must, in general, prove it, although it involves a negative: Hicks v. Martin, 13 Id. 304; Towsey v. Shook, 25 Id. 108. But it is held by many authorities that in an action for a breach of covenant of seisin, the burden of proving seisin is upon the defendant, since he is presumably in possession of the evidence in regard to the matter: See Mecklem v. Blake, 82 Id. 707, and note.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE IS CITED in Great Western R. R. Co. v. Hanks, 36 Ill 284, where it is said that the language used in the principal case, "we have repeatedly held that it was necessary in pleading to negative all these exceptions,” was unwarranted, as the court had thus held only in regard to the exceptions contained in the enacting clause of the statute.

ROBERTS v. OGLE.

[80 ILLINOIS, 459.]

RIGHT OF OWNERS OF STOCK UNDER LAWS OF STATE OF ILLINOIS to turn them upon the common range of the county is within legislative control, and may be abridged or destroyed by the legislature, and this power may be conferred upon an incorporated town. ORDINANCE DECLARING SWINE RUNNING AT LARGE WITHIN CORPORATE LIMITS TO BE NUISANCES, and providing for the abatement thereof, passed by an incorporated town under the authority conferred by its charter to declare what shall be nuisances, and to provide for the abatement thereof by ordinance, is valid, notwithstanding that under the laws of the state the owners of stock have the right to turn them upon the common range of the county.

REPLEVIN for eight hogs against Roberts, the town constable of the town of Carrollton, who took the hogs while running at large within the corporate limits, by virtue of an ordinance passed by the trustees of the town, by which it was declared that the running of hogs at large in the town was a nuisance, and that it was the duty of the town constable to take up any swine found running at large, and to keep them, and post notices describing the swine, and to sell them, if not redeemed, in the prescribed time and manner. Roberts refused to deliver the swine except upon the payment of his charges as prescribed in the ordinance. Upon the trial of the cause, the court gave the instruction contained in the opinion.

James W. English, for plaintiff in error.

By Court, CATON, C. J. The town of Carrollton was by its charter authorized to declare what should be nuisances, and to provide for the abatement thereof by ordinance. An ordinance was passed declaring swine running at large within the corporate limits to be nuisances, and providing for the abatement thereof. The court instructed, "that under the laws

of the state of Illinois, the owners of stock have the right to turn them upon the common range of the county, and the corporation of the town of Carrollton has no right to pass an ordinance to impair that right; and that the ordinance under which the defendant justifies the taking of the plaintiff's hogs is null and void, so far as it regards persons residing without the limits of the corporation." This instruction was erroneous. Admitting the right of common to be as stated, it is not such a right as is not within legislative control. It may be abridged or destroyed wherever and whenever the law-making power may think the public good may require it. If the legislature has the constitutional authority to confer this power upon the corporation, then the corporation had authority to pass this ordinance. The right to have hogs at large in the corporate limits is of no higher order than the right to have spirituous liquors within the same limits; and in the case of Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill. 588 [60 Am. Dec. 773], we held that it was competent to the legislature to authorize the corporation to destroy such right by declaring liquor a nuisance there. The ordinance was valid, and the instruction erroneous.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, POWER OF, TO PASS ORDINANCES: See City of St. Paul v. Laidler, 72 Am. Dec. 89, and note citing prior cases 97.

POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TO PROHIBIT AND PREVENT NUI. SANCES, and to declare what is a nuisance: See Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 40 Am. Dec. 337, and note 344; power to regulate the sale of liquors: Ses State v. Clark, 61 Id. 611, note 614; Goddard v. Jacksonville, 60 Id. 773.

SMYTH V. HARVIE AND TULEY.

[31 ILLINOIS, 62.)

DUTY OF ATTORNEY DOES NOT TERMINATE WITH RECOVERY of judgment, but extends to the collection of the money recovered, when the sum charged for professional services was designed to cover the collection of the money, as well as the recovery of the judgment.

DUTY OF PARTNERSHIP COMPOSED OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW, who embrace a collecting business with the practice of law, extends to the collection of money recovered by judgment, unless it is otherwise agreed between the parties; and as this is a partnership duty, it continues with each member, after the dissolution of the firm.

LIABILITY OF EACH MEMBER OF PARTNERSHIP of attorneys to collect money recovered by judgment continues after the dissolution of the partnership,

notwithstanding such dissolution may have taken place before the business intrusted to them was completed, and the only way that such liability can be released is by notice of the dissolution. In the absence of such notice, as the client intrusted his business to the firm, he has a right to look to each member thereof for its faithful performance. THE opinion contains the facts.

Hurd and Booth, for the plaintiffs in error.

Barker and Tuley, for the defendants in error.

By Court, WALKER, J. The plaintiffs in error retained defendants in error to institute a suit against McDonnell. A judgment was recovered, an execution was issued, real estate was sold, and purchased for four hundred dollars, and a certificate of purchase was taken in the names of plaintiffs in error. Afterwards, McDonnell redeemed the land from this sale, paying into the hands of the sheriff, for the purpose, $440. On the nineteenth day of February, 1857, defendant Harvie took the certificate of purchase to the sheriff, obtained the money, and receipted for it in the name of the firm. It seems that this money was never paid to plaintiffs in error, and this action was brought for its recovery, together with $128.54, received at a different time.

