demande, s'est déclarée fermement résolue à mettre ces réformes à exécution et l'a officiellement communiqué aux Cabinets. Il en est résulté pour ceux-ci un droit moral, celui de veiller à l'accomplissement de cette promesse, et une obligation, celle d'insister pour que les insurgés et les réfugiés secondent cette œuvre d'apaisement en cessant la lutte et en rentrant dans leurs foyers. Cependant, ce programme de pacification, bien qu'accepté en principe par toutes les parties, a rencontré un double écueil. Les insurgés ont déclaré que l'expérience du passé leur défendait de se fier aux promesses de la Porte, à moins d'une garantie matérielle positive de l'Europe. La Porte a déclaré de son côté qu'aussi longtemps que les insurgés parcouraient le pays en armes, et que les réfugiés ne se repatriaient pas, il lui était matériellement impossible de procéder à la nouvelle organisation du pays. En attendant les hostilités ont repris leur cours. L'agitation entretenue par cette lutte de huit mois s'est étendue à d'autres parties de la Turquie. Les populations Musulmanes ont dû en conclure que la Porte n'avait déféré qu'en apparence l'action diplomatique de l'Europe, et qu'au fond elle n'avait pas l'intention d'appliquer sérieusement les réformes promises. De là un reveil des passions religieuses et politiques, qui a contribué à amener les déplorables évènements de Salonique et la surexcitation menaçante qui se manifeste sur d'autres points de l'Europe Ottoman. Il n'est pas douteux non plus qu'à son tour cette explosion du fanaticisme réagit sur la situation des esprits en Bosnie et en Herzégovine, comme dans les Principautés voisines. Car les Chrétiens de ces contrées ont dû être vivement impressionnés par le fait du massacre de Consuls Européens, en plein jour, dans une ville paisible, sous les yeux des autorités impuissantes, alors qu'on les engage à se confier au bon vouloir des Turcs irrités par une lutte longue et acharnée. Si cette situation se prolongeait on risquerait ainsi de voir s'allumer l'incendie générale que la médiation des Grandes Puissances avait précisément en vue de conjurer. Il est donc de toute nécessité d'établir certaines garanties de nature à mettre hors de doute l'application loyale et complète des mesures arrêtées entre les Puissances et la Porte. Plus que jamais il est urgent de peser sur le Gouvernement du Sultan pour se décider à se mettre sérieusement à l'œuvre afin de remplir les engagements contractés par lui envers l'Europe. Comme premier pas à faire dans cette voie, les trois Cours Impériales proposent d'insister auprès de la Porte, avec toute l'énergie que doit avoir la voix unie des Grandes Puissances, afin de l'amener à une suspension d'armes pour le terme de deux mois. Ce délai permettrait d'agir à la fois sur les insurgés et les réfugiés, pour leur donner confiance dans la sollicitude vigilante de l'Europe, sur les Principautés voisines, pour les exhorter à ne pas entraver cette tentative de conciliation, et enfin sur le Gouvernement Ottoman, pour le mettre en demeure d'accomplir ses promesses. On pourrait ainsi ouvrir la voie à des pourparlers directs entre la Porte et les délégués Bosniques et Herzégoviniens, sur la base des vœux que ceux-ci ont formulés et qui ont été jugés aptes à servir de points de départ à une discussion. 1. Les matériaux pour la reconstruction des maisons et églises seraient fournis aux réfugiés rentrants, leur subsistance serait assurée jusqu'à ce qu'ils puissent vivre de leur travail. 2. En tant que la distribution des secours relèverait du Commissaire Turc, celui-ci devrait s'entendre sur les mesures à prendre avec la Commission Mixte, mentionnée dans la note du 30 Décembre, afin de garantir l'application sérieuse des réformes et d'en contrôler l'exécution. Cette Commission serait présidée par un Herzégovinien Chrétien, composée d'indigènes représentant fidèlement les deux religions du pays; ils seraient élus dès que l'armistice aura suspendu les hostilités. 3. À l'effet d'éviter toute collision, le conseil serait donné à Constantinople de concentrer les troupes Turques, au moins jusqu'à l'apaisement des esprits, sur quelques points à convenir. 4. Les Chrétiens garderaient les armes comme les Musulmans. 5. Les Consuls ou délégués des Puissances exerceront leur surveillance sur l'application des réformes en général et sur les faits relatifs au repatriement en particulier. Si avec l'appui bienveillant et chaleureux des Grandes Puissances et à la faveur de l'armistice, un arrangement pouvait être conclu sur ces bases, et mis immédiatement en œuvre par la rentrée des réfugiés et l'élection de la Commission Mixte, un pas considérable aurait été fait vers la pacification. Si, cependant, l'armistice s'écoulait sans que les efforts des Puissances réussissent à atteindre le but qu'elles ont en vue, les trois Cours Impériales sont d'avis qu'il deviendrait nécessaire d'ajouter à leur action diplomatique la sanction d'une entente, en vue des mesures efficaces qui paraîtraient réclamées dans l'intérêt de la paix générale, pour arrêter le mal et en empêcher le développe BRITISH REPLY to the Proposals of Austria, Germany, and Russia for the Pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.*-London, May 19, 1876. The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell. MY LORD, Foreign Office, May 19, 1876. HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the Memorandum of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch of the 13th instant,† containing the proposals of the Governments of Austria, Germany, and Russia for the pacification of the Herzegovina and Bosnia. These proposals had been agreed upon by Count Andrássy, Prince Bismarck, and Prince Gortchakow at a meeting at Berlin, and your Excellency was requested to communicate them to Her Majesty's Government, with the hope that Her Majesty's Government would accede to them and express their opinion at once upon the telegraphic summary furnished by your Excellency. I informed your Excellency on the 15th instant that it would be necessary for me to consult my colleagues, and that I could not give any reply until after the proposals of the three Governments had been considered by the Cabinet. I have now to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government regret to find themselves unable to co-operate in the policy which the three Governments have invited them to pursue. Her Majesty's Government appreciate the advantage of concerted action by the Powers in all that relates to