the petition, dismissed the action. This court, upon appeal, said, in substance, that the judgment sued upon might or might not be void. If based upon her tort, or a contract executed by her dum sola, or rendered when she was a feme sole, it would not be void; but if founded upon a claim of such a character as would ordinarily support only an ordinary action, then, as it would be void as to her, so would any judgment against her upon it. This view was taken after as careful an examination and consideration of the authorities as was pos sible, and the opinion of the court will be found in Parsons v. Spencer, 83 Ky. 305.

As the character of the claim upon which the judgment had been rendered did not appear from the petition, this court reversed the judgment dismissing it, and remanded the cause for further preparation. The issues having been formed by proper pleading, and a part of the record of the suit in which the judgment sought to be enforced was rendered being in evidence, the lower court rendered a decree enforcing the judgment against the property of the feme covert, and she has appealed.

The record of the old suit, filed in this one, sufficiently identifies it as the action in which the judgment sued upon was rendered. The pleadings in this suit give the style of the action and the court in which the judgment was rendered, and the record in evidence conforms thereto. It shows, also, that the claim was not of a character authorizing the personal judgment against the female appellant, who was then a married woman, and the question is therefore presented, whether she can now resist its enforcement against her property upon the ground that it is void by reason of her coverture when it was rendered. The opinion upon the former appeal substantially decided the question. It is contended, however, with earnestness and ability, that it must be treated as erroneous only; that it cannot, therefore, be assailed collaterally, and the party can obtain relief from such a judgment only by vacating it by a direct proceeding, or by an appeal. The proceedings authorized by our code of practice for reversing or vacating a judgment apply where it is merely erroneous, and therefore voidable. If it be void, however, it may be resisted in any court of general jurisdiction, and not merely in the court which rendered it. Although, therefore, the judgment in question was rendered in a different court from that in which this action was brought, yet if it be void, the appel

lant may defend against it, because no subsequent proceedings can be based upon a void judgment. It is well settled that a judgment which is merely erroneous cannot be assailed collaterally. If the court has jurisdiction of the person and the subject-matter, then, however irregular may be the proceeding, the judgment is merely erroneous, and is binding until reversed or vacated in the manner provided by law. This is what the cases decide which are cited by counsel for the appellee.

It is equally well settled that a void judgment will not support further proceedings; so the question is at last, Is this judgment void, or merely erroneous?

Generally, a feme covert has no personality in law. She is not recognized by it, save in a few excepted cases, so that a personal judgment can be taken against her. The contracts of an infant are, in general, voidable only, while those of a married woman are void. True, she may, under certain circumstances, bind her separate estate, but not herself personally, the reason being that she has no personal identity in law. It does not follow, because, as an exceptional case, a personal judgment may go against her for her tort, or upon a contract made by her when single, the reason being, that her status at the making of it is regarded as following it to its completion, that therefore all personal judgments against her are merely erroneous, and not void. If she has no legal status in court, certainly it should have no jurisdiction to render a judgment binding her personally. Her existence is merged in that of the husband, and she can make no contract binding herself personally, or subjecting her to a judgment in personam. Her contract is void in law. In equity it may be enforced against her separate estate if she so intended; but she incurs no personal liability by it, because she has, legally speaking, no personal existence, and it must be satisfied out of her estate by proceedings in rem. She is by law incapaci tated from retaining an attorney, and no personal liability arises, because she has no legal existence. There is, therefore, so far as she is concerned, no person within the court's jurisdiction. If a personal judgment be rendered upon a claim, the alleged liability is merely placed upon an advanced footing; and if originally it was void as to her, then the unauthorized judgment should not estop her from resisting it, from the fact that she was not sui juris, and had no such legal existence as authorized a personal judgment.

We are aware there is a conflict of authority in this country upon this question, but the views above advanced seem to us not only supported by reason, but we know they are sustained by such high authority as the supreme courts of Pennsylvania, Missouri, and other states. In this case the rights of no innocent or third parties have intervened. The present action is between those who were parties to the unauthorized judgment, and its entry, inasmuch as the claim upon which it was founded was void as to her, and she could have no voice or control of the suit, should not prejudice her. Her helplessness must protect her. As to her, the judgment was void.

