If we are to overcome this neurosis, and reacquire the world leadership that has been lost, I believe that precedent action by the Congress is essential.

(a) The Congress should remove restrictive clauses of the Atomic Energy Act, so that the military developments in atomic energy can be treated under the usual procedures defined for military development generally. As Waldemar Kaempffert points out in the New York Times, February 5, 1956:

It is plain that if we are to do away with unnecessary secrecy the concept will have to be abandoned that any advance in the application of atomic energy must be regarded as "born" secret. There are military matters that cannot be disclosed, but there are also hundreds of industrial suggestions for the utilization of atomic energy that should be freely published. But this is impossible without further liberalization of the Atomic Energy Act.

(b) The Congress should make clear that the United States wants no widespread system of technological secrecy and security clearances for its citizens after the Soviet pattern. The emphasis should be on a small and elite system of classification and protection of a few secrets judged to be really important.

(c) The Congress should specify the limitations on secrecy classification of military applications of science and technology, and provide for appropriate methods of review and judgment in classifying information so that the whole public interest is properly weighed before stamping any document secret. Moreover, when classified, the boundaries of such secrets should be very sharply defined and procedures established to declassify promptly with passage of time.

(d) The Congress should remove restrictions on scientific visitors so that the United States can fully enjoy the benefits of free scientific exchange.

(e) The Congress should make possible travel of American scientists to foreign laboratories for visits and research, without prejudice to their usefulness to the United States.

(f) The Congress should emphasize and support the importance of science in formulation of foreign policy and the need for a high-level Science Office in our Department of State and for science attachés in our embassies abroad.

This clear expression of interest by the Congress seems necessary if the administrative elements of the Government are to act with confidence and safety. Present laws place our Government officials under strong compulsion to suppress information without providing counterbalancing incentives for its proper release. This defect in the laws leads to an excessive overevaluation on the side of secrecy, just to be on the safe side. Many responsible Government officials recognize the defects in the present laws that encourage, or even require, undesirable restrictions on information that they are powerless to lift. I believe, for example, that the Atomic Energy Commission has been reasonably effective in releasing information up to the restrictive provisions of the law and under severe political scrutiny. But such release is necessarily piecemeal and long after the fact. Consequently, textbooks are late and students poorly trained.

In the long view, I believe that the public interest requires the freedom of substantially all scientific and technological information. The public should have the opportunity to understand and discuss the

nature and implications of its potential applications. The exception must be unusual and clearly defined. The application of technology for man's benefit needs the penetrating critique that the diverse interests of our citizens can offer. Three hundred years ago Galileo wrote:

On this matter of introducing novelties *** And who had ever heard that minds created free by God should submit slavishly to the arbitrary will of others? That they should submit in matters of truth to the decisions of a committee of men not qualified to judge? * * * These are the novelties that carry with them the ruin of commonwealths and the subversion of the State.

It is in freedom and progress, not restriction, that America finds its power.

(Supplementary memorandum to the statement of L. V. Berkner, president, Associated Universities, Inc. :)

Mr. BERKNER. Serious technological secrecy is relatively recent, emerging sharply as a product of the upsurgence of our technological revolution. There are, of course, a few earlier examples extending throughout history, but these were of almost insignificant importance.

But as society generally has become deeply dependent on technological development, so too has the military organization increased its dependence on science and technology.

Initially, at least, it appeared reasonable that the military restrict the exchange of ideas having military implications on the ground that to permit the free flow in information would hand the enemy our developmental achievements "on a platter."

In the modern world, however, all the important areas of science have military implications and, under our present policies, must therefore fall inevitably under the cloak of military secrecy.

Not long ago, for instance, a responsible scientist mentioned to me that he had endeavored to arrange a scientific conference on fundamental high-temperature physics. He found that this was impossible, however, because all the important recent advances were "classified information." At the same time, Marguerite Higgins has reported in the New York Herald Tribune, February 6, 1956:

"An Indian engineer told me, for example, that Soviet development of heatresistant materials was far more advanced than anything he had seen in the West."

