posed to hasten his return to Philadelphia, with CHAP. VIII. the intention of considering at that place, rather 1795. than at Mount Vernon, the memorial against the provision order, and the conditional ratification of the treaty. In a private letter to the secretary of state, of the 29th of July, accompanying the official communication of this determination, he stated more at large the motives which induced it. These were, the violent and extraordinary proceedings which were taking place, and might be expected throughout the union, and his opinion that the memorial, the ratification, and the instructions which were framing, were of such vast magnitude as not only to require great individual consideration, but a solemn conjunct revision. The opposition which the treaty was receiving from the meetings in different parts of the union, he viewed in a very serious light;...not because there was more weight in any of the objections than was foreseen at first,...for in some of them there was none, and in others, there were gross misrepresentations; nor as it respected himself personally, for that he declared should have no influence on his conduct. He plainly perceived, and was accordingly preparing his mind for the obloquy which disappointment and malice were collecting to heap upon him. But he was alarmed on account of the effect it might have on France, and the advantage which the government of that country might be disposed to make of the spirit which was at work, to cherish a belief, that the treaty was calculated to favour Great Britain at CHAP. VIII. her expense. Whether she believed or disbelieved 1795. these tales, their effect would be nearly the same; for, during the continuance of the war, or of the animosity which prevailed between those nations, it would be the policy, and it was to be feared, would be the conduct of France, no matter at whose expense, to prevent the United States from being on good terms with Great Britain, and also to prevent Great Britain from deriving any advantage from the trade of the United Stajes, however great might be the benefits resulting therefrom to the latter. How far this policy and interest might carry the French republic was problematical; but when she saw the people of America divided, and such a violent opposition given to the measures of their government, pretendedly in her favour, it might be extremely embarrassing, to say no more of it. "To sum up the whole" he added, "in a few words, I have never, since I have been in the administration of the government, seen a crisis which, in my opinion, has been so pregnant with interesting events, nor one from which more is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one side or the other. From New York there is, and I am told will further be a counter current ;* but how formidable it may appear I know not. If the same does not take place at Boston and other towns, it will afford but too strong evidence that the opposition is in a manner universal, and The chamber of commerce in New York had voted resolutions expressing their approbation of the treaty. would make the ratification a very serious busi- CHAP. VIH. ness indeed. But as it respects the French, even 1795. counter resolutions would, for the reasons I have already mentioned, do little more than weaken in a small degree the effect the other side would have." In a private letter of the 31st of July to the same gentleman, after repeating his determination to return to Philadelphia, and his impression of the wisdom, the temperateness, and the firmness for which the crisis most eminently called; he added" for there is too much reason to believe, from the pains that have been taken before, at, and since the advice of the senate respecting the treaty, that the prejudices against it are more extensive than is generally imagined. How should it be otherwise? when no stone has been left unturned that could impress on the minds of the people the most arrant misrepresentation of facts: that their rights have not only been neglected but absolutely sold: that there are no reciprocal advantages in the treaty: that the benefits are all on the side of Great Britain: and, what seems to have had more weight with them than all the rest, and has been most pressed, that the treaty is made with the design to oppress the French republic, in open violation of our treaty with that nation, and contrary .too to every principle of gratitude and sound policy. In time, when passion shall have yielded to sober reason, the current may possibly turn; but, in the mean while, this government in relation to France and England, may be compared to a ship between Sylla and CHAP. VIII. Charibdis. If the treaty is ratified, the partisans 1795. of the French, (or rather of war and confusion) will excite them to hostile measures, or at least to unfriendly sentiments;...if it is not, there is no foreseeing all the consequences that may follow as it respects Great Britain. "It is not to be inferred from hence that I am or shall be disposed to quit the ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than have yet come to my knowledge, should compel it; for there is but one straight course, and that is to seek truth, and to pursue it steadily. But these things are mentioned to show that a close investigation of the subject is more than ever necessary; and that there are strong evidences of the necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying the determination of government into effect, with prudence as it respects our own people, and with every exertion to produce a change for the better with Great Britain." Speaking of the memorial, the form of ratification, and the instructions to accompany the latter paper, all of which had been transmitted to him, he indicated an opinion that the memorial ought to be soon presented. "In a matter, however," he said, "so interesting and pregnant of consequences as this treaty, every step should be explored before it is taken, and every word weighed before it is uttered or delivered in writing." In a letter of the third of August, written to the same gentleman, in which he stated the in creasing extent of hostility to the treaty, the CHAP. VIII. president added. "All these things do not shake my determination with respect to the proposed ratification, nor will they, unless something more imperious and unknown to me, should, in the opinion of yourself and the gentlemen with you, make it advisable for me to pause." 1795. In the afternoon of the 11th of August, the president arrived in Philadelphia; and on the next day, the question respecting the immediate ratification of the treaty was brought before the cabinet. The secretary of state maintained singly the opinion, that during the existence of the provision order,* and during the war between Britain and France, this step ought not to be taken. This opinion did not prevail. The resolution was Condi adopted to ratify the treaty immediately, and to ratified by accompany the ratification with a strong memorial against the provision order, which should convey in explicit terms the sense of the American government on that subject. By this course, the views of the executive were happily accomplished. The order was revoked, and the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged. tionally the president. unpopular in States. The president was most probably determined The treaty to adopt this course by the extreme intemperance the United with which the treaty was opposed, and the rapid progress which this violence was apparently • Previous to the reception of the account of this order, the opinion of the secretary had been in favour of ratifying the treaty. |