quently as ignorant and brutalised as Russian serfs now are. Prussia began by repressing the customary excesses of the nobles. She introduced an improved judicial system, established schools, and by other means improved the habits and condition of the people. These reforms, together with the abolition of servitude, have produced excellent results; though, owing to its original degradation, Posen is still the most backward of the Prussian provinces. Posen and Silesia, with the exception of those parts inhabited by the descendants of the German colonists, are, it must be remembered, of Slavonic origin, and, in the name of Panslavism, of which the Czar is the great apostle, would be demanded from Prussia. Russia would soon find the Baltic admirably suited to her purposes; and as the Prussian territory forms but a strip of land between Poland and the sea, it would soon be in the condition of the Danubian principalities, and even less capable of resistance than Turkey. Unlike Turkey proper, Prussia is not protected by the conformation of her territory; and, from her geographical position, she presents a permanent temptation to the power that would attack her by land and sea at the same time. In the event of the success of Russia, Austria is exposed to as great danger as Prussia. She is not ignorant that appeals have been already made to her subjects in the name of religion, and disaffection excited in the cause of the orthodox faith and of Panslavism. The elements for such a propagandism are to be found in that great empire, composed, as it is, of many states differing in extent and in population, as in creed. Most of them have been united under the imperial crown by inheritance, or by treaty, rather than by conquest; and their boundaries remain as they existed when independent, with the exception of the Italian possessions. Of the thirty-eight millions that form the population of the Austrian empire, about eighteen millions are Slavonians. The Roumani of Transylvania would desire to be united to their brethren; and the Hungarian war has shown that, if so favourable an occasion as the triumph of Hungary offered, the The Hungarians would readily place them- We It is admitted by persons who cannot be suspected of any great love for England and France, that these countries have a good and legitimate cause of war against Russia. The author of a pamphlet recently published, entitled Neutralité de l'Autriche, states that, even at St Petersburg, few are to be found who contest that right. The immense resources so long and so carefully accumulated by Russia, the odious manner in which she carries on war, the disorders and insurrections she so treacherously excites and pays in other countries, utterly regardless of the ruin which falls on the innocent and helpless populations, her systematic plan of attacking the integrity, destroying the independence, and finally appropriating to herself the territory of inoffensive neighbours and allies-and all this iniquity practised with the most earnest protestations of moderation, disinterestedness, and even amity-have left no other alternative to those who have not made up their minds to bow to the Muscovite yoke, than to draw the sword in the cause not only of civilisation, but of existence itself. We admit her exceptional situation as an excuse for Austria not having long since assumed a more vigorous action. We, too, were slow in action; and we, too, have statesmen who, if they did not connive at the nefarious proceedings of Russia, have at all events been miserably duped; and we cannot plead the excuse of Austria. That empire had scarcely settled down from the terrible convulsion which had shaken every member of her vast and unwieldy frame, and had not recovered from her cruel condition between the dangerous protectorate of a powerful and ambitious ally on one hand, and the revolution on the other. The ties which once bound Austria to Russia have, however, since been loosened; the injury inflicted on Austrian interests has been very great. At the moment when Russia believed that she could count on the goodwill and the services of her protegée, she had not as yet paralysed her commercial existence by blocking up the mouths of the Danube. Neither had Russia unmasked her intrigues in Greece. She had not as yet supplied funds for piratical ships which menace the trade of the Archipelago, and that of Austria in the Adriatic. She had not as yet roused the brigand insurrection of Montenegro; and her emissaries in Servia, which touches Austria so nearly, were not yet avowed. Time has removed all doubt that even the grateful partiality of the Emperor Francis Joseph entertained as to the real designs of Russia; but unless Austria now carry her forbearance so far as to wait till the Cossacks invade her territory, she can cherish no further hope of the forbearance or loyalty of the Czar. Russia, her protector in 1849, has become her enemy, and menaces the integrity and independence of Austria quite as much as she does that of Turkey. It is no cause of suspicion or censure that Austria desired, before any more decided action, to reassure herself with respect to Germany. An understanding with her old rival, Prussia, was absolutely necessary, as any antagonism with that power, in such circumstances as the present, would be of immense advantage to Russia. That her first idea was one of conservation, will not appear strange to those who have even a slight knowledge of the constitution of the Austrian empire, with its various and conflicting nationalities, and that that idea found its most effective realisation in the construction of a powerful German league. To it we owe the fact that the resistance to Russia has assumed a twofold character. For the last two years, these states have adopted, in common, certain moral obligations, which are comprised in the treaty, though it would, no doubt, be better to have maintained a unity of action, and constituted, at the last and most critical moment, one vast German camp, ready to act, side by side, with the West, and one army, that of the civilisation and balance of power in Europe, against barbarism and unbounded ambition. It would, no doubt, have been better if the great powers had long since taken their stand on one common ground, for many events have occurred which would have been avoided had a good understanding existed from the commencement of the Eastern question— or the same union in action as in protocols. If, however, there was at any time any hesitation about Austriaif there really existed a disposition to listen to the seductions, or to yield to the menaces of Russia-if the picture of future revolution, more