it is immaterial upon what consideration it was done. If, then, in fact, the statute applied, the ruling of the circuit judge was right, to the effect that the plaintiff's negligence did not bar the action, and we must therefore determine that question.

The argument that the statute does not apply because the engine was in the rear of the train instead of in front, and that consequently a lookout ahead on the locomotive is dispensed with, proceeds upon the erroneous assumption that if the railroad company, for convenience or otherwise, takes the engine from the front end of a train, and uses it in the rear, or at some other place in the train, a lookout is dispensed with in front. This is manifest when we look to the object of the statute. It contemplates an engine in front, with perfect head-light, a bell to be rung, and machinery for blowing the whistle, reversing the engine, and taking the precautions indicated in the special and general terms of the statute, including, of course, a place for the lookout to be, and an engineer, fireman, or some other person, always there as a lookout. Now, in case the engine had been in front, and its head-light or its machinery for alarm or stopping taken away from it, or the lookout taken off of it, it would not be denied that the company was liable; but because the company had taken, not one, but all, of these things away, the argument is, that it escapes statutory liability. Thus stated, it seems perfectly manifest that the proposition is erroneous. Putting it in other words, it is, that although the railroad company could not take away any one of these and avoid liability, it could take them all away and do so. That the whole includes all of its parts is a proposition not more axiomatic than that all the parts are necessary to make up the whole.

If, therefore, observance of the statute as a whole consists in "keeping an engineer, fireman, or other person upon the locomotive always upon the lookout ahead," in order that objects appearing on the track may be discovered, and the other precautions taken for which the statute provides, it follows that all these things are necessary to be severally done, in order that the whole requirement be complied with. The lookout must be kept ahead on the locomotive, and the locomotive must, of course, be kept there for him to be upon, or he cannot be upon it, and kept in the place required. The keeping of the locomotive there, therefore, is one of the parts of the observance, like all others, absolutely essential to consti

tute the whole observance. And the same is true as to other things not specifically mentioned as included within the purpose of the statute, and which by construction have been held essential, as a head-light for night use on running trains. So of those things mentioned in the statute and properly belonging to the engine, and parts of its machinery, as the whistle and bell. These must be ahead or in front of the train, because it is not contemplated that collisions will occur in the rear. Nor would the statute be met by having a light and a lookout in front while the engine is in the rear. The statute intends, not a lookout as a formal matter, but a lookout on the locomotive in front, and the machinery and appliances on it at hand, and in immediate control, so that as soon as an object appears, the observance of it, and the attempts to avoid collision, may be prompt and immediate; for, in the great majority of cases they must be so if they serve any purpose. To have a lookout with a lantern in front, watching in a dim light for an obstruction which could be seen only a few feet off, and then signaling an engineer in the rear to ring a bell or blow a whistle far away from the object, and take such precautions as could be then and there done to avoid an accident, would be practically to provide for accidents instead of against them. The man with the lantern could see, at best, but a short distance; the engineer must take some little time to observe his signal; then, when he does so, if he rings the bell or causes the whistle to be sounded, he is at a greater distance from the object, and alarms may not therefore be so well heard, or understood, or appreciated. In this case the engine was 270 feet from the front of the train. The statute, in making the engineer, or fireman, or some other person on the locomotive represent a lookout, manifestly contemplates looking, alarming, and acting as practically contemporaneous. It is no more contemplated that the engine, therefore, should be in the rear than that the lookout should. Both must be in front if the statute is complied with.

It may be argued that this is inconvenient; that a railroad company must sometimes back its trains on its track. This may be entirely true, but it proves nothing. The company can do all its running that way if it prefers; the statute does not prohibit it absolutely and at all events. The statute merely makes it liable for any injury inflicted while doing so. If, for reasons of convenience or economy, the company prefers to take the risk, it may do so; but it cannot complain

that it suffers the legal consequences of the risk thus taken. Of course, it can reduce the risk to a minimum by keeping some one in front of the train, and warning off or actually removing obstructions. If it prevents injury, it prevents loss; but this it must do if it avoids the consequences of disregarding the statute. Nothing else will answer.

In the present case the company elected to attempt the running of the train in a street without observing the statutory precautions, but in the observance of others which it deemed sufficient. These, however, proved insufficient, and plaintiff's injury was the result of that election and misjudgment. His recovery was the legal consequence. It was made small by properly considering his contributory negligence, and there is nothing in its amount or otherwise of which the defendant can complain.

Let the judgment be affirmed, with cost.

RAILROADS — DUTY TO OBSERVE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. — A railroad operating its trains through the streets of a city must comply with the statutory requirements to prevent accidents: Katzenberger v. Lawo, 90 Tenn. 235; ante, p. 681, and note.

COLLIER V. MURPHY.

[90 TENNESSEE, 300.]

EXEMPTIONS WAGES EXEMPTED NOT LIABLE TO SET-OFF WHEN. — Laborers' wages to the amount of thirty dollars are exempt by the statute, and cannot be subjected to a set-off by a claim in no way springing out of the contract relations between the parties, but arising out of a distinct and independent transaction.

