the purchase price partly in cash and partly in first mortgage bonds of the debtor and execution and delivery of a deed to the purchaser, a nominee of respondents. It appears not only that the respondents were parties to the 77B proceeding but that, prior to the consummation of the sale, the state court was fully advised of the steps taken in the federal courts and of the pendency of the petition for certiorari in this court to review the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal.

The respondents went forward with the proceedings in the state court, looking to a sale of the debtor's property, with full knowledge that a rehearing might be granted and that the order entered thereon might be appealed. They are not entitled, therefore, to rely on any status acquired in the state court suit as precluding further consideration of the petition for reorganization. The motion must accordingly be overruled.

2. The petitioner asserts that the grant or refusal of a rehearing rested in the sound discretion of the District Court, and since in the proper exercise of that discretion the court entertained the application and reheard the case upon the merits, its action again dismissing the petition for reorganization was a final order and the appeal therefrom was timely. The respondents contend that the first order of dismissal having terminated the cause, and the thirty days allowed by the bankruptcy act for appeal from the order having expired, the District Court was without power to entertain a petition for rehearing and its second order of dismissal was a nullity. Wherefore, they say, the appeal taken more than thirty days from the date of the original order of March 2, 1936, if considered as challenging that order, was out of time, and the motion to dismiss was properly granted by the Circuit Court of Appeals. We hold the petitioner's position is sound and the appeal should have been entrtained.

Opinion of the Court.

300 U.S.

8

Though a court of bankruptcy sits continuously and has no terms,” respondents urge that, as courts of bankruptcy are courts of equity, the rules applicable to the rehearing of a suit in equity should be applied in bankruptcy cases, and as it appears the term of the District Court expired April 20, 1936, the court had lost its power to disturb the order of March 2nd. A court of equity may grant a rehearing, and vacate, alter, or amend its decree, after an appeal has been perfected and after the time for appeal has expired, but not after expiration of the term at which the decree was entered. It is true the bankruptcy court applies the doctrines of equity, but the fact that such a court has no terms, and sits continuously, renders inapplicable the rules with respect to the want of power in a court of equity to vacate a decree after the term at which it was entered has ended.

In the alternative the respondents argue that where, as here, an adjudication is refused, and the case is retired from the docket, the requirement that an appeal shall be perfected within thirty days from the order of dismissal deprives the court of power to reinstate and rehear the cause after the expiration of the time limited for appeal. They insist that the act contemplates the speedy disposition of causes in bankruptcy and therefore fixes a brief period for appealing from orders therein. To permit the court to rehear a cause after the time for appeal has expired, and to enter a fresh order which is appealable, would, they urge, tend unduly to extend the proceedings, create uncertainty as to the rights of the debtor and creditors, and ignore the intent of Congress.

? Sandusky v. National Bank, 23 Wall. 289, 293; In re Lemmon & Gale Co., 112 Fed. 296, 300; Freed v. Central Trust Co., 215 Fed. 873, 876; In re Rochester Sanitarium & Baths Co., 222 Fed. 22, 26.

* Equity Rule 69; Aspen Mining Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 31, 36; Voorhees y. Noye Mfg.Co., 151 U.S. 135; Zimmern v. United States, 298 U. S. 167.

8

But we think the court has the power, for good reason, to revise its judgments upon seasonable application and before rights have vested on the faith of its action. Courts of law and equity have such power, limited by the expiration of the term at which the judgment or decree was entered and not by the period allowed for appeal or by the fact that an appeal has been perfected.” There is no controlling reason for denying a similar power to a court of bankruptcy or for limiting its exercise to the period allowed for appeal. The granting of a rehearing is within the court's sound discretion, and a refusal to entertain a motion therefor, or the refusal of the motion, if entertained, is not the subject of appeal.10 A defeated party who applies for a rehearing and does not appeal from the judgment or decree within the time limited for so doing, takes the risk that he may lose his right of appeal, as the application for rehearing, if the court refuse to entertain it, does not extend the time for appeal." Where it appears that a rehearing has been granted only for that purpose the appeal must be dismissed. The court below evidently thought the case fell within this class. On the contrary, the rule which governs the case is that the bankruptcy court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, if no intervening rights will be prejudiced by its action, may grant a rehearing upon application diligently made and rehear the case upon the merits; and even though it reaffirm its former action and

11

9

10

• United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55; United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304; and cases cited in Note 8.

Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 238; Steines v. Franklin County, 14 Wall. 15; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756; Boesch v. Gräfj, 133 U.S. 697; San Pedro Co. v. United States, 146 U. S. 120.

11 Roemer v. Bernheim, 132 U. S. 103, 106; Morse v. United States, 270 U. S. 151, 154; Clarke v. Hot Springs Elec. L. & P. Co., 76 F. (20) 918, 921.

12 In re Stearns & White Co., 295 Fed. 833; Bonner v. Potterf, 47 F. (2d) 852, 855; United States v. East, 80 F. (2d) 134, 135.

Opinion of the Court.

300 U.S.

refuse to enter a decree different from the original one, the order entered upon rehearing is appealable and the time for appeal runs from its entry.13 The District Court's action conformed to these conditions. Two days after the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for allowance of appeal from the original order of March 2, 1936, petitioner notified respondents of its intention to apply for rehearing. Prompt application was made and the cause was promptly heard. A supplemental petition was presented and entered upon the files by leave of court. The original, the amended, and the supplemental petitions were considered upon the merits, and the court made findings and announced conclusions of law with respect thereto. There is no indication that the petition for rehearing was not made in good faith or that the court received it for the purpose of extending petitioner's time for appeal. The court found that no rights had intervened which would render it inequitable to reconsider the merits. There was no abuse of sound discretion in granting the motion and reconsidering the cause.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion.

Syllabus.

ISBRANDTSEN-MOLLER CO., INC. v. UNITED

STATES ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 307. Argued January 15, 1937.—Decided February 1, 1937.

1. An order of the Secretary of Commerce requiring a steamship

company to file a copy or summary of its books and records for a specified period, which should show each commodity carried from the United States to a foreign country, with point of shipment, point of destination, and rate charged or collected, the effective date of the rate, and trans-shipment and terminal charges and rules affecting rates or value of the service rendered, held

within the purview of 8 21 of the Shipping Act of 1916. P. 144. 2. An administrative order justified by a lawful purpose is not ren

dered illegal by the existence of another motive in the mind of

the officer issuing it. P. 145. 3. An order not calling for the production, or demanding an inspec

tion, of books or documents, but calling for a copy or a summary,