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8. The printing press shall be free(i) to every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. No conviction shall be had, in any prosecution for the publication of Libels. papers relating to the official conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or to any other matter proper for public investigation or information,(k) where the fact that such publication was not maliciously or negligently made, shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury;(1) and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court as in other cases.
mary convictions for the breach of municipal ordinances are not in violation of this section. Kulp v. Wilkesbarre, 29 P. L. J. 414. Jones v. City, 2 Kulp 68. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 30 P. L. J. 14. The act 1st May 1861, authorizing the trial of certain offences before a justice and a jury of six, is constitutional. Lavery v. Commonwealth, 101 P. S. 561. The act of 4th May 1855, giving the custody and earnings of children to the mother where the father neglects to provide for them, is not in conflict with this section. Van Billiard v. Van Billiard, 6 C. C. 333.
9. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, Art. 1. Sect. 8. from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, subscribed to by the affiant.(m)
(h) See Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 424. In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 P. S. 204. Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 551-2. Trial by jury is a constitutional right, which cannot be waived by implication. Trimble's Appeal, 6 W. 133. Lauman v. Young, 31 P. S. 310. Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 129. The legislature has no power, either to provide that a petit jury,may be composed of a less number than twelve, or that a number of the petit jury, less than twelve, may render a verdict. 23 Law Rep. 458. Kleinschmidt v. Dunphy, 1 Montana 118. Aylesworth v. Reece, Ibid. 200. Commonwealth v. Saal, 10 Phila. 496. Barter v. Putney, 37 How. Pr. 140. But the act of 1861, that certain offences may be tried by a justice and six jurors, is constitutional. Lavery v. Commonwealth, 101 P. S. 560. A municipal corporation, being the creature of the legislature, cannot claim the constitutional right of a trial by jury. Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 P. S. 374.
(i) Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 325. Runkle v. Mayer, 3 Y. 520. Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Y. 269. Commonwealth v. Meeser, 1 Brewst. 492.
(k) Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Y. 267. Commonwealth v. Odell, 3 Pitts. 449.
Art. 1. Sect. 7. Freedom of the press.
(1) The new constitution has introduced an entirely new principle into the law of libel in this state, to wit, that where the matter complained of is proper for publication, and it is established, that it was published without negligence or malice, a criminal prosecution cannot be maintained. Commonwealth v. McClure, 11 Phila. 469. Commonwealth v. Woodward, 7 Luz. L. Reg. 39, 44. And see Struthers v. Peacock, 11 Phila. 287. There must be proof of malice or negligence, to convict of libel, where the publication relates to the official conduct of persons in a public capacity. Commonwealth v. Singerly, 15 Philà. 368.
(m) A warrant of arrest, issued upon common rumor and report of the party's guilt, though it recite that there is danger of his escaping, before witnesses could be summoned, to enable the judge to issue it upon oath, is illegal; and no officer is bound to exe
10. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard by himself Art. 1. Sect. 9. and his counsel, (n) to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against Rights of accused him. (o) to meet the witnesses face to face, (p) to have compulsory process for in criminal proseobtaining witnesses in his favor; and in prosecutions by indictment or informa- cutions. tion, a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, (9) nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.(r)
11. No person shall, for any indictable offence, be proceeded against criminally, by Art. 1. Sect. 10. information, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, Criminal informawhen in actual service, in time of war or public danger; or, by leave of the court, tions. for oppression or misdemeanor in office. (s) No person shall, for the same offence, Twice in jeopardy. be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;(t) nor shall private property be taken or
cute it. Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38. But an arrest for felony may be made without warrant. Wakely v. Hart, 6 Ibid. 316. So, a justice, if obstructed in his official duties, may commit, or hold to bail, without oath or hearing. Commonwealth v. McClure, 2 Chest. Co. 557. As to the sufficiency of a search-warrant, see Moore v. Cox, 10 W. N. C. 135.
(n) It need not appear by the record, that the prisoner was allowed counsel. Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 37 P. S. 108. The right of a defendant in a criminal trial to be heard by counsel before a jury cannot be denied. Stewart v. Commonwealth, 117 P. S. 378. Theel v. Commonwealth, 22 W. N. C. 58.
