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an outgrowth from the case of French v. Stew was given by the interlocutory and the final art, Hay et al., No. 360, just decided, ante, | decree in the case before us. 854.

For the facts relating to the present case, except such as will be found in this opinion, we refer to the opinion of the court in the for

mer case.

Soon after the decree of the 23d of December, 1869, was rendered in that case for the payment, by Hay, of $2,387.66, suit was instituted against him upon a transcript of the decree in the District Court of the City and County of Philadelphia. On the 21st of March, 1871, the plaintiff recovered a judgment. On the 5th of April following, the defendant sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the State. The case is still pending in that court. On the first of June, 1871, Hay filed this bill, praying for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff from proceeding to collect the judgment. On the same day a preliminary injunction was granted by the court below. Answers were filed and testimony was taken. On the 11th of January, 1873, the case came on for final hearing, and a perpetual injunction, as prayed for, was decreed.

The defendants thereupon removed the case to this court by appeal.

The case in which the decree of the State Court of the 23d of December, 1869, was rendered, was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States in February, 1870.

That decree was set aside and annulled by the latter court on the 22d of October, 1872. On the 13th of October, 1873, the case was finally heard and the bill dismissed.

That decree as to Hay has just been affirmed by this court.

It will thus be seen that a stronger equity can hardly exist than that which is developed in favor of the appellee in the case before us.

The order of the court below, annulling the decree upon which the suit at law in Pennsylvania was founded, was fatal to that action, and entitled Hay to a perpetual injunction, without reference to the final result of the prior case.

If it could not be given in this case the result would have shown the existence of a great defect in our federal jurisprudence, and have been a reproach upon the administration of justice. In that event the payment of the annulled decree may be enforced in Pennsylvania, and Hay, notwithstanding the final decree in that case, and in this case, would find himself in exactly the same situation he would have been if those decrees had been against him instead of being in his favor. They would be nullities as regards any protection they could have given him. Instead of terminating the strife between him and his adversary, they would leave him under the necessity of engag ing in a new conflict elsewhere. This would be contrary to the plainest principles of reason and justice.

The prohibition in the Judiciary Act against the granting of injunctions by the courts of the United States touching proceedings in State Courts has no application here. The prior jurisdiction of the court below took the case out of the operation of that provision.

If the State Courts should persist in proceeding a thing not to be expected-the wrong will be on the part of those tribunals and not of the court below.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. HANNAH C. GRANDIN, Admrx. of John H. Piatt, Deceased, Appt.,

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UNITED STATES. (See 8. C., "Piatt's Administrator v. United States" 22 Wall., 496-513.)

Oral evidence to prove new agreement, after written one-settlement of part of claimacceptance of award-when does not bar further claim.

1. Oral evidence is admissible to prove a new and distinct agreement made subsequently to a written agreement upon a new consideration, whether it be as a substitute for the old or in addition to and beyond it.

2. A settlement of part of a claim is not a bar to the residue of the claim.

3. Where a party accepts the amount awarded

by commissioners for his claim, he acquiesces in the decision of the tribunal by which a part of in his favor. the claim is rejected, as well as in the finding

This bill is not an original one. It is auxiliary and dependent in its character, as much so as if it were a bill of review. Logan v. Patrick, 5 Cranch, 288; Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet., 1; Dunlap v. Stetson, 4 Mason, 349, 360; Clarke v. Mathewson, 12 Pet., 164. The court having jurisdiction in personam had power to require the defendant to do or to refrain from doing anything beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction which it might have required 253*] *to be done or omitted within the limits of such territory. Watts v. Waddle, 6 Pet., Argued Mar. 25, 29, 30, 1875. Decided Apr. 19, 391; Lewis v. Darling, 16 How., 1. Having the possession and jurisdiction of the case, that

4. But where the accounting officers were forbidden by law to allow the claimant anything be construction of the Act of Congress to suppose yond a certain amount, it would be an unreasonable that its framers intended that the claimant should relinquish another large balance found to be due [No. 222.]

him.

1875.

PPEAL from the Court of Claims.

Jurisdiction embraced everything in the case, A The case is fully stated in the opinion of

the court.