terrible than that which convulsed her in 1848, was laid open before her, and if, conscious of many duties unperformed, many obligations unfulfilled, and many wrongs inflicted by her, she shrank at the thought of a complete and a final rupture with her former friend, that moment, we firmly believe, has passed away. Before the publication of the Seymour correspondence, we could have understood hesitation and doubts, but not since the proclamation to the world of the scornful language of the Czar. We have shown that the interests of Austria have been the first to suffer; that her trade was arrested by the closing of the Danube, and by the Greek piracy paid by Russia; that the brigands of Montenegro were but obeying orders from St Petersburg; and that the hostility of Russia is even now felt in Servia. The longer Austria delayed before declaring herself, the more enemies she would have to encounter. We believe, then, that her merely expectant attitude is now definitively abandoned. Her salvation is at stake, no less than the integrity of the Ottoman empire; and while reserving to themselves a liberty of action in the conferences presided over by M. Buol, the German powers have not, by that reservation, left themselves a door open for escape; and Austria, above all, has pledged herself to act. If gratitude to Russia for past services be alleged, it may be answered that, by accepting her aid in 1849, the Emperor Francis Joseph did not bind himself to sacrifice the independence of his crown, the integrity of his territory, and the interests of his people; and if any scruples still exist on that score in the imperial mind, England and France may reply, in the words of Corneille "Vous lui devez beaucoup ; Mais la reconnaissance et l'hospitalité Sur les âmes des rois n'ont qu'un droit limité. Quoi que doive un monarque, et dût-il sa couronne, Il doit à ses sujets encor plus qu'à personne. S'il est juste, d'ailleurs, que tout se considère, It is true that, with England and France united, there can be little apprehension as to their being equal to the task of bringing the Czar to reason; but with the co-operation of Austria and Prussia, the war has what may be called a more sovereign character. If we have so earnestly desired the co-operation of the two great German powers, it was with the object of seeing peace speedily established on a more solid and more lasting basis than before, and that the Emperor of Russia, all-powerful and terrible as he has long appeared to Europe, shall not enjoy the satisfaction of having, for any length of time, disturbed the peace of Europe. The conduct of Austria, since the treaty of the 20th April, has been more straightforward and more energetic than what any one expected from her. The note presented to Russia, in accordance with the provisions of that instrument, was so firm and precise, that the Prussian Cabinet, or rather the King, became alarmed, and the first symptom of weakness was taken advantage of by the agents of Russia to promote a rupture between the two states, even at the risk of war between them. The fears of the King were acted upon. Austria was accused of having given an erroneous interpretation to the treaty, and of having exaggerated its importance; and matters were carried so far that, as our readers will probably remember, a ministerial crisis followed at Berlin. The anger of the Russian party was principally directed against the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Baron Manteuffel was at one moment threatened with the loss of office. It was alleged by the Russo-Prussians that, by signing the treaty, Prussia had for ever sacrificed her independence and liberty of action; that no choice was now, or would in future be, left her, whether she desired to advance, or recede, or stop short; and that she had imposed on herself the obligation to follow in the wake of Austria. In the additional article of the treaty, which provides for the case of the Emperor of Russia's refusal to give the "complete security " required of him, it was observed, that the complete subordination of Prussia to Austria was formally stipulated. In such an emergency Austria was authorised to adopt whatever measures she may judge most efficacious for the speedy evacuation of the Principalities, and arresting the progress of the Russian armies; and should her territory be attacked in consequence of those measures, Prussia was bound to employ the whole of her military force to repel that attack. The Russian party at Berlin deduced from that article the probability, nay, the certainty, that war would arise out of the convention, but that the interest of Austria would alone be cared for, without any reciprocity in favour of Prussia. At such a critical moment the vacillating character of Frederick-William strongly contrasted with the firmness of the young emperor Francis Joseph. When informed of what was passing at Berlin, his Majesty observed that the treaty was signed; that it was duly ratified by the two sovereigns; and that all that remained now was, to execute it that if any demur arose on that head, and if Prussia meant by her objections the non-recognition of the engagements she had knowingly, and of her own accord, bound herself to, Austria could not but regard such refusal as a casus belli,-for most assuredly Austria would make no concession. This firmness of the youthful sovereign produced the desired effect. It put an end to the ministerial crisis; and the good understanding which the treaty, and which one of the contracting parties appeared desirous of interrupting, was once more, and, we trust, permanently established. One of the first consequences of that restored good-feeling was, the signing of the protocol by the representatives of the four Powers, which annexes the Austro-Prussian treaty to the AngloFrench convention. The object of the Berlin treaty was, the protection of the political, moral, and material interests of the great German Confederation, which have been seriously injured, and would be seriously menaced in future by the continued and indefinite occupation of the Danubian Principalities, and the farther advance into the Ottoman territory of the Russian armies. That fact is expressly stated in the additional article of the treaty; and in the instrument itself the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia declare that "it appertains to Germany to fulfil a high mission at the close of the present war, in order to provide against a future which could not be otherwise than fatal to the general wellbeing of Europe." The adhesion of the German Confederation to this treaty would complete the grand alliance which the grasping