No. 1187. ROMONA OOLITIC STONE COMPANY v. CHICAGO, INDIANAPOLIS & LOUISVILLE RAILWAY COMPANY. Submitted May 18, 1908. Decided June 2, 1908. Decision of the Commission in the similar case of Romona Oolitic Stone Company v. Vandalia R. R. Co., 13 I. C. C. Rep., 115, adhered to, and defendant carrier ordered to desist and refrain from showing purported weights upon its billing until such weights shall have been ascertained either by weighing or by some fair method of computation from cubic contents. Walter Kessler for complainant. G. W. Kretzinger for defendant. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. LANE, Commissioner: The issues presented in this case are identical with those in Romona Oolitic Stone Co. v. Vandalia R. R. Co., 13 I. C. C. Rep., 115. Complainant, an Indiana corporation, engaged in quarrying stone at Romona, Ind., and in shipping the same to its customers in various states, asks that the Commission order the defendant to cease and desist from its present practice of billing carload shipments of stone at the marked capacity of the cars. It also asks that defendant be ordered to bill said shipments at the published carload minima of the cars used. In Romona Oolitic Stone Co. v. Vandalia R. R. Co., supra, the Commission, in response to a like complaint against the Vandalia Railroad Company, declined to order the carrier to make billing at the carload minima, saying: It is evident that this would be quite as unjust and quite as unreasonable as the present practice of billing at the marked capacity of the cars. In that case, therefore, the carrier was ordered to cease and desist from indicating upon its waybills the weight of interstate carload ship ments of stone from Romona, in the state of Indiana, until such weight should have been determined, either by actual weighing or by estimation according to fair and reasonable rules in cases where actual weighing might be impracticable. The same conclusion fʊllows in this case, the facts being practically identical with those in the Vandalia case and the principle to be applied being the same. In its brief defendant insists that the rule laid down in the Vandalia case will either compel carriers to have scales at every station or will result in delay in forwarding shipments from nonscale stations until the consent of the shipper to estimated weight may be obtained. It is sufficient to say that a number of extensive railroad systems have for years followed the plan indicated by the Commission of not indicating weight upon the billing until the same shall have been determined either by weighing or by estimation. The undesirable results feared by defendant have not followed. Defendant's argument that shipments should not be billed at the carload minima for the reason that carriers would be exposed to loss on such cars as were delivered without weighing is, of course, correct. This position was taken by the Commission strongly in the Vandalia case, and is adhered to. Shipments should be billed at actual weight. The practice of billing at a fictitious weight results, in a certain percentage of cases, in the delivery and collection of freight at such weight. In asking that the fictitious weight upon the way bills be made uniformly too low, complainant is asking for an unjust and unreasonable rule. In like manner, in asking that it be allowed to continue to bill at a fictitious weight which is generally too high, the carrier is asking for the continuance of an unreasonable rule. The Commission's order will result in billing at actual weight or not at all, thus insuring collection of freight in the proper amount. It is fair to say that the number of cars shipped by complainant over the rails of defendant delivered without weighing, on which, therefore, freight was collected to an amount greater than was legally due, seems not to have been so great as stated by complainant. That a number of cars were so delivered and an excessive amount of freight money collected is, however, true. It may be that overcharge claims for this freight have been, or will be, paid to the shipper. The right to make an overcharge claim, however, is not a satisfactory emedy for an unreasonable billing rule, by which the mistakes or carelessnesses of the railway's servants are bound to result in excessive charges to the shipper. An order will be entered accordingly. 13 I. C. C. Rep. No. 1356. MACBRIDE COAL & COKE COMPANY v. CHICAGO, ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS & OMAHA RAILWAY COMPANY. Submitted May 1, 1908. Decided June 3, 1908. 1. The Commission may afford relief from the imposition of demurrage charges upon a showing that the complainant has been subjected either to unjust discrimination or to the payment of unreasonable charges. As the record in this case does not warrant a finding of unjust discrimination or unreasonable charges, the complaint is dismissed. 2. If complainant contends that demurrage charges exacted by defendant did not constitute a lawful lien upon the property, and that defendant's action amounted to an unlawful conversion, its action should have been brought before some court of competent jurisdiction and not before this Commission, whose function is to enforce the provisions of the act to regulate commerce and kindred laws. John G. Hale for complainant. Nelson J. Wilcox and Thomas Wilson for defendant. