defendant in error may have it docketed and dismissed upon producing a certificate from the clerk of the court wherein the judgment or decree was entered, stating the cause and certifying that such writ of error or appeal was duly sued out and allowed. Under these rules it has been decided that the names of the parties must be stated in full, and it is not sufficient to say Holliday et al. v. Batson et al. The certificate must also state specifically the day of the entry of the judgment or the decree, and it is not enough that the term is given, because the term may not have ended thirty days before the term of the supreme court commenced. The appellee may also file the record of the court below, and move to dismiss the appeal, when the record is not filed by the appellant. The rule of the court in relation to the time in which the appellant must file the record, is peremptory, and "can in no respect depend upon the convenience of the clerks of the inferior courts." 4

There can be no appeal without security to prosecute the same, and for costs or the like, under the statute in some cases, and as the court may direct in others. But so far as all this is within the discretion of the court, it belongs exclusively · to the court below, and the appellate court will not interfere with it.5

Whenever an appeal case is heard and decided, and a mandate goes down to the court below to carry the decree into effect, there may be an appeal from that court on the execution of that mandate; because it is necessary that the appellate court should

1 Holliday v. Batson, 4 How. 645; Smith v. Clark, 12 How. 21.

2 Rhodes v. Steamship Galveston, 10 How. 144.

3 United States v. Fremont, 18 How. 30.

4 Sturgess v. Harrold, 18 How. 40. The counsel for the appellants in this case applied for an extension of time under the 63d rule, and presented a certificate of the clerk of the circuit court to the effect that he could not consistently with the other duties of his office make out and have ready the transcripts of the records and proceedings within the time specified. The court refused to grant the motion.

5 Stat. of 1789, ch. 20, § 22; Stat. of 1803, ch. 40, § 2; The Dos Hermanos, 10 Wheat. 306. It was held in this case that if the appeal was prayed for and allowed within five years it was valid, although security was not given until after the lapse of five years, and that the mode of taking the security and the time of perfecting it were within the discretionary power of the court below. But this rule does not apply to a case where the appeal is to operate as a supersedeas, for in such a case the appeal bond must be filed within ten days after the rendition of the decree. Adams v. Law, 16 How. 144.

have the power of securing the due execution of their decree.1 But on such appeal, nothing prior to the mandate comes before the appellate court as a question by itself. And, therefore, after a case is sent back to the circuit court, the objection cannot be taken on a second appeal that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in the first instance from the circuit court, on the ground that the decree in that court was not a final one.2 But all the prior proceedings, documents, and evidence, are in the hands of the appellate court, for the purpose of deciding accurately any questions which may arise subsequently to the mandate. If there be a general decree of restitution in the Supreme Court of the United States, no party can set up new claims or new liens in the court below, even if they would have been allowed had they been asserted before the original decree.+ So if interest be not mentioned in the decree, none will be allowed.5

1 Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch, 313; Boyce v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275. In Sibbald v. The United States, 12 Pet. 488, 492, the court said: "The inferior court is bound by the decree as the law of the case; and must carry it into execution, according to the mandate. They cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution, or give any other or further relief; or review it upon any matter decided on appeal for error apparent; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded. . . . . If the special mandate is not obeyed or executed, then the general power given to all the courts of the United States to issue any writs which are necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law;' by the 14th section of the judiciary act; fairly arises, and a mandamus, or other appropriate writ will go." In United States v. Fremont, 18 How. 30, an appeal was dismissed on the ground that it was not entered in the supreme court in time, and also on the ground that as the inferior court having taken no action in the case, except to enter the mandate on its records, there was nothing to appeal from. 2 Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413; Whyte v. Gibbes, 20 How.

541.

3 The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431. A decree for general restitution of property had been made in this case. It appeared on the face of the proceedings that the property had been appraised at its value, including the duties to the United States by the claimant, and a stipulation for the amount given. It was held that the decree awarded only the value of the property to the libellant, and that the claimant was entitled to deduct the duties.

