been gave him no rights in his changed condition, and rights existing under other conditions did not of necessity continue when his conditions were changed. We base his rights upon what he was at the time-the character of his employment-rather than upon what he had been. But because the court gives an unsound reason for a correct conclusion, which is often done by lawyers, judges and philosophers, we will not disturb the judgment. Affirmed. BRAINARD & JOHNSON, Appellees, vs. KINSEY ELWOOD, Appellant. Filed December 15, 1879. An attorney's lien, on moneys due his client in the hands of the adverse party, attaches to the judgment entered therefor, and his rights cannot be changed or interfered with, the proper notice of his lien having been entered in the judgment docket, by a stipulation on the part of the owner of such judgment that the same may be vacated. The judgment will be allowed to stand, notwithstanding such stipulation, at least to the extent of his interest therein. SEEVENS, J., dissenting.—[Ev. Appeal from Jones district court. This appeal is taken from the order of the court, overruling a motion made by the defendant, to set aside the judgment rendered in the case. Sheeam & McCarn, for appellant. W. I: Chamberlain, for appellees. ADAMS, J. The judgment in question, for $2,004, was rendered June 1, 1878. On the third day of June the attorneys who obtained the judgment for the plaintiffs filed liens thereon for their services in the case. There was evidente also tending to show that certain creditors of the plaintiffs acquired an interest in the judgment. In October, 1878, the plaintiffs and defendant entered into a stipulation that the judgment should be set aside. At the next December term of the court the motion in question was made, being based on the stipulation. In the view which we take of the case it will be sufficient to consider whether the court was justified in overruling the motion by reason of the attorney's liens filed upon the judgment. In our opinion it was. Code, § 215, provides that an attorney's lien may be made effective against the judgment debtor by giving notice of the lien in the judgment docket. When this is done it appears to us that the attorney acquires an interest in the judgment, and by a proper proceeding may have a decree against the judgment debtor and judgment creditor for the enforcement of so much of the judgment as shall enable him to collect what is due him. It is true that it is not specifically provided that the attorney shall have a lien upon the judgment; but, where a lien is given upon money due by a judgment, it appears to us that there is a resulting right to enforce the lien through the judgment. Where a person has a lien upon the promissory note secured by mortgage or otherwise he has, without doubt, the benefit of the security. The security is an incident to the debt, and must redound to the benefit of any person who becomes entitled to collect the debt. If, then, in the case at bar, the attorneys acquired an interest in the judgment, it was not within the power of the judgment creditor to divest it, either by discharging the judgment or by consenting that it might be set aside. It is true a case may arise where the judgment ought to be set aside, and that, too, without the expense of an appeal. From this it is argued that parties should be free to deal with the judgment in their own way. But if such a case should arise the parties can find a short road to freedom, either by paying the attorney or by releasing the lien under the statute. Code, § 216. It may be that, if the defendant had moved to set aside so much of the judgment as was not covered by the lien, the motion should have been sustained; but no such question is before us. The principal object of the plaintiffs, in consenting that the judgment might be set aside, may have been to defeat their attorneys. If so they doubtless preferred that the motion should be overruled altogether than sustained as to that part of the judgment not covered by the attorney's lien. In our opinion there was no error in overruling the motion. Affirmed. The appellant filed a motion to strike from the files the appellee's additional abstract. It appears to us that there was no reason for filing such abstract, and the motion is sustained. SEEVERS, J. Being unable to concur in the foregoing opinion, I desire to briefly state the grounds of my dissent. An attorney has a lien on "money due his client in the hands of the adverse party." To effectuate the lien the attorney must serve a notice on the adverse party, stating “the amount claimed, and in general terms for what services. If, however, a judgment has been recovered by the client, such notice is deemed sufficiently served by entering the same “in the judgment docket opposite the judgment." Code, § 215. It is clear the lien is on the money in the hands of the adverse party, and not on the judgment. A judgment is evidence of indebtedness; but it may be set aside by a new trial, or reversed on appeal. When this is done it no longer exists as evidence of indebtedness. Now I think the parties, in the absence of fraud, may by stipulation set aside the judgment, and thus save the expense of an appeal, in which, in their judgment, there must be a reversal. The judgment below should be reversed. THE STATE OF Iowa, Appellee, vs. JACOB F. DILLARD, State v. Westfall, Appellant. Filed December 16, 1879. Iowa, followed.