applicable to the District or its appropriations unless specifically made applicable thereto.

The proposition that offices of the District are not Federal offices rests upon established status of the District as a municipal corporation having an entity separate and distinct from the Federal Government. This status is settled beyond controversy. The matter is fully and clearly discussed in decision of the United States Supreme Court (Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S., 540; Metropolitan R. R. Co., 132 U. S., 1; District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U. S., 640). It is unnecessary for the purposes of this decision to review these cases.

While it is true beyond question that the District is a municipal corporation having a separate entity, with its own administration of municipal affairs, it is also true that the function of its offices is that of administration, and that Congress exercises exclusive power of legislating for the District, including, of course, the appropriating of money and the fixing of limitations on its expenditure. It is clear, therefore, that the applicability to the District of any statute which Congress may enact must depend, not upon the status of the District as a separate entity from that of the Federal service generally, but upon the terms of the statute itself, and, in case of doubt as to the scope of the statute, upon the surrounding circumstances and underlying purpose of the legislation.

The auditor has cited various rulings of the courts, the Attorney General, or the Comptroller of the Treasury, as to the applicability or otherwise of several general statutes to the District. These citations serve to emphasize the necessity for consideration and interpretation of each statute separately, and the impracticability of announcing any general rule which shall govern the applicability of all statutes. No rule so broad as that a general statute shall not apply to the District unless it is in specific terms made so applicable can be sanctioned. Inference to be drawn from a failure of Congress to expressly apply general legislation to the District can go no further than a presumption that such legislation is not applicable to the District; a presumption which must yield to a contrary intent of the statute as established by its provisions and underlying purpose. The full text of section 5 of the act of July 16, 1914 (38 Stat., 508), is as follows:

"SEC. 5. No appropriation made in this or any other act shall be available for the purchase of any motor-propelled or horse-drawn passenger-carrying vehicle for the service of any of the executive departments or other Government establishments, or any branch of the Government service unless specific authority is given therefor, and after the close of the fiscal year nineteen hundred and fifteen there shall not be expended out of any appropriation made by Con

gress any sum for purchase, maintenance, repair, or operation of motor-propelled or horse-drawn passenger-carrying vehicles for any branch of the public service of the United States unless the same is specifically authorized by law, and in the estimates for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and sixteen and subsequent fiscal years there shall be submitted in detail estimates for such necessary appropriations as are intended to be used for purchase, maintenance, repair, or operation of all motor-propelled or horse-drawn passenger-carrying vehicles, specifying the sums required, the public purposes for which said vehicles are intended, and the officials or employees by whom the same are to be used."

This statutory inhibition attaches to any appropriation made in the act in which it appears or in any other act. It therefore attaches to the appropriations in the District appropriation act. The inhibition applies to "the executive departments or other Government establishments or any branch of the Government service."

For purposes of municipal administration and within its statutory grant of powers the District government is a separate entity operating within its own sphere independently of the executive departments or establishments of the Federal Government generally; but it is also an instrumentality of the Federal Government by means of which Congress, in the discharge of an authority conferred and a duty imposed by the Constitution, has provided for the government and administration of affairs at the seat of the Federal Government in territory ceded to the Federal Government and accepted by Congress under the provisions of the Federal Constitution.

The District government is therefore clearly a "branch of the Government service" in the broad sense in which the words are used in this statute, although given by Congress certain defined powers, duties, and obligations, and although its offices may be offices of the municipality and not offices of the United States for some purposes (Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S., 540; Cox v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl., 512).

The service of the District government is thus within the letter of the restrictive legislation hereinbefore quoted. The evident intent and purpose of the statute is that no money appropriated by Congress shall be spent for the purchase of the prescribed vehicles "unless specific authority is given therefor," and this applies to District appropriations as well as to other appropriations for the Federal service generally.

Aside from this rather strict view of the statute I think it may be said that a broad, comprehensive view of the whole section undoubtedly requires the inclusion of the District of Columbia within its true spirit and meaning. The prohibition is against the use of money appropriated by any act and the addition after the words so fre2216°-YOL 21-15- 43

quently used, "executive departments or other Government establishments," of the words " or any branch of the Government service " conveys the idea of an intent to so broaden the language as to include all activities under Federal control.

The specific question presented in this case is whether the purchase of a passenger-carrying automobile for service at the District workhouse at Occoquan, Va., is lawful under the terms of the statute.

The appropriation to which it is proposed to charge this purchase (38 Stat., 547, 548) provides for "transportation; maintenance and operation of means of transportation, and means of transportation.” This appropriation carries authority for the purchase of "means of transportation," and in the absence of all restriction would undoubtedly carry authority for the purchase of passenger-carrying vehicles. It does not, however, specifically authorize the purchase of such. vehicles, and therefore does not take such purchases out of the inhibition of the general statute.

The purchase of the automobile in question was unlawful under the statute and payment therefor is accordingly not authorized.

CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE PAY OF ASSISTANT SURGEONS IN MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS OF THE NAVY.

The provisions of the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1007), giving a credit of five years' constructive service to officers of the Navy appointed from civil life are not applicable to assistant surgeons in the Medical Reserve Corps of the Navy.

Decision by Comptroller Downey, March 27, 1915:

The Auditor for the Navy Department submits for approval, disapproval, or modification his decision of March 17, 1915, as follows:

"In the settlement of the accounts of M. M. Ramsay, pay inspector, United States Navy, Naval Academy, first quarter, 1915, the question arises as to the right of a member of the Medical Reserve Corps of the Navy to constructive service in the calculation of his pay.

