sustained by proof that he fraudulently pretended to have an order from that person to purchase the goods, and bargained for them on his own be half at the price named. Nor is there any variance between a further aver ment, that the vendor, by reason of such pretenses, was induced to thus sell and deliver the goods, and proof that his inducement was the expectation of receiving the price from the party represented as giving such order: Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7 Allen, 548; 83 Am. Dec. 712. If there is a variance between the christian name of the party defrauded, or of the defendant, as alleged and proved, it is fatal: State v. Horn, 93 Mo. 190. But where the prosecutor is named in the indictment by the initials of his name alone, while the proof shows his full christian name, and that he is the party charged, there is no variance: Franklin v. State, 52 Ala. 415. Distinguished from Other Crimes. The crime of obtaining money or goods by false pretenses, and the crime of larceny, are distinguishable from one another in this: that if by means of the false pretenses the owner of the property is induced to part with the possession only, still intending to retain the right of property, the taking by such means, if done with a felonious intent to deprive the owner of his property and to convert it to the use of the taker, is larceny; but if the owner, by means of such pretenses, parts not only with the possession, but also with the right of property, the crime of the party is obtaining the property by false pretenses, and not larceny. To constitute the offense of obtaining money or goods by false pretenses, the title as well as the possession of the property must be obtained by the accused, and must pass from the defrauded party. When the possession only is obtained, without an intent on the part of the owner to part with the title to the property, but with a felonious intent on the part of the taker to convert it to his own use, the crime committed is larceny: State v. Vickery, 19 Tex. 326; Cline v. State, 43 Tex. 494; Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, 119 Pa. St. 254; 4 Am. St. Rep. 642; State v. Hall, 76 Iowa, 85; 14 Am. St. Rep. 204; March v. State, 117 Ind. 547; Miller v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 15; Ross v. People, 5 Hill, 294; Smith v. People, 53 N. Y. 111; 13 Am. Rep. 474; People v. Rae, 66 Cal. 423; 56 Am. Rep. 102; Zink v. People, 77 N. Y. 114; 33 Am. Rep. 589; State v. Kube, 20 Wis. 217; 91 Am. Dec. 390. The distinction between the crime of obtaining money or property by false pretenses, and the crime of embezzlement, is the same as that between the former and larceny: Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325. The distinction between obtaining property by false pretenses and forgery is, that where a false and fictitious document is used which was executed by a third person, and the person so using it represents it to be executed by himself, he is guilty of false pretenses; but if he represents the document as that of the real maker, he is guilty of uttering a forged instrument: Mann v. People, 15 Hun, 155. Paying or exchanging counterfeit money for goods is not obtaining money or goods by false pretenses, but is the higher crime of passing counterfeit money: Check v. State, 1 Cold. 172; State v. Allred, 84 N. C. 749. But, in order to constitute the latter crime, the money passed must be a representation of genuine coin on both sides; and if it is a piece of spurious metal about the size of a current coin, representing it on one side, but an advertisement on the other, and not in itself purporting to be coin, passing it as a coin is a false pretense, if the other requisites to the crime exist: Roberts v. State, 2 Head, 501. Instructions. On the trial of one accused of obtaining money or property by false pretenses, the jury should be instructed that it is necessary for the state to prove the substance of the charge as laid: State v. Rivers, 58 Iowa, 102; and that although the pretense need not be proved in the exact words charged, still that the idea conveyed by the defendant and that alleged must be identified by the proof: State v. Vanderbilt, 27 N. J. L. 328; and that, to convict, the jury must believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused obtained the money of the prosecutor with intent to cheat and defraud him by inducing him to believe and rely upon the false representations made, and that all the facts in evidence bearing on the question of intent must be taken into consideration: State v. Sarony, 95 Mo. 349. ADAMS V. STOREY. [135 ILLINOIS, 448.] DOWER AS CONTINUING RIGHT. - The right of a wife to be endowed o → third part of all the lands whereof her deceased husband was seised of an estate of inheritance, at any time during the marriage, continues after divorce, unless she voluntarily relinquishes it, or it is barred for one of the causes prescribed by the statute, or she is, by some rule of law or equity, precluded or estopped from asserting it. DOWER IS THE PROVISION WHICH IS MADE BY LAW for the wife out of the lands and tenements of her husband for her support and maintenance after his death, but the wife cannot have both dower and that which is given in lieu of dower out of the same property. -- ALIMONY IS AN ALLOWANCE MADE TO A WOMAN on a decree of divorce for her support out of the estate of her husband, and under exceptional circumstances it may be decreed, once for all, of a sum in gross, or of real estate absolutely, to the wife, and at all events alimony terminates with the life of the husband. DOWER, ALIMONY AS A BAR TO. - Where, upon a decree of divorce in favor of a wife, entered by consent, she is given an annuity for life, secured by a lien on certain real estate, and also by the husband's mortgage on the same, the annuity so decreed will be presumed to have been in lieu of dower, and if she receives such annuity during the husband's life and after his death, she will be estopped from claiming dower in the real estate securing her annuity. WRIT of error to reverse a decree assigning dower in certain real estate. The opinion states the facts. Weigley, Bulkley, and Gray, for the plaintiffs in error. BAKER, J. The matter of the decree of February 17, 1868, allowing to Maria P. Storey, the defendant in error herein, for her alimony and maintenance, the sum of two thousand dollars per annum, "for so long as she may be and remain sole and unmarried," was before this court at a former term, and it was held that the annual allowance of two thousand dollars, to be paid according to the provisions of that decree, did not terminate with the life of the husband, but was binding upon his estate after his death, and should be continued to her so long as she lives and remains sole and unmarried: Storey v. Storey, 125 Ill. 608; 8 Am. St. Rep. 417. In the present proceeding for the assignment to her of dower in the same land and premises upon which said annuity was made a lien and charge, various points are made by plaintiffs in error, such as the sufficiency of the proof to establish the death of Wilbur