section 14 of the act, the agreement entered into under the act of 1873, specifically provides that the quarterly payments therein provided for "shall during said term be in the place of all rental for the ground occupied by the market buildings of said company." The use of the term "determinable fee" was evidently not for the purpose of defining the actual estate granted, but the provision that it should be "taken and considered as " a determinable fee was probably intended simply as a basis for the accomplishment of the further purposes indicated in the same section.

The agreement referred to fixed the status of these quarterly payments as that of rental for the ground occupied. This ground belonged to the United States, and the rental thereof was a revenue of the United States, except in so far as it may have been donated by the United States to the District of Columbia or vested in the District as trustee for designated cestuis que trust.

The statutes and agreements hereinbefore referred to have been given judicial consideration and interpretation in the case of District of Columbia v. Washington Market Company (3 MacArthur, 559), reviewed by the United States Supreme Court on writ of error (108 U. S., 243).

This suit was brought to recover a balance alleged to be due the District on November 1, 1875, on account of the company's rental, which balance represented the difference between a yearly payment of $25,000, as provided by section 14 of the act of May 20, 1870, supra, and payments which had been actually made by the company at the rates provided, respectively, by the later act of the District legislative assembly and the agreement between the District officials and the Market Co.

The trial court held in effect that Congress possessed the power to reduce the rental exacted by section 14 of the act of 1870, and might accomplish that end by authorizing the District of Columbia to reduce or release the rents; that the act of 1873, supra, giving to District officials power to enter into an arrangement with the MarketCo. for the purpose of acquiring part of the land held by the company, did, in fact, confer upon the District authority to make the reduction provided for in the agreement entered into with the company and that said agreement was lawful in this particular and constituted a bar to the action.

These rulings covered the issues raised by the pleadings, but the court proceeded to discuss certain collateral questions brought out in the argument of the case and said that the agreement created no obligation upon the part of the District to raise $17,500 per annum, the difference between the original and the reduced rental, and apply the same to the relief and support of the poor of the District, because even if the District was effectually substituted for the market com

pany in the fourteenth section of the company's charter, the operation of the section would merely require the District to pay the money to itself, which would work an extinguishment of the rent.

The court went further and declared its opinion that the designation of beneficiaries of the original act as "the poor of the city of Washington and of the District of Columbia" is too vague and indefinite to create a trust in favor of said poor enforceable by law, and that a trust so created would be totally void under the law governing the District.

On writ of error the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that no irrevocable trust had been created by the act of 1870, but confined its opinion to the issues raised by the pleadings. Discussing the question of consideration for the release by the Market Co. of a portion of its holding, the court said

66** *

and no consideration for the release of a part of demised property is more suitable to the nature of the relation between the parties than an equitable or agreed apportionment of the rent."

The agreement dealt with the obligation imposed upon the Market Co. by section 14 of its charter and did not affect the obligation which said section imposed upon the District of Columbia as successor to the city of Washington to receive the rental paid by the company, and to set it apart and expend it for the purposes of the statute. It is true that the rental payments might, under the terms of the agreement, be merged, wholly or in part, in the general taxes to be paid by the company, but so long as the company continued to pay any part of the rental such payments retained their character as revenues of the United States to be received by the District under the conditions prescribed by the act of 1870.

Congress directed that this rental should be "set apart" for a certain specific purpose. Unless and until it should be applied to those purposes it remained a Federal revenue in which the District had no other right or interest.

The act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat., 116), changed the form of government of the District of Columbia but did not otherwise make any change in the payment and disposition of the Market Co. rental, which continued to be paid, received, set apart, and expended in accordance with the act of 1870 up to the time that the so-called organic act of June 11, 1878 (20 Stat., 102), went into effect.

This latter act provided a permanent form of government for the District of Columbia, and that all laws then in force relating to the District of Columbia not inconsistent with the provisions of said act should remain in full force and effect.

There is nothing in the organic act that is inconsistent with the continuing payment of this rental to the District of Columbia by 2216°-VOL 21-15-23

the Market Co.; nor is there anything in said act that changes the character of the rental as a revenue of the United States. Being a Federal revenue the provisions in the organic act relating to the collection and disposition of revenues of the District of Columbia have no application to this rental.

While the rental might still be paid to and received by the District of Columbia, there are provisions in the organic act which are inconsistent with the application of the funds to the purposes contemplated by the act of 1870, and to the extent of this inconsistency the original statute and agreement have been superseded by the organic act.

Of this act the Supreme Court, among other things, has said:

"But the whole tenor of the act shows that it was intended to supersede previous laws relating to the same subject matter, and to provide a system of government for the District complete in itself in all respects."

The organic act provides that expenses of the government of the District of Columbia shall be estimated annually and that 50 per centum of the approved estimates shall be appropriated by Congress and the remaining 50 per centum paid from revenues of the District. The expense of supporting and relieving the poor of the District is clearly within this provision, and the United States thus assumed the obligation of paying one-half of such expenses. No such obligation existed prior to the passage of the organic act, and these rental payments, therefore, constituted a voluntary contribution by the United States toward said expenses, which the courts have held was revocable at the pleasure of the United States.

