justice in support of his decision. Other British

authorities might be cited confirming the same views and doctrines, but I will content myself with stating a fact which is in itself proof incontrovertible that even in Great Britain where the prerogatives of the crown are certainly more extensive in relation to the liberties of the subject than the Con

stitutional authority of the President is over citizens of the United States, it is not conceded to be the right of the crown to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and during the long period of time intervening between the dethronement and execution of Charles the First and the present day, no British monarch has dared to assume the prerogative of power which has been arrogantly and defiantly seized and exercised by Abraham Lincoln and subordinates under his command. During the period referred to England and Ireland were convulsed on several occasions with insurrections and rebellion; yet it was only when Parliament thought it proper to be done that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended. This fact is both significant of the sacred regard entertained both in the public mind of Great Britain for the sanctity of private rights, and of the respect which the British crown is obliged to pay to these constitutionally recognized rights of British subjects.

The history of the Writ of habeas corpus in our own country dates properly for its origin in the Convention which formed the Constitution of the United States.

This Convention met in May, 1787, in Philadelphia. On the 29th of May, Mr. Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, laid before the House a draft of a plan of a Federal Constitution, the VIth Article of which provided, "The Legislature of the United States shall pass no law on the subject of religion, nor touching or abridging the liberty of the press; nor shall the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ever be suspended, except in the case of rebellion or invasion.'

On the 6th of August the Committee of Detail, consisting of Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wilson, reported a draft of a Constitu