A great many such examples can be cited.

Since more and more of our scientific activity is coming within the purview of secrecy, the need for appraisal of the effects of secrecy on our scientific stature and progress, and therefore on our national security, becomes of increasing importance.

It seems highly probable that a little technological secrecy, like a little poison, may be a good thing, but too much can destroy us.

Therefore, it is important to understand just where the balance lies.

A famous psychologist at the University of Michigan once pointed out to me that creative thinking is the reassociation of old ideas in new ways. The really significant new concepts of science are often, if not always, the result of association of widely diverse facts and ideas that may not hitherto have seemed remotely connected.

Such ideas as the laws of mechanics and the concepts of space and time derived from astronomy, together with the work of Planck on high temperature radiation, led Einstein to postulate the equivalence of mass and energy. On this concept is based the development of nuclear energy.

Yet today, any intelligent military organization, operating under the present security rules, would certainly classify the equivalent of Planck's work so that it would be denied to a potential Einstein.

In the same way, it is necessary to understand how the benefits of science to our Nation will quickly be extinguished by widespread technological secrecy. In suppressing seemingly isolated scientific bits of information of direct military value, we at the same time prevent the germination of scientific ideas of much greater scientific, social, and military significance. The really great concepts generated from a free and virile science and injected into our industrial complex, can provide far greater security through technology supremacy than we could ever hope to achieve through the secrecy of technological information.

The application of really serious secrecy to military technology seems to have coincided with the discovery of radar about 1930. During the ensuing decade, the results were not impressive.

In the case of radar, secrecy seriously delayed its development, and neither technical nor tactical progress was very appreciable. As a consequence, although it was technically and demonstrably adequate to have done this relatively simple job, radar failed to prevent Pearl Harbor (a tactical failure born of military ignorance imposed by secrecy, for the clear warning of radar was ignored). Had they known our radar protection of Pearl Harbor, there is at least a reasonable doubt that the Japanese would have attempted a surprise.

In any event, our own commanders certainly would not have been ignorant of the powerful tools at their command, and the outcome might well have been very different.

Moreover, the development of airborne radar applications awaited the war, for at its commencement we had no antisubmarine radar, no night fighters, no means for extensive sea search. The absence of such weapons is directly attributable to the technological ignorance and delays resulting from secrecy.

Had airborne radar been developed and advertised openly, the consequent great progress in these developments might have so weakened the German confidence in their submarine supremacy, or in their capabilities for strategic air attack, that the war might not have occurred.

In any event, our shipping losses after its beginning would certainly have been less than the tragic millions of tons.

More recently, the establishment of our northern air defenses was delayed by at least 1, and more probably 2 years by technological secrecy.

In fact, the security of information was so good that even the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of State did not learn, until after his retirement, that the main underlying technological problems had been solved more than 2 years earlier.

Is there anything in this history to lend confidence in the security provided by technological secrecy as contrasted to the security of progress? We could go on with these examples, but I leave the judgment to you.

We must understand clearly, that in applying technological secrecy on an evergrowing scale after 1930, that we had no previous experience on which to go, since it arose from a situation new to society and to armies. We did not then understand that technological secrecy was quite a different matter than the secrecy of tactics and battle order, of communication codes, of intelligence, and of intentions.

Since that time our experience with technological secrecy has grown, and it is now time to revise our policies in the light of the consequences that can be read with ever-increasing clarity.

The maintenance of the widespread secrecy of technological information makes necessary the employment of procedures and regulations for the security of such information.

Under these procedures the scientist cannot avoid becoming the almost unique target, because he is the source of much of the information to be protected. It is his creative thought that produces the need for technological secrecy. Yet the application of our present security procedures condition the scientist to avoid contact with any idea that may lead to military application. Why should this be so? The reasons seem clear.

