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pany. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
A. G. Ellick, of Omaha, Neb. (Edson Rich, of Omaha, Neb., on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
William F. Gurley and David A. Fitch, both of Omaha, Neb., for defendant in error.
Before SANBORN, CARLAND, and STONE, Circuit Judges.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff below, Mr. Marone, recovered a judgment against his master, Union Pacific Railroad Company, for an injury to his eye, which he claimed was caused by the negligence of the company, and the company insists that the trial court erred, in that it failed to direct a verdict in its favor at the close of the trial. These were the facts: Marone was and had been for some time working for the company as a section man under John Anderson, the foreman of his gang. The company had made and put in force a rule that, “When cutting rails with a track chisel, those doing this work must wear goggles provided for that purpose," and had provided suitable goggles, and they were in the toolhouse at Omaha where the accident happened. The company had also provided suitable saws with which to cut rails. There was testimony that the ordinary custom and practice of railroad companies was to cut such rails as the plaintiff was cutting at the time of the accident with saws, and on the other hand there was testimony that the usual custom was to cut them with a sledge hammer or a maul and a chisel, and for the purpose of this decision the former testimony must prevail. A short time before the day of the accident, while Marone was cutting a rail with a sledge hammer and chisel, a piece of steel was chipped off, and it struck him in the wrist. In the afternoon of July 7, 1916, before the accident which happened on that day, the foreman, Anderson, directed Marone and two other members of his gang to cut some rails with a sledge hammer and chisel. Marone told him he wanted something to protect his eyes, because he was scared the other day when he received the piece of steel in his wrist. Anderson answered, "Go on; that's all right; we never use them.” Marone testified he went on “because he was scared to lose his job,” and while he was swinging the sledge hammer to cut the rail with the chisel the piece of steel was chipped off and driven into his eye. Did these facts present any substantial evidence of negligence of the company which caused the injury to the plaintiff?
 1. The liability of a master for the personal injuries of his servants is a question of general law; and, in the absence of a state statute, it is not governed in the federal courts by the decisions of the courts of the states, but by the common law and the rules established by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of the other federal courts. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 370, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed. 772; Gardner v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 150 U. S. 349, 358, 14 Sup. Ct. 140, 37 L Ed. 1107; Beutler v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 224 U. S. 85, 32 Sup. Ct. 402, 56 L. Ed. 679; Brooks v. Central Sainte Jeanne, 228 U. S. 688, 694, 33 Sup. Ct. 700, 57 L Ed. 1025; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 367, 368, 21 L. Ed. 627; Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213, 226, 25 L. Ed. 612; Myrick v. Michigan Central Ry. Co., 107 U. S. 102, 109, 1 Sup. Ct. 425, 27 L. Ed. 325; Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 106, 13 Sup. Ct. 261, 37 L. Ed. 97; Newport News & M. V. Co. v. Howe, 52 Fed. 362, 3 C. C. A. 121; Kinnear Mfg. Co. v. Carlisle, 152 Fed. 933, 936, 82 C. C. A. 81, 84, Illinois Central R. Co. v. Hart, 176 Fed. 245, 251, 100 C. C. A. 49, 55, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117; Tweeten v. Tacoma Railway & Power Co., 210 Fed. 828, 831, 127 C. C. A. 378, 381.
12-4] 2. Negligence is a breach of duty, and where there is no duty or no breach thereof there is no negligence.
