with her words, or rather with her silence. But Prussia, as well as Austria, has approved and sanctioned, in as solemn a manner as such an act is capable of, the measures adopted by the maritime powers. She has, in common with her sister of the Germanic confederation, declared that England and France acted right in supporting Turkey against the pretensions of Russia. The ultimatum, presented in the name of the powers to Russia, was approved by her, as also the subsequent declaration of war by the English and French governments. In fact, every step successively adopted by these two powers in defence of the integrity of Turkey, and consequently against Russia, has been repeatedly sanctioned, including that which annexes the Anglo-French convention, and the Austro-Prussian treaty, to the engagements comprised in the protocol of the 9th April. We have already observed that we do not set much importance on the delay of Prussia and Austria in commencing hostilities in the field. In the present instance, the priority of the declaration of war belongs properly to the powers that have already made it. With respect to France in particular, her geographical position enabled her to do so without loss of time. But had Prussia drawn the sword two months ago, as was so often demanded by the public, with her troops not yet organised nor concentrated, and Russia with her one hundred thousand men in Poland, the Prussian territory would have been at once invaded at a moment it was most unprepared. Those who believed that it was by negotiation, and by temporising, that the great German powers would be induced to assume the same active attitudes as France and England, were in error. It is rather our own determination of purpose, our vigour and energy of action, and our success, that will lead them into co-operation. When they find that they have not to deal with Russia single-handed, that they have not the undivided burden of the war to support, they will then join us in the field; and we have little doubt that the thunder of the cannon so near their frontier will be itself an appeal to which the nation will not be deaf, and

that it will inspire the army and the people with patriotic ardour.

In this alliance against barbarism— on the triumph of which the safety of Western Europe, as well as of Turkey depends-in this great league which does honour to our times, two of the most powerful nations of the earth, great in the arts of peace and war, have laid aside their rivalries and jealousies, have forgotten or forgiven past hatreds and wrongs, and with sincerity of purpose have sacrificed on the altar of the public good the animosities of centuries. Nothing can be more exciting, and at the same time more noble, than that glorious fraternisation of France and England by sea and land;-the Zouave and the British grenadier fighting side by side, and the union-jack and the tricolor, with all the stirring memories they call up, waving over the same sea, and meeting as they never yet have met. The cause is not exclusively French or English, it is that of Europe; and no state, however small, and with the slightest pretensions to civilisation, can hesitate to lend a hand to the good work. If there be any, however, which, owing to its circumscribed territory, or acting under the influence of a servile Prince, or from any other motive, shall draw back from the common cause, that state should be placed under the ban of Europe. Whatever be its form of government, whatever be its creed-Catholic, Protestant, or Greek, if it refuse to respond to the call, it should be excluded from the society of Europe; and the law of the Greek legislator, which pronounced degradation and death on the citizen who, when his country was in peril, did not fly to its aid, should be applied to it. In such circumstances, each state ought to be regarded as a citizen of the great European commonwealth; the useless or the renagade member has no claim to protection, and cannot expect to be maintained in the rights which it has forfeited by cowardice or treachery.

It will not be irrelevant if, after noticing the conditions of the larger States, and weighing the reasons which, in our judgment, render their co-operation with the Western governments a matter of peremptory obligation, even

one of regard to their own interest, we say a few words about the secondary States, and the peculiar position of each, both as respects Russia, and the Powers to whom it is expected that they will afford their co-operation. Among those States that enjoy a form of government more or less similar to that of France and England, and who for that reason are particularly obnoxious to Russia, Spain and Portugal, though the most distant from the theatre of war, and therefore less exposed to its effects, are among the first that ought to come forward. It may even be a question whether these countries are not bound by the spirit of the Quadruple Alliance, which has not yet terminated, to lend their co-operation. The Quadruple Alliance was formed with the object of creating and maintaining a system which had for its basis the negation of the principle of legitimacy. This alliance was intended to be in direct opposition to the coalition inspired and protected by the Russian Emperor in his character as champion of legitimacy and absolutism. That coalition was the instrument with which he meant to divide Europe, and intervene in the quarrels of other States in conformity with the traditional policy of Russia; to terminate at some future day what he considers to be a revolutionary system, and to effect the expulsion of their actual occupants from the thrones of Spain and Portugal, and the restoration of Dom Miguel and Don Carlos as the representatives of the legitimist principle, and, in his eyes, the only rightful sovereigns of their countries. The question of religion, too, occupies an important place in this consideration. His treatment of the Catholics of Poland shows that the Czar hates quite as strongly the Christian sects that differ from the Orthodox faith, as he does the Mussulman. Non-orthodox Christians are equally unbelievers in his eyes; and in his twofold character as restorer of absolutism on the thrones of Europe, and defender of Orthodoxy, Spain and Portugal have everything to fear from his success.