1. If he knows no secrets, he cannot be involved in security questions. Scientists are no different from anyone else in desiring to protect their reputations. Once they are involved in secret matters, their reputations may be destroyed by any person who makes irresponsible charges. Because many people accept the cliche, "Where there's smoke, there's fire," a subsequent clearance does little to undo the damage.

2. Clearance is not a permanent status, and a scientist's reputation is constantly susceptible to multiple jeopardy. Having once been admitted to secret information or having even originated it, the scientist knows that he may be destroyed by a subsequent change of policy or by other irrelevant circumstances that may result in suspension of that clearance. During each clearance review, his entire life comes under scrutiny, and any act or indiscretion that may have had no relevance to security at the time, may arise to damn him. The threat of a review of his security clearance can be used to discourage his exploration of possible alternatives for the correction of national weaknesses--if these alternatives happen not to coincide with current policy.

3. In the process of reassociating ideas in new ways, the scientist must acquire from many sources the ideas to be associated. The development of a new concept

does not occur in a flash, but is the consequence of hard thinking and long discussions with scientists of other views and of varied experience. Yet, if the emergent idea is of subsequent military importance, and is later classified, the scientist may become involved in security procedures because of the earlier discussions of his own ideas that were an essential precedent to generating the new concept in his own brain.

4. If he has been engaged in scientific leadership in the national interest, he is inevitably involved in extensive security questioning relating to his colleagues, to the views of his colleagues, to his estimate of their intent, and to their statements and actions at informal scientific conferences. He must act as witness at security hearings, or render sworn statements concerning events long since past. He may unwittingly and quite improperly involve another through some misinterpretation of his meaning or error in his recollection. The application of security procedures becomes a harassment to all involved.

5. If he expresses a strong view on some technological matter that may be contrary to the application of technology to current or to subsequent policy, he is open to the accusation of taking this view with the intent of deliberate subversion. If, as a consequence of study, he finds serious deficiency in our military position and advocates a course of action to correct that deficiency, he may be accused of conspiracy against the existing, though inadequate policy. Moreover, secrecy prevents him from stating the essential technical grounds on which his view is based. Therefore, in the simple process of doing his job for his country well, he is open to damaging criticism against which he is permitted to produce little defense.

6. In a system of widespread technological secrecy, the scientist finds it increasingly difficult to sort out from the tremendous multiplicity of facts those that are secret and those that are open. He may not even know that a scientific fact. obvious to him, is classified as secret somewhere in the system. Consequently, his knowledge of secrets tends to restrict productive scientific discussions far beyond the necessity of the security system. But, if he errs, he must be certain to err on the side of safety. Therefore, the freedom of discussion, on which the maintenance of his professional competence depends, and from which really great scientific progress emerges, is severely hampered.

7. The clearance procedure itself is complicated by requirement for numbers of detailed forms that must be submitted to a multiplicity of agencies at frequent intervals. Clearance involves intolerable redtape and involvement of endless time and energy.

The situations that I cite above are not hypothetical; every one can be documented by specific cases.

The point is that the security process strongly conditions the scientist not to do those very things our country most needs. Under these circumstances we have lost the spontaneous will and opportunity for men to contribute to our strength when they possess special knowledge and the vision to see how it can be applied. Responsible men recognize the conditioning and will not consciously permit it to stand in the way of their duty and responsibility to their country and to the ideals that it represents.

But repeated applications of these security procedures makes the average scientist feel a little like the dog in the psychological experiment who is kicked every time the bell is rung. Presently he runs quite unconsciously when the bell of "military security" is rung, without waiting for the kick. There is a limit to the frustrations experienced by the really creative scientist beyond which his creativeness is destroyed irrespective of his willingness to serve.

The scientist originating and working with secrets, and this includes most of us, is subjected to pressures and influences not experienced by ordinary AmeriThe scientists are not asking for preferential treatment, but for a relief from distracting pressures that are unknown to the ordinary American-a relief that is imperative if they are to keep America abreast of scientific progress.

cans.