(0) The 20th section of the code of criminal procedure of 31 March 1860, does not conflict with this provision. Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 37 P. S. 338.
(p) In all criminal cases the witnesses must be examined in the presence of the accused, and be subject to cross-examination. Howser v. Commonwealth, 51 P. S. 338. This clause applies to impeachments, which are criminal prosecutions. Porter's Trial 100-12. But depositions were taken and read on the trial of Judge Hopkinson. Hopkinson's Trial, 40–3. It does not, however, abrogate the common-law principle, that dying declarations are admissible in evidence, in cases of homicide. Woodsides v. State, 2 How. (Miss.) 656. Anthony v. State, Meigs 265. Campbell v. State, 11 Geo. 353. Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131. State v. Nash, 7 Iowa 349.
(g) See Galbreath v. Eichelberger, 3 Y. 515. People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74.
(r) A private act is not such a law. Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171. Brown v. Hummel, 6 P. S. 87. And see Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 314. It means, judgment of law, in its regular course of administration through courts of justice. Fetter v. Wilt, 46 P. S. 460. Craig v. Kline, 65 Ibid. 399, 413. A law must furnish some just form or mode in which the duty of the citizen shall be determined, before he can be visited with a penalty for non-performance. Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 P. S. 80. The act 11th April 1889, defining a limitation of six months, within which a practising veterinary surgeon must register, is in violation of this section. Ritter v. Rodgers, 8 C. C. 451.
(s) See Respublica v. Wray, 3 Dall. 490. Respublica v. Griffiths, 2 Dall. 112. Respublica v. Prior, 1 Y. 206. Respublica v. Burns, Ibid. 370. Respublica V. Montgomery, Ibid. 419. Commonwealth v. Commissioners, 1 S. & R. 382. The act of 1843, compelling a sheriff to dismiss a deputy who extorts illegal fees, is constitutional. Leeds's Appeal, 75 P. S. 75.
(t) This only applies to capital offences. McCreary
Art. 1. Sect. 10. applied to public use, without authority of law, and without just compensation being first made or secured. (u)
12. All courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, (v) and right and justice administered, without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the commonwealth, in manner, such courts, and in such cases, as
the legislature may by law direct. (w)
Art. 1. Sect. 12.
13. No power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the legislature, or Suspending laws. by its authority.
Art. 1. Sect. 13.
14. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.
Art. 1. Sect. 11.
Courts of justice
to be open.
Fines and punish
15. All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital ofArt. 1. Sect. 14. fences, (x) when the proof is evident, or presumption great; (y) and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.
Prisoners to be
16. No commission of oyer and terminer or jail delivery shall be issued.
17. The person of a debtor, where there is not strong presumption of fraud, shall not be continued in prison, after delivering up his estate for the benefit of Art. 1. Sect. 16. his creditors, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.
18. No ex post facto law,(z) nor any law impairing the obligation of con
v. Commonwealth, 29 P. S. 323. The court, even in a capital case, may discharge a jury, before verdict, in case of absolute necessity; but mere inability to agree, is not such a case; and if a jury be discharged, under such circumstances, the prisoner may plead it in bar of another trial. Commonwealth v. Clue, 3 R. 498. And see Hollister v. Commonwealth, 60 P. S. 103. Hilands v. Commonwealth, 17 W. N. C. 36. A prisoner is not once in jeopardy, until a full jury is empannelled and sworn. Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 P. S. 1. A person is in jeopardy when a jury has been empannelled and sworn to try him on a capital charge. Hilands v. Commonwealth, 111 P. S. 1.