EXEMPTION STATUTES ARE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED in favor of debtors.

ACTION for wages. The opinion states the case.

J. M. Troutt, for Collier,

Caruthers and Mallory, for Murphy.

LURTON, J. Plaintiff in error brought suit for wages due him as a laborer, the amount claimed being less than thirty dollars. Defendant, after this debt was created, but before suit, took an assignment of a judgment in favor of N. P. McChesney, and against the plaintiff, Collier, and relied upon same as a set-off under section 3628, Milliken and Ventrees's Code. Plaintiff insisted that, under the act of 1871 (inserted as section 3931, Milliken and Ventrees's Code), the wages due him were exempt from execution, attachment, or garnishment,

and that his debt was not, therefore, subject to be set off by a claim in no way springing out of his contract relation with defendant. This objection was overruled, and defendant allowed to rely upon the McChesney judgment as a set-off against the wages due to plaintiff. This ruling was based upon section 3628 of the code, which provides: "The defendant may plead, by way of set-off or cross-action,- 1. Mutual demands held by the defendant against the plaintiff at the time of action brought, and matured when offered in set-off." This provision must, however, be construed with reference to the act of 1871, whereby thirty dollars of the wages of every mechanic and laborer is exempted from "execution, attachment, or garnishment." Exemption statutes are entitled to a liberal construction. The manifest purpose of the legislature was to exempt this amount of wages from any kind of coercive process of the law. If such a demand cannot be reached by attachment or execution or garnishment, is it a claim subject to be set off by a claim or demand in no way springing out of the contract under which the wages were earned? We think the exemption laws cannot be defeated by such a construction of the statute concerning set-offs. The case is much like that of Duff v. Wells, 7 Heisk. 17.

While the language used in the act of 1871, strictly construed, would protect such wages only from "execution, attachment, or garnishment," yet the whole spirit of the act is such that we think this claim was not subject to any manner of legal seizure. "Seizure" is a word often used in our exemption laws, and this word has been used by the editors of the last revision of our code as fairly construing the force and meaning of this exemption of wages. While we must look to the original act when any doubt arises as to the correctness of this revisal, yet the word as used by the revisors expresses very fully what we take to be included within the meaning of the act of 1871. To subject this claim for wages to a set-off of the kind here offered was to subject exempted wages to a species of legal seizure not admissible.

Let judgment be rendered here for the amount of the judgment below, and the amount of the judgment improperly allowed to be set off, and costs of appeal.

EXEMPTIONS

WAGES. — Money recovered as wages is exempt from garnishment: Cox v. Bearden, 84 Ga. 304; 20 Am. St. Rep. 359; Wallace v. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501; 23 Am. Rep. 661, and note. Compare extended note to Brown v. Hebard, 91 Am. Dec. 411-425.

EXEMPTIONS

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE. Statutes exempting prop

erty from execution should be liberally construed: In re McManus, 87 Cal 250; 22 Am. St. Rep. 250, and note.

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SET-OFF. As to what demands may and what may not be pleaded by way of set-off or counterclaim, see note to Gregg v. James, 12 Am. Dec. 152– 157; note to Woodruff v. Garner, 89 Am. Dec. 482–492.

EXUM V. STATE.

[90 TENNESSEE, 501.]

JURISDICTION -STATE COURTS HAVE, OVER OFFENSE COMMITTED IN FED ERAL CUSTOM-HOUSE, WHEN. -The state courts have jurisdiction of the crime of perjury committed upon the trial of a cause in a state court holding its session in a United States custom-house situated within the limits of a county town, by express permission of the federal authori ties, and under a state law authorizing the judge to hold its sessions at any place within the limits of the county town, if he should deem it impracticable or inconvenient to hold them at the court-house.

THE opinion states the case.

J. M. Troutt, for Exum.

Attorney-General Pickle and E. L. Bullock, for the state.

TURNEY, C. J. "If for any cause, in the opinion of the court, deemed sufficient it shall be impracticable or inconvenient for any court to hold its sessions at the court-house, or place designated by law, it shall be lawful for the court to hold its session, or any part thereof, at any room within the limits of the county town; and all its proceedings at such place, whether in civil or criminal cases, shall be as valid as if done at the court-house": Milliken and Ventrees's Code, вес. 4870.

At the time of the commission of the perjury charged, and of the finding of the indictment, the court-house was undergoing repairs. The court deemed it impracticable and inconvenient to hold its sessions therein, and by the consent and permission of the authorized agents of the United States government, the circuit court held its session in a room of the custom-house, a building within the limits of the city of Jackson, the county town of Madison County, and within a few yards of the court-house.

On a trial before that court of a case cognizable only in the state courts for the county of Madison, the plaintiff in error was guilty of the crime of perjury, and was indicted by the grand jury for the county then holding its session as a part