Messrs. Thomas Wilson, William Johnston and Ben. M. Piatt, for appellant:

and every question arising which could be determined in it until it reached its termination and the jurisdiction was exhausted. While the jurisdiction lasted it was exclusive, and could not be trenched upon by any other tribunal. Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet., 400; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How., 583, 15 L. ed., 1028; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How., 450, 16 L. ed., 749; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall., 370, 21 L. ed., 290. The The Act itself does not show such an incourt below might, upon a cross-bill and, per- tention on the part of Congress, nor does its haps, upon motion, have given the relief which 'language warrant such a construction.

The single legal question presented for the decision of this court is, whether this Act of Congress affords a legal bar to the recovery by the claimant of moneys otherwise admitted to be due to her.

1. If such an intention had existed on the, Phelps v. Zuschlag, 34 Tex., 371; Bane v. part of Congress, it would have been very easy Detrick, 52 Ill., 199; Bowker v. Lowell, 49 to use apt words to express it. Nothing is Me., 429; Hackett v. King, 6 Allen (Mass.), more common in Acts of Congress passed for 58; Strong v. Grannis, 26 Barb., 122; Tilley v. the relief of private claimants than the words Damon, 11 Cush. (Mass.), 247; Brown v. Peck, "in full payment," or "in full satisfaction" of 2 Wis., 261; Breck v. Blanchard, 2 Fost. (N. his claim, etc. It has been done in many hun- | H.), 303; Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill (N. Y.), dred cases. If these words had been inserted, 154; Atty-Gen. v. Sothon, 2 Vern., 497. this meaning would have been made clear, and Piatt could not have misunderstood it.

2. Instead of an intention on the part of Congress that the Act of May 8, 1820, was a settlement of all claims against the United States, it was evident that its intention was distinctly the contrary; for under the Act of 1820, the accounting officers could allot only $48,230.77, and no more; the proviso of the Act limited the relief to be granted to Piatt to that sum, because that was the amount claimed by the United States from him, and for which suits against him had been commenced.

Instead of being or pretending to be a full and complete settlement, which should include "all claims against the defendants," the allowance to be made thereunder was expressly limited by the proviso not to "exceed the amount now claimed by the United States, and for which suits have been commenced against Piatt."

If the Act stood without the proviso, Congress, in referring these accounts to the accounting officers, had authorized and required them to make the settlement, "on just and equitable principles," and had left the officers free to make a full and complete settlement on the principles declared, then it might be said that this should be construed as a settlement of all claims against the defendants. But with the proviso attached which limited and restricted the allowance not to exceed a certain fixed sum, I do not see with what show of reason the claim can be made.

The accounting officers of the Treasury did not so regard it, for they proceeded to state his accounts, and allowed him, in that statement, the item of $63,620.48, while the only relief which could have been afforded him, under that Act, was for the sum of $48,230.77, for which a suit had been commenced.

Upon the report of the accounting officers, the subsequent Congress appropriated and paid the above sum of $63,620.48.

The accounting officers did not pretend to state or settle all of Piatt's claim. They only stated 849 bbls. of flour-not 730,070.10 rations.

The circumstances in which Piatt was placed at this time prevent any such legal effect, even if the intention were clearly expressed in the Act.

When a man, under the ancient laws providing imprisonment for debt, is arrested and thrown into jail to answer a debt he does not owe, and when the plaintiff owes him; and while in prison a settlement is offered him, which he accepts in order to be released, such settlement so made is of no binding force as a settlement, however definitely or plainly it may have been stipulated and agreed upon. Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall., 214, 19 L. ed. 136; U. S. v. Huckabee, 16 Wall., 431, 21 L. ed. 463; see also 2 Bac. Abr., 402, tit. Duress;

Where a party by compromise agrees to accept a less sum than what is actually due, the sum agreed upon must be paid or the compromise is void.

Blackburn v. Ormsby, 41 Pa., 97; Hearn v. Kiehl, 38 Pa., 147; State Bank v. Littlejohn, 1 Dev. & B., 565, and cases there cited; Higgins v. Halligan, 46 Ill., 173, 176, 177.