4 The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431.

5 Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch, 313. The decree of the supreme court in this case said nothing about interest. The property in dispute had been sold, and the court said: "If this money remains in possession of the court, it carries no interest; if it be in the hands of an individual, it may bear interest, or otherwise, as the court shall direct." See also, The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431; Boyce v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275; Hemmenway v. Fisher, 20 How. 255.

If a bond be given in the district court conditional to pay or do a certain thing in case of condemnation in that court and there be an appeal to the circuit court and condemnation there, it has the same effect to forfeit the bond.1

SECTION V.

OF JURISDICTION IN CASES OF SEIZURES.

The district court is the primary court of revenue, having original jurisdiction in all cases of seizures under the statutes of the United States concerning imposts, navigation, or trade; it may try all questions and entertain all suits, either for the condemnation or acquittal of the property seized: and may decree restoration and compel delivery of the property or of its proceeds or value, into the possession of those whom it finds ultimately to be entitled thereto;2 and may do this as well by suinmary decree or decretal order, if the case be already before the court, as upon original proceedings.

It does not derive its jurisdiction from any possession, actual or supposed, of its officers, but from the act and the place of the seizure for the forfeiture; and if it once acquire jurisdiction, it seems that this is not avoided by any subsequent irregularity.3

1 United States v. Four Part Pieces of Woollen Cloth, 1 Paine, C. C. 435. See also, United States v. Schooner Little Charles, 1 Brock. C. C. 380.

2 The Abby, 1 Mason, 360.

3 Sch. Bolina and Cargo, 1 Gallis. 75. On page 81, Story, J., said: "In the admiralty, in all proceedings in rem, the court has a right to order the thing to be taken into the custody of the law, and it is presumed to be in the custody of the law, unless the contrary appears; and when once a vessel is libelled, then she is considered as in the custody of the law, and at the disposal of the court; and monitions may be issued to persons having the actual custody, to obey the injunctions of the court. The jurisdiction of the admiralty, however, is not founded on that circumstance."

And on page 83, "The District Court of the United States derives its jurisdiction, not from any supposed possession of its officers, but from the act and place of seizure for the forfeiture. Act, 24th September, 1789, ch. 20. And when once it has acquired a regular jurisdiction, I do not perceive how any subsequent irregularity would avoid it. It may render the ultimate decree ineffectual in certain events, but the regular results of the adjudication must remain. I do not apprehend that an accidental de

The court of the district in which the seizure is first made (without regard to the place where the forfeiture occurs), has exclusive original cognizance of it;1 and if the property be carried into another district, the circuit court will remand the property to the district in which it was originally seized.2 But if the seizure be made upon the high seas, or within the territory of a foreign power, that court has cognizance of it, into which court, or the district of which court, it is finally carried. If the seizure is on land, the court proceeds as a court of common law, with a jury, and the general course of the English Exchequer upon informations in rem is followed.5

These two jurisdictions, admiralty and common law, though vested in one court, are perfectly distinct and independent, and cannot be blended together. But if the seizures be upon waters,

struction by fire, would prevent the court from protecting its officers from prosecution by pronouncing, if just, a regular condemnation."

In the case of Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch, 2, the principles of admiralty law, as to the jurisdiction of the court over the property, were fully laid down by Marshall, C. J. The privateer Addition, cruising under a commission during the war with Great Britain, captured the Sloop George and libelled her in the court of admiralty for New Jersey, where she was condemned and decreed to be sold. The claimant, Jennings, appealed, and the decree was reversed by the circuit court. Pending the appeal the vessel was sold; and Jennings brought a suit against the captors as wrongdoers. The court held, that the moment a vessel was libelled, it was in the custody of the law, not of the captors, and that the court of admiralty, having possession of the property, had an undoubted right to sell it for the benefit of the parties. The law on these two points, was ably examined under the principles then acknowledged (1807), and the conclusions there laid down appear to be now well settled.

....