The duty of the master is one of provision. The duty of the servant is one of operation, and neither is liable for the negligence of the other. It is the duty of the master to exercise reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place in which, and reasonably safe machinery or appliances with which, the servants may do the work assigned to them, and for causal negligence in the discharge of this duty the master is liable and the servants are not. It is the duty of the servants to exercise reasonable care so to use the place, machinery, and appliances furnished, so to conduct the operations intrusted to them, as to protect themselves from risk, danger, and injury, and for a breach of this duty the servants are liable and the master is not. Where the place in which the servant is required to work, or the machinery or appliances with which he is required to work, or the method of doing the work, is made or becomes dangerous and results in injury only because of the negligence of the injured employé, or because of the negligence of his fellow servants, or because of the concurring negligence of both, the master is not liable, for such negligence is a breach of the duty of operation and not a breach of the duty of provision. Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 375, 10 Sup. Ct. 397, 33 L. Ed. 656; Central Railroad Co. v. Keegan, 160 U. S. 259, 262, 264, 267, 16 Sup. Ct. 269, 40 L. Ed. 418; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Charless, 162 U. S. 359, 361, 363, 364, 365, 16 Sup. Ct. 848, 40 L. Ed. 999; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346, 349, 358, 16 Sup. Ct. 843, 40 L. Ed. 994; Alaska Mining Co. v. Whelan, 168 U. S. 86, 89, 18 Sup. Ct. 40, 42 L. Ed. 390; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 194 U. S. 338, 339, 346, 347, 24 Sup. Ct. 683, 48 L. Ed. 1006; Martin v. Atchison, Topeka & S. F. Ry. Co., 166 U. S. 399, 401, 403, 17 Sup. Ct. 603, 41 L. Ed. 1051; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bourman, 212 U. S. 536, 539, 541, 29 Sup. Ct. 319, 53 L. Ed. 641; Beutler v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 224 U. S. 85, 88, 32 Sup. Ct. 402, 56 L. Ed. 679; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Needham, 63 Fed. 107, 11 C. C. A. 56, 25 L. R. A. 833; Brady v. Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co., 114 Fed. 100, 103, 52 C. C. A. 48, 51, 57 L. R. A. 712; Pennsylvania Co. v. Fishback, 123 Fed. 465, 467, 59 C. C. A. 269, 271; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Éd. 772; Howard v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. (C. C.) 26 Fed. 837; Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U. S. 349, 14 Sup. Ct. 983, 38 L. Ed. 1009; Grady v. Southern Ry. Co., 92 Fed. 491, 34 C. C. A. 494; Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S.
313, 318, 4 Sup. Ct. 433, 28 L. Ed. 440; City of Minneapolis v. Lun-
The case of Kreigh v. Westinghouse & Co., 214 U. S. 249, 254–258,
“We think that upon this branch of the case it was a question for the jury
In the earlier part of the opinion it declared the law applicable to
“The employé is not obliged to examine into the employer's methods of
imposed upon the master, and he cannot delegate it to another and escape liability on his part, nevertheless, the master is not held responsible for injuries resulting from the place becoming unsafe though the negligence of the workmen in the manner of carrying on the work, where he, the master, has discharged his primary duty of providing a reasonably safe appliance and place for his employés to carry on the work, nor is he obliged to keep the place safe at every moment, so far as such safety depends on the due performance of the work by the servant and his fellow workmen. Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 313 [4 Sup. Ct. 433, 28 L Ed. 440]; Perry v. Rogers, 157 N. Y. 251 (51 N. E. 1021)."
Other illustrations of this rule are numerous. A servant was injured by the failure of a porter and a carpenter of a steamship company securely to replace a portion of a railing on a ship which had been temporarily removed, and the stewardess fell into the water (Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 375, 10 Sup. Ct. 397, 33 L. Ed. 656); by a reckless order of the foreman of a railroad gang and his failure to discharge his duty to be in his place on the rear car (Central R. R. Co. v. Keegan, 160 U. S. 259, 262, 264, 267, 16 Sup. Ct. 269, 40 L. Ed. 418); by the careless act of a section foreman in running a hand car to the serious injury of one of his Pacific R. R. Co. v. Charless, 162 U. S. 359, 361, 363–365, 16 Sup. Ct. 848, 40 L. Ed. 999); by the negligent act of the foreman in stopping his hand car suddenly without warning (Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346, 349, 358, 16 Sup. Ct. 843, 40 L. Ed. 994); by the negligent order of the foreman in charge of the work to open the gate of a chute without warning to one of his gang, whereby the latter and the rocks upon which he was working were carried through the chute (Alaska Mining Co. v. Whelan, 168 U. S. 86, 89, 18 Sup. Ct. 40, 42 L. Ed. 390); by the negligent act of a local telegraph