turned, as the only channel through which the CHAP. III. surplus produce of their luxuriant soil could be conveyed to the markets of the world; and on its free navigation depended, as they conceived, the future wealth and prosperity of their country. Irritated by understanding that it had been contemplated by the old congress to barter away this right for twenty-five years, they gave some evidence of a disposition to drop from the confederacy, if this valuable acquisition could not otherwise be made. This temper could not fail to be viewed with interest by the neighbouring powers, who had been encouraged by it, and by the imbecility of the government, to enter into intrigues of an alarming nature.

Previous to his departure from Mount Vernon, the president had received intelligence, too authentic to be disregarded, of private machinations by real or pretended agents both of Spain and Great Britain, which were extremely hostile to the peace, and to the integrity of the union.

On the part of Spain, it had been indicated that the navigation of the Mississippi could never be conceded while the inhabitants of the western country remained connected with the Atlantic states, but might be freely granted to them if they should form an independent empire.

On the other hand, a gentlemen from Canada, whose ostensible business was to repossess himself of some lands on the Ohio which had been formerly granted to him, frequently discussed the vital importance of the navigation of the Mississippi, and privately assured several influential

CHAP. III. individuals, that if they were disposed to assert 1789. their rights, he was authorized by lord Dorchester the governor of Canada to say, that they might rely confidently on his assistance. With the aid it was in his power to give, they might seize New Orleans, fortify the Balise at the mouth of the Mississippi, and maintain themselves in that place against the utmost efforts of Spain.

The probability of failing in any attempt to hold the mouth of the Mississippi by force, and the resentments against Great Britain which prevailed generally throughout the western country, diminished the danger to be apprehended from any machinations of that power; but against those of Spain, the same security did not exist.

In contemplating the situation of the United States in their relations not purely domestic, the object of most immediate consideration was the enmity which had been manifested towards them by several tribes of Indians. The military strength of the northern nations, who inhabited the country between the lakes, the Mississippi, and the Ohio, was computed at five thousand men, of whom about fifteen hundred were at open war with the United States. With the residue, treaties had been concluded; but the attachment of young savages to war, and the provocation given by the undistinguishing vengeance which had been taken by the whites in their expeditions into the Indian country, on all those who fell in their way, furnished reasons for apprehending that these treaties would soon be broken.

In the south, the Creeks, who could bring into CHAP. III, the field six thousand fighting men, were at war 1789. with Georgia. In the mind of their leader, the son of a white man, some irritation had been pro duced by the confiscation of the lands of his father, who had resided in Georgia; and several other refugees from that state, whose property had also been confiscated, contributed still further to exasperate the nation. But the immediate point in contest between them was a tract of land on the Oconee, which the state of Georgia claimed under a purchase, the validity of which was denied by the Indians. The regular effective force of the United States was less than six hundred men.

Not only the policy of accommodating differences by negotiation which the government was in no condition to terminate by the sword; but a real respect for the rights of the natives, and a regard for the claims of justice and humanity, disposed the president to endeavour, in the first instance, to remove every cause of quarrel by a treaty; and his message to congress on this subject evidenced his preference of pacific measures.

Possessing many valuable articles of commerce for which the best market was often found on the coast of the Mediterranean, struggling to export them in their own bottoms, and unable to afford a single gun for their protection, the Americans could not view with unconcern the dispositions which were manifested towards them by the Barbary powers. A treaty had been formed with the emperor of Morocco, and no indications were given by that sovereign of an intention to violate

CHAP. HI. it. But from Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, peace 1789. had not been purchased; and those regencies

consider all as enemies to whom they have not sold their friendship. The unprotected vessels of America presented a tempting object to their rapacity; and their hostility was the more terrible, because by their law of nations prisoners become slaves.

With all the powers of Europe, America was at peace; but with some of them, there existed controversies of a delicate nature, the adjustment of which required a degree of moderation and firmness, which there was much reason to fear would not, in every instance, be exhibited.

The early apprehensions with which Spain had contemplated the probable future strength of the United States, and the consequent disposition of the house of Bourbon to restrict them to narrow limits, have been already noticed. After the conclusion of the war, the attempt to form a treaty with that power had been repeated, but no advance towards an agreement on the points of difference between the two governments had been made. A long and intricate negotiation between the secretary of foreign affairs, and Don Guardoqui, the minister of his catholic majesty, had terminated with the old government; and the result was an inflexible adherence on the part of Mr. Guardoqui to the exclusion of the citizens of the United States from navigating the Mississippi below their southern boundary. On this point there was much reason to fear that the cabinet of Madrid would remain immoveable. The violence with which

the discontents of the western people were ex- CHAP. II pressed, furnished Spain with additional motives 1789. for perpetuating the evil of which they complained. Aware of the embarrassments which this display of restlessness must occasion, and sensible of the increased difficulty and delay with which a removal of its primary cause must be attended, the executive perceived in this critical state of things, abundant cause for the exercise of its watchfulness, and of its prudence. With Spain, there was also a contest respecting boundaries. The treaty of peace had extended the limits of the United States to the thirty first degree of north latitude, but the pretensions of the catholic king were carried north of that line, to an undefined extent. He claimed as far as he had conquered from Britain, but the precise limits of his conquest were not ascertained.

The circumstances attending the points of dif ference with Great Britain, were still more serious, because in their progress, a temper unfavourable to their accommodation had been uniformly excited.

With the war, the resentments produced by the various calamities it had occasioned, were not terminated. The idea that Great Britain was the natural enemy of America had become habitual. Believing it impossible for that nation to have relinquished absolutely its views of conquest, many found it difficult to bury their animosities, and to act upon the sentiment contained in the declaration of independence, "to hold them as the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends." In addition to the complaints respecting