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. LANE, Commissioner: Complainant is a wholesale dealer in coal and coke with offices in Chicago, Ill. During February, 1907, it shipped 7 carloads of coal from Marion, Ill., consigned to itself at Minneapolis, Minn. The cars reached Minneapolis on various days between March 4 and 18, 1907, via the line of the defendant company. On April 6, 1907, one Billings, the Minneapolis agent of complainant, advised defendant that the said 7 cars of coal had been sold to the Northern Pacific Railway Company, and requested their delivery to that company. Defendant communicated with the agent of the Northern Pacific Railway Company and was informed that that company would accept delivery of the cars only upon condition that all transportation, switching, and demurrage charges thereon were paid by complainant. Defendant thereupon informed complainant that the freight charges upon the 7 cars amounted to $392.50, the demurrage charges up to April 17 to $171, and that upon receipt of the total amount of freight and demurrage charges the cars would be delivered to the Northern Pacific. Complainant sent defendant a check for the amount of the freight charges, but refused to pay demurrage charges, which had accrued subsequent to April 6, the date when disposal orders were given to the railroad company. Defendant refused to deliver the cars without payment of its demurrage charges, and they remained on its tracks until May 11, 1907, when the coal was sold by defendant's Minneapolis agent for $405. On the date the sale was effected the demurrage charges amounted to $374, and the difference between this amount and the amount realized from the sale, or $66.67, was tendered to the complainant by defendant. Complainant refused to accept the tender and filed this complaint, asking for an award of damages in the amount of $691.53. Upon what theory this complaint was filed with the Commission does not appear to be very clear, but it may be assumed that the Commission could afford relief upon a showing either (1) that complainant had been discriminated against, or (2) had been subjected to payment of unreasonable charges. The record does not warrant a finding of unjust discrimination against complainant. The demurrage charge objected to is published in its tariffs, is applied alike to all shippers, and failure to assess charges in accordance therewith would constitute a violation of the statute. If discrimination is claimed because defendant refused to deliver the cars in advance of payment of demurrage charges, while doing a credit business with other shippers of whose financial responsibility it was satisfied, the answer is that complainant refused to pay the demurrage charges accruing after April 6. Complainant does not challenge the reasonableness of the freight charge, but only the reasonableness of the demurrage charge. No facts have been introduced to show that a charge of $1 per day for demurrage is unreasonable, and we can not so find. In Kehoe & Company v. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co., 11 I. C. C. Rep., 166, a similar charge was found to be just and reasonable. It follows that the complaint must be dismissed and an order will be entered accordingly. If complainant's contention is, as it appears to be, that demurrage charges did not constitute a lawful lien upon the property, and defendant's action amounted to an unlawful conversion, its action should have been brought before some court of competent jurisdiction and not before this Commission, whose function. is to enforce the provisions of the act to regulate commerce and kindred laws. No. 1091. J. H. LEONARD v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY AND KANSAS CITY & WESTPORT BELT RAILWAY COMPANY. Submitted December 2, 1907. Decided May 12, 1908. 1. Under the act to regulate commerce, as amended June 29, 1906, a carrier by railroad operating entirely within a state becomes subject to the provisions of the act if it engages in interstate transportation, although it has entered into no arrangement with any other carrier by railroad or water for the movement of traffic between points upon its line and points without the state. 2. The movement of freight from a point in one state to a point in another state by rail must be regarded as an entirety and every railroad participating in that movement thereby becomes subject to the act to regulate commerce even though its service is performed entirely within a single state. 3. Under the circumstances stated in the report the Kansas City Southern Railway should give to the complainant the benefit of the $3 switching charge which it absorbs when delivery is made to a connection for switching purposes within the switching limits of Kansas City, although in this case the delivery to the Belt Railway is without such switching limits. C. W. Durbin, J. H. Sutton, and J. T. Burney & Son for complainant. S. W. Moore and F. H. Wood for Kansas City Southern Railway Company. J. H. Lucas for Kansas City & Westport Belt Railway Company. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. PROUTY, Commissioner: The complainant is a coal dealer having retail yards located at various points in Kansas City, Mo., one of which is in what was formerly Westport, Mo., but is now a part of Kansas City. The Kansas City & Westport Belt Railway, hereafter called the Belt Railway, extends from Westport to Dodson, Mo., a distance of about 9 miles, of which 14 miles are within and the balance without the limits of Kansas City. The Kansas City Southern Railway runs through Dodson to Kansas City. In fact, Dodson is located upon the tracks of the St. Louis & |