In the case of Green v. Page, 80 Ky. 368, notes were given by a husband and wife for an interest in a hotel building. In an action by the assignees against the assignors, it was claimed that the failure to take a personal judgment upon the notes against the wife absolved the assignors from liability; but this court said that such a judgment would have been a nullity. The views of this court, as given in the opinion upon the former appeal of this case (and as now again stated), have since been followed in the case of Stevens v. Deering, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 393. It is averred in the reply, and not denied, that in the action in which the judgment now sought to be enforced was rendered, the appellant and her husband availed themselves of all defenses, both legal and equitable. This is a sort of legal conclusion of the pleader. It is not averred that she, in that action, set up her coverture, and that the court then decided whether such was her status, and passed upon the question, nor does this otherwise appear. The original appeal is sustained, and judgment below reversed, with directions to dismiss the action.

This disposes of the cross-appeal, and it is dismissed.

MARRIED WOMEN-JUDGMENTS AGAINST - VALIDITY OF: See extended note to Caldwell v. Walters, 55 Am. Dec. 599-602. A married woman is liable for the price of clothing for a minor child, where she bought it and ordered it charged to her: Meads v. Martin, 84 Mich. 306. A married woman is responsible for the price of articles purchased for use on her separate estate: Brown v. Thomson, 27 S. C. 500.

LOTTERY-AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT BOND. -The sale of an Austrian gov ernment bond, under which the purchaser receives in any event the face value thereof, with interest up to the time of a drawing, and a premium prize of twenty per cent, with a chance to draw a higher prize from numbers drawn from a wheel at stated times, is the sale of a chance in a lottery, within the meaning of a statute prohibiting the sale of "anything” which, on the happening of an event or contingency in the nature of a lottery, entitles the holder to money or property.

LOTTERY-WHAT IS. — Any device whereby money or any other thing is to be paid or delivered on the happening of any event or contingency in the nature of a lottery is a lottery.

LOTTERY-FOREIGN GOVERNMENT BOND-RIGHT OF STATE TO PROHIBIT SALE OF. When a foreign government bond is coupled with conditions and stipulations which change its character from a simple bond for the payment of money of a specified amount to a species of lottery ticket, a state statute prohibiting the sale thereof does not violate treaty stipulations nor constitutional provisions.

LOTTERY LAWS - EFFECT OF, ON NON-RESIDENTS. A statute prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets within the state operates equally and alike upon resident and non-resident foreigners, and as to the latter, it does not violate treaty or constitutional provisions.

Peter J. Campbell and William S. Bryan, Jr., for the appellant.

William Pinkney Whyte, attorney-general, for the appellee. IRVING, J. Section 172 of article 27 of the code of Public General Laws of this state is in these words: "No person shall draw any lottery or sell any lottery ticket in this state; nor shall any person sell what are called policies, certificates,

or anything by which the vendor or other person promises or guarantees that any particular number, character, ticket, or certificate shall, in any event, or on the happening of any contingency, entitle the purchaser or holder to receive money, property, or evidences of debt." Section 173 of the same article provides that "all devices and contrivances designed to evade the provisions of the preceding section shall be deemed offenses against it." Section 176 makes provision for punishing any one who may keep "a house, office, or other place for the purpose of selling or bartering any lottery ticket, policy, certificate, or any other thing by which the vendor or other person promises or guarantees that any particular number, character, ticket, or certificate shall in any event, or on the happening of any contingency in the nature of a lottery, entitle the purchaser or holder to receive money, property, or evidence of debt." The next section punishes the owner of any house for permitting it to be used as a place for selling lottery tickets, or any of the things in the nature thereof mentioned in the preceding section.

The appellant was indicted in the criminal court of Baltimore for violating these lottery laws of the state. The first count charges the appellant with selling to Bernard C. Winckler "a lottery ticket." The second count charges the sale of "a lottery policy." The third charges the sale of "a lottery certificate." The fourth count charges him with selling "a certain thing by which the vendor thereof promised that a particular number should, on the happening of a contingency in the nature of a lottery, entitle the holder of said thing to receive money, contrary to the form of the act of assembly in such case made and provided," etc. Other counts charged him with keeping "a room," "a place," "a house," for the sale of such things, and for permitting such room, place, or house to be kept for such purpose.

No question arises upon the form or sufficiency of the indictment. The appeal presents but a single question, whether certain evidence was properly admitted by the trial court in support of any of these charges against the appellant.

The case was tried before the court without the aid of a jury, and the only exception in the case is to the admission of the testimony set out in the exception, which was objected to en masse. The witness testified that the appellant sold to him for the sum of ninety-five dollars an instrument called an "Austrian Government Bond," which provides that the Aus