ing ground, or used as such by the Catholic or any other church, it is not important to inquire. That it was a public burying ground is beyond dispute; there is no conflict in the evidence on this point. "Public grounds, including all places for the burial of the dead," are exempt from taxation. Code, $ 797; Revision, § 711. Under this provision we think there can arise no doubt that about one acre of the land was not taxable, and, therefore, could not have been lawfully sold for taxes. As to this part of the land we think the judgment of the circuit court is so in conflict with the evidence that it cannot be supported. The judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Reversed.

CHARLES FOGLESONG, Appellee, vs. JOSEPH GERBER and others,

Appellants.

Filed October 25, 1879.

Evidence in this case held sufficient to support the findings of the court below, and judgment is affirmed.-[ED.

Appeal from Dallas district court.

The plaintiff brings this action for the possession of certain lands, and for the quieting of his title thereto, and that the defendant Warford may be compelled to deliver to plaintiff a deed which Warford has in his possession, executed by the defendants, Joseph and Elizabeth Gerber, for the land in controversy. The court entered a decree as prayed in the petition. The defendants appeal.

Callvert, Macy & Smith, for appellants.

North & Woodin and Barcroft, Given & Drabelle, for appellee.

DAY, J. 1. On the 30th day of September, 1875, the defendants Joseph and Elizabeth Gerber entered into negotiation with the plaintiff for an exchange of 66 acres of land which they owned in Dallas county, Iowa, for their choice of 160 acres of land out of 280 acres owned by the plaintiff in Shannon county, Missouri. The plaintiff claims that the trade was completed; that the defendants delivered to the plaintiff the possession of the land in Dallas county, and executed and delivered to him a deed therefor, which was afterwards deposited with the defendant Warford until the other defendants should select the 160 acres to be deeled to them, and as further security that plaintiff would deed said

land pursuant to the terms of his bond at the time executed. The plaintiff further claims that the defendants have failed to select the lands to be deeded to them in Missouri, and that they have surreptitiously resumed possession of the lands conveyed to the plaintiff. The defendants claim that the trade was not completed; that they were to have the privilege of examining the land in Missouri, and if not satisfied with it that their deed was to be returned by Warford, and the trade was to be at an end. They claim that the land in Missouri was not as represented; that they were not satisfied with it and that they notified Warford not to deliver the deed to plaintiff, and advised plaintiff that the trade would not be consummated. We have examined the evidence with care, and, whilst it is conflicting, we unite in holding that it supports the claim of the plaintiff, as the court below found.

2. The defendants allege that the Missouri lands are not of the quality and location represented by the plaintiff, and they ask that the contract entered into by them be declared void, and they be released therefrom. The plaintiff executed to the defendants a bond for a deed in which the quality of the land to be conveyed to the defendants is described. Whilst the evidence shows that the land is not of very good quality, we think it is of the character described in the bond. The evidence tends to show that 160 acres might be selected out of the 280 acres owned by the plaintiff, which would be as valuable as the land traded to plaintiff, subject to the encumbrance which plaintiff was to assume.

The judgment is affirmed.

MARY J. RUSSEL, Appellee vs. G. R. LONG, Constable,

Appellant.

Filed October 27, 1879.

The increase of stock belonging to the wife is not subject to liability for the debts of the husband, though his services may have contributed to such increase. The purchase of a plow is not a family expense for which the property of the wife will be jointly liable.—[ Ed.

Appeal from Dallas circuit court.

The plaintiff is a married woman.

year,

Her husband, Martin

Russel, is a farmer. He owns no real estate, but rents land from year to which he cultivates. The plaintiff performs the ordinary duties of a housewife, without the aid of hired help, and she generally assists her husband in planting and

gathering corn, loading and stacking hay, etc.; but she has at no time been engaged in any business separate from the husband. They have thus lived and labored for the last ten years. In the year 1869 the plaintiff's father gave her a cow and a hog. She exchanged the hog for another cow. In the spring of 1878 the descendants of the two cows, and the calf of the cow given to plaintiff by her father, produced six calves, and there were then fourteen head of cattle in all, the same being the increase of said cows, and held by plaintiff and her husband. The husband of the plaintiff has furnished feed for the sustenance of all of said cattle, with such aid as his wife has been able to give him, except that her father gave them abut sixty bushels of damaged corn at one time, and fed the cattle for them about six weeks in the spring of 1877. The husband of the plaintiff purchased from Furst & Bradley a breaking plow, with which he broke prairie for hire. The money received for such work was used for the support of his family, consisting of himself, plaintiff and one child. Furst & Bradley recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace against said Martin Russel for the contract price of the plow. An execution was issued upon the judgment, and the defendant, as constable, levied upon the six spring calves. The plaintiff, claiming to be the owner of the calves, replevied them from the constable. The cause was tried by the court without a jury, and it was found upon the foregoing facts that plaintiff was the owner of the property, and possession thereof was awarded to her. The defendant

appeals.