-[Ed. Appeal from Warren district court. C. C. Cole and Williamson & Parrott, for appellant. PER CURIAM. This cause was submitted upon a stipulation between the attorney general and defendant's counsel to the effect that it involves the same questions discussed by this court in The State v. Benjamin J. Westfall, at the Dubuque October term, 1878, reported in - Iowa, Following that decision, the judgment of the court below in this case is reversed. P. H. BARNES, Appellant, vs. M. CAVANAGH and others, Appellees. Filed December 16, 1879. Bailey, in 1870, gave Tyler a bond for the conveyance of real estate. Tyler failing to make payment, Bailey, in June, 1875, obtained judgment against him for interest due, costs and attorney's fees, execution on which was stayed by plaintiff, Barnes. In November, 1875, Bailey procured judgment for the principal sum, with interest accrued from the time of the entry of the first judgment, foreclosed the bond, the property being bid in, in January, 1876, by Bailey. From this sale, Tyler, who was in possession of the property, had a right to redeem at any time within one v3-51 (no. vii) (801) year. In October, 1876, Bailey caused execution to issue on the first judgment against Tyler and plaintiff, Barnes. By direction of plaintiff the sheriff levied on Tyler's interest in the land, being the right to immediate possession and he right to redeem from the execution sale thereof, which execution the sheriff, under directions of Bailey refused to enforce by sale, although the plaintiff was ready and willing to bid therefor the amount of the execution and costs, but returned the execution. Bailey subsequently caused another execution to issue and be levied on the property of plaintiff. In an action to restrain the sale of such property, and to charge the real estate with the payment of the said first judgment, held, that Tyler's interest in the land was property subject to levy: that the sheriff, on the same being pointed out to him by Barnes, should have levied upon and offered it for sale. All that a surety upon a bond for the stay of execution is obliged to do to protect his own property is to point out property of his principal which can be levied upon.-[ED. Appeal from Johnson district court. Action in equity. The action was dismissed on the merits, and plaintiff appeals. Clark & Haddock, for appellant. Boal & Jackson, for appellees. SEEVERS, J. The facts are that in 1870 the defendant Bailey sold to Tyler certain real estate, and gave the latter a bond, in which Baily agreed he would convey to Tyler the real estate upon the payment of the purchase money. Tyler went into possession and made improvements. Failing to pay the purchase money, a judgment was obtained by Bailey against Tyler, in June, 1875, for interest due, costs and attorney's fees. Execution on this judgment was stayed by the plaintiff. Afterwards Bailey brought an action to foreclose the bond, and a judgment was rendered therein against Tyler, in November, 1875, for the principal debt, and such interest as had accrued thereon subsequent to the first judgment. The bond was foreclosed, and a special execution directed to issue for the sale of the real estate. The premises were sold under an execution issued on said judgment, in January, 1876, to Bailey. Tyler had the right to redeem from this sale within one year. In October, 1876, Bailey caused an execution to issue on the first judgment against Tyler and the plaintiff. By direction of the latter and contrary to the directions of Bailey, the defendant Cavanagh, as sheriff, levied on the interest of Tyler in said real estate. It was duly advertised for sale. Because of directions received from Bailey the sheriff refused to offer the property for sale, although the plaintiff was ready and willing to bid therefor the amount of the execution and costs, and the execution was returned by the sheriff. Subsequently Bailey caused another execution to issue, which was levied on the property of the plaintiff. To restrain the sale of such property, and in some form or manner to charge the real estate aforesaid with the payment of said judgment, is the object of this action. The legal propositions necessary to be determined are, whether Bailey can be compelled to resort to Tyler's interest in the real estate to obtain satisfaction of his judgment before he can call on the plaintiff. The judgment in which the plaintiff stayed execution was general. No special lien was created thereby which, by operation of law or otherwise, related back of the judgment. It therefore became a lien on Tyler's interest from its rendition only. Code, § 2883. The judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceeding related back to the date of the bond. The lien of such judgment was therefore the prior lien on the real estate. But Tyler either had, or was entitled to, possession of said real estate, and also the right to redeem from the sale made under the senior lien. It was upon this right or interest the levy was made, and the question is whether such interest was or could be subject to levy under execution. We think it could; and the purchaser would have obtained the right to redeem from the previous sale, and also the right to the immediate possession of the premises, for the reason that from such sale Tyler was not entitled to redeem. Code, § 3102. It is urged that the plaintiff, as surety of Tyler, could not point out and require Bailey to levy on the encumbered property of the principal debtor. This question we are not required to determine, because the objection that the property was encumbered would be without weight if any person was ready and willing to bid, when offered for sale, the amount of the execution and costs. This must be true at least as to Bailey, for if the sale had taken place, and the plaintiff had bid the amount of the execution for Tyler's interest in the real estate, this would have satisfied the debt, and more than this Bailey could not with reason ask. As Tyler had an interest in the real estate, Bailey could not levy on the property of the plaintiff until the property of the principal debtor was exhausted. All the surety has to do in such a case, in order to protect his property from being levied upon, is to point out property belonging to the principal debtor. This was done in this case, and the property should have been offered for sale. It is urged by the appellee Bailey that such sale would have encumbered his right or title. It is clear, however, as |