Refusal of requested instructions upon matters fully covered by and more clearly set forth in other instructions is not error. 5. TRIAL 241-READING APPLICABLE PAR- Thomas W. Gilchrist and John P. Brennan, both of Providence, for plaintiff. Clifford Whipple and Alonzo R. Williams, both of Providence, for defendant. PER CURIAM. After trial in the superior court sitting in Providence county before a justice of that court and a jury, in MayJune, 1916, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff's motion for a new trial of the case was heard and refused by the trial judge in a rescript filed August 12, 1916, and the case is now before this court upon the plaintiff's bill of exceptions. Said bill alleges exceptions to the number of 127, of which 126 were allowed by the trial judge. The first exception was to the refus6. APPEAL AND ERROR al of the court to grant a new trial on any ALLEGED MISCONDUCT NOT REVIEWABLE of the several grounds alleged; exceptions Where a proper instruction had already been given upon alleged contributory negligence of plaintiff in riding upon the platform of defendant's electric car, it was clearly within the court's province to quote a paragraph from a Supreme Court opinion to further set forth his views thereon; the same being applicable here under the facts. 688(2)-COUNSEL'S WHERE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT FOR DETER- Where it cannot be said that a statement 143(1)-PUBLIC POLICY FORBIDS IMPEACHMENT OF VERDICT BY JURORS. Evidence to impeach a verdict, so as to warrant a new trial, is not to be received from the jurors themselves or any of them, on the grounds of public policy. 8. NEW TRIAL 55-BIAS OF JURY FROM FOR- Where a juror, upon being called, on his own motion stated he had worked for defendant five years before but was independent now, having no connection with defendant, and plaintiff's attorneys did not move to exclude him, it was too late to object after verdict; and complaint of his misconduct with other jurors and witnesses during trial, not before objected to, comes too late after verdict to aid in securing new trial. Nos. 2-92, inclusive, relate to admissions or ing out answers; exceptions Nos. 93-126 rejections of testimony, or exhibits, or strik(with the exception of exception No. 120, which was disallowed by the court) relate to refusals to charge the jury specifically as requested by the plaintiff in numerous written requests; and exception No. 127 is to the action of the court in reading to the jury a certain paragraph from a reported decision of this court. Out of all these numerous exceptions the plaintiff has pressed in argument before this court exception No. 1 to the refusal to grant a new trial, and Nos. 10, 15, 21, 22, 29-35 inclusive 37-40 inclusive, 64, 70, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 89-92 inclusive, of his exceptions as to admissions or rejections of testimony; and Nos. 93, 94, 96, 98-100 inclusive, 106, 110, 112, 115, 116, 117, 122, 124, 126, 127, as to the charge or refusals to charge as requested. The defendant's brief sets forth in detail the questions raised or attempted to be raised upon this bill of exceptions, and for convenience of this discussion we state these questions as follows: the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the (1) Did the court err in refusing to grant ground that the verdict was against the law and the evidence and the weight thereof? (2) Did the court err in refusing to grant the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground that new and material evidence had been discovered which could not have been discovered before or during the trial with the exercise of due diligence? (3) Did the court err in refusing to allow certain questions to be asked of witnesses to which exceptions were properly taken? (4) Did the court err in its charge to the jury in those portions thereof to which exceptions were duly taken? (5) Did the court err in refusing to charge as requested by the plaintiff to which exceptions were duly taken according to the rules laid down by this court? (108 A.) (6) Should a new trial be granted by this [proaching and entering upon the curve, to court because of the remarks made by the de- that of numerous other witnesses, including fendant's attorney in his address to the jury the plaintiff, who were in as good or better. as set forth in the motion for a new trial? position (being on the car) than she was to (7) Should this court grant a new trial on testify on these points. We agree with the' the ground that the jury was not a fair and trial judge in his finding, in substance, that impartial jury? the addition of this testimony to that of the other witnesses before the jury would not have been likely to affect the verdict; but here, again, we have not before us all of the testimony in the case which would