ambition of Russia has raised up against her. We have dwelt at some length on the line adopted by Austria in this matter, because we cannot help feeling that it redounds to her honour, as it most assuredly coincides with her interests. Austria has once more taken the lead in the political affairs of Germany. It was at Vienna that the conference of the four Powers was established; it was at Vienna that these schemes were adopted, which emanated from the desire, and the necessity, of maintaining the peace of Europe; and it was there also that the important treaty of Berlin and the additional articles were drawn up. We have little doubt that if Austria carries out with the same firmness the obligations she has contracted in her own interest and that of Europe, she will derive the greatest benefit from them, and that, even in a more selfish point of view, she will find that, on this as on all occasions, honesty is the best policy. It has been the fashion among a certain class of French politicians for the last forty or fifty years, to predict, at no very distant period, the fall of the British empire; and even the wretched Ledru Rollin has written two or three stupid volumes with the object of proving, no doubt to his own satisfaction, and to that of people of his calibre, that the hour of England's decline had long ago arrived, that her wonderful career of prosperity was arrested, and that the only thing she had to do was, to prepare herself as decently as possible for her final fall. It was, however, some security that M. Ledru Rollin continued to stay in our doomed country, as it showed that we were safe, at all events, for another year or so. Similar predictions have been made over and over again about the Austrian empire; and, in truth, there was a period within the last few years when its dismemberment was, even by the most incredulous, deemed inevitable. Many a time during the five-and-twenty years spent in the great struggle of the republican and imperial period of France, it was believed that the last hour of Austria had sounded, and that she had long lost her place among the great powers of Europe. She has nevertheless struggled through the tempest; and when she recovered her authority, she recovered it without serious loss, and without a rival over all Germany. The empire that, to all appearance, had been solidly established in 1814, was again shaken to its foundation in 1848. Its capital and its provinces were ravaged at the same time by civil and by external war; the imperial family had to fly from Vienna, and seek refuge in the depths of the Tyrolese mountains. All Germany seemed to rise and make a last effort to shake off her domination, to form one compact body, to cast loose Austria, and to confer the supreme and united power on Prussia. Not much more than a year has gone by since Austria sustained against Prussia a lengthened struggle on the commercial constitution of Germany; and in that struggle Austria certainly had not the best part. Yet she again issued safe out of her trials; and on the occasion to which we have just referred, she succeeded in regaining all her preponderance. The revolution is no longer visible on the theatre where it was triumphant; the coolness which existed between her and England has disappeared, and she is once more united to her ancient and faithful ally by an obligation of the noblest kind the maintenance of the independence of Western Europe against an overgrown and unscrupulous Power. While the gratitude of Austria to wards Russia for her powerful aid in 1849, is alleged as a powerful reason againt a community of action with the maritime powers, the ties of relationship existing between King Frederick-William and the Emperor Nicholas-the Czarina being the sister of the former-are regarded as rendering impossible the co-operation of Prussia with England and France. We admit the full force of such a circumstance, particularly on a mind like that of the King of Prussia. But these influences are merely personal. The Prussian monarchy is not any longer a pure despotism, where the will of the Sovereign is the law of the nation. Prussia enjoys, in a more or less imperfect form, a representative regime; the press is, to a certain extent, free; and there are sufficient means to ascertain the direction, and estimate the force, of public opinion. On other and equally important occasions, the king, whose weakness and infirmity of purpose are proverbial, ran counter to public opinion, and the king was forced to succumb. Those family influences are, as we have said, purely personal, and do not affect the nation at large, who will not allow their country to be degraded into a satellite of Russia. Prussia, the most important member of the Germanic confederation after Austria, will not suffer that confederation to descend to the rôle of a commission charged with Russian interests, and established in the very heart of Germany. The Prussian nation will not tolerate it, merely because the sister of the king happens to be the Empress of Russia. It is true that other titles and other honours have been lavishly scattered by the Czar among the officers of the Prussian army, with the view of purchasing their goodwill, and seducing them from their duty as Germans. In many instances this has been successful; but we have heard that the success is principally confined to what may be termed the more aristocratic classes of the army, and that among the cavalry, for instance, a decidedly strong feeling exists at this moment in favour of Russia. The officers who have been decorated by the Emperor of Russia, take particular care to exhibit in public their stars and ribbons, as if in contempt of public opinion, and as an indication of their sympathy for the Russian cause. This is not, however, the only motive for their conduct. They see in the Emperor of Russia a protection against revolution; and this, considering the class to which the cavalry officers generally belong, is not very extraordinary. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the disclosures in the correspondence of Sir Hamilton Seymour must have produced, even upon the persons of whom we speak, a great effect; their partialities must have received a rude shock on the perusal of these letters, and have singularly cooled down their zeal. The most ardent admirers of the Emperor Nicholas must have felt his face burn with shame and indignation at the contemptuous manner in which he affected to ignore the existence of Prussia as one of the states of Europe; and it is impossible to doubt that, in the event of the success of Russia, her acts, so far as Prussia is concerned, would be in conformity |