Among the secondary states of Europe which would find little mercy at the hands of Russia, in the event VOL. LXXVI.-NO. CCCCLXV.

of her triumph, Piedmont is, perhaps, the most exposed to danger. Her great crimes are, her form of government, and her invasion of the Austrian territory, unjustifiable we do not hesitate to admit, under Charles Albert. But the Constitution of Piedmont, which has survived the ruin of so many others, because it is moderate, and suited to the habits of the people, and which has been so faithfully respected by the king, and maintained by the people; its religious and secular reforms, and the probability of their progress; the loyalty to the house of Savoy, and the attachment to the order of things created by the Revolution of 1848, render Piedmont an abomination which must be extirpated from the south of Europe. If we are unable to arrest Russia in her career, not only would everything like liberal institutions be destroyed in Piedmont, but we believe that, to gain over Austria, it would be offered as a bribe to her. The integrity and political existence of Piedmont, in fact, depend on the successful resistance of the Western Powers; and when the proper moment comes, we have little doubt that she will be ready to take part in the sacrifices made in defence of Europe, and not maintain, during such a crisis as the present, a dangerous neutrality. The manner in which the Sardinian government received the official communication of the AngloFrench Convention in the beginning of June, affords ground for belief that the Cabinet of Turin will not be backward in its co-operation should it become necessary. M. Cavour, in his reply to the English and French ministers, bestowed the greatest praise on what he termed "the disinterested devotedness" with which the two Powers pursued in common the triumph of the only policy which could re-establish peace on a solid basis; and he expressed his hope, in the name of the king and government, "that their noble efforts will be crowned with that success which every Power should desire who has really at heart the independence of the States, and the maintenance of the balance, of Europe."

Were Russia in possession of one of the shores of the Adriatic, neither the King of Naples nor the Grand

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Duke of Tuscany would have reason to feel satisfied in such a neighbourhood; and the former would do well to lose no time in preparing himself for a perpetual vassalage, if he will not avail himself of the present opportunity of winning some credit for his troops by rendering service to the rest of Europe. The principle laid down by Switzerland, up to the moment we write, has been that of strict neutrality. This may be all very fine in words or on paper, but we much doubt the possibility of any State placed so near the theatre of war, or the power that will be engaged in it, to maintain its neutrality. The question, as the Swiss Confederation must well know, is not now one of mere secondary interest. The Swiss are better aware than any one, that the general interest of Europe is at stake, and that there is no country which is more exposed than Switzerland. Such neutrality as she would maintain has been always difficult, and, in the present instance, it is impossible. It is not now for the first time that Switzerland has to learn that her independence is essentially connected with the balance of power in Europe, and that if this balance were destroyed, or seriously disturbed, her independence would not be worth a month's purchase. Her co-operation with the other states of Europe, in a question of such vital importance to all, she is not merely bound in honour to afford, but her existence as an independent Confederation obliges her not to refuse it. We are therefore of opinion that Switzerland may fairly be comprised in the States that will assist, when the time comes for general and armed resistance to Muscovite ambition.