If a doubt should exist as to the meaning of the Act of May 8, 1820, whether the allowance mentioned therein was intended to be final, or only a provisional allowance for the enlargement of Piatt until his counts should be settled on just and equitable principles, and the balance, if any, in his favor, ascertained and provided for by law, the Act and the proviso should be liberally construed in favor of the object of relief, and decided according to that construction which is most consonant to equity. 8 Wheel. Am. Com. Law, 142; Cross v. U. S., 8 C. C., 1; Kerlin v. Bull, 1 Dall., 178; U. S. v. Bright, Whart. Pa. Dig., 708; Bank of N. Am. v. Fitzsimons, 3 Binn., 356.

No legislative council, without bad faith, can destroy a contract made and executed in good faith. There is no leaning of the courts to the idea that Congress intends to do wrong. Nor is it to be presumed by the court that Congress intended to withhold from John H. Piatt $1, much less $131,508.90, justly due to him. But we deny that Congress had any such intention, or that the private Act of May 8, 1820, admits any such construction.

Messrs. Geo. H. Williams, Atty-Gen., and John Goforth, Asst. Atty-Gen., for appellee:

A construction by Congress of the Act of May 8, 1820 (found in the report of the select committee, to whom was referred the memorial of the legal representatives of John H. Piatt, upon which the appropriation of $63,620.48 was made, read Jan. 9, 1824, 18th Congress, 1st Sess.), shows that there was thought, either in the representatives of Piatt or in Congress, that the claim under the assurances had not been finally settled.

no

"All these circumstances duly considered, the committee are of opinion that the balance found by the Comptroller is justly due and ought to be paid.

In that opinion the committee fully concur, for reasons already stated; and the conclusion they are brought to is, therefore, inevitable, that, as between the United States and the assignees of John H. Piatt, the settlement ought to be decisive."

The committee, therefore, ask leave to report a bill.

An allowance by the Legislature in full, when accepted by claimant, is an estoppel of further claim.

Sholes v. The State, 2 Chand., 182; Calkins v. The State, 13 Wis., 389.

"The word 'settle' has an established meaning and implies the mutual adjustment of ae

counts between different parties, and an agreement upon the balance. When, therefore, it is averred that the committee settled with the plaintiff, we think that sufficiently avers his consent, because without his consent, express or implied, there could be no settlement." Baxter v. State, 9 Wis., 44; see, also, 11 Ala., 419.

This was an offer of settlement by Congress to Piatt, of a disputed claim. He could accept its offer or not as he chose.

That he had no other remedy at the time does not affect the question.

Mason v. U. S., 17 Wall., 67, 21 L. ed. 564. He presented his proofs, made his claims, and accepted the allowances without protest. He is barred by the submission of his claims.

U. S. v. Adams, 7 Wall., 479, 19 L. ed. 254; U. S. v. Child, 12 Wall., 232, 20 L. ed. 360; U. S. v. Justice, 14 Wall., 535, 20 L. ed. 753; Mason v. U. S., 17 Wall., 67, 21 L. ed. 564

There was no duress. Piatt could have demanded that any part of the claim, upon which Congress placed no limit as to proof and no restriction as to amount, and not connected with the assurances in any way, should have been applied by the accounting officers to that portion of his indebtedness which had not been included in the pending suits.

No compulsion was exercised over him at any stage of the proceedings.

Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court:

Parol evidence of what passed between the parties, either before their contract was reduced to writing or during the time it was in a state of preparation, is not admissible to add to, subtract from, or in any manner to vary or qualify the terms of the executed instrument; but it is competent for the parties, after the agreement is reduced to writing, at any time before breach of it by a new contract not in writing, unless the agreement is one required by law to be authenticated by writing, either to waive the same altogether, or to dissolve or annul it, or in any manner add to, subtract from, or vary or qualify the terms of the instrument, and thus to make a new contract, which in a proper case may be proved partly by the written agreement and partly by the subsequent verbal terms engri fted upon it by the new stipulations. Emerson v. Slater, 22 How., 41, 16 I. ed. 365; Ad. Cont., 6th ed., 934.

