pected by the aid of a mill to carry on an extensive business in making pianos and furniture from the lumber he sawed, to supply the eastern markets. He meditated building a town on an adjacent farm, and building a church and large school. He thought he had invented an excavat ng machine, which would bring him in a large sum of money from the government. He claimed to have parties to whom he could ship any amount of lumber, and to have a contract for the black walnut to be used in the state capitol. He said there was $80,000 in Detroit which he could have. He talked of setting up a very large wood-yard in the village of Rochester, and actually attempted to make a contract for wood with one of his neighbors, who regarded him at the time as incompetent. He applied to a surveyor to survey a mill lot and a railroad branch running to it, a short time before he bought the machinery from Brownell, and the surveyor avoided it partly because he appeared wrong. At the same time Curtis repeated to him some of his plans, and told him he could command $80,000. After he bought the machinery, and his brother refused to put it in the old mill, he made preparations and excavated a place for new building, under unusual circumstances, and was shown by the testimony to have manifested surprise after some of the work had been done, as if had not before understood what was going on. In the ensuing spring he committed suicide, under circumstances which had at least some tendency to show he was then insane. There were other items of conduct having some such tendency.

The facts enumerated may not have been conclusive in themselves, although some of them seem to be more than even any extravagent talker would be likely to indulge in unless somewhat off his balance. It is, perhaps, possible, if there was nothing in his appearance and demeanor to indicate mental disturbance, that he might have been indulging in talking largely for the mere sake of talking. But some of these things are too wild to be reconciled with his general conduct when sane, without stretching presumptions very far. Nevertheless there was enough in. the conduct of his friends to require scrutiny.

He had brothers and sisters in the neighborhood who were claimed by himself, and possibly by his wife, to have intermeddled unduly with his affairs. He had some business relations with them, and a mortgage was obtained by one of them for another member of the family during the period when he was subject to these delusions. This mortgage was

a 10 per cent. mortgage, given to take up mortgages held by other persons. It was a beneficial transaction to the mortgagee. We are not informed of the rate of interest on the other mortgages. There is no doubt at all that during the period from 1872 till just before his death, in 1876, he was permitted to manage his own affairs, and did manage them with average correctness. It is also in evidence that his condition was not such as to impress strangers as amounting to insanity. We have had some difficulty in getting over this practical treatment, which would.usually overcome the testimony of those who, while so dealing, profess to have regarded a man as insane.

We think, however, that it is sufficiently explained. The proof is satisfactory that at the time when he was found speaking and acting extravagantly he was pale, haggard and unnaturally excited, and had the appearance of an insane man, and was believed to be insane by his family. These extravagances reappeared in about the same way at intervals, and during those attacks his mind reverted to the same subjects, or those which were similar. Once or twice his wife took measures to guard against mischief which he seemed likely to do to himself, but there is not much evidence that he was thought dangerous to others. The family appear to have regarded him as more or less insane throughout, but as not enough so, except at detached periods, to interfere with his affairs. There is reason to think they were not far from the truth. The testimony of his wife gives a more complete and intelligible account than that of any one else, and if we assume, which we think we must, that he was completely insane in the early part of 1872, we cannot doubt that the recurrence in subsequent years of similar conduct was the manifestation of insanity. And it is not very important to consider or to conjecture whether insanity actually left him or was only milder during the periods of more rational behavior, inasmuch as the proofs of its existence at the very period of the Brownell bargain are unmistakable, and continued subsequently.

It is not surprising that his family acted as they did, as no necessity appeared to exist for interference, and the facts were such as might make any one hesitate to declare him insane. There were acts and conduct which we do not think it desirable to dwell upon that may be explained better by the continuance of mental disturbance than in any other way. The case is not void of difficulty, but on a complete review

of it we are satisfied that the view taken below was correct, and that Curtis was non compos mentis when he gave the mortgage. While it appears that Brownell had warning given which ought to have put him on his guard, we have not been satisfied that his conduct, when he made the bargain, was open to serious censure. It is nearly as much his misfortune as his fault.

The decree must be affirmed, with costs. (The other justices concurred.)

MARY B. PRATT US. HORACE B. PRATT and others.

Filed November 29, 1879.

Agreement to provide for support of parents by a son, considered, and held to obligate him to provide such support at his own house and not elsewhere. En.

Appeal from Berrien.