(u) See art. XVI. § 8. This clause is a disabling, not an enabling one. Harvey v. Thomas, 10 W. 66. It is a limitation, not on the taxing power, but on the right of eminent domain. Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Bl. 510. There are no other limitations to the power of the state over private property, than those that are placed upon it by the constitution. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 113. The commonwealth has a constitutional right to authorize a turnpike company to lay out a road through the private ground of a citizen, without making compensation for the soil. McClenachan v. Curwen, 6 Binn. 509. Such compensation having been originally made in each purchaser's particular grant. s. c. 3 Y. 373. East Union v. Comrey, 100 P. S. 362. The mere laying out of streets through private property, is not a taking, within the meaning of the constitution; it is only when they are actually opened and applied to public that the owners are entitled to compensation. City of Pittsburgh, 2 W. & S. 320. It is not necessary, that the compensation should be actually ascertained and paid, before the property is appropriated; it is enough, that an adequate remedy is provided, by which the owner can obtain compensation, without unreasonable delay. Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 P. S. 309. Commonwealth v. Wood, 10 Ibid. 97. Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Co., 58 Ibid. 26. Hatermehl v. Dickerson, 8 Phila. 282. See Yost's Report, 17 P. S. 524. And a law limiting the time within which the owner's claim for damages shall be exhibited, is not unconstitutional. Rerford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308. To authorize the taking of private property for public use, there must be an adjudication upon the facts which render it proper. Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 P. S. 80; s. c. 9 Phila. 171. The legislature may constitutionally require the owners of property benefited by a public improvement, to pay the damages sustained by those whose property is taken, in proportion to the benefits received by each of them. McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 W. 296. Fenelon's Petition, 7 P. S. 175. Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. 85. People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419. But if the whole benefit be a public one, and the owners do not derive any special benefit from the improvement, such act is unconstitutional. Washington Avenue, 69 P. S. 352. Craig v. Philadelphia, 89 Ibid. 265. Philadelphia v. Rule, 93 Ibid. 15. Scranton v. Penn. Coal Co., 105 Ibid. 445. And the government cannot take the property of one citizen, for the mere purpose of transferring it to another, even for a
full compensation, where the public is not interested in such transfer; such an arbitrary exercise of power is an infringement of the spirit of the constitution, not being within the powers delegated by the people to legislature. Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 P. S. 309. Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Ibid. 24. Brown v. Hummell, 6 Ibid. 91. McMichael v. Skilton, 13 Ibid. 217. Ervine's Appeal, 16 Ibid. 264. Kneass's Appeal, 31 Ibid. 90. Lance's Appeal, 55 Ibid. 16. Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 358. Palairet's Appeal, 67 P. S. 479. The legis lature may, indeed, authorize a trustee of the legal estate in land to convert it into money, for the purpose of distributing the proceeds among the parties entitled. Norris v. Clymer, 2 P. S. 277. Sergeant v. Kuhn, Ibid. 393. Kerr v. Kitchen, 17 Ibid. 434. Moers v. Reading, 21 Ibid. 201. But they cannot authorize the sale of the property of parties sui juris, and seised of a vested estate, against their consent. Ervine's Appeal, 16 P. S. 256. Kneass's Appeal, 31 Ibid. 87. And see Richards v. Rote, 68 Ibid. 248. Wolford v. Morganthal, 91 Ibid. 30. The right of eminent domain extends to corporate franchises. Towanda Bridge Co., 91 P. S. 216. Phila. & Gray's Ferry R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 102 P. S. 123.
(v) This requires that the law relating to the transaction in controversy, at the time when it is complete, shall be an inherent element of the case, and shall guide the decision; and that the case shall not be altered, in its substance, by any subsequent law. Menges v. Dentler, 33 P. S. 495.
(w) Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 116, 117.
(2) A prisoner charged with homicide, may be admitted to bail, even after indictment found, where the evidence shows that the offence is not a capital Commonwealth v. Lemley, 2 Pitts. 362. Commonwealth v. Keeper, 2 Ash. 227.
(y) This clause has reference to the guilt of the prisoner, not to the nature or degree of the offence. Commonwealth v. Lemley, 2 Pitts. 362.
