Vannice v. Bergen. would have the right to treat it as thus far canceled and satisfied, and would have been to this extent protected This will not be disputed. If an ordinary purchaser would be thus protected, the defendants, as the sheriff's vendees, stand in my opinion upon ground equally high, and have rights equally large. The law is, "that a purchaser at sheriff's sale, will take the land, discharged of every claim or title, whether arising under an unregistered deed, or a mere equity of which he had no notice at the time of the purchase, and which would be invalid as against an ordinary purchaser." This is the doctrine deduced from the American cases, as laid down by Judge HARE in his note to Bassett v. Nasworthy, 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq., part 1, p. 76. And the rule applies equally where the judgment creditor is the purchaser, as where the purchase is made by a stranger. (Waldo v. Russell, 5 Mo., 387; Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Ledyard, 8 Ala., 866; Den v. Rickman, 1 Green N. J. (Law), 43, in all of which the judgment plaintiff was the purchaser. See, also, Orth v. Jennings, 8 Blackf., 420; Heister v. Fortner, 2 Binn., 40, 45; Mann's Appeal, 1 Barr., 24; Kaufflet v. Bower, 7 S. & R., 64, 82; Scribner v. Lockwood, 9 Ohio, 184; Jackson v. Post, 15 Wend., 588, reviewing and explaining former cases in 4 Cow., 599, and 9 Cow., 120; Jackson v. DuBois, 4 Johns., 216.) In this last case it was held that a mortgage not registered has priority over a judgment docketed subsequently, which is the doctrine in this State also. Norton v. Williams, 9 Iowa, 528; 10 Id., 353; 11 Id., 174; Welton v. Tizzard, supra. SPENCER, J., remarks: "The judgment being by act of law, does not destroy the lien acquired by the unregistered mortgage, nor gain a preference over it. Should the mortgagee permit a sale to take place prior to the regis try, then, in my opinion, the vendee of the sheriff would Vannice v. Bergen. be protected from the mortgage, and it would lose its priority." 4 Johns., 216. In view of these authorities I cannot deem the majority opinion a true exposition of the law, so far as that opinion holds that equities between Vannice and Bergen will follow the land into the hands of the defendants, after they have become the purchasers of the land, without notice of those equities. Such a rule tends to shake and unsettle the security which the law attaches to titles bona fide, derived by purchasers at sheriff's sales. It is admitted that the defendants purchased bona fide, and without notice of the equities with which they are now sought to be charged. They are, in my opinion, entitled to the same protection, and stand as free from equities, of which they had no notice, as if they were ordinary purchasers. And their rights can no more be cut down by a court of equity, than by a court of law. The equities of the plaintiffs are not so strong as would be the equities in favor of a person who had an unrecorded deed, or who had fully paid for land without getting a deed; and I can scarcely think that the equities of such a person should be allowed to prevail against the bona fide purchaser of the land at sheriff's sale. It follows that the defendants, as the sheriff's purchasers (no notice of the plaintiff's equities having been brought home to them prior to the sale by the sheriff), are clearly entitled to hold the land, discharged of any lien of the mortgage, so far as it secured the note to Albert V. Vannice, he having discharged his mortgage of record, prior to the sale by the sheriff. But, under the view in which I am now considering the case (viz., that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the defendant's judgment, when he accepted his deed from Vannice v. Bergen. Bergen), a different result is reached, as to the other note which was payable to Henry Vannice. No satisfaction of record was entered by him. His mortgage remained uncanceled, so far as the record disclosed to the defendant. The record only showed that Bergen had conveyed his equity of redemption to Henry. It did not show whether Henry had taken this conveyance as additional security for his mortgage debt, or in satisfaction of it. As the mortgage was not satisfied of record by Henry, the inference would, perhaps, be, that he had taken the legal title with no intention to extinguish his mortgage. See, as to merger, and effect thereof, Wickersham v. Reeves, 1 Iowa, 413; Wilhelmi v. Leonard, 13 Id., 330; White v. Hampton, Id., 259. At all events, the mortgage remaining unsatisfied of record, as to Henry's interest, would be notice to defendants of any rights or equities which Henry