have been material and necessary to the determination of the weight of the evidence, and it might be that upon consideration of all the evidence, we should find, as the jury may have found, that whatever the nature of the accident, and the negligence of the defendant's servant, the plaintiff was not injured as he claimed. (8) Should this court grant a trial on the ground that Juror Keegan had been a motorman and a witness for the defendant at some time before the time of the trial? (9) Should this court grant a new trial on the ground that Juror Keegan was not a fit person to sit upon a jury? (10) Should this court dismiss the plaintiff's exceptions and refuse a new trial because of the failure of the plaintiff to furnish a full transcript in this case? (11) Should this court dismiss the plaintiff's bill of exceptions and refuse a new trial in this case because the exceptions are not definite and clearly set forth? [1] 1. As to the first question relating to the exception to the court's refusal to grant a new trial, it is to be noted that the plaintiff has omitted from the transcript brought up before us all of the medical testimony intro duced at the trial on behalf of both parties, being the testimony of eight physicians. In a case like this, where serious injuries to the spine were claimed on behalf of the plaintiff, of a permanent nature, involving, if the plaintiff is to be believed, a great deal of pain and suffering both past and future, the medical testimony is most important in estimating the weight of testimony, and it might well be that the jury were governed largely, if not entirely, in coming to their verdict, by such testimony. It is conceivable that the medical testimony was such that the jury were convinced that the plaintiff suffered no appreciable injury by reason of the accident, and that his testimony and that of his witnesses was so far discredited by the medical testimony that he and they were not to be believed as to what they said regarding the accident itself. The judge who refused to grant a new trial had all this testimony before him, and this court is unable to say that he erred in denying the motion on the ground that the verdict was against the law and the evidence and the weight thereof; so far as this branch of the case is concerned, it is not strictly before us upon this partial transcript, and this exception must be overruled. See Larisa v. Tiffany, 42 R. I. 143, 105 Atl. 739. [2] 2. As to the second question whether there was new and material evidence newly discovered brought before the court, upon affidavit, we find no error in the court's refusal to grant a new trial. There was no new evidence produced by the affidavit of Miss Sutton; she was a new witness discovered in some way not material after the trial; but her evidence was merely cumulative as to the speed of car and as to its manner of ap [3] 3. With regard to the 42 exceptions urged in argument by the plaintiff, 26 of them relating to the exclusion or admission of testimony against plaintiff's objections, we have examined them, not once, but several times, in the endeavor to find whether or not there was error in regard to any or all of them. We do not find it necessary to examine them here in detail, because it does not appear to us that there was reversible error in any of them. We find that the plaintiff was allowed to place before the jury all of the facts necessary to a proper consideration of his case, and that he suffered no injury by reason of any of said rulings. [4] 4, 5. With regard to the 15 several refusals to charge as requested by the plaintiff, we find, upon reading the charge to the jury as delivered by the court, that all of the matters set forth in the refused requests, so far as they were material or necessary to the proper consideration of the real issues in the case, were set forth clearly in the charge, and were so clearly set forth as to give the jury a better, simpler, and clearer idea of the law governing the case than the jury would have obtained by consideration of the numerous requests, which were in fact so numerous that they would have tended to confuse the jury. We find no error in the refusal of the court to give the charges as requested. [5] With regard to exception No. 127 taken to the reading in the charge to the jury of a certain paragraph from the case of Brunnchow v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R. I. 211, 214, 58 Atl. 656, we find no merit therein. The court had already properly instructed the jury in accord with the principles of that case upon the question of alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff in riding upon the platform of the car. It was clearly within the province of the court to quote the paragraph in question if he saw fit in further setting forth his views upon that question. The statement of the