May Term, fense; but, say the books, it is where the statute "creates 1852. the offense" and points out a specific remedy, that that THE STATE remedy must be pursued. This is the general rule, and V. CATTRON. we see nothing in the case before us indicating an intention on the part of the legislature to make an exception to that rule. Per Curiam.-The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c. W. M. Franklin, J. L. Ketcham, and N. B. Taylor, for the state. Monday, THE STATE v. BURGER.-In Error. THE judgment in this case is reversed, with costs, for reasons given in the case of The State v. Virt, at the present term (1). Cause remanded, &c. W. M. Franklin, J. L. Ketcham, and N. B. Taylor, for the state. (1) See ante, p. 447. Monday, THE STATE v. CATTRON.-In Error. THE judgment in this case is reversed, with costs, for reasons given in the case of The State v. Virt, at the present term (1). Cause remanded, &c. W. M. Franklin, J. L. Ketcham, and N. B. Taylor, for the state. (1) See ante, p. 447. Nov. Term, 1852. THE STATE v. MORRIS.-In Error. THE judgment in this case is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for reasons given in the case of The State v. Virt, at the present term (1). W. M. Franklin, J. L. Ketcham, and N. B. Taylor, for the state. (1) See ante, p. 447. MAY V. JOHNSON. Monday, THE STATE V. JONES.-In Error. November 22, THE judgment in this case is reversed, with costs, for Monday, reasons given in the case of The State v. Virt, at the present term (1). Cause remanded, &c. W. M. Franklin, J. L. Ketcham, and N. B. Taylor, for the state. (1) See ante, p. 447. MAY V. JOHNSON and Another. A person who has executed to a constable a bond for the delivery of property levied upon execution, will be estopped, in trespass against the officer for the seizure of the property, from denying that the judgment and execution were against himself, if the bond was procured without fraud. Such a bond will not be held to have been fraudulently procured, from the fact of previous misrepresentations by the constable of the obligor's liability thereon, and its not being read or explained to him, it not appearing that the obligor was an illiterate person or that he had not the means in his power of knowing the truth. ERROR to the Monroe Circuit Court. PERKINS, J.--Trespass for forcibly seizing and carrying Monday, 1852. MAY V. JOHNSON. Nov. Term, away the goods of Solomon May, the plaintiff. Plea, by way of estoppel, that said plaintiff, on, &c., at, &c., by his certain delivery-bond, admitted that, on, &c., the said Hardesty, one of the defendants, then and there being a constable, &c., levied on the goods described in the declaration by virtue of an execution issued, &c., and directed to said Hardesty, on a judgment rendered against said plaintiff and in favor of said Johnson, the other of the defendants, for the sum of, &c., which is the identical taking complained of, &c. Replication, that the plaintiff ought not to be estopped, &c., because, he says, that just before the supposed execution of said bond, the said Hardesty was informed that the judgment and execution obtained by said Johnson were not against the plaintiff in this suit but against another person of a like name, often called "Little Sol.;" whereupon said Hardesty informed said plaintiff that if such was the fact, nothing further would be done in the matter, but he must give a delivery-bond for the property or it would be seized and taken away; and the said plaintiff, trusting to the representations of said Hardesty, without the delivery-bond being read or explained to him, signed the same, &c. Demurrer to this replication sustained, and final judgment rendered for the defendants. The first inquiry will be as to the validity of the replication. It sets up facts showing, as is claimed, fraud in the procurement of the delivery-bond. We do not think fraud is shown. If the plaintiff had been, in the language of judge Sullivan in Sceright v. Fletcher, 6 Blackf. 380, " an illiterate man, and the bond had been misread to him, he not being able to detect the imposition, the case would have been different. But it appears that he signed the bond without reading it himself, or hearing it read, and, with all the means of knowing the truth in his power, reposed a blind confidence in representations not calculated to deceive a man of ordinary prudence and circumspection. In such a case, the law affords no relief. 2 Stark. Ev. 374." In the present case it was not neces 1852. THE STATE sary that the plaintiff should have given a delivery-bond; Nov. Term, for, had the officer illegally deprived him of the possession of his property, the law would have afforded ample redress in damages. The question next arises upon the plea, (for the demurrer reaches it,) whether that admission estops the obligor in the bond from controverting, in this suit, the existence of the judgment and execution against himself. This suit is between the parties interested in that bond, and in relation to the subject-matter of it. In a suit upon the bond against the obligor for a failure to deliver the property according to the condition, the admission in question would have estopped the obligor from denying it, there being no fraud; and we think said admission as effectual an estoppel in this, as it would be in such a suit. See Trimble v. The State, 4 Blackf. 435. Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed with costs. J. S. Watts, J. L. Ketcham, and N. B. Taylor, for the plaintiff. C. Dewey, for the defendants. V. CLARK. THE STATE V. CLARK. The charge in an indictment was as follows: That the defendant, on, &c., at, &c., unlawfully sold to one J. W. a quantity of spiritual liquors by retail, less than a quart, to-wit, one half-pint of spirituous liquor, for five cents in money, he, the defendant, not being licensed to vend spiritual liquors by retail; contrary, &c. Held, that the indictment was not bad for using the word spiritual instead of spirituous. ERROR to the Boone Circuit Court. Monday, BLACKFORD, J.-This was an indictment, which, on the November 22. defendant's motion, was quashed by the Circuit Court. The charge in the indictment is as follows: That the defendant, on, &c., at, &c., unlawfully sold to one James Wysong a quantity of spiritual liquors by retail, less than 1852. Nov. Term, a quart, to-wit, one half-pint of spirituous liquors for five cents in money, he, the defendant, not being licensed to vend spiritual liquors by retail; contrary to the statute, THE STATE. &c. HAMILTON V. The only objection made to the indictment is, the use in it of the word spiritual instead of spirituous. That the grand jury, by the words spiritual liquors, meant spirituous liquors, there can be no doubt. The indictment, indeed, expressly says so; for, after charging the unlawful sale of spiritual liquors, it says, to-wit, one half-pint of spirituous liquors, &c. It has been held that an indictment charging that the defendant did feloniously stal, take, and carry away one watch, &c., was not bad merely because the word stal was used instead of the word steal. Wills v. The State, 4 Blackf, 457. We think the objection made to the present indictment should have been overruled. Per Curiam.-The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c. A. J. Boone, for the state. HAMILTON, Auditor of Marion county, v. THE STATE, on the By the statute of 1852, the members of the state board of equalization were appointed to discharge a public duty, and there being no provision that a less number than the whole should proceed in the business, the district delegates and the state auditor who convened at Indianapolis as such board, had no authority to act in the absence of the delegate from the sixth district. Were the order of said board increasing the appraisement of land in Marion county otherwise valid, it would be null and void, because it was made in the absence of one of the members of the board. Said board is a mere creature of the statute, and has no authority except what the statute confers; and the board being only authorized by the statute to equalize the appraisement of land between the several congressional districts, the order of the board for equalizing the appraisement between |