Nourse, Kauffman & Co., for appellants.
Baugh & Sweeley, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J. 1. By the common law not only the increase of the cows, but the cows themselves, under the facts found, would have been the property of the husband, and liable for his debts. But the legislature of this state has taken a wide departure from the common law upon the subject of the rights of married women to hold property independent of the husband and his creditors. A married woman may own in her own right real and personal property, and manage, sell, convey and devise the same by will to the same extent and in the same manner that her husband can property belonging to him. Code, § 2202. If either husband or wife obtain possession of property belonging to the other, the owner of the property may maintain an action therefor in the same manner as if they were unmarried. Section 2204. Neither hus

band nor wife is liable for the ordinary debts of the other, nor is the property of either, nor the rent or income of such property, liable for the separate debts of the other. Section 2212. It is contended that as the plaintiff was not engaged in a separate business from that pursued by her husband, her earnings while in the performance of the duties growing out of the marital relation are the property of her husband, and as the increase of the cows was produced by the labor and care of the husband, or of the husband and wife jointly, such increase is the property of the husband; and we are cited to Mewhirter v. Hatton, 42 Iowa, 288, and Tuttle v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. Id. 518. It was held in those cases that the earnings of the wife were the property of the husband, and that he could recover for an injury to her by which she was unable to perform the ordinary labor incident to the marital relation; that the wages of the wife are her property only when she carries on a separate business, or is working for wages. But the question in this case is, we think, essentially different from that determined in the cases cited. Here the wife is not claiming for her wages; she is claiming specific chattel property, the increase of other property which was owned by her. The statute nowhere makes the possession of property a test of ownership as to creditors of the husband, as was the case at common law, and under the Revision of 1860. But it is contended that the increase of the property belongs to the husband because he was the party by whose labor, skill and care such increase was produced.

If it had been shown that the husband hired the cows of the plaintiff for a given period, and that during such period the increase was produced, there might be force in the suggestion. But the record shows that the husband voluntarily expended his labor and the products thereof in the care and keeping of his wife's property, and it does not appear that there was any agreement for compensation either in the increase of the property or otherwise. We think the property was not liable for the payment of the husband's debts. In Webster v. Hildreth, 33 Vermont, 457, it is said: "Equity has no jurisdiction to compel men to work for their creditors who may perversely prefer to work for the benefit of their wives and children, and leave their honest debts unpaid." See Hanson v. Millett, 55 Maine, 184. It does not appear when the husband contracted the debt in question. It will be presumed it was since the taking effect of the sections of the Code above cited. 2. It is claimed that the purchase of the plow was a family

expense, and properly chargeable upon the property of the wife. Code, § 2214. We have held that a reaping machine was not property of that character. McCormick v. Mirth, December term, 1878. That a plow is not embraced in the class of property designated by the statute seems to us to be beyond question. Besides, there was no judgment against the plaintiff upon which an execution could have issued against her separate property.

Affirmed.

A. R. SMALLEY, Appellant, vs. S. H. GREENE, Appellee.

Filed October 27, 1879.

No damages are recoverable for a breach of an agreement by an attorney to turn over to a third person accounts placed in the hands of such attorney for collection. An agreement not to practice law in a particular town is valid. The provision in the statute of frauds in regard to contracts not to be performed within a year, is applicable only to contracts not to be performed on either side. Question not raised in the court below carnot be considered here.-[ED.

Appeal from Dallas circuit court.

The plaintiff filed his amended petition alleging that the defendant was engaged in the practice of law in Adel, Dallas county, and on or about the fifth day of April, 1877, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a verbal agreement by which the defendant agreed to sell his law business to plaintiff, including collections on hand, and correspondence, office furniture, and good will-the defendant, at the same time, as a part of said agreement, agreeing that he would, from and after the fifth day of April, 1877, not continue or engage in the practice of his profession in the town of Adel, in consideration of which agreement the plaintiff agreed to execute and deliver his two promissory notes to the defendant for the sum of $125; that at the time of making this agreement the defendant represented to plaintiff that he had on hand for collection and would turn over to plaintiff promissory notes on divers persons, amounting in the aggregate to $4,500; that on the fifth day of April, 1877, the defendant delivered to plaintiff the office furniture as agreed upon, and the plaintiff, relying upon defendant's representations that he had for collection and would deliver to plaintiff the above mentioned amount of notes, and the further agreement of defendant that he would not again engage in the practice of his profession in the town of Adel, executed and delivered to defendant the promissory notes of plaintiff for one hundred and dollars; that the defendant refuses to turn over and deliver to plaintiff said