might be able to set up thereunder, as against the mortgagor. To this effect are the cases of Bolles v. Chaunsey, 8 Conn., 389; Hayden v. Burney, 7 Vermont, 493; and see Am. Law. Reg., Nov., 1862, p. 7, and cases; Brinckerhoff v. Lansing, 4 Johns. Ch., 65; Heard v. Evans, 1 Freem. Ch., 79; Packard v. Kingman, 11 Iowa, 219; Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y., 354, 359 (1857), containing latest New York doctrine as to notice. Or, if it would not amount to notice, yet such a record remaining unsatisfied, would be sufficient to put defendants upon inquiry as to the interest or rights of Henry. If they did not wish to be affected by it, they ought to have made inquiry, and if they had made such inquiry, they would have become advised of his equities. Under the authorities above cited, defendants are not to be considered as purchasers, without notice as to the note payable to Henry, and as to which the mortgage had not been canceled of Vannice v. Greene, Traer & Co. record. It is my opinion that the mortgage should be revived only, so far as this note is concerned. VANNICE V. GREENE, TRAER & Co. 1. CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. On February 19th, 1859, B. confessed judgment in favor of G. T. & Co., by a statement which did not concisely set out the cause of the indebtedness, but the judgment entry recited that the statement did make such showing; the judgment entry was read and approved, March 11th, 1859, B. sold certain property, upon which it was a lien, to V., who had knowledge of such judgment; after which it was levied upon and sold under the judgment. Held: 1. That the judgment is good as between the parties to it. 2. That the plaintiff having purchased with actual knowledge of said judgment, after it had been read, approved and signed by the judge, and that the judgment entry recited the matter claimed to be essential—and at the time knowing nothing of the actual contents of such statement-stands in no better position than a party. Appeal from Benton District Court. FRIDAY, JUNE 24. THIS case grows out of the same transaction as that immediately preceding. Defendants obtained judgment by confession against Bergen and Chinn. Plaintiff, as a subsequent purchaser of certain lands incumbered by said judgment, filed this bill to remove the cloud created thereby, claiming that he had notice of the existence of said judg ment; that it was rendered in vacation; that the statute was not complied with; that the clerk had no power to enter the same, and that it was void and of no effect. On the hearing the bill was dismissed and plaintiff appeals. C. H. Conklin for the appellant. J. C. Traer and I. M. Preston & Son for the appellees. Vannice v. Greene, Traer & Co. WRIGHT, Ch. J.-The conclusion arrived at in the preceding case would seem to render the present one of but little importance to the parties. As it may become material, however, to know whether defendants have such an interest in the property as entitles them to redeem from plaintiffs' mortgage, or to any possible surplus from the sale of the land, after satisfying the prior incumbrance, we shall very briefly dispose of the questions made. From the report of the referee, it appears that the statement in writing, filed with the clerk, giving the authority to render the judgment, has been lost, and its exact contents cannot, therefore, be known. He finds, however, that it did not state concisely the facts out of which the indebtedness arose, nor state it otherwise than by setting out the promissory note, evidencing said indebtedness. The statement was duly signed and sworn to by the defendants, and the entry of the judgment by the clerk, recites, that said statement "set forth concisely the grounds of the indebtedness." The confession was based upon a bona fide indebtedness, from Bergen and Chinn to the present defendants, and plaintiff, as is found by the referee, and not controverted by counsel, had actual notice of said judgment at the time of purchasing the lands. At the next term of court after the statement was filed, the entry of judgment was read, approved and signed by the judge, as required by law. Rev. § 2665. The judgment was rendered February 19, 1859. It was read and approved March 11, 1859. Bergen sold to Vannice March 6, 1860. Defendants levied upon the land April 7, and sold it under their execution, June 16, 1860. This action was commenced December 17, 1860. Upon the above facts, our conclusions are: First. That the judgment is good as between the parties to it. Second. That plaintiff, having purchased, with full actual knowledge of said judgment, after it had been read, approved and signed |