(z) Any law changing the punishment of offences committed before its passage, is ex post facto and void, under the constitution, unless the change consist in the remission of some separable part of the punishment before prescribed, or be referrible to prison discipline or penal administration, as its primary object. Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95. An act granting a new trial is unconstitutional. De Chastellux v. Fair child, 15 P. S. 18. Ervine's Appeal, 16 Ibid. 266-7. Baggs's Appeal, 43 Ibid. 512. Hendrickson's Estate, 2 Pitts. 360. But an act extending the period of limitation, where the existing limitation has not run against the prosecution of a crime, is not an ex post facto law. Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 P. S. 506. The act 17 April 1876, prohibiting the practice of dentistry by others than certain parties, is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law as to then practising dentists. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 29 P. L. J. 434. Retrospective laws, however, are not forbidden by the constitution. Beck v. Borough, 2 C. C. 511. The legislature may, by a retrospective statute, validate acts done in general accordance with the directions of a previously existing law by officers whose
tracts(a) or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities shall Art. 1. Sect. 17. be passed.
19. No person shall be attainted of treason or felony by the legislature. 20. No attainder shall work corruption of blood, nor, except during the life of the offender, forfeiture of estate to the commonwealth. The estate of such persons as shall destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in cases of natural death; and if any person shall be killed by casualty, there shall be no forfeiture by reason thereof.
Effect of attainder limited.
Art. 1. Sect. 20. Right of petition, Art. 1. Sect. 21. Right to bear arms.
Art. 1. Sect. 22. Military subordi23. No standing army shall, in time of peace, be kept up, without the consent of nate to the civil the legislature; and the military shall, in all cases, and at all times, be in strict power. subordination to the civil power. (c)
Art. 1. Sect. 23.
24. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the Quartering of consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. troops.
Art. 1. Sect. 24.
25. The legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction; nor create any office, the appointment to which shall be for a longer term than Titles and offices. during good behavior.
26. Emigration from the state shall not be prohibited.
Art. 1. Sect. 25. Emigration.
Art. 1. Sect. 26.
27. To guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, WE DECLARE, that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate.
21. The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, &c. for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remon
22. The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the state, shall not be questioned. (b)
authority was, at the utmost, voidable. Common wealth v. Hoff, 1 Woodward 464. Where the legislature had the antecedent power to levy a tax, it can by a retroactive law cure any irregularity or want of authority in the persons levying the same. Hewitt's Appeal, 88 P. S. 55. The act 10 May 1889, forbidding judgment for want of an appearance in foreign attachment at or after the third term, if a declaration has been filed fifteen days before the entry of judgment, was held to be applicable to pending actions. Lane v. White, 24 W. N. C. 380.
Ex post facto laws.
Art. 1. Sect. 18.
(a) See Evans v. Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218. Deichman's Appeal, 2 Wh. 396. Chadwick v. Moore, 8 W. & S. 49. Bunn v. Gorgas, 41 P. S. 441. Miller v. Ripka, 4 Phila. 309. An act of assembly cannot impair a contract made, after it has passed both houses of the general assembly, but before its approval by the governor. Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 P. S. 202. The legislature, provided it do not violate the constitutional prohibitions, may pass retrospective laws. Hepburn v. Curts, 7 W. 300. Journeay V. Gibson, 56 P. S. 57. See Danner v. Shissler, 31 Ibid. 289. Juniata Township, Ibid. 301. Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Ibid. 46. But a contract which has become void, by force of its inherent conditions, cannot be reinstated by act of assembly. Plank Road Co. v. Davidson, 39 P. S. 435. See Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Ibid. 9. Whenever a power to repeal, alter or amend a charter, is reserved in it, its exercise does not impair the obligation of the contract. Commonwealth v. Fayette County Railroad Co., 55 P. S. 452. See Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430. The charter of a municipal corporation is not a contract, within the prohibition of the constitution. City of Erie v. Erie Canal Co., 59 P. S. 174. It is not competent for the legislature to suspend execution in violation of a waiver of a stay of execution embodied in a contract. White v. Crawford, 84 P. S. 433. Powers conferred upon a private corporation by its charter are not affected by this constitution where such corporation has accepted no beneficial legislation under it. Ahl v. Rhoads, 84 P. S. 319. Commonwealth v. Water Co., 94 Ibid. 516. Where the charter of a bank exempts it from taxation for a certain period in consideration of a bonus paid, such exemption is bligatory as a contract. Commonwealth v. Bank, 1 Pears. 323. See Commonwealth v. Water Co., 94 P. S. 516. Drew v. Railroad Co., 32 Sm. 46. The state having granted to one corporation the right to lay its rails upon a public street, cannot confer any inconsistent rights upon another company. Maris v.