law taken from that case was applicable to the case at bar in connection with other statements of the principles of law substantially taken from the same case. There was no error in the instruction | connection with the defendant; had worked given in this regard. [6] 6. As to the sixth question, relating to remarks made by defendant's counsel in closing argument, to the effect that the plaintiff's claim was fraudulent, which are claimed to have been prejudicial to the plaintiff and for which plaintiff now claims he should have a new trial, we do not find in the transcript any report of any such words, nor do we find that they were called to the attention of the court at the time they were made, so that, if they were prejudicial, the jury might be then instructed in regard to them. We only find them set forth in the plaintiff's motion for a new trial in paragraphs 4 and 5. We think the trial judge in his rescript dealt with them properly and adequately, and that such words, if used, were no ground for a new trial. In the absence of the full transcript, we are unable to pass intelligently upon the use of said words; we are unable to say that upon the defendant's argument of the entire testimony the words were not justified from the defendant's standpoint in a vigorous and proper statement of its position. [7] 7. The plaintiff's attempt to impeach the verdict of the jury by affidavits from certain jurors themselves attempting to show improper conduct or prejudice on the part of the Juror Keegan, in the jury room, and to show that the jury were improperly influenced by him in coming to their verdict, is entirely unwarranted and unjustifiable. It is too well settled to require argument that evidence to impeach a verdict, so as to warrant a new trial, is not to be received from the jurors themselves or any of them, on grounds of public policy. Such is the well-settled law of this state, in consonance with the authority of this country generally and of England. [8] 8, 9. As to the propriety of the action of the trial judge in allowing the Juror Keegan to sit as a juror, there is nothing in the transcript or in the affidavits of either the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorneys to show any error requiring a new trial. When the juror William F. Keegan was called as a juror and took his place, he stated of his own motion that he had worked for the Rhode Island Company and been a witness for them five years ago. He was briefly examined, stated that he was independent now, had no 99 as a motorman for the defendant off and on for ten years. Plaintiff's attorneys did not make any motion to exclude him from the jury. Neither then nor at any time during the trial did plaintiff's attorneys object or make any attempt to exclude Keegan from the jury, although said attorneys now say by affidavits on file that they noticed during the progress of the trial that Keegan was talking to the foreman, that he was signaling to a witness, and that he made remarks to the foreman about the testimony of witnesses, such as "some more of that damn nonsense, referring to evidence then being given by a witness for plaintiff, and "what the hell does he know about a greasy rail," referring to testimony then being given by plaintiff in rebuttal. If the plaintiff's attorneys had been desirous to take advantage of any supposed hostility to them on the part of Keegan, it was their duty at the time to have called the attention of the judge to his alleged improper conduct, to the end that the court might take such order as he deemed proper and necessary, if in fact he found Keegan to be acting improperly, and might have admonished him to do his duty. It is too late after verdict to attempt to take advantage of such matters for the purpose of securing a new trial. We find no error on the part of the trial court in this regard. [9] 10. The action which we have above in dicated is a sufficient answer to this question. We have refused to consider as properly before us such exceptions as cannot be properly considered without a full transcript. We have passed upon such exceptions and such questions as we deem to be properly before us upon such evidence as is contained in the transcript. 