Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Secretary, Committee Print No. 2 expressly leaves it in the sole judgment of the military boards. It is not compulsory. It is optional with the boards, in your sole discretion. We do not here set up any compulsory granting of a general discharge, limited. It is not mandatory. It is in your sole discretion.

What is wrong with that? It is optional. It is not the only right he gets under this statute. It is to try to prove, by competent evidence, by evidence sufficient in the judgment of the military boards. That is all.

May I say this, Mr. Secretary: Both before and since I wrote H. R. 1108, I was importuned, and have been since, to suggest that there be an entirely new board recommended to Congress, a civilian board, composed entirely of civilians, and I have taken the position, and I do now, of recognizing the problem of discipline.

We members of the subcommittee all do. Congress does, I am sure; but you do not find anything in the committee print making it mandatory that you change your original discharge of any kind. You cannot find it, sir. I am sure you cannot.

Now, why should not the statute then give you that authority? I may say, one reason we wrote this as we did is because in answer to my question a couple of years ago I have it over the signature of Mr. Burgess; I am sure Mr. Blandford has it in front of him in my folderwhere he stated he felt the boards had no authority under the present statute to take into consideration the later exemplary conduct, and I would assume from your statement that you do not consider that, unless you find error in the original military discharge, substantiating Mr. Burgess' statement.

I have his signed statement. Therefore, the amendment in the statute that we are proposing is to give you that authority. Do you not want it? If not, why not? Why would that interfere with military discipline, to give your own military boards the authority to take into consideration the age of the individual at the time of the incident, the normal punishment that might have been adjudged, the moral turpitude, if any-why would you not want to take those factors into consideration?

If you are going to give the lad the right to prove that he is entitled to a general discharge-limited-if we are going to give him that right to apply for that, what is wrong with it? How could that interfere with military discipline?

For instance, there might be 10,000, there might be 20,000 boys that now have less than honorable discharges. I do not know. It is many thousands, I am sure, from your own records.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Eighty thousand, approximately.

Mr. DOYLE. Eighty thousand?

Mr. BLANDFORD. More than that, but 80,000 who have had their cases reviewed who have had changes denied.

Mr. DOYLE. All right; 80,000 have applied. I do not know how many thousands have received those less than honorable discharges that have not applied, but probably at least that same number.

If what you and I agree to is true, Mr. Secretary, these 80,000 that have not applied, and a portion of the 80,000 that did apply and were turned down, stigmatized for life, according to your own agreement with me this morning, why should we not try to, in just cases, amend

the statute so that your own military boards, if they find it worthy, should be permitted to remove the stigmas? Why?

How in the world could the possible consideration of these 80,000 existing cases possibly interfere with military discipline, taking the back history into account?

Mr. JACKSON. Do you want me to comment at this time, sir?
Mr. DOYLE. Yes; please.

Mr. JACKSON. If I may, and again this is quite an extensive statement leading up to the question, but I would like to have permission to say to you, sir, that I did not say I found nothing in the bill that would make it mandatory.

Indeed, the reason why I requested clarification for the legislative history was that in my opinion, and although I am not presently in the legal business, there was some question about it.

I am satisfied from what has been said here that what I considered to be the mandatory provision in the bill has been amply negated by the legislative history, but I did not say that I had no thought or question about there being something mandatory, so I wanted to correct the record to that extent, and I am perfectly satisfied with your statement, sir, and with that of your counsel.

Now, with respect to the matter of the 80,000, I think that you agree, sir, and the members of your committee agree, that in that 80,000 there are X number who do not rate consideration in terms of getting a general discharge limited-even if they have been exemplary. Mr. DOYLE. We will so stipulate. We recognize that is true. Mr. JACKSON. So whether that brings it down to 2,000 or to 78,000, nobody knows.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Jackson this question in connection with his concern over what effects this bill will have?

Would I interpret what you have said to mean that in your opinion section 302 of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act had a very serious effect upon maintaining discipline in the armed services and that section 207 of the Legislative Reorganization Act had a further very serious effect upon maintaining discipline because those two boards were established to review discharges, and these boys, all of them who are back-door lawyers, know that those boards exist and that as a result of the passage of those two laws, you have had more people discharged from the armed services who felt that they could go back and get their discharges changed?

Do you honestly feel that the existence of these two laws has brought about more disciplinary problems?

Mr. JACKSON. I have never made any such statement.

Mr. BLANDFORD. No. I am inferring what you are saying is that any time we give a board power to do something, we attract attention of the GI to the fact that he can have his discharge changed. Therefore, you must also feel the same way about the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Mr. JACKSON. I do not think that follows completely. I would not be prepared to say that it has not been a factor in the discipline area, but the main thing here is no matter how you behave in the service, if you behave yourself after you get out, you have a chance of getting a new discharge.

This is something quite apart from the fact that there were, as the Congress knows, during the latter part of the war, a great many, for one reason of another, BCD's, et cetera, which were, upon consideration, considered unjust.

Now, how far a boy would argue that, because those were changed, I am going to go to the limit and get one or not, I cannot say, but certainly I think that is different from saying, "Whatever I do, as long as when I get out, if I behave myself, I have a chance of coming clean with a different piece of paper."

Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest, because of the time factor, that Mr. Robinson and, is it Mr. Taft, and Mr. Curley are here, and all three of them can answer some questions.

Mr. Robinson, would you step up here for a moment and identify yourself for the reporter? I would like to get one thing straight for the record.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE S. ROBINSON, DEPUTY SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR INSTALLATIONS; AND CHAIRMAN, AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

Mr. ROBINSON. I am George S. Robinson, deputy special assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, and I am also Chairman of the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Robinson, do you or do you not take postservice conduct into consideration in reviewing cases?

Mr. ROBINSON. We certainly do.