"William G. Townsend was appointed an acting assistant surgeon in the Navy from August 28, 1912; accepted his appointment and executed required oath of office September 6, 1912. He was appointed as assistant surgeon in the Medical Reserve Corps of the Navy from February 7, 1913, accepted his appointment and executed required oath of office March 15, 1913.

"Under date of February 24, 1913, he received the following order: "DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, "Washington, D. C., February 24, 1913.

*

*

*

"You are hereby detached from duty at the Marine recruiting station, Baltimore, Md., and from such other duty as may have been

assigned you; will report to the officer in charge of the Navy recruiting station, Baltimore, Md., for such other duty as may be assigned you at that station.

"This employment on shore duty is required by the public in

terests.

"Under date of March 10, 1913, he received the following order:

"Upon the execution of your oath of office as assistant surgeon, Medical Reserve Corps, United States Navy, your appointment as acting assistant surgeon in the United States Navy will be regarded as revoked, and you will continue on your present duties.

"This employment on shore duty is required by the public interests.

"Upon his appointment as acting assistant surgeon September 6, 1912, he was credited with five years' constructive service as on appointment from civil life. (See Plummer v. United States, 224 U. S., 137; 18 Comp. Dec., 967.) Upon his appointment as assistant surgeon in the Medical Reserve Corps of the Navy he was also credited with five years' constructive service in computing his pay, and said increase has been passed by this office from March 15, 1913, to July 15, 1914. I now have said credit before me in the accounts of Pay Inspector Ramsay from July 16 to September 30, 1914, and as the question is one involving an original construction of a statute, I deem it proper to submit same to you, notwithstanding the practical interpretation placed upon the statutes involved by this office in the passing of said credit heretofore.

"The act of August 22, 1912 (37 Stat., 344), provides:

"That a Medical Reserve Corps, to be a constituent part of the Medical Department of the Navy, is hereby established under the same provisions, in all respects (except as may be necessary to adapt the said provisions to the Navy), as those providing a Medical Reserve Corps for the Army, and as set forth in the act to increase the efficiency of the Medical Department of the United States Army, approved April twenty-third, nineteen hundred and eight.'

66

Section 9 of the act of April 23, 1908 (35 Stat., 68), establishing the Medical Reserve Corps of the Army, provides:

"SEC. 9. That officers of the Medical Reserve Corps, when called upon active duty in the service of the United States, as provided in section eight of this act, shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders for the government of the Regular Army, and during the period of such service shall be entitled to the pay and allowances of first lieutenants of the Medical Corps with increase for length of service now allowed by law, said increase to be computed only for time of active duty.' * *

"It will be observed that section 9 (supra) defines in what manner and upon what service the 'increase for length of service' is

to be calculated, viz, 'said increase to be computed only for time of active duty.' I do not think it can be construed that the last-quoted proviso has reference to the periods during which increase in length of service, when determined, is to be paid, but rather that it establishes the basis upon which longevity increase is to be calculated, for the reason that it is defined elsewhere in section 9 (supra) for what periods pay is to be credited, viz, when called upon active duty.' I think it is clear that section 9 (supra) provides that the longevity of members of the Medical Reserve Corps of the Army is to be calculated upon the periods of their active duty only.

"I find no provision of law authorizing to members of the Medical Reserve Corps of the Navy increase of longevity otherwise than as provided for members of the Reserve Corps of the Army, and accordingly am of opinion and so decide that Asst. Surg. Townsend upon his appointment in the Medical Reserve Corps of the Navy is not entitled, in computing his longevity increase, to be credited with the five years' constructive service provided by section 13 of the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1007), and that Pay Inspector Ramsay is not entitled to credit in his accounts for the increased pay so allowed from July 15 to September 30, 1914, being difference between $2,000 per annum, pay of lieutenant (junior grade) in first five years (rank of Asst. Surg. Townsend), and $2,200, pay of same grade after five years' service.

"In 19 Comptroller's Decisions, 744, it was said with reference to the act of March 4, 1913 (37 Stat., 891), providing:

*

"That so much of an act * approved March 3, 1899. which reads as follows: "And that all officers, including warrant officers, who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life shall, on the date of appointment, be credited for computing their pay with five years' service," shall not apply to any such persons entering the Navy from and after the passage of this act ** * * as follows:

"While this law clearly prohibits the crediting of constructive service on appointments made after its passage, I see nothing in its terms to indicate an intent to take from an officer appointed after its passage a credit for constructive service legally received by him prior to its passage. In other words, I think the plain import of the provision is that it is the crediting of constructive service, and not the counting of such service previously credited that is prohibited from and after the passage of the act.'

"Asst. Surg. Townsend was legally in receipt of constructive service while acting as assistant surgeon in the Navy, but the provisions of the act of April 23, 1908 (supra), and of August 22, 1912 (supra), so clearly limit the longevity of a member of the Medical Reserve Corps of the Navy to periods of active duty that it is not required to go beyond or outside of said acts to determine such longevity increase."

It may be observed that the appointment of acting assistant surgeons in the Navy was authorized by the act of May 4, 1898 (30) Stat., 380), and the position is an entirely separate and distinct one from that of assistant surgeon in the Medical Reserve Corps.