Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

PREFACE

In 1956, the Middle East took center stage in world affairs and in American foreign policy. It was a region in which the United States had long played only a peripheral role, from the suppression of the Barbary pirates in the Age of Jefferson to the landing, in 1942, of American troops at Morocco. Even during the decade immediately following World War II, when this country aided the beleaguered State of Israel and helped restore to power the Shah of Iran, our interests lay primarily in the reconstruction of Europe and the stabilization of the Far East. It is also important to remember that in those days the United States did not depend on oil imports from the Middle East, as did our allies in Western Europe. We were, however, seriously concerned with attempted Soviet inroads into the Mediterranean area, where historically they had sought to gain entrance. Three years after the death of Stalin, American foreign policy analysts were still trying to decipher the objectives of his successors. Their forays into the non-aligned nations of Southeast Asia, and in India and Yugoslavia, had signalled a shift in Soviet policy of the highest magnitude, and portended new initiatives directed at the emerging Arab States. How would these non-aligned nations respond to the global competition between East and West? How deep was our interest in the Middle East, and would the United States go "to the brink" to meet the Soviet challenge in that region?

In retrospect, it seems odd that the stimulus for the violent actions of 1956 was not one of military intervention, but of public works and civil engineering. At cause was Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser's dream of building the Aswan High Dam, a project greater than the pyramids, and certainly more practical for his povertystricken people. Although staggering in cost and construction requirements, the dam was essentially the type of project the United States wished to encourage: It would revitalize Egypt's economy, provide land for its farmers, power for its industry, feed its hungry, and perhaps cement its ties with its Western financial backers. But the American offer to help underwrite construction of the Aswan Dam was no simple matter, as the discussions in these transcripts clearly indicate. Members of the committee were troubled over the large expenditures, the setting of dubious precedents, and the granting of long-term agreements in which Congress could not fully supervise executive activity. Finally, there were fears, as expressed by the Secretary of State, that the dam could become a "white elephant," imposing an austerity economy on Egypt and adversely affecting that nation's relations with its creditors. Which of these considerations, or

any others, weighed heaviest on John Foster Dulles' decision to withdraw the offer of aid remains a question for historians to debate. One thing seems certain, not even the "master chessman" anticipated the dramatic chain of events that would follow his bold move, from the seizure of the Suez Canal to the three-pronged invasion of Egypt by Israel, Great Britain, and France.

The debate over the Aswan Dam competed with other Middle Eastern problems for congressional attention. The shipment of arms to Arab nations bordering on Israel became a public issue that year, along with the extension of the American lease on the Dhahran Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Was the United States, as the question was put, willing to accept religious discrimination imposed on American citizens in return for military concessions in the Middle East? Or, on the other side of the argument, did we have any right, or chance of success, to dictate our beliefs to nations whose antagonisms were longstanding and unshakable? Twenty years later these remain questions to ponder in our quest for international human rights.

The Middle East also entered into the discussions on the Mutual Security Act of 1956, the largest single item on the committee's agenda. Of course, foreign aid was worldwide in scope, and hearings on the bill produced testimony that ranged from Latin America to Southeast Asia to NATO. Military matters in the aid program increasingly consumed the committee's time and disturbed its members. Was foreign aid really building good will? Were we putting too much emphasis on military aid and not enough on educational and economic assistance? There was much talk of the unpopularity of the program, of doubts about its effectiveness, and of possibly transferring the military portions of the bill to the Defense Department's budget. The spirit of bipartisanship was still evident in these hearings, particularly as members of both parties came to the administration's aid in restoring drastic cuts in the Mutual Security Act made in the House. Yet the growing doubts were there that would soon severely weaken the bipartisan consensus.

One reads these transcripts with some surprise over how little of the discussion related to Eastern Europe, in light of the turmoil there in the summer and autumn of 1956. A simple fact explains much of the absence: The United States did not extend foreign aid to Poland and Hungary, the two nations where popular discontent with Soviet domination had spilled out into the streets in dramatic defiance. While the committee sought information on these events, its pressing concern was the legislation at hand. The Eastern European nation which drew the greatest share of attention was Yugoslavia, as a result of Senator Joseph McCarthy's attempt to cut off American aid to Marshal Tito's government, diverting attention from the real anti-Communist movement underway elsewhere.

The tragic events in Hungary, as described in the emergency briefing session which ends this volume, differed drastically from the hopeful and confident assessments administration spokesmen had been giving the committee during the year. Indeed, at one session the Secretary of State had described Khrushchev as "on the ropes" after his denunciation of Stalinism had touched off independence movements in the satellite countries. For a brief time there did seem hope for the

promised liberation of Eastern Europe and rollback of Soviet influence. Then, at the crucial moment, the rifts in the Western alliance that resulted from the invasion of Egypt undercut "Western support for the popular movements in Eastern Europe. With the attention of the United States riveted to the Suez Canal Zone, Soviet tanks entered Budapest and ruthlessly crushed the Hungarian revolution. It was a bitter pill, one which stimulated considerable policy reexamination in the following years and which still deserves attention from those concerned with the foreign policy of the United States and its allies.

The selection of transcripts for this volume represents the editor's choice of material possessing the most usefulness and interest for the widest audience. The verbatim transcripts are published with a minimum of editorial revision. Subheads, editorial notes, and some documents specifically discussed in the hearings, are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material deleted (other than "off the record" references for which no transcript was made) has been summarized in the appropriate places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes for those sessions, in chronological sequence. Unpublished transcripts and other records of the committee for 1956 are deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to scholars under the access rules of that agency. In accordance with the general policy for the series, the text of this volume was submitted to the Departments of State, Defense, and the CIA and participating Senators for review and comment, but they recommended no changes or deletions of substance.

This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.

JOHN SPARKMAN.