Mr. BLANDFORD. You do take it into consideration?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Do you feel that taking postservice conduct into consideration has brought about a marked increase in military problems in the armed services?

Mr. ROBINSON. I do not know whether I am qualified to answer that. I can give a personal opinion, based on no experience at all: My reaction would be that it does not. I am not qualified to speak on that. Mr. BLANDFORD. It does not?

Mr. ROBINSON. Does not.

Mr. BLANDFORD. In order to have your board take jurisdiction, if I allege in my petition that at the time the offense was committed, I was 17; that I had only been in the service for 4 months; that what I did was considered of minor import in the civilian jurisprudence; that there was no moral turpitude involved; that I actually was absent, we will say, over leave, on four successive occasions, and as a result, I went before a section VIII board and they gave me an undesirable discharge; on the basis of that statement, would you take jurisdiction over the case if I request a review of my discharge?

Mr. ROBINSON. I think we probably would.

Mr. BLANDFORD. You would. Therefore, I have alleged no error. I have merely alleged an injustice. Therefore, no error has to be alleged. It is just an injustice. I say it is inequitable. Therefore, you take jurisdiction; is that right?

Mr. ROBINSON. That is right.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Then I come in with evidence of my good behavior afterward, and you find it is a borderline case. Does my postservice conduct have any effect upon the decision of the Board?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Then what possible effect can this bill have upon the actions of your Board?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, my own personal feeling is that there is nothing in this bill that tells the Board-let me put it this way:

There is nothing in the bill that says we shall consider something if we did not already consider it.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Thank you very much. That is all I want to know. Mr. ROBINSON. I would make one thing clear, and perhaps I can point it up by a specific case which has come to my mind. We had an application from a captain who had a very enviable record in the Air Force. I think he completed 25 or 50 missions. He came home— I think he was on his way out--and I think he got liquored up a little bit one night. He broke in with another lad to a place where they kept some recreational equipment and stole some insignificant items. He was apprehended and court martialed, I believe, for larceny, I don't know whether it was petty larceny or what. But he was found guilty.

He came back to our Board and filed an application for a change in the nature of his dismissal about 5 years after he left the service. He alleged what had actually happened. He admitted that he had committed the offense, and he alleged that since he was out, and he had affidavits to support it, that he was manager of some power concern out in the Far West, had three kids and was a good churchgoing lad, happily married, and I remember I asked him why he had waited so long to come back before the Board to ask for a change in the nature of his dismissal.

He said that he wanted to demonstrate that he had lived a good life after he got out, but he was primarily concerned with the fact that he said he had a good combat record, and when his kids grew up and he was asked about his service he wanted to be able to tell them he got out under decent conditions.

There was no error in the fact that he was court-martialed. We have always given a rather broad, liberal interpretation to the phrase in the act.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Did you change the discharge?

Mr. ROBINSON. We did.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Robinson, may I ask this question: Do you feel, as a board chairman, that you would like to have the authority to grant something new, this general discharge limited, in that gray area where you do not want to give a man an honorable discharge or dishonorable discharge but you do not think he ought to carry a dishonorable discharge on his back the rest of his life? Don't you think you would like to have that authority?

Mr. ROBINSON. I am not so sure. I would rather look at it as a board chairman this way:

If the fellow has a good case and can demonstrate these things that we take into consideration to our satisfaction, I would rather see him present a case and get his original discharge changed.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Do you think there are cases where you would give a man a general discharge limited where you would not give him a discharge under honorable conditions?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes; I would answer that "Yes."

Mr. GUBSER. Do you have available to you the comparative figures of offenses which might lead to a discharge less than honorable for the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army? I am trying to find out whether or not, with this policy which you have already put into effect, you have more trouble with your enlisted airmen and officers than do the Navy and the Army.

Do you believe the Air Force has more of a disciplinary problem than the Navy and the Army?

Mr. ROBINSON. I wouldn't know.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Robinson is Chairman of the Air Force Board. I injected Mr. Robinson because it is getting along in time and we have not heard from General Kuhfeld. I thought we ought to settle this problem before we continue on.

Mr. DOYLE. Before we go to the next witness, might I call attention, in view of our discussion, Mr. Secretary, to committee print No. 2. I will read on page 12, but the same language occurs elsewhere.

In the case of any individual heretofore or hereafter discharged or dismissed from any of the Armed Forces under conditions other than honorable, except by sentence of the general court martial, the appropriate board shall issue to such individual a general discharge limited, dated as of the date of the decision by the Board. If, after taking into consideration in each case the reasons for the nature of the original discharge or dismissal, including but not limited to, the conditions that prevailed at the time of the incident, the age of the individual at the time of the incident, the normal punishment that might have been adjudged, and the moral turpitude, if any, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Board by oral and written evidence or both.

That certainly is crystal clear that it leaves it up to the discretion and determination of the Board, its option. It is not mandatory. The reason I put that into the record here, Mr. Secretary, is to clarify your thinking that we, the subcommittee, say it is not mandatory and not intended to be. This shall be issued unless it is established to the satisfaction of the Board.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. The only thing mandatory is that the Board take that into consideration.

Mr. DOYLE. That is right.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. They have to take that into consideration under this bill.

Mr. DOYLE. That is right. They take these four points into consideration but not limited to those.

Then it provides, on page 13, how the written evidence or oral evidence shall be presented.

Mr. ROBINSON. I would like to make one observation which pertains to the bill, and I may have misled you in saying that in this specific case I mentioned that the Board changed the nature of the dismissal.

The Correction Board does not change anything. It merely recommends to the Secretary. In other words, as the bill is presently written with regard to general discharges, it gives the Board the authority to do it, and the Board has no authority at the present time to change a discharge. It is merely a recommendation.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. How firm is that recommendation? Have you ever been overruled?