Services of an important character were ren dered by the deceased claimant during the war of 1812, as Commissary of Subsistence. and it appears that when he ceased to act in that capacity there remained in his hands $46,112.56 unexpended, of the public moneys appropriated for that purpose. On the 26th of January, 1814, the deceased, then in full life, contracted in writing with the Secretary of War to furnish rations to the northwestern army for the period of one year, upon the terms and conditions fully set forth in the petition. Pursuant to that contract, he delivered the rations required, to the amount in value of $269.051.28, as appears by the finding of the court below. All of the rations included in that aggregate of value were furnished accord ing to the terms of the written contract; but

the United States failed to make the stipulated payments, and made default to the amount of $210,000, and were, in fact, as the court below find, unable to fulfill the terms of their contract. Payments being refused, and the Secretary of War admitting that the United States were unable to fulfill the contract, both as to what was due and as to what might become due for future supplies, the contractor notified the Secretary of War that he should furnish no more rations under that contract.

Both parties appear to have acquiesced in that view of the case, but the public exigency rendered it imperatively necessary that a large quantity of rations should be immediately furnished for the northwestern army, and the court below finds, that in order to meet the exigency of the public service, it was agreed by parol between the deceased claimant and the Secretary of War, that the former should furnish the required rations, and that he should receive for the same whatever price they should be reasonably worth at the time and place of delivery, and that the United States, instead of paying as stipulated by the terms of the original contract, might defer payment until such time or times as they should have the requisite funds.

Rations were furnished by the contractor under the new arrangement, exceeding in number seven hundred thousand, and the court below finds that the fair and reasonable value of each ration was forty-five cents at the times and places at which they were furnished, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $328,531.54, as appears by the fourth finding of the court below. By the same finding it also appears that the accounting officers of the Treasury settled the accounts of the contractor at the close of the war, without any knowledge of the parol agreement and, consequently, that they allowed him only the price designated in the original written contract, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $148,791.87, leaving due to him a balance of $179,739.67.

Unadjusted accounts were also held by the deceased claimant against the United States for transportation services and expenses, and for supplies in the form of rations furnished for the use of indigent citizens and Indians, not embraced nor included within either of the described contracts or agreements for which he claimed large credits. Instead of admitting those accounts, the United States instituted a suit against the claimant, to recover the balance due from him as Commissary of Subsistence; and the fifth finding of the court below shows that he was arrested and held to bail in that suit, and that Congress, during the pendency of the same, passed an Act for his relief. By that Act the proper accounting officers were directed to settle his accounts on just and equitable principles, giving all due weight to the settlements and allowances already made, and to the assurances and decisions of the War Department, provided the sum allowed under such assurances shall not exceed the amount now claimed by the United States, for which suit has been commenced against the claimant. 6 Stat. at L., 245.

Under and in pursuance of that Act, the accounting officers of the Treasury settled his accounts as follows:

1. They allowed him for his transportation Statute of Frauds, or that such an oral agreeclaim and for the rations furnished to citizens | ment may have the effect to vary any of the and Indians, $63,620.48, which is a matter en- terms of the written contract or to waive or tirely separate and distinct from the rations discharge it altogether. furnished under the parol agreement.

2. They also adjusted his accounts for the rations delivered to the army under the parol agreement in the following manner: before making any deductions, they estimated the fair and reasonable value of the rations furnished under that agreement, and then deducted the price of rations already paid to the claimant, and from the balance thus ascertained they made a further deduction, sufficient to reduce the amount of the credit to the sum due from the claimant as Commissary of Subsistence, in obedience to the proviso contained in the private Act passed for his relief.

Enough appears by the foregoing statement to show that the last deduction amounted to the sum of $131,508.90, which still remains due and unpaid, as appears by the fourth finding of the court below.

Subsequently, Congress passed another private Act, under which the assignees and administrators of the deceased claimant were paid the amount allowed for the transportation claim and for the rations furnished to the indigent citizens and Indians, and the present suit was brought to recover the balance for the rations furnished to the army under the parol agreement. 6 Stat. at L., 314.

Four only of the judges of the Court of Claims were present at the hearing of the case. They were unanimous in all of the findings of fact and in respect to the conclusion of law, that the parol agreement was valid, and as to the amount of the balance due to the deceased claimant; but being equally divided upon the right of the claimant to recover, they entered judgment in favor of the defendant for the purpose of an appeal to the Supreme Court. Appeal was taken from that judgment by the present claimant, and the assignment of errors is that the second conclusion of law, that the cause of action is barred by the allowance reported by the accounting officers of the Treasury, is erroneous.