the general powers
Railway Co., 10 Phila. 41. A legislative grant of an exclusive right to maintain a ferry may be repealed unless founded upon a valuable consideration. Johnson v. Crow, 87 P. S. 184. The legislature may repeal an act granting additional privileges to a corporation. Zimmerman v. Turnpike Co., 32 Sm. 96. Railway Co.'s Appeal, 102 P. S. 123. The legislature may require a creditor of an embarrassed corporation to indicate his dissent from measures deemed essential to the common welfare, or be taken to have assented to the same. Canal Co. v. Gilfillan, 93 P. S. 95. The following acts have been held not to violate the obligation of contract: act 28 May 1872, limiting the distribution of the effects of a dissolved fire company, in Commonwealth v. Fire Engine Co., 10 Phila. 393; act 4 April 1873, requiring insurance companies to file certified copies of their charters, in Commonwealth v. Beneficial Association, 10 Phila. 554; the act authorizing the opening of streets through the grounds of the Girard College, in Girard College, 10 Phila. 145; act 11 May 1881, requiring a copy of the application to be attached to the policy of insurance. Life Association v. Musser, 120 P. S. 384. The act 4 April 1868, limiting the amount of recovery for a personal injury, was held to be unconstitutional in Railway v. Boudrou, 92 P. S. 475; and the act 15 April 1868, limiting the recovery of damages against corporations for loss of life, in Railroad Co. v. Bowers, 124 P. S. 183. The act 12 April 1872, requiring notes given for a patent right" to have those words written on the face thereof, is not unconstitutional. Shires v. Commonwealth, 120 P. S. 368. Laws effecting the remedy do not impair the obligation of contracts. Phelps' Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 525. Neither does an act giving a right of appeal where none before existed. Long's Appeal, 87 P. S. 11. Nor an act authorizing the transcript of a balance due by a tax collector to be filed as a lien against his property and execution to issue thereon. School Directors v. Reed, 2 Pears. 187. See Supervisors v. Dennis, 96 P. S. 400. Cooper v. Loan Association, 100 P. S. 405. Hillingshead v. Cousins, District Court, Phila. 4 Feb. 1821. Ms. County v. Coleman, 39 L. I. 281. Felt's Appeal, 1 Mona. 282. Sutton v. Clark, 7 W. N. C. 437, Parks v. Boynton, 98 P. S. 370. Biddle v. Hooven, 120 P. S. 221. Meredith v. Thomas, 4 Kulp 505.
(b) An act prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, is not a violation of this section. Wright v. Commonwealth, 77 P. S. 470.
(c) See Commonwealth v. Small, 26 P. S. 33.
Art. 2. Sect. 3. Terms of office. Art. 2. Sect. 4.
OF THE LEGISLATURE.
Art. 2. Sect. 1.
28. The legislative power of this commonwealth shall be vested in a general Legislative power, assembly, (d) which shall consist of a senate and a house of representatives. (e) 29. Members of the general assembly shall be chosen at the general election, every second year.(g) Their term of service shall begin on the first day of December next after their election. Whenever a vacancy shall occur in either house, the presiding officer thereof shall issue a writ of election, to fill such vacancy for the remainder of the term.
Art. 2. Sect. 2. Biennial elections. Vacancies.
Meetings of the
Art. 2. Sect. 5.
Art. 2. Sect. 6. Disqualifications.
31. The general assembly shall meet at twelve o'clock, noon, on the first Tuesday of January, every second year, and at other times when convened by the governor, but shall hold no adjourned annual session after the year 1878. In case of a vacancy in the office of United States senator from this commonwealth, in a recess between sessions, the governor shall convene the two houses, by proclamation, on notice, not exceeding sixty days, to fill the same.