F. Storey; the competency of the evidence which was introduced to show the seisin by him, during the coverture, of the premises in which dower is claimed; the rendering of a decree against plaintiffs in error, jointly, for damages for detention of dower; and the entering of any decree whatever against Hansen, one of the plaintiffs in error, for damages for the non-assignment of dower, which are merely ancillary to the paramount question at issue, and which, in the view which we take of that question, we may forbear considering. In this state, the right of a wife to be endowed of a third part of all the lands whereof her deceased husband was seised of an estate of inheritance, at any time during the marriage, is a statutory as well as a common-law right. Being a clear statutory and legal right, it continues, unless she voluntarily relinquishes it, or it is barred for one of the causes prescribed by the statute, or she is, by some rule of law or equity, precluded or estopped from asserting it. In Gilbert v. Reynolds, 51 Ill. 513, it was held that a widow may, by her laches, estop herself from claiming dower. In Collins v. Woods, 63 Ill. 285, and Allen v. Allen, 112 Ill. 323, it was held that acts and conduct sufficient to constitute an equitable estoppel would bar the right. In Hoppin v. Hoppin, 96 Ill. 265, it was held that her covenant of warranty against all encumbrances would operate to prevent her from afterwards setting up a claim to dower. In Torrey v. Minor, 1 Smedes & M. Ch. 489, it was held that a covenant of the ancestor of the widow barred her claim to dower. And in Skinner v. Newberry, 51 Ill. 203, where moneys were due the testator, at his decease, upon executory contracts for the sale and conveyance of real estate, it was said that the widow, "by claiming her share of the purchase-money, cuts off her rights of dower in the lands sold." The divorce of 1868 was granted for the fault and misconduct of the husband, and it was expressly found by the decree that defendant in error was without fault in the premises. So, as matter of course, under our statute (Dower Act, sec. 14), the mere entry of the decree for a divorce had no effect to deprive her of her inchoate right of dower. But the decree for divorce was followed by a further decree, wherein it was adjudged and decreed that the defendant in the divorce suit pay, or cause to be paid, to and for the use of defendant in error, for so long as she may be and remain sole and unmarried, the sum of two thousand dollars per annum, payable in quarterly installments of five hundred dollars each, and further ordered and decreed that the sums of money so allowed her, and for her use, should be a lien and a charge upon the premises which are described in the decree, and in which she is now seeking to get dower. Dower is the provision which the law makes for a wife out of the lands and tenements of her husband for her support and maintenance after his death. Alimony is that allowance which is made to a woman, on a decree of divorce, for her support out of the estate of her husband. It is the equivalent of the obligation implied in every marriage contract, that the husband shall furnish his wife a suitable support and maintenance: Stillman v. Stillman, 99 Ill. 196. By the English law, alimony was but an allowance during the joint lives of the husband and wife, and it could not be ordered for the term of the wife's life, because it is a maintenance to her, while the husband's duty to maintain her ceases at his death: See Lennahan v. O'Keefe, 107 Ill. 620, and authorities there cited. It was said in that case, that under our statute the power of the court to allow alimony is broader than it was in England, and also said that the court may, under exceptional circumstances, make an allowance for alimony, once for all, of a sum in gross, or may decree real estate absolutely to the complainant. But no allowance of the character of either of those above indicated was made in the decree of 1868, and the provision therein made for the alimony, maintenance, and use of the divorced wife was an annuity of two thousand dollars for so long as she may be and remain sole and unmarried, and such annuity was amply secured by making it a lien and a charge upon real estate. The annuity in question is an annuity for life, since it can be determined only by the voluntary act of the annuitant: 4 Coke, 3 a; Hamilton v. Buckwalter, 2 Yeates, 389; 1 Am. Dec. 350. At the time that the decree was entered for two thousand dollars per annum, defendant in error had two rights, and two only, as against the defendant in the divorce suit or his property. One was against him personally, for support and maintenance during their joint lives, and which, if she did not sooner decease, would necessarily terminate with his life; and the other was an inchoate right, to become consummate at his death, to be endowed of the third part of all the lands whereof he had been seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture. At the same time, the only legal duty which was imposed upon said defendant was one which was correlative to the first of the above-mentioned rights, and was the duty to support and maintain her during the joint lives of both. There was no legal duty incumbent upon him that was responsive to the other of said rights of defendant in error, but in place thereof the law itself both gave to her such right, and secured the same to her, but out of his estate, not to take effect, however, until after his decease. The decree which was entered by the court was responsive to both of these rights of defendant in error, and gave to her the full measure of all that she could lawfully or justly or equitably claim in satisfaction of either and both of the rights with which she was invested. The decree did not in express terms provide that dower should be barred, but such was its evident intention, and the provisions of the bond, trust deed, and other instruments in evidence indicate that it was so understood by both of the parties to the suit and by the court. It was, as appears upon its face, a consent decree, and it ordered and adjudged that the defendant "pay, or cause to be paid, to and for the use of the said complainant, for so long as she may be and remain sole and unmarried, the sum of two thousand dollars per annum," etc., and further ordered and decreed "that said sums of money shall be, and they are hereby declared to be, a lien and a charge upon the following premises and lands," etc. The moneys are decreed to be paid "to and for the use of the complainant," and the annuity is extended during the term of her life, and is made a lien and a charge upon the real estate of the defendant, thereby giving her a life estate therein. As matter of fact, the allowance made not only furnished her with alimony proper, but with a full and liberal equivalent for dower. The installments of the annuity that have accrued since the death of the husband, and those that may hereafter become due, were and are based upon no right vested in defendant in error or duty incumbent upon her divorced husband, unless they |