The provisions of the organic act, together with the provisions of the acts of June 7, 1880 (21 Stat., 162), March 3, 1881 (21 Stat., 466), and March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 470), limit the payment of expenses of the District of Columbia to such expenses only as have been estimated, approved, and appropriated for, and thus prohibit the use of the moneys derived from the Market Co. rentals to augment the provision made by annual appropriation for the expense of supporting and relieving the poor. It is clear that, in the absence of express statutory authority, this money could not be applied, after the passage of the organic act, to the purposes contemplated by the act of 1870; and it is equally clear that under the terms of the act of 1870 it could not be used for any other District purpose.

The sole question now to be determined is whether this money shall be covered into the Treasury as a miscellaneous receipt of the United States or as a revenue of the District of Columbia.

In addition to what has already been said on this point, it is well to consider the wording of the original statute under which the Market Co. rental was paid to and received by the District:

The said company shall pay yearly every year during the said term of ninety-nine years unto the city of Washington the sum of $25,000; which sum shall be received by said city and set apart and expended under the direction of the city government of said city for the support and relief of the poor of said city and of the District of Columbia;

* * *""

The rights and duties of the District under this statute as successor to the city of Washington are not affected by the later statutes. and agreement.

The rental is required to be "set apart" and expended for the purposes of the statute and for those purposes only. This language is inconsistent with the theory that title to the rental should vest absolutely in the District, or that the District should receive the money in any other capacity than that of trustee, to be applied to and expended for the statutory purpose, or to be held in trust for the United States in case it can no longer be used for said purpose.

That Congress took this view of the matter is evidenced by a joint resolution of February 10, 1879 (20 Stat., 488), authorizing certain expenditures for the relief of the poor, section 2 of which provides:

"That the commissioners of the District be, and they hereby are, authorized to expend $15,000 for the relief of the poor, $7,500 to be derived from the Central Market rents and $7,500 from the general fund of said District."

This provision was in addition to an appropriation for the relief of the poor carried on the half and half plan in the current appropriation for sundry civil expenses, including expenses of the District of Columbia. (20 Stat., 404.)

This resolution clearly recognized the half and half principle and contributed the Market Co.'s rental as representing the proper proportional payment by the United States. It also recognized the fact that the general authority and direction to spend this money for the relief of the poor carried by legislation enacted prior to the organic act was no longer in force.

The act of July 18, 1888 (25 Stat., 314, 316), making appropriation for the expenses of the District of Columbia for this fiscal year 1889, provides:

"That hereafter all fees collected by the inspector of gas and meters and the harbor master and amounts collected for leases of streets and reservations and wharf charges shall be paid to the collector for payment into the Treasury to the credit of the United States and the District of Columbia in equal parts."

The land upon which the Market Co.'s buildings are located is part of a reservation which belonged wholly and unconditionally to the United States. (Van Ness v. City of Washington, 4 Pet., 232; District of Columbia v. Washington Market Company, 3 MacArthur, 559, 566.) If the statute and agreement under which the Market Co.

holds this land constitute a lease, then the amounts collected from the company as rental for the leased premises come within the terms of the statute quoted and should be paid into the Treasury accordingly.

A clear and concise definition of a lease has been given by the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Gratiot et al. (14 Pet., 526, 538), as follows:

"The legal understanding of a lease for years is a contract for the possession and profit of land for a determined period, with the recompense of rent."

The provisions of the act of 1870, as embodied in sections 12, 13, and 14 of said act, are not entirely in accord with this definition of a lease. It is difficult, except upon the theory heretofore stated as to some words used, to reconcile all the language of these sections with the requisites of a leasehold estate, but whatever may have been the nature of the company's tenure under the act itself, the terms of the later agreement establish the character of the company's quarterly payments as rental for the occupancy of the land for the term fixed by the statute. Their character as rental has been recognized by both the trial court and the appellate court in the case of District of Columbia v. Washington Market Company, supra, and has been so designated by Congress in the joint resolution of 1879, supra.

Rental is essentially an incident of a leasehold estate, and the company's tenure under this agreement is that of a lessee for a fixed term of years with quarterly rental as recompense.

The quarterly rental now in question should be covered into the Treasury, one-half to the credit of the United States and one-half to the credit of the District of Columbia, in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1888, supra.

It appears that all of these quarterly collections of Market Co. rental have, since the fiscal year 1879, been credited to the "General fund, District of Columbia."

The rental of $7,500 covered by the resolution of February 10, 1879, supra, was specifically appropriated and disposed of by that resolution. The whole of all rentals collected from that time down to the passage of the act of July 18, 1888, supra, should have been covered into the Treasury as a revenue of the United States and to the credit of the United States. Rentals collected after the passage of said act should have been paid into the Treasury to the credit of the United States and the District of Columbia in equal parts in accordance with its terms.

The general account between the United States and the District of Columbia for the fiscal year 1914, in which receipts and disbursements of the District for that year have been adjusted, was settled by the auditor under date of October 10, 1914, and this settlement