32. Senators shall be at least twenty-five years of age, and representatives twentyone years of age. They shall have been citizens and inhabitants of the state four senators and repre- years, and inhabitants of their respective districts, one year next before their elec
tion (unless absent on the public business of the United States or of this state), and shall reside in their respective districts, during their terms of service.
Art. 2. Sect. 7. Persons convicted to be disqualified.
of infamous crimes
Art. 2. Sect. S.
Not to be increased
during the term. Art. 2. Sect. 9. President of the senate.
Speaker of the
Art. 2. Sect. 12.
30. Senators shall be elected for the term of four years, and representatives for the term of two years.
33. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he may have been elected, be appointed to any civil office under this commonwealth; and no member of congress, or other person holding any office (except of attorney-at-law, or in the militia), under the United States or this commonwealth, shall be a member of either house, during his continuance in office. (h)
36. The senate shall, at the beginning and close of each regular session, and at such other times as may be necessary, elect one of its members president pro tempore, who shall perform the duties of the lieutenant-governor, in any case of absence or disability of that officer, and whenever the said office of lieutenant-governor shall be vacant. The house of representatives shall elect one of its members judges of elections, as speaker. Each house shall choose its other officers, and shall judge of the elec
Houses to be
tion and qualification of its members. (1)
Art. 2. Sect. 10.
37. A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members.
38. Each house shall have power to determine the rules of its proceedings, and punish its members, or other persons, for contempt or disorderly behavior in its presence, (m) to enforce obedience to its process, to protect its members against violence, or offers of bribes or private solicitation, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, to expel a member, but not a second time, for the same cause; and shall have all other powers necessary for the legislation of a free state. (n) A member expelled for corruption shall not thereafter be eligible to either house; and punishment for contempt or disorderly behavior shall not bar an indictment for the same offence.
39. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time,
34. No person hereafter convicted of embezzlement of public moneys, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime (i) shall be eligible to the general assembly, or capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this commonwealth.
35. The members of the general assembly shall receive such salary and mileage for regular and special sessions as shall be fixed by law, and no other compensation whatever, whether for services upon committee or otherwise. No member of either house shall, during the term for which he may have been elected, receive any increase of salary, or mileage, under any law passed during such term.(k)
(d) In Locke's Appeal, 72 P. S. 491, it was decided by the supreme court, that an act submitting the question of granting tavern-licenses to the electors of_a ward was not in conflict with the constitution. In Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 P. S. 507, the former supreme court arrived at exactly an opposite conclusion. Each of these decisions was made by a bare majority of the court, so that in point of number the judges on either side of the question are evenly balanced. Under these circumstances, the question can hardly be deemed settled in Pennsylvania. In Morse v. Goold, 17 N. Y. 281, it was ruled by the court of appeals of New York, that a judgment given by a divided court, though it settles the case between the parties, was not obligatory as a precedent. See Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. Rep. 865.
(e) See Greenough v. Greenough, 11 P. S. 494. De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Ibid. 20. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 60.
(g) If a majority of the votes have been cast for a
disqualified person, the one who received the next highest number is not to be returned as elected. Commonwealth v. Cluley, 56 P. S. 270. State v. Giles, 1 Chand. 112. State v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497. Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145. Contrà, Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93. Carson v. McPhetridge, 15 Ind. 327. Stewart v. Hayes, 3 Chicago Leg. News 117. And see Bright. Elect. Cas. 150-1. People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451.
publish the same, except such parts as require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of Art. 2. Sect. 12.
Yeas and nays.
40. The sessions of each house, and of committees of the whole, shall be open, unless when the business is such as ought to be kept secret.
Sessions to be
41. Neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than Art. 2. Sect. 14. three days, (0) nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be Adjournments. sitting.
42. The members of the general assembly shall, in all cases, except treason, Art. 2. Sect. 15. felony, violation of their oath of office, and breach or surety of the peace, be privileged from arrest, during their attendance at the sessions of their respective houses, members. and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.(p)
Art. 2. Sect. 16.