the questions arising out of the insurrection, but they cannot consent to join in proposals which they do not conscientiously believe likely to effect the paci fication which all the Powers desire to see attained. The proposals contained in the Memorandum are directed to pressing upon the Porte the establishment of an armistice for two months, with a view to direct negotiations between the Porte and the delegates of the insurgents on the basis of the wishes which the latter have expressed, and which have been thought fit to serve as points of departure for discussion. In the first place, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that they would not be justified in insisting upon the Porte consenting to an armistice without knowing whether the military situation admitted of its being established without prejudice to the Turkish Government, and without rendering necessary the exercise of greater efforts on the renewal of the campaign, and a consequent prolongation of the struggle. Moreover, the faithful observance of * Page 1230. + Laid before Parliament with "Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Turkey and the Insurrection in Bosnia and the Herzegovina," in 1876. the armistice by both sides would have to be secured, since the Porte could not well be called upon to suspend operations against the insurgents while the insurrection was receiving support from Servia and Montenegro, and the insurgents strengthening their position and recruiting their forces and obtaining arms and supplies. The mere fact of the insurrection remaining unsuppressed would be likely to give it additional vitality, and the result of an armistice might, therefore, be to lead to a rejection of any demands which the Porte might fairly be expected to concede, and thus hinder rather than advance the prospects of pacification. At the same time Her Majesty's Government would not advise the Porte against acceding to an armistice should the Turkish Government consider that the political and military position admitted of it, and its result would be likely to be beneficial; although in view of the objections which I have mentioned, and others of a similar character which will readily occur to your Excellency, Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in recommending it to the Porte, still less in insisting upon its acceptance. In my despatch of the 15th instant I have informed your Excellency of some of the objections which I stated to Count Münster had occurred to me in regard to the five points which were proposed as a basis for negotiation between the Porte and the insurgents; a further consideration of the proposals has not led to any modification of the opinion I then expressed. Her Majesty's Government doubt whether the Porte has the means of providing for the reconstruction of the houses and churches of the insurgents or of finding subsistence for the returning refugees. If Her Majesty's Government are rightly informed, the cost would be very heavy, and the Porte has not the requisite funds at its disposal. The distribution of relief by such a Commission as is contemplated would be little better than a system of indiscriminate almsgiving. It would probably be beyond the power of the Porte to adopt, and, if adopted, would prove utterly demoralising to any country. Her Majesty's Government do not mean to say that the Porte would not be wise in affording any practicable facilities and inducements for the return of the population who have quitted, or been driven from, their homes owing to the insurrection, but they do not consider that they can urge upon the Porte to undertake engagements the observance of which would be beyond its power. The concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain their arms. The "Consular supervision" would reduce the authority of the Sultan to nullity; and, without force to support it, supervision would be impossible. Even if there were any prospect of the Porte being willing and able to come to an arrangement with the insurgents on the basis proposed, which Her Majesty's Government scarcely believe possible, the intimation with which the Memorandum closes would render any such negotiation almost certainly abortive, for it could not be supposed that the insurgents would accept any terms of pacification from the Porte in face of the declaration that if the insurrection continued after the armistice the Powers would intervene further. Regarded in this light the proposal of an armistice seems to Her Majesty's Government to be illusory. There is another point not referred to in your Excellency's telegraphic summary, but to which it is necessary for me to advert, viz., the proposal in the third paragraph of the Memorandum that the Powers should agree upon the measures to be taken by their respective naval forces for the safety of foreigners and of the Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire at Salonica and other places where it might be threatened. Her Majesty's Government have already desired that Her Majesty's ship Swiftsure should proceed to Salonica, and that Admiral Drummond, with three other vessels of war, should go to Besika Bay, where he will be in ready communication with Her Majesty's Embassy, and an additional vessel of small size has been placed in attendance at Constantinople at Sir H. Elliot's request. They have heard that other Powers have reinforced their squadrons in Turkish waters, and that there is a considerable naval force assembled at Salonica. Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the measures thus taken will have had a good effect in affording confidence to the subjects of Great Britain and other Powers at Salonica and elsewhere; and they will readily give instructions to Admiral Drummond and the captains of Her Majesty's ships under his orders to give any protection and assistance which may be necessary for the preservation of the lives and properties of foreign subjects should they unhappily be in immediate danger, either in concert with the commanding officers of the ships of the other Powers, or, in the absence of any such ships, on their own responsibility. Her Majesty's Government do not, however, at present apprehend any necessity for such measures, and they are of opinion that care should be taken that the naval forces of foreign Powers are not employed in any manner contrary to the Treaty rights of the Porte or subversive of the Sultan's authority. Your Excellency is authorized to read this despatch to Prince |