operator in giving false information to the train despatcher, whereby a fireman and an engineer lost their lives by reason of a collision (Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 194 U. S. 338, 339, 346, 347, 24 Sup. Ct. 683, 48 L. Ed. 1006); by the failure of a section foreman to look out for an approaching train, by his order to his workmen to look away from the train, his promise to warn them of its approach, and his failure to give the warning (Martin v. Atchison, Topeka & S. F. Ry. Co., 166 U. S. 399, 401, 403, 17 Sup. Ct. 603, 41 L. Ed. 1051); by the order of the section foreman directing one of his gang to jump off a moving train, and the reckless jerking of the train by the engineer (Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bourman, 212 U. S. 536, 539, 541, 29 Sup. Ct. 319, 53 L. Ed. 641); by the negligent act of the switching crew of a railroad company in running a car for repair into the special yard, where a repairer in the employ of the company was working upon another car, whereby he was killed (Beutler v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 224 U. S. 85, 88, 32 Sup. Ct. 402, 56 L. Ed. 679); by the failure of a servant engaged in operating a train to properly turn a switch (St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Needham, 63 Fed. 107, 11 C. C. A. 56, 25 L. R. A. 833); by the failure of a switchman to properly place red lights (Brady v. Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co., 114 Fed. 100, 103, 52 C. C. A. 48, 51, 57 L. R. A. 712); by the direction of a yardmaster to an engineer and a conductor to take their train from a track on which another' is standing (Pennsylvania Co. v. Fish
back, 123 Fed. 465, 467, 59 C. C. A. 269, 271); by the failure of an engineer to obey his instructions, whereby a collision results (Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed. 772; Howard v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. [C. C.) 26 Fed. 837); by the negligence of a conductor whereby the place where a laborer is building a culvert is made dangerous and he is struck by the locomotive (Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U. S. 349, 14 Sup. Ct. 983, 38 L. Ed. 1009); by the disobedience of a rule which requires personal notice to workmen on certain tracks that cars are to be moved thereon (Grady v. Southern Ry. Co., 92 Fed. 491, 34 C. C. A. 494); by the omission of bricklayers to secure a timber in the wall, whereby an injury results to a carpenter who is directed to work about it (Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 313, 318, 4 Sup. Ct. 433, 28 L. Ed. 440): by the careless act of a foreman of a gang of laborers engaged in the construction of a sewer, which causes dynamite to be placed in the hole in a rock, and, after it has failed to explode by his order to a workman ignorant of its presence to dig whereby an explosion which injures the workman results (City of Minneapolis v. Lundin, 58 Fed. 525, 528, 7 C. C. A. 344); by the act of workmen in a mine in firing a blast, which loosens a superincumbent mass and makes the place beneath it dangerous so that one of them proceeding to work under it is injured by its fall (Finalyson v. Utica Min. & Mill. Co., 67 Fed. 507, 510, 14 C. C. A. 492); by the order of a foreman to his gang to remove iron braces from the top of a pile that is safe while undisturbed, whereby the pile is caused to topple upon a fellow servant (Lach v. Burnham (C. C.) 134 Fed. 688); by the act of a foreman directing one of his gang to cut away a post from under a shed whereby a portion of the structure falls upon him (Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 73 Fed. 970, 972, 20 C. C. A. 147); by the act of a foreman in causing the piling of heavy castings so negligently that they fell upon one of his gang (Deye v. Lodge & Shipley Machine Tool Co., 137 Fed. 480, 70 C. Č. A. 64); by the act of a baggageman who kicks a block of ice out of his passing car against a signalman (Illinois Central R. Co. v. Hart, 176 Fed. 245, 251, 100 C. C. A. 49, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117); by the act of workmen carelessly throwing a piece of timber from a height upon the head of a fellow workman without warning, when all were working, with 500 or 600 other servants, in operating a sawmill (Wood v. Potlatch Lumber Co., 213 Fed. 591-594, 130 C. C. A. 171); by the failure of a foreman to have an iron plate which had been temporarily removed replaced, and by his order to one of his gang, without warning him of the absence of the plate, to assist in rolling a heavy hogshead over it (Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brown, 146 Fed. 24–29, 76 C. C. A. 482; by the act of the driver of an automobile whereby a fellow servant, making a trip therein in the course of his work, was injured (Brooks v. Central Sainte Jeanne, 228 U. S. 688, 693, 33 Sup. Ct. 700, 57 L. Ed. 1025); by the negligence of fellow servants in permitting cars on a switch track to collide with another train on which the plaintiff was being carried to or from his work by his master (Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Dodd, 188 Fed. 597, 602,