Attempt is made to vindicate this conclusion chiefly upon two grounds: 506*] *(1) That the auditor passed to the credit of the deceased claimant the amount

claimed by the United States as due from him as Commissary of Subsistence, and that he, the claimant, accepted the settlement without protest.

(2) That Congress intended by the Act directing the adjustment of his accounts that the settlement should be final and conclusive; that the Act was in the nature of an offer for a disputed claim and that the acceptance of the adjustment is a bar to the claim.

Verbal agreements between the parties to a written contract made before or at the time of the execution of the contract are, in general, inadmissible to vary its terms or to affect its construction, as all such agreements are considered as merged in the written contract. Both parties admit that proposition, nor is it denied by the defendants that oral agreements subsequently made, on a new and valuable consideration, before the breach of the contract, may have the effect to enlarge the time of perform ance of the contract, if it is not one within the

Exceptions, it is everywhere admitted, exist to the rule that parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument. Most of such exceptions are enumerated by Mr. Greenleaf, and in the course of that enumeration he says: "Neither is the rule infringed by the admission of oral evidence to prove a new and distinct agreement upon a new consideration, whether it be as a substitute for the old or an addition to and be yond it; and if subsequent and involving the same subject-matter, it is immaterial whether the new agreement be entirely oral or whether it refers to and partially or totally adopts the provisions of the written contract, provided the old agreement be rescinded and abandoned." 1 Greenl. Ev., 12th ed., § 303; 2 Taylor, Ev., 6th ed., § 1044; Goss v. Nugent, 5 Barn. & Ad., 65; Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Met., 400; Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns., 39; Marshall v. Lynn, 6 Mees. & W., 109; Stead v. Dawber, 10 Ad. & El., 57; Harvey v. Grabham, 6 Ad. & El., 65; Stowell v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C., 927.

*Sufficient appears in the very nature [*507 of the new arrangement to show that the promise of the United States was made upon a good and valid consideration, as nothing is better settled than the rule that, if there is a benefit to the defendant and a loss to the plaintiff consequent upon and directly resulting from the defendant's promise in behalf of the plaintiff, there is a sufficient consideration moving from the plaintiff to enable the latter to maintain an action upon the promise to recover compensation. 1 Pars. Cont., 6th ed., 431.

Other authorities state the rule much stronger, authorizing the conclusion that benefit to the party by whom the promise is made, or to a third person at his instance, or damage sustained at the instance of the party promising by the party in whose favor the promise is made, is sufficient to constitute a good and valuable consideration for the support of an action of assumpsit. Violett V. Patton, 5 Cranch, 150; Chit. Cont., 28; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet., 182.

Modern authorities supporting the proposition that parol evidence is admissible to prove such a new agreement, under the circumstances disclosed in this case, are very numerous and are quite sufficient to show that the proposition may be regarded as an established rule of decision. Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Met., 489; Bk. v. Woodward, 5 N. H., 99; Barley v. Johnson, 9 Cow., 99; Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend., 75; Lindley v. Lacey, 17 C. B. (N. S.), 584.

Apply that rule to the case and it is quite clear the the whole amount claimed by the plaintiff was due to the deceased claimant at the time his accounts were adjusted by the accounting officers of the Treasury, in addition to the amount claimed by the United States in set-off for balance due from him as Commissary of Subsistence. Well founded doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained, as it satisfactorily appears that in order to reduce his claim to an amount not exceeding the claim of the United States, those officers [*508 found it necessary to deduct, from the aggre

ever, proceed upon the ground that such a commission possesses any judicial power to bind the parties by their decision or to give the decision any conclusive effect. Claimants in such cases may appear before the commission or not, as they choose, but the decision is, if they do appear and accept the terms awarded as a final settlement of the controversy, without protest, they must be understood as having precluded themselves from further claim and litigation.

