"For recording any instrument or paper not exceeding three folios, filing same, and indorsing thereon the date, hour, and minute same was received for record, first division, $1; second, third, and fourth divisions, $1.50. * * * "For each additional folio in excess of three folios, * * * first division, $0.20; second, third, and fourth divisions, $0.30." It appears that the Territorial legislature has passed a statute known as the vital-statistics law requiring that all certificates of marriage, of death, or of birth shall be filed with a commissioner for record, and has fixed a fee of $1 for recording each such certificate. While this Territorial statute may have increased the volume of work which these commissioners are required to do, it does not seem to impose upon them any additional duty which may not be required of them under their Federal obligation as recorders, as it is not shown that the record required by Territorial law is additional to or different from the record required by the Federal statute. When these commissioners record certificates of marriage, of birth, or of death it would seem that they act under Federal statute and are entitled to the Federal fee provided for such service, and in the absence of a rule of competent authority to the contrary they will be held to account accordingly. Your question is general in character, but it does not appear that any other Territorial statutes than those considered in this decision and the one of even date hereinbefore referred to are involved, and it would seem that all present necessities are met by these two decisions. It is difficult and inadvisable to attempt a decision of general application on this line. Should other like Territorial statutes come up for interpretation they may be submitted for decision as occasion may arise. AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT. An express authority to make contracts is not divested by a subsequent change from permanent to annual appropriations for the subject matter of the contracts. Comptroller Downey to the Secretary of the Interior, January 13, 1915: I have your letter of January 4, 1915, requesting decision"In case appropriations are made to provide for the work covered by contracts executed before such appropriations are enacted, under the circumstances heretofore affecting the Reclamation Service, and funds become available on July 1, 1915, for the purpose, whether the work may be continued under said contracts or if the contracts in fact terminate by operation of law on June 30, 1915, so far as subsequent work thereunder is concerned." The act of August 13, 1914 (38 Stat., 690), prohibits from July 1, 1915, expenditures for carrying out the purposes of the reclamation law except out of appropriations made anually therefor out of the reclamation fund; and estimates are required to be made for the appropriations including the extension and completion of existing projects and the construction of new projects. Of the contracts specifically mentioned by your submission, all involve work extending beyond June 30; some were made before the passage of the act of 1914; in one proposals were received before the passage of the act, but the contract was made afterwards; and in another, the contract was made after the passage of the act but contained a stipulation that it should be subject to future appropriations for work done after June 30. All contracts now being made are stated as containing the latter stipulation. As a general rule, unless authorized by law, contracts may not be made except under appropriations adequate to their fulfillment (sec. 3732 and sec. 3679, Rev. Stat., as amended), but I do not think that in so far as there is work to be done the next fiscal year, the objection is to be made to these contracts that as to that part of the work the contract was not authorized by law. Section 2 of the reclamation act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), authorized the Secretary of the Interior to locate and construct irrigation works; and section 4 authorized him to let contracts for the construction of the projects in such portions or sections as practicable, providing the necessary funds were available in the reclamation fund. These provisions gave a general authority to contract and the reclamation fund was heretofore a permanent appropriation therefor. As to the contracts made before the act of 1914, the provisions of the reclamation act authorized them when made. The effect of the act of 1914 is simply to prohibit payments upon them from the reclamation fund for work done after June 30, 1915, and require specific appropriations therefor. (21 Comp. Dec., 313.) As to the contracts made after the act of 1914, it is not clear whether they concerned projects already under construction at the passage of the act of 1914; but however that may be, I think the provisions of the reclamation law (secs. 2 and 4, supra) constituted authority for making these contracts. The provisions of the act of 1914 changed the character of the appropriation from permanent to annual. This affects the payments that may be made and contracts can only be made accordingly— conditioned upon appropriation. You state provision has been made in the estimates to Congress for continuing in the next fiscal year the work covered by these contracts. In view of the provisions of the reclamation law, I see no reason for viewing the contracts as terminating June 30, 1915, if appropriations are made therefor. PAYMENT FOR PUBLICATION OF ADVERTISEMENT. Where authority is given to publish an advertisement in a paper a certain number of times "between" two given days, payment for the publication on the last-named day is not authorized. The word "between," when used in speaking of the period of time "between" two certain days, excludes the days designated as the commencement and termination of such period. Comptroller Downey to S. R. Jacobs, Disbursing Clerk, Treasury Department, January 14, 1915: I have your letter of the 12th instant submitting a voucher in favor of the Post Publishing Co., of Boston, Mass., for $12.60, covering charges for the publication of an advertisement in the Boston Post on December 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, being for six issues at the rate of $2.10 per issue. The authority for the publication of this advertisement is a letter addressed to the publisher of the paper by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, under date of December 8, 1914, in which said publisher is authorized to publish the advertisement in the daily edition of his paper "six times between Dec. 9th and Dec. 21st, 1914." My decision is requested as to whether, in view of the terms of this authorization you are authorized to pay for the