In regard to the question of irregularity in the record and in the manner of sale, the court said, in Jennings v. Carson, "At any rate, the court of admiralty must be supposed to have done its duty, and to have been in possession of the thing in contest, if its duty required that possession. . . . . The George and her cargo, therefore, must be considered as being in custody of the law, unless the contrary appears. If this conclusion be right, it follows that the regularity of the sale, is a question of no importance to the defendants, since that sale was the act of a court having legal possession of the thing, and acting on its own authority."

1 Keene v. United States, 5 Cranch, 304.

2 The Abby, 1 Mason, 360, per Story, J.

8 The Abby, 1 Mason, 360.

4 The ship Richmond v. United States, 9 Cranch, 102; The Merino, 9 Wheat. 391. 5 United States v. Fourteen Packages of Pins, Gilpin, 235; 651 Chests of Tea v. United States, 1 Paine, C. C. 499, 504; The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391.

6 In The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391, Marshall, C. J., after stating the case, proceeded as follows: "By the act constituting the judicial system of the United States, the district courts are courts both of common law and admiralty jurisdiction. In the trial of

navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, this court had admiralty jurisdiction by the statute by libel with. out jury.1

all cases of seizure on land, the court sits as a court of common law. In cases of seizure made on waters navigable by vessels of ten tons burden and upwards, the court sits as a court of admiralty. In all cases at common law, the trial must be by jury. In cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it has been settled in the cases of United States v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; United States v. Sch. Sally, 2 Cranch, 406; and United States v. The Betsey and Charlotte, 4 Cranch, 443; that the trial is to be by the court. Although the two jurisdictions are vested in the same tribunal, they are as distinct from each other as if they were vested in different tribunals, and can no more be blended, than a court of chancery with a court of common law. The court for the Louisiana district was sitting as a court of admiralty; and when it was shown that the seizure was made on land, its jurisdiction ceased. The libel ought to have been dismissed, or amended by charging that the seizure was made on land. The direction of a jury in a case where the libel charged a seizure on water was irregular; and any proceeding of the court, as a court of admiralty, after the fact that the seizure was made on land appeared, would have been a proceeding without jurisdiction. The court felt some disposition to consider this empanelling of a jury at the instance of the claimants, as amounting to a consent that the libel should stand amended; but on reflection, that idea was rejected. If this is considered as a case at common law, it would be necessary to dismiss this appeal; because the judgment could not be brought before this court but by writ of error. If it is considered as a case of admiralty jurisdiction, the sentence ought to be reversed, because it could not be pronounced by a court of admiralty, on a seizure made on land. As the libel charges a seizure on water, it is thought most advisable to reverse all the proceedings to the libel, and to remand the cause to the district court for farther proceedings, with directions to permit the libel to be amended."

In 1828, the same case came on to be heard again, under the name of United States v. 422 Casks of Wine, 1 Pet. 547, judgment having been rendered in the court below in favor of the claimants. The appeal was made, on the ground that the original claimants, Hazard & Williams, were not the real owners of the wine under seizure. The court held, that it was too late for this ground to be taken, because it should have been taken before the trial in the court below. The court said: "The objection is founded upon a mistaken view of the time, nature, and order of the proceedings proper in suits in rem, whether arising on the admiralty or exchequer side of the court. In such suits, the claimant is an actor and entitled to come before the court in that character only, in virtue of his proprietary interest in the thing in controversy; this alone gives him a persona standi in judicio. It is necessary that he should establish his right to that character, as a preliminary to his admission as a party ad litem, capable of sustaining the litigation. He is, therefore, in the regular and proper course of practice, required, in the first instance, to put in his claim upon oath, averring in positive terms, his proprietary interest. If he refuses so to do, it is a sufficient reason for a rejection of his claim. If the claim be made through the intervention of an agent, the agent is, in like manner, required to make oath to his belief of the verity of the claim, and, if necessary, he may also be required to produce and prove his authority, before he can be admitted to put in the claim. If this is not done, it furnishes matter of exception, and may be insisted upon by the adverse party, for the dismissal of the claim. If

1 The Margaret, 9 Wheat. 421.