gate estimate of the value of the rations furnished under the parol agreement, an amount exactly equal to the balance found due to the claimant by the subordinate court from whose judgment the appeal is prosecuted in this case. Nothing was paid to the claimant under that private Act except what was allowed to the claimant for services and expenses in furnishing transportation and rations for the use of Indians and indigent citizens. He was discharged from arrest and the balance due from him to the United States for the moneys in his Where a party accepts the amount awarded hands as Commissary of Subsistence was also in such a case, it is just to conclude that he discharged, but nothing was paid to him for acquiesces in the decision of the tribunal by the large balance now found to be due by the which a part of the claim is rejected as well court below. Argument to show that such a as in the finding in his favor, but the accountsettlement is not a bar to the residue of the ing officers in this case were forbidden by law claim is unnecessary, as the proposition is to allow the claimant anything beyond the utterly destitute of merit and repugnant to amount in his hands as Commissary of Subthe plainest dictates both of law and justice. sistence, and they obeyed the directions given 2. Opposed to that is the suggestion, in be- in the Act of Congress. Manifestly [*510 half of the United States, that the Act of Con- the claimant had no option upon the subject, gress was in the nature of an offer of compro-and in the opinion of the court it would be an mise, and that the acceptance of the adjust-unreasonable construction of the Act of Conment is a bar to the claim.

gress to suppose that its framers intended that the claimant should relinquish the large balance found to be due him in consideration of his discharge from arrest and the discontinuance of the suit against him for the recovery of the amount due from him to the United States.

Certain cases from the state reports are referred to which it is supposed assert a different rule, but the court here is of a different opinion. Sholes v. State, 2 Chand., 182; Barter v. State, 9 Wis., 44; Calkins v. State, 13 Wis., 389.

Support to that proposition is attempted to be drawn from the decision of this court in the case of Mason v. U. S., 17 Wall., 70, 21 L. ed. 565, but the court here is very clearly of the opinion that the case cited affords no countenance whatever to any such conclusion. Muskets were wanted by the United States in that case, and it appears that the plaintiff in that controversy contracted to manufacture and deliver at a specified time large quantities of such arms at the price specified in the contract. Arms of the kind were delivered and paid for, and the plaintiff was notified by order Suffice it to say, that in the case before the of the Secretary of War, that a larger quan- court no appropriation whatever was made in tity would be received. Preparations were ac- favor of the claimant. Where the claim is cordingly made by the plaintiff to fill the sec-disputed and an appropriation is made in favor ond order, but the Secretary of War subsequently appointed a special commission to audit and adjust all such orders and claims. They reported that the contract should be 509*] confirmed *to a certain extent upon the condition that the contractor should, within fifteen days after notice of their decision, execute a bond, with good and sufficient sureties, for the performance of the modified contract, and the case shows that he executed the modified contract and gave the required bond. By that contract he engaged to manufacture thirty thousand muskets, and the finding of the subordinate court showed that the contract was fulfilled by both parties.

What the court decided in that case was, that the claimant voluntarily accepted the modification of the contract as suggested by the commissioners and that he executed the new contract in the place of the one superseded, which new contract he must have understood was intended to define the obligations of all concerned. Beyond all doubt the new contract in that case was substituted for the old one, and the court held that no party, after accepting such a compromise and executing such a discharge, could be justified in claiming damages for a breach of the prior contract which had been voluntarily modified and sur

rendered.

of the claimant for an amount less than the amount claimed, and the appropriation purports to be in full payment of the demand, the rule may be different, but it is sufficient to say in response to those authorities that nothing was appropriated in this case, and the accounting officers of the Treasury were forbidden to allow anything beyond what was involved in the pending suit against the claimant.

Judgment reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to render judgment in favor of the petitioner for the amount found to be due her in the fourth finding exhibited in the transcript.

Mr Justice Bradley, dissenting:

I dissent from the judgment of the court in this case. In my view the case was decided and settled more than fifty years ago. The claim cannot be established without opening that settlement, and declaring that a valid contract was made which had been decided not to be a valid contract, but only a mere claim for some equitable allowance which was in fact made and accepted at that time.

*Piatt, the original claimant, was an [*511 army contractor in the Northwest during the War of 1812. Becoming embarrassed by not receiving funds from the Government, and from Other cases to the same effect have been de- the great rise in the prices of provisions, he cided by this court. U. S. v. Child, 12 Wall., threatened to throw up his contract; but, the 232, 20 L. ed. 360; U. S. v. Justice, 14 Wall., allegation is, that at the request of Mr. Mon535, 20 L. ed. 753. None of those cases, how-roe, then acting Secretary of War, and upon

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