1795.

was renewed. Apprehending that this order might CHAP. VIII. be construed and intended as a practical construction of that article in the treaty which seemed to favour the idea that provisions, though not generally contraband, might occasionally become so, a construction in which he had determined not to acquiesce, the president thought it wise to reconsider his decision. Of the result of this reconsideration, there is no conclusive testimony. A strong memorial against this objectionable order was directed; and the propositions to withhold the ratifications of the treaty until the order should be repealed; to make the exchange of ratifications dependent upon that event; and to adhere to his original purpose of pursuing the advice of the senate, connecting with that measure the memorial which had been mentioned, as an act explanatory of the sense in which his ratification was made, were severally reviewed by him. In conformity with his practice of withholding his opinion on controverted points until it should become necessary to decide them, he suspended his determination on these propositions until the memorial should be prepared and laid before him. In the meantime, his private affairs required that he should visit Mount Vernon.

So restless and uneasy was the temper respecting foreign nations which had long been manifested, that no surprise ought to be excited at the anxiety which was felt on the negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain, nor at the means which were used before its contents were known, to extend the prejudices against it.

CHAP. VIII.

Although in the progress of the negotiations, 1795. parts of them had been occasionally published, great umbrage was taken at the mysterious secrecy in which they had been involved. That the instrument itself was not immediately communicated to the public, and that the senate deliberated upon it with closed doors, were considered as additional evidences of the contempt in which their rulers held the feelings and understandings of the people, and of the monarchical tendencies of the government. Crowned heads, it was loudly repeated, who were machinating designs subversive of the rights of man, and the happiness of nations, might well cover with an impenetrable veil, their dark transactions; but republics ought to have no secrets. In republics, the functionaries being the servants of the people, acting solely for their benefit, ought to transact all national affairs in open day. This doctrine was not too absurd for the extravagance of the moment.

The predetermined hostility which this treaty was doomed to encounter, increased its activity as the period for deciding the fate of that instrument approached. On its particular merits, no opinion could be formed, because they were unknown; but on the general question of reconciliation between the two countries, a decisive judgment was extensively made up. The sentiments called forth by the occasion demonstrated, that no possible adjustment of differences with Great Britain, no possible arrangement which might promise a future friendly intercourse with that power, could be satisfactory. The executive

was openly attacked; its whole system strongly CHAP. VIII. condemned; and the mission of Mr. Jay, particu- 1795. larly, was reprobated in terms of peculiar harshness. That a treaty of amity and commerce should have been formed, whatever might be its principles, was a degrading insult to the American people · a pusillanimous surrender of their honour; and an insidious injury to France. Between such a compact and an alliance, no distinction was taken. It was an abandonment of the ancient allies of the United States, whose friendship had given them independence, and whose splendid victories still protected them, for a close connexion with their natural enemies, and with the enemies of human liberty.

The pretended object of the mission, it was said, was a reparation for wrongs, not a contaminating connexion with the most faithless and corrupt court in the world. The return of the envoy without that reparation, was a virtual surrender of the claim. The honour of the United States required a peremptory demand of the immediate surrender of the western posts, and of compensation for the piratical depredations committed on their commerce, not a disgraceful and humiliating negotiation. The surrender and the compensation ought to have been made instantly, for no reliance could be placed in promises to be performed in future.

That the disinclination formerly manifested by Great Britain, to give the stability and certainty of compact to the principles regulating the commercial intercourse between the two countries,

CHAP. VIII, had constituted an important item in the catalogue of 1795. complaints against that power: that the existence

or non existence of commercial treaties had been selected as the criterion by which to regulate the discriminations proposed to be made in the trade of foreign nations: that, in the discussion on this subject, the favourers of commercial hostility had uniformly advocated the policy of giving value to treaties with the United States. These opinions were instantly forgotten and relinquished by the party which had strenuously supported them while urged by their leaders in congress; and it was imputed as a crime to the government and to its negotiator, that he had proceeded further than to demand immediate and unconditional reparation of the wrongs sustained by the United States.

With this course of passionate declamation were connected the most strenuous and unremitting exertions to give increased energy to the love which was openly avowed for France, and to the detestation which was not less openly avowed for England.*

Such was the state of parties when the senate advised the ratification of the treaty. Although common usage, and a decent respect for the executive, and for a foreign nation, not less than a positive resolution, required that the seal of secrecy should not be broken by the senate, an abstract of this instrument, not very faithfully taken, was given to the public; and on the 29th of June, a senator of the United States transmitted

*See Note No. XVI, at the end of the volume

a copy of it to the most distinguished editor of the CHAP. VIIL opposition party in Philadelphia, to be communi- 1795. cated to the public through the medium of the press.

If the negotiation itself had been acrimoniously censured; if amicable arrangements, whatever might be their character, had been passionately condemned; it was not to be expected that the treaty would assuage these pre-existing irritations.

In fact, it was impossible that public opinion should not receive from it a considerable shock; and that men, uninfected by faction, should not, at its first appearance, feel some disappointment. In national contests, unless there be a strong predilection in favour of the adversary country, few men, even among the intelligent, are sensible of the weakness which may exist in their own pretensions, or can allow their full force to the claims of the adverse party. Their own complaints form the perpetual theme of popular declamation, and are listened to with complacency; while those which may be urged against them are seldom heard. All their own wishes appear perfectly reasonable, and they are astonished that equivalents for what they ask should be required from them. If the people at large enter keenly into the points of controversy with a foreign power, they can never be satisfied with any equal adjustment of the controversy, unless other considerations, stronger than abstract reason, afford that satisfaction; nor will it ever be difficult to prove to them, in a case unassisted by the passions, that in any practicable commercial contract, they give too much and receive too little.