Defendant Tuley relies upon a dissolution of the partnership between himself and Harvie, previous to the receipt of this redemption money, as a defense to that portion of plaintiffs' claim. This was allowed by the court below, in which a judgment was rendered for $44.25, the balance of the $128.54, and interest, after deducting defendants' fee for services in collecting the money.

Whilst by the rules of the ancient common law it was no part of an attorney's duty to receive money on a judgment, yet in more modern times attorneys have become collecting agents as well as lawyers. By uniform custom and practice, attor neys engage in and attend to the collection of money as a part of their professional duty. Such is inseparable from the practice at the present day. It is not reasonable to suppose that either party imagined, at the time of this retainer, that the duty of the defendants ceased when they obtained the judgment on the plaintiffs' claim. And the sum charged for professional services no doubt was designed to cover the collection of the money, as well as the recovery of the judgment. In fact, the evidence of the value of their services refers to all they did in the case. They thus recognize their undertaking as collecting agents.

Then, if their partnership embraced the business of collecting money, as well as the practice of the law in other branches of the profession, it became a part of their duty to collect the money after judgment was recovered, unless otherwise agreed. If this was a partnership duty, it continued with each member, after the dissolution of the firm. Plaintiffs gave credit to the firm as it was then constituted, and they did not release themselves from their obligation by its dissolution. For aught we know, the fact that Tuley was a partner may have been the inducement to confide the business to the care of the firm.

Even if a dissolution of the partnership could have released the members from liability for a failure to complete the business, it could only have been after notice of the dissolution. In the absence of such notice, plaintiffs had no option in determining whether they would continue the cause in the hands of the member who took charge of the business of the firm, or would place it in the hands of another attorney. It cannot be that their business can be transferred to others without their consent, so as to escape responsibility. They did not trust either member of the firm separately, but it was to both that the business was intrusted, and they have the right to look to both for its faithful performance. The court below erred in finding that Tuley was released from liability by the dissolution of the partnership, and the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY AT LAW DOES NOT TERMINATE with the rendition of judgment, but continues until its collection: Albertson etc. v. Goldsby, 65 Am. Dec. 380, and cases cited in note 383. See also note to Fitch v. Scott, 34 Id. 94, where it is held that if an attorney undertakes to collect a debt, it is his duty to sue out all process to effect that end. To the same effect is Pennington v. Yell, 52 Id. 262.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE IS CITED WITH APPROVAL, in McLain v. Watkins, 43 Ill. 26, where an attorney had land sold under execution to collect a debt due his client, after the expiration of the time in which to redeem he received and paid the money received as redemption to his client, who, before that time, had assigned his interest, and it was held that after the time for redemption expired, the relation of attorney and client ceased, and the attorney could do no act without new authority from his client, that he was therefore liable to the execution defendant for the redemption money received.

LEIGHTON V. HALL.

[31 ILLINOIS, 108.J

ARREST. - COPY OF ORDER OF COURT not running in the name of the people, and adjudging that a party named therein shall pay a certain amount to the sheriff to whose hands the copy of the order shall come, or in default thereof, the sheriff should arrest and detain him in custody, does not authorize the sheriff to make the arrest on default of the party, as the Illinois constitution provides that "all process, writs, and other proceedings shall run in the name of 'The People of the State of Illinois.” ILLINOIS STATUTE AUTHORIZES CONSERVATORS OF PEACE to arrest for crimi. nal offenses committed in their presence; but if they make arrests under other circumstances, they do so at their peril, and must take the responsibility of showing that the prisoner has been guilty of a crime. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF COURT MAY, upon a mere order of the court, detain

persons who are in the presence of the court, or who are already in custody; but such order, if sent into the country without process, will not anthorize an arrest.

BILL for divorce against Hall by his wife, defendant in error. During the course of proceedings in this action, the court entered an order that Mrs. Hall receive from her husband the sum of one hundred dollars alimony pendente lite. The action against Leighton, as sheriff, arises from an order of court made in the first action, by which he was ordered to pay into court the sum of $104.45, for contempt in failing to arrest Hall on the order first above mentioned. The other

facts appear from the opinion.

W. C. Goudy, for the plaintiff in error.

C. C. Bonney, for the defendant in error.

By Court, CATON, C. J. After a careful consideration and examination of this subject, we have arrived at the conclusion that this decree against the sheriff cannot be sustained, for the reason that he was not authorized to arrest Hall on the order, with a copy of which he was furnished. The twentysixth section of the fifth article of the constitution declares that "all process, writs, and other proceedings shall run in the name of 'The People of the State of Illinois."" No such writ or other such process was issued to the sheriff commanding him to arrest Hall. He was simply furnished with a copy of an order of the court, adjudging that Hall should pay one hundred dollars to the sheriff to whose hands a copy of the order should come, or in default thereof, the sheriff should arrest and detain him in custody. The sheriff served the copy of the order on Hall, who did not pay the money, and the