11. We find that such of the plaintiff's exceptions as we have passed upon are clearly set forth in the bill of exceptions as allowed by the trial judge. Upon the whole case as made before us, we find no reversible error on the part of the trial judge. The exceptions are all overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court sitting in Providence county, with direction to enter its judgment for the defendant upon the verdict of the jury. (42 R. I. 426) (108 A.) Where conveyances from common grantor to plaintiffs and their predecessors contained clauses subjecting the land to right of way to defendant's lands, defining the location and extent of right of way, such clauses notified plaintiffs and their predecessors of its existence, and estopped them from disputing it in so far as lawfully appurtenant to defendant's land. 3. EASEMENTS 51-CONTIGUITY OF AFTERACQUIRED LOTS GIVES NO RIGHT OF WAY BY NECESSITY TO OTHER LOT. Contiguity of defendant's after-acquired garden lots gives no right to use therefor a right of way by necessity to his adjoining cottage lot. and trampled down and walked upon the herbage and committed other wrongs of a like nature. The defendant pleaded (1) the general issue; (2) unobstructed right of way by prescription; (3) unobstructed right of way by necessity. The plaintiffs traversed these pleas, and issue was joined. The case came on for trial in the superior court before Mr. Justice Doran and a jury at East Greenwich, June 28, July 2, and July 3, 1918, and resulted in a disagreement. It was again tried on February 7 and February 10, 1919, before Mr. Justice Sweeney and a jury. At the conclusion of testimony, and upon motion of the plaintiffs, the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs, with damages assessed in the sum of $1. The case is here on the exceptions of the defendant to the ruling of the court directing a verdict for the plaintiffs. The essential facts appearing in evidence are as follows: On November 18, 1893, John B. Archambault, the common ancestor in title of the parties, conveyed to Algondus Larame, the defendant, a parcel of land in Warwick, R. I., being the southwest corner of lot No. 30 on a plat of house lots made and surveyed by G. T. Lamphear for A. K. Barnes. The grantor owned in addition to 4. EASEMENTS 58(3)-FEE OWNER'S RIGHT | lot No. 30, lots Nos. 28 and 29 on said plat, TO GATE AT HIGHWAY. A gate of light weight, placed by plaintiff owner of fee at the intersection of defendant's way of necessity over owner's land with a public street, is not an unreasonable or unlawful obstruction to defendant's easement. and the parcel conveyed to the defendant was bounded southerly and westerly by land of other owners and northerly and easterly by land of the grantor, John B. Archambault, who at that time owned and occupied the cottage now owned and occupied by these Exceptions from Superior Court, Kent plaintiffs; the lot on which it stands boundCounty; John W. Sweeney, Judge. Action by Maria Anne Chenevert and another against Algondus Larame. Directed verdict for plaintiffs, and defendant excepts. Exception overruled, with direction to enter judgment on the verdict. Murphy, Hagan & Geary, of Providence (John F. Murphy, of Providence, of counsel), for plaintiffs. Archambault & Archambault, of Providence, for defendant. PARKHURST, C. J. This is an action in trespass quare clausum, and is brought by Maria Anne Chenevert and Mathilde Boulais, both of the town of West Warwick, against Algondus Larame, also of West Warwick, the writ being dated May 1, A. D. 1917. The land is situate in what is now the town of West Warwick, formerly Warwick, at Arctic Center. The declaration is in two counts. The first count alleges that the defendant entered the close of the plaintiffs and tore down a gate. The second count alleges that the defendant entered the close of the plaintiffs ing easterly on McNiff street. No reference was made in the deed from John B. Archam bault to the defendant concerning a right of way from said parcel of land, the cottage lot, so called, to a street. There was a cottage house on the land purchased by the defendant, and when he moved into it and occupied it he gained access to McNiff street by passing over land of John B. Archambault on a path about 9 feet wide north of the northerly side of the house occupied then by Mr. John B. Archambault, the grantor, and now by these plaintiffs. At the time that John B. Archambault conveyed the cottage lot to the defendant, November 17, 1893, there was no way for the defendant to reach McNiff street, or any other public highway, except over land of John B. Archambault. On September 2, 1896, John B. Archambault conveyed to Alphonse Archambault that portion of lot No. 30, which is now plaintiffs' land, bounded easterly on McNiff street, northerly by land of John B. Archambault, and westerly by the cottage lot, so called, of the defendant. In the deed conveying said lot to Alphonse Archambault was the following clause: For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes "The owner of a lot west of this lot has the [ than 10 years, also an unobstructed right of right of a driveway on this lot to McNiff street." Alphonse Archambault conveyed said lot to Alfred Larame by a deed, dated August 19, 1901, containing the following clause: "The owner of the lot west of this lot has the right of a driveway on this lot to McNiff street." The plaintiff's purchased the same lot from Alfred Larame on December 