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Let us have a government, by which our lives, CHAP. II. liberties, and properties will be secured; or let us know the worst at once. Under these impres- 1787. sions my humble opinion is that there is a call for decision. Know precisely what the insurgents aim at. If they have real grievances, redress them if possible; or acknowledge the justice of them, and your inability to do it in the present moment. If they have not, employ the force of government against them at once. If this is inadequate, all will be convinced that the superstructure is bad, or wants support. To be more exposed in the eyes of the world, and more contemptible than we already are, is hardly possible. To delay one or the other of these expedients, is to exasperate on the one hand, or to give confidence on the other, and will add to their numbers; for like snow-balls, such bodies increase by every movement, unless there is something in the way to obstruct and crumble them before their weight is too great and irresistible.

Precedents are

"These are my sentiments. dangerous things. Let the reins of government then be braced, and held with a steady hand; and every violation of the constitution be reprehended. If defective, let it be amended, but not suffered to be trampled upon while it has an existence."

In a letter written about the same period, colonel Humphries, after stating his apprehensions that the insurgents would seize the continental magazine at Springfield, proceeded to add; "a general failure to comply with the requisitions of congress for money, seems to prognosticate that

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CHAP. II. we are rapidly advancing to a crisis. The wheels of the great political machine can scarcely continue to move much longer, under their present embarrassment. Congress I am told are seriously alarmed, and hardly know which way to turn, or what to expect. Indeed, my dear general, nothing but a good Providence can extricate us from our present difficulties, and prevent some terrible conclusion.

"In case of civil discord I have already told you, it was seriously my opinion that you could not remain neuter; and that you would be obliged in self defence, to take part on one side or the other, or withdraw from the continent. Your friends are of the same opinion; and I believe you are convinced that it is impossible to have more disinterested or zealous friends, than those who have been about your person.'

"It is," said the general in reply, "with the deepest and most heartfelt concern, I perceive by some late paragraphs extracted from the Boston papers, that the insurgents of Massachussetts, far from being satisfied with the redress offered by their general court, are still acting in open violation of law and government, and have obliged the chief magistrate in a decided tone to call upon the militia of the state to support the constitution. What, gracious God, is man! that there should be such inconsistency and perfidiousness in his conduct. It is but the other day that we were shedding our blood to obtain the constitutions under which we now live;...constitutions of our own choice and making:...and now, we are un

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sheathing the sword to overturn them. The thing CHAP. II. is so unaccountable that I hardly know how to realize it; or to persuade myself that I am not 1787. under the illusion of a dream.

"My mind, previous to the receipt of your letter of the first ultimo, had often been agitated by a thought similar to the one you expressed respecting an old friend of yours: but heaven forbid that a crisis should come when he shall be driven to the necessity of making a choice of either of the alternatives there mentioned."

Finding that the lenient measures which had been taken by the legislature to subdue the resentments of the insurgents only enlarged their demands; that the pardon proffered to those who would return to their duty was rejected with scorn; that the conciliating efforts of government only increased their audacity; and that they were proceeding systematically to organize a military force for the subversion of the constitution; governor Bowdoin, who had been probably restrained by the temper manifested by the house of representatives from an earlier resort to force, at length determined, with the advice of council, on a vigorous exertion of all the powers he possessed, for the protection and defence of the commonwealth. Upwards of four thousand militia were ordered into service, and were placed under the command of the veteran general Lincoln. "His military reputation," says Mr. Minot," and mildness of temper, rendered him doubly capacitated for so delicate and important a trust." But the public treasury did not afford the means of

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CHAP. II. keeping this force in the field a single week, and 1783 the legislature not being in session the constituted

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authorities were incapable of putting the troops in motion. This difficulty was removed by individual patriotism. From the commencement of the commotions, the citizens of Boston had manifested unequivocally their fidelity to the constitution. On this occasion, a number of gentlemen with the governor at the head of the list, subscribed in a few hours a sufficient sum to carry on the proposed expedition.

In the depth of winter, the troops from the eastern part of the state assembled near Boston, and marched towards the scene of action. Those from the western counties met in arms under general Shepard, an officer who had served with reputation through the war of the revolution, and took possession of the arsenal at Springfield. Before the arrival of Lincoln, a party of the insurgents attempted to dislodge Shepard, but were repulsed with some loss. Not being pursued by that officer, who could not venture to weaken his post by detachments, they continued embodied, but did not venture again to undertake offensive operations.

Urging his march with the utmost celerity, Lincoln soon came up ; and pressing the insurgent army, endeavoured by a succession of rapid movements, in which the ardour of his troops triumphed over the extreme severity of the season, to disperse, or to bring it to action. Their generals retreated from post to post with a rapidity which for some time eluded his designs; and, rejecting

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every proposition to lay down their arms, used all CHAP. II. their address to produce a suspension of hostilities until an accommodation might be negotiated with the legislature. "Applications were also made," says general Lincoln, "by committees and select men of the several towns in the counties of Worcester and Hampshire, praying that the effusion of blood might be avoided, while the real design of these applications was supposed to be, to stay our operations until a new court should be elected. They had no doubt, if they could keep up their influence until another choice of the legislature and of the executive, that matters might be moulded in general court to their wishes. To avoid this was the duty of government." In answer to these applications, Lincoln exhorted those towns who sincerely wished to put an end to the rebellion without the effusion of blood, "to recall their men now in arms, and to aid in apprehending all abettors of those who should persist in their treason, and all who should yield them any comfort or supplies."

The army of government continued to brave the rigours of the climate, and to press the enemy without intermission. At length, with the loss of a few killed and several prisoners, the rebels were dispersed, their leaders driven out of the state, and this formidable and wicked rebellion was completely quelled.

The same love of country which had supported the officers and soldiers of the late army through a perilous war, still glowed in their bosoms; and the patriot veterans of the revolution, uninfected