S. W. Fowler, for complainant.

E. S. Pratt, for defendants.

COOLEY, J. This controversy belongs to that unhappy class where parents, having divested themselves of the means of independent support in favor of children, find themselves, afterwards, discontented in the position in which they have placed themselves, and resort to litigation with their children, to the destruction of family and domestic happiness.

The complainant is the widow of Horace B. Pratt. In 1866, in the life-time of her husband, she united with him in a conveyance of their little property, consisting of one hundred and sixty acres of cheap land and a small amount of personal property, worth, in all, perhaps, $1,200, to the defendant Horace B. Pratt, their son, taking back from him an agreement that the son should give them "a good and sufficient support during their natural lives, providing sufficient food and clothing, medicine and medical attendance when necessary, and not requiring of them any labor or service other than they may voluntarily render." The written contract contained a provision that the parents should have a lien on the property to secure performance of its stipulations.

The father did not survive this arrangement long, but the mother lived with her son after her husband's death, some eight years. They appear to have lived in a very economical way, but contented and without controversy, the mother taking general charge of the household work for the son, who

was unmarried. The son then married, and difficulties arose. These, however, are entirely unexplained; the mother giving no sufficient reason for them, but declaring that she has a reason which she chooses not to tell. We have no reason to think the son was wanting in due provision for his mother any more after his marriage than before.

When difficulties sprang up, the mother left the son's house and went elsewhere to live. She now claims to be entitled to a support by her son wherever she sees fit to reside.

When the very moderate circumstances of the parties are taken into account, it is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that it was the understanding and expectation of all the parties that the support the son was to give was to be furnished at his own house. As a business arrangement, he could not have afforded to make it on any other terms. The mother, therefore, was not justified in leaving the son as she did and demanding support elsewhere, unless she could show that he failed in his duty to her. This showing has not been made; and, much as our sympathies may be excited in her behalf by her dependent condition, we have no alternative but to affirm the decree, with costs. (The other justices concurred.)

NATHANIEL BURGER VS. MARTIN LIMBACH.

Filed November 29, 1879.

Facts as presented by the record considered, and held to not show any error to prejudice of appellant.-[ED.

Error to Wayne.

Daniel E. Prescott, for plaintiff in error.

Van Dyke & Brownson, for defendant in error.

GRAVES, J. Limbach, a hardware dealer, sued Burger, before a justice of the peace, for part of the purchase price of a stove and certain pipe and zinc sold to Burger some time before. He recovered before the justice, and afterwards on appeal, and Burger has brought the case here on exceptions.

At the time the articles were sold one Herbst was serving Limbach as his clerk, and the theory of the defence in the circuit court was that Herbst, by authority of Limbach, sold the goods for wood, to be paid to himself, and that the wood had been paid, and to prove this defence he made Limbach

his witness; and the latter, testifying in that character, swore that Herbst was clerk for him, and sold the goods to Burger, and, in effect, that the sale was in his presence. But he further testified, as Burger's witness, that he did not authorize Herbst to sell on his own account, or to sell for wood, and moreover that Herbst, on the very occasion, told him that Burger wanted to buy on credit, and inquired of witness if he should sell in that way, and that witness told him to do so, and that Burger said he would pay and actually did pay five dollars. He also swore, on Burger's part, that it had not been his custom to allow Herbst to sell goods for pay to be taken by himself. Having made this explicit showing by Limbach, as his own witness, Burger is hardly justified in complaining of the refusal to allow him to inquire further of Limbach whether he had not, on other occasions, permitted Herbst to sell on his own account, nor of the refusal to let him go over the same ground, in a general way, which had been covered already by more definite questions and answers.

The defence impliedly admitted that Burger knew he was buying at Limbach's shop, and that the goods were his, and that Herbst could not sell them as his own without authority from Limbach; and the bill of exceptions states that it did not appear that Limbach knew of any other arrangement between his clerk and Burger than that which Burger had proved by Limbach. Moreover there seems to have been no evidence given or offered to prove that the sale or any part of the negotiation occurred at some other time.

Hence it is not perceived that the court erred to Burger's prejudice in refusing to permit the latter to swear that on the occasion specified he made a private arrangement with Herbst to pay him in wood.

While some of the rulings might very well have been different, we are not satisfied that there are any which would justify a reversal.

The case derives a peculiar complexion from the showing actually made on Burger's part through Limbach himself, and from the shape of the questions which were ruled down.

After considerable attention to the record we think the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

(The other justices concurred.)