43. The state shall be divided into fifty senatorial districts of compact and contiguous territory, as nearly equal in population as may be; and each district shall be entitled to elect one senator. Each county containing one or more ratios of Senatorial dispopulation shall be entitled to one senator for each ratio, and to an additional senator for a surplus of population exceeding three-fifths of a ratio, but no county shall form a separate district, unless it shall contain four-fifths of a ratio, except where the adjoining counties are each entitled to one or more senators, when such county may be assigned a senator on less than four-fifths, and exceeding one-half of a ratio; and no county shall be divided, unless entitled to two or more senators. No city or county shall be entitled to separate representation, exceeding one-sixth of the whole number of senators. No ward, borough or township shall be divided in the formation of a district. The senatorial ratio shall be ascertained by divid- Ratio. ing the whole population of the state by the number fifty.
44. The members of the house of representatives shall be apportioned among Art. 2. Sect. 17. the several counties, on a ratio obtained by dividing the population of the state, as ascertained by the most recent United States census, by two hundred. Every districts. county containing less than five ratios shall have one representative for every full ratio, and an additional representative, when the surplus exceeds half a ratio; but each county shall have at least one representative. Every county containing five ratios, or more, shall have one representative for every full ratio. Every city containing a population equal to a ratio shall elect separately its proportion of the representatives allotted to the county in which it is located. Every city entitled to more than four representatives, and every county having over one hundred thousand inhabitants, shall be divided into districts of compact and contiguous territory; each district to elect its proportion of representatives, according to its population; but no district shall elect more than four representatives.
45. The general assembly, at its first session after the adoption of this constitu- Art. 2. Sect. 18. tion, and immediately after each United States decennial census, shall apportion the state into senatorial and representative districts, agreeably to the provisions of of the state. Apportionment the two next preceding sections.
46. No law shall be passed, except by bill; and no bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage through either house, as to change its original purpose. 47. No bill shall be considered, unless referred to a committee, returned therefrom, and printed for the use of the members.
48. No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed, containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.(r)
(0) An adjournment of the house for more than three days, without the concurrence of the senate, does not, ipso facto, work a dissolution of the general assembly. West Philadelphia Passenger Railroad Co. v. Union Passenger Railway Co., 9 Phila. 495.
(p) See Bullard's Case, 4 W. N. C. 540.
(q) The arrogation by the legislature of judicial power in the construction of laws is unconstitutional. Iron Works v. Oil Co., 122 P. S. 627. Grant Street, 121 P. S. 596. It is not possible by legislation to alter the fact of illegitimate birth. Edward's Appeal, 108 P. S. 283. The legislature have power to vote themselves a per diem compensation after the expiration of one hundred days. Commonwealth v. Butler, 99 P. S. 540. As to the delegation of legislative power, see note to State v. Circuit Court, 15 Atlan. 298. Where a statute is made to depend for its validity upon a subsequent popular vote, it is unconstitutional. Tarpayer's Petition, 25 P. L. J. 146. See Bowen v. County, 6 C. C. 613. Overseers v. Commissioners, 135 P. S. 400. City v. Savage, 23 W. N. C. 332. Commonwealth v. Halstead, 1 C. C. 335. Von Storch v. School Dis
Art. 8. Sect. 1.
trict, 3 C. C. 571. School District's Appeal, 113 P. S.
(r) If the title of an act do not clearly indicate its subject-matter, it is unconstitutional. Ruth's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 498. Road in Phoenixville, 2 Chest. Co. 433. But it is not necessary that the title should be a complete index of its contents. Commonwealth v. Green, 58 P. S. 226. Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Ibid. 425. It is only necessary that the title should fairly give notice of the subject of the act, so as to reasonably lead to an inquiry into its body. Allegheny County Home's Appeal, 77 P. S. 77. State Line and Juniata Railroad Company's Appeal, Ibid. 429. Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Ibid. 433. If an act, entitled a supplement to a former one, the date and title of which are given, be germane to the original statute, it does not violate the constitutional provision. Loewi v. Haedrick, 8 W. N. C. 70. Bank of Titusville v. Caldwell, 13 Fed. Rep. 429. Craig v. Presbyterian Church, 88 P. S. 42. If the title of an act be simple, it is only those provisions that are not covered by it that are void. Allegheny County Home's Appeal, 77 P. S. 77.