Of Greece, or rather the Greek Government, so much has been said recently, that any particular allusion to it is scarcely necessary. Notwithstanding the analogy between the religious faith of Greece and Russia, the merest reflection and the simplest common sense ought to have ranked her in the number of our allies; for even supposing the disclosures of Sir Hamilton Seymour to have been kept secret from the world, there can be little doubt that one of the first acts of Russia, after the conquest of Con

stantinople, would be to seize on that petty kingdom, which, even in times of peace, and under the most favourable circumstances, only subsists by means of the subsidy granted to her by the allies. But the conversations of the Emperor of Russia with our minister have shown pretty clearly the sort of benevolence which Russia feels towards King Otho, and his avowed determination not to tolerate any extension of his territory; but, with the full knowledge of all this, the clear-sighted and clever Otho commenced war against Turkey, and consequently against Turkey's allies, well knowing how that war, so far as he is concerned, must end. It has ended in the occupation of the Greek territory by a few thousands of the allied forces; in the blockade of its coasts, and the consequent interruption of all communication between the insurgent subjects of the Porte and the Hellenic bands; in the absolute submission of the king; his humiliating apology; his promises of amendment for the future, pronounced in presence of the English and French ministers, whose advice he had scornfully rejected; the dismissal of the ministry who were his accomplices in that mad attempt; and the nomination of new advisers long known for their determined resistance to Russian influence, and decidedly friendly to the Western powers. How King Otho, or his queen, who is the fanatical partisan of Russia, or his ministers, could for a moment suppose that Greece would be tolerated in her open partisanship, is what we cannot conceive, unless we presume upon a greater absence of intellect than even that which his Majesty has hitherto got credit for. To declare war against Greece would be absurd; and many motives would prevent us from overthrowing an independence which we have done so much to found. Perhaps, after the occupation of her territory, the severest penalty that we might impose on that ungrateful government would be to demand payment of the debt she owes us; and as it is probable that the answer would be anything but satisfactory to the creditor, to take the best security we might find. Greece has already keenly felt the effects of her conduct to the

protecting powers in the ruin of her commerce and finances. After much for bearance and much advice, abused and rejected, French and English troops now occupy the Piræus, and the neutrality Greece refused to observe she is now forced to maintain; and the brigandage she has encouraged by sea has been checked by our cruisers and those of France. In that part of Europe, then, Russia has no further chance of a useful diversion in her favour; and we may be pretty sure that, with agitation paralysed in Greece, and the Hellenic government bound to its good behaviour, the insurrection of their co-religionists in the states of the Sultan will not be of long continuance. The withdrawal of the aliment which fed it will have the effect of soon tranquillising the country; and the vigilance of our own agents, and those of France, will prevent the excesses of the Turkish authorities, which have too often occasioned and justified insurrection. What we have said with respect to Switzerland, applies with equal, and even with greater, force to Belgium. The King of the Belgians has given too many proofs of sound judgment, not to understand that the independence secured to his kingdom by France and England can only be maintained on the condition of accepting the responsibility, and frankly executing the duties, of his position. King Leopold had the good sense to abstain, at the critical moment, from entering into the coalition against France which, more than two years ago, the Emperor of Russia was forming, and into which, with the aid of his " cellent" and accommodating friend, England was expected to enter. This combination, which had a twofold object-first, the absolute predominance of Russia in Europe; and second, the restoration of the Bourbon family to the throne from which they have been driven-failed, as we have seen, notwithstanding the favourable circumstance of Lord Aberdeen's presence in the Cabinet. King Leopold must have fully comprehended the danger that would menace his dynasty by participation in such an intrigue. But his Belgian Majesty must now feel that one of his first duties is to co

ex

operate in his own defence. It is true that treaties exist which stipulate the neutrality of Belgium in case of war. These treaties, however, are well known to have been drawn up with a view to France, in order to detach from her an ally lying so temptingly in her way; but such as they are, no one believes that they would stand a week after the first cannon-shot was fired near her frontier. If Belgium desire to be really independent, she must prove that, when the occasion comes, she is worthy of it. "If Belgium conduct herself like a woman," observed a foreign diplomatist on a recent occasion, "she must be married to some one who shall be willing and able to protect her." That marriage, we hope and believe, will not be necessary; and we are sure that, should the necessity arise, Belgium will not be found wanting.