I do not say these things in criticism of the security system. As long as we have widespread technological secrecy as a national policy I doubt that these defects in its application can be avoided; nor does their existence excuse any violation of either the spirit or letter of security procedures. I point out these defects in order that we may understand the consequences of technological secrecy. The proper balance between security derived from secrecy of technological information and security derived from progress must be understood clearly. There is one other point that we cannot escape.

An important concept in science is no less important to our national security because it is produced by one who cannot be cleared by the arbitrary application of security procedures.

We must not forget that Hitler and Mussolini abrogated their right to the atomic bomb when they indulged in the doubtful extravagance of driving a few leading scientists from their shores because they couldn't be cleared according to Nazi or Fascist lights.

Scientific greatness always rises from diversity of thought, never from conformity. Since the security procedures that support technological secrecy inevitably put a premium on conformity, they tend to prevent our Nation's realization of the very greatness that we seek.

For technological secrecy tends to obscure the essential dependence of democracy on diversity of thought and opinion. In the atmosphere of conformity, induced by our present neurosis, the encouragement of the diversity on which our system of free enterprise depends has been some times considered a form of subversive activity bearing on man's security clearance, in spite of constitutional guaranties. An agile brain that can create great things is almost certain to be nonconformist.

The effect of the clearance procedure goes far beyond the protection of secrets. There is the case of one of our great chemists, a Nobel Laureate, who was directing his learning to the synthesis of a suitable blood substitute. If a blood substitute could be found, this man with his superb skill could find it. Because of irresponsible charges from undisclosed sources, the support for his work was cut off by a nonmilitary agency of the Government. No formal charges were made, no hearing was possible since the work was not secret. There was no opportunity to clear these charges.

Here we must ask ourselves, is it better for our security that the work of this man be cut off, or that we have the means of saving thousands of lives on the battlefield and millions of lives at home should atomic attack ever come?

The lowest levels of personal clearance, such as the AEC "P" approval, or files check, and its military equivalents on men doing nonsecret work is the most dangerous device ever introduced in democracy.

For the individual can be and often is blacklisted without recourse or even knowledge of it.

Therefore, technological secrecy tends to put many of our best thinkers behind a wall across which they have no communication with our Government. Moreover, this wall excludes many of the great foreign scientists of our time. Can we afford the policy of banishing or banning great scientists in the face of our present perils? One recalls the remark of Lagrange to Delambre the day after the execution of Lavoisier :

"Only a moment to cut off that head and a hundred years may not give us another like it."

Therefore, it is imperative that we find the best balance of technological secrecy as weighed against free information-a balance designed to give us optimum strength. I will try to enumerate the factors involved.

1. The system of technological secrecy must not involve large undertakings: In a democratic system it is absolutely impossible to cloak large undertakings in secrecy. Their very existence can be seen and discloses their main purposes. Large numbers of men from janitors, through factory workers to the engineers, scientists, and management know essential details. As I once remarked elsewhere, "It is like trying to hide an elephant under a paper hat." Since leaks inevitably occur for reasons beyond anyone's control, the enemy is informed, but our own scientists on the whole are not. Consequently, enemy progress on such undertakings is very possibly greater than our own. Penetration of a large-scale project by a determined enemy is impossible to prevent by any known method except perhaps an iron curtain around the whole country. 2. The number of secret projects should be sharply limited:

A widespread system with leaks is not rigidly respected. Therefore, the security value of those few projects that should be highly protected is devalued since they are jumbled together with thousands of projects that should never be classified at all. Consequently, the widespread secrecy system defeats the essential security. Real secrecy on a few critically important technological matters should be enforced rigidly and at every step. Only a few small-cut critical projects can be policed with the rigidity that ensures real hope of success. Technological secrecy should never be used where there is doubt that its effectiveness can be complete, and should only be used in defined situations when there is complete confidence that it will be effective.