insertion on December 21, the day on which the proposals mentioned in the advertisement were to be opened. Payment can be made for only such insertions as come within the terms of the authorization, that is to say, for publication on days "between” December 9 and December 21. The word "between," when used in speaking of the period of time "between" two certain days, has been held to exclude the days designated as the commencement and termination of such period. (People v. Hornbeck, 61 N. Y. Supp., 978; Kendall v. Kingsley, 120 Mass., 94, 95; Weir v. Thomas, 44 Nebr., 507. See also Winans v. Thorp, 87 Ill. App., 297, 298; Cook v. Gray, 6 Ind., 335, 337; Richardson v. Ford, 14 Ill., 332, 333; Bunce v. Reed, 16 Barb., 347, 352; Robinson v. Foster, 12 Iowa, 186, 188; Atkins v. Boylston F. & M. Ins. Co., 46 Mass., 439, 440.) A reason for adhering to technical construction in this case is found in the fact that a publication on the 21st could be of no value to the Government. You are advised, therefore, that payment is not authorized for the publication on December 21. INSPECTION OF HORSES EN ROUTE UNDER REQUIREMENT OF STATE LAW. The property of the United States or any of the instrumentalities employed by it in the performance of its proper functions is not the subject of taxation by a State or by any subdivision thereof. 2216°-VOL 21-15-29 1 The requirement of a State law of the evidence of inspection of horses before admission to the State does not make it the carrier's duty to make or procure the inspection of Government horses en route. Decision by Comptroller Downey, January 14, 1915: The Southern Pacific Co. applied October 24, 1914, for a revision of the action of the Auditor for the War Department in disallowing per settlement No. 19701, dated October 25, 1913, the sum of $60.40 claimed as reimbursement for amounts paid for veterinary services, as follows: Bill F. 26343, applying “Mallein test" on one horse at Ogden, Utah, Jan. 25, Same test on two horses, Sept. 28, 1911, while en route from Fort Riley, Kans., Bill F. 26599, for $3, inspection of one horse at St. Joseph, Mo., June 27, 1912, while en route from Duluth, Minn., to Huachuca, Ariz., bill of lading 556, dated June 21, 1912........... $5.35 6. 70 5.35 17.40 3.00 Bill F. 26341, for $25, inspection of three horses at Roseburg, Oreg., Feb. 11, 1913, while en route from Gardner, Mont., to San Francisco, Cal., bill of lading 106, dated Feb. 3, 1913...... 25.00 Bill F. 27118, for $15, inspection of one horse at Ashland, Oreg., on Sept. 15, 1911, while en route from Boise, Idaho, to San Francisco, Cal., bill of lading 5, dated Aug. 28, 1911.... 15.00 60. 40 The auditor disallowed the said claims for reasons stated by him as follows: "The Judge Advocate General in an opinion dated Oct. 22, 1910, on a similar case, held that payment could not be made. See page 1025, Digest of the Opinions of the Judge Advocate General (Howland), where are also cited other decisions of a closely related nature. "There appears to have been no contract or agreement on the part of the United States for this service, hence it was voluntary, and the United States is under no obligation to reimburse the Southern Pacific Co. for such service. It further appears that all State laws requiring an inspection such as that made, in this case (see law quoted on page 79, Circular 5-B, issued June 15, 1913, by W. H. Hosmer, agent) are void, as against the sovereign, the United States. See opinion of the Attorney General of August 18, 1904 (25 Op. Atty. Gen., 234; also 9th Comp., 181)." The company contends that said expenses were incurred because of the requirements of State laws. The California statute of March 7, 1911, chapter 131, page 293, prohibits the importation of horses into the State of California excepting when such horses are accompanied by a certificate of inspection from a veterinarian whose competency and reliability are certified to by 4 authorities charged with the control of live-stock sanitary work in the State from whence such horses come or are accompanied by a certificate of inspection issued by a veterinary inspector in the employ of the United States Department of Agriculture certifying that such horses have been examined and subjected to the Mallein test and are free from disease. The said certificate of inspection is required to be made out in duplicate, one copy of which shall be attached to the bill of lading when such horses are transported in railroad trains or steamboats, and the other copy, together with a record of the Mallein test or tests, shall be mailed to the State veterinarian of the State of California on the day the shipment is made. The Arizona Civil Code of 1913 provides by section 3697 for prohibition by proclamation by the governor, under conditions specified, of the importation of live stock, unless accompanied by a certificate of good health given by a duly authorized State veterinarian, and by section 3699 prohibits knowingly bringing into the State any domestic animal infected with or which has been exposed to any contagious or infectious disease. Under the Arizona statute the limitation upon the importation of live stock into the State applies only in accordance with the conditions named, the existence of which must be shown before the inspection of horses en route to Arizona could in any event be assumed to be required. In the absence of any evidence whatever as to said conditions it is not necessary to give any further consideration to the item of charge for the inspection of one horse at St. Joseph, Mo., en route Duluth, Minn., to Huachuca, Ariz., which must therefore be presumed to have been voluntarily incurred. The company contends that under the California statute the horses were required to be inspected before being taken into the State and that it was therefore the duty of the carrier to permit and pay for such inspection under its contract for transportation, which, being in the usual form, required the shipments to be delivered safely to the consignees within a reasonable time after date of shipment, and that the carrier is required to overcome any obstacle that would stand in the way of such delivery; that the law requiring such inspection was clearly within the police powers of the State; and that the fee paid to the veterinarians in the present case was in no sense a "tax" from which the State derives a revenue and therefore not to be included in that class of cases following McCulloch v. The State of Maryland et al. (4 Wheat., 316), holding that a State may not tax the Federal Government or any of its instrumentalities. It is well recognized that the police power of a State extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and to the protection of all property within the State, and |