When we come to Sweden and Denmark, the question assumes greater importance. Sweden has wrongs to avenge, and rights to recover. She has not entirely abandoned, even after a lapse of forty-six years, the hope of again possessing Finland, which was torn from her by her gi gantic neighbour. Such, however, is not the only motive which would induce the Swedish people to join the alliance against Russia; for the dangers to their existence as an independent nation in the success of that. Power, afford us a better security than even the recollection of the past, and the desires and hopes which it may call forth. Sweden stands in a position similar to that of Turkey; and it is certain that, if Russia were once mistress of the Dardanelles, she would before long be supreme in the Sound. That strait also is a key to her empire, and the possession of Sweden and Denmark is quite as desirable for Northern, as that of Turkey for Southern Russia. We have no doubt that the absorption of these States forms part of the vast plan of Russia, who finds in them elements for the extension of her empire by means of her maritime power. The sort of armed neutrality at first adopted by Sweden was perfectly intelligible. Until the allied fleets were completely established in

the Baltic, it was difficult to make any movement indicative of hostility; whilst the presence of our fleet, and of a considerable force ready to act simultaneously on various points of the Russian coast, would remove all motive for hesitation, and enable Sweden to throw herself heartily into the contest against an enemy from whom she has quite as much to dread as the Sublime Porte has. But let her remember-and we have no doubt she well knows the fact that perseverance in such neutrality would not be the means of conciliating Russia, while she would hardly meet with sympathy or respect from the rest of Europe. To us, the co-operation of Sweden and Denmark would be of the greatest advantage. Their ports are admirably adapted as a base for our naval operations. Their troops would be in the theatre of operations the moment hostilities were declared; in four-and-twenty hours they would be in Finland, or in the Gulf of Bothnia. Of the active co-operation of Sweden with us, we have little doubt. The peculiarity of her position, the deep injury she has already sustained at the hands of Russia, and the annihilation of Swedish independence that would follow from the triumphant progress of that Power, appear to us a fair guarantee for her complete and active adhesion.

Whatever be the faults that have been committed with respect to second and third rate States, this is not the moment to remember them. With an aggregate population of not less than fifty millions, they do not deserve the indifference with which they have in great part been treated, nor the oblivion in which they have been left. Their weight thrown into the scale at so momentous a period as the present, must be considerable, whether we regard their territorial extent, their numerical strength, or their geographical position. It has been remarked that Cardinal Richelieu and Napoleon, no mean authorities in such matters, sedulously cultivated the alliance of secondary States; they did not neglect or despise any alliance, or any contingent, however small. At the Congress of Vienna, owing principally to the peculiarity of

The

the situation, a partition was made, to which the belligerents gave their assent, but in which the first-rate Powers dictated the law. That law was unfortunate for Germany, as it created rivalries which were chiefly to the advantage of Russia. Holy Alliance, too, in which Russia played the principal part, reduced the secondary governments to a condition of tutelage, and, in fact, excluded them altogether from the European combination. The evil was, it is true, somewhat mitigated by the Quadruple Treaty, which, as we have said, was conceived in opposition to the Holy Alliance-the constitutionalism of the south against the absolutism of the north. It now becomes the duty, as it is the interest, of the great Powers to make an appeal to the secondary States, to furnish their respective contingents for the defence of the cause-a cause not of private interest, of aggrandisement, or of conquest, but of general defence. There is not a powerful sovereign or a petty prince, who values his honour, or cares to preserve his dominions-there is not a people that loves its independence, but is bound to assist in repelling the invasion of the barbarians; for the present war against Russia is a crusade of civilisation and liberty, from which none can draw back without a stigma being affixed to them for ever. He who yields to the seductions of Russia, will have sealed his fate as surely as if he were conquered by her arms; and wherever the Russian cross is planted, there servitude must be. The term of the mighty struggle in which we are engaged, we do not venture to predict; nor, should our enemy be aided by any of the governments of Europe to carry it to a successful issue, can we say for what people is reserved the gracious indulgence granted by the Cyclops to Ulysses of being devoured the last; but we are certain that we are all marked as the prey, sooner or later. The conquest of the Ottoman Empire, and the annihilation of Islamism, is not the only object of the Czar. The creeds of Western Europe are as obnoxious to him as is the Koran; and in both cases religious zeal is but the pretext for territorial