18, 1911, and their deed contained the following clause: "This conveyance is made subject to the right of way over said premises referred to in said deed" -referring to the deed last above mentioned. At the time John B. Archambault conveyed the cottage lot, so called, to this defendant, there was a fence along the northerly side of the path, which has always remained there. The defendant, on August 6, 1901, purchased from Lucien Archambault a lot of land west of his cottage lot and adjoining it. The lot purchased from Lucien Archambault was bounded westerly by a platted street known as McGlynn street, being the highway delineated on plaintiff's Exhibit A simply as "Street." Seven years and one-half before the bringing of this action the defendant built a twofamily house on the lot which he purchased from Lucien Archambault, which is west of and bounds upon the so-called cottage lot, and he has occupied that house ever since, and rented the other tenement and likewise the cottage. The plaintiffs placed a gate on McNiff street at the easterly end of the path or driveway on April 21, 1917, and the defendant tore it down. Two weeks later the plaintiffs erected another gate, which was immediately knocked down by the defendant. Within a day or two thereafter a third gate was put up at the same place by the plaintiffs, and that gate was knocked down by the defendant. At the trial in the superior court it was agreed that the only issue in the case was to be whether or not the defendant committed trespass when he removed the gates erected by the plaintiffs across the path or driveway on McNiff street; in other words, the trial was had solely on the first count of the declaration. It has not been disputed that the defendant, his ten children, his tenants, and tradesmen in general, used the way for the purpose of gaining ingress to and egress from the two-tenement house in which the defendant lived, on the lot west of the socalled cottage lot, also owned by the defendant, from the time the house was built, 7% years before the trial, as well as for ingress and egress to and from the cottage lot. The defendant has pleaded an unobstruct way by necessity, and, while admitting the entrance upon the way and taking down the gates, claims that the gate erected by the plaintiffs was an obstruction to his right of way, and that he was justified in removing it. [1] As to the claim of a right of way by prescription, the evidence does not support such claim. There is no need to claim a right of way by prescription so far as the use of the way for entrance and egress to and from the cottage lot is concerned, because from the outset he had a right of way by necessity to the cottage lot, and all the evidence is to that effect. There was no other way to get to and from the cottage lot to the highway, except over the land of his grantor, John B. Archambault. The defendant had as much right to use the way as appurtenant to this cottage lot the first moment that he took possession of it as he ever had, and the only relevancy of the evidence as to continued and uninterrupted user of the way would be to show what was the way set out and defined by the grantor over the grantor's land, if in fact the right to use that particular way for that purpose were ever disputed, which it never was so far as the evidence discloses. [2] It is to be noted, also, that when, in September, 1896, John B. Archambault conveyed the land now owned by the plaintiffs, and his grantee in turn conveyed the same land to Alfred Larame, August 19, 1901, the deeds contained the clause, "The owner of the land west of this lot has the right of a driveway on this lot to McNiff street," and that the deed to the plaintiffs from Alfred Larame, December 18, 1911, is made subject to this same right of way. This language served to further define the location and extent of the right of way, and to notify the plaintiffs and their predecessors. in title of its existence in favor of the defendant, and to estop the plaintiffs and their predecessors from disputing it, so far as it was lawfully appurtenant as a way of necessity to the defendant's cottage lot. Further, it is to be noted that the words of the reservation of the right of way are "the right of a driveway," and do not say an "unobstructed" right of way. As to the testimony regarding. the use or attempted use of this way as appurtenant to the lot westerly of the cottage lot, where the defendant's two-tenement house was built, it appears that this two-tenement house was built 71⁄2 years prior to the trial, or about 1911-1912; prior to that time it appears that the defendant used the westerly lot as a vegetable garden for himself and family, and the evidence entirely fails to show any such continuous and uninterrupted use of the way for purposes of ingress and egress to and from this garden lot, or for |