LIBRARIES. - LIENS. LIBRARIES. See COMMON SCHOOLS; STATE LIBRARY. 1. Cities authorized to receive donations for free libraries May appropriate for. 2. Law library for the supreme court. 3. Judges may appoint librarian in counties. Compensation. 23 May 1887. P. L. 179. Citizens to receive 1. It shall be competent for any incorporated city within this commonwealth and the same is hereby empowered to take and hold any grant or donation of money, books and manuscripts, or property, real or personal, for the use of estab- donations for free May appropriate lishing a free library within the limits of such corporation, and to make provision, libraries. by annual appropriation, for the maintenance of such library. 22 April 1891. P. L. 26. 2. The sum of five thousand dollars be appropriated for the purchase of law for. books for the use of the supreme court, to be kept in the rooms of said court in the city hall in Philadelphia. Such books to be selected by the justices of said court, and on warrants drawn by the auditor-general shall be paid for by the state treas- Law library for urer on the certificate of the chief justice that the same have been purchased and court. delivered in the said rooms. the supreme 19 April 1889. P. L. 38. 3. Where not otherwise regulated by local or special laws, the judges of the several courts of this commonwealth, if they deem it necessary, shall have power to appoint a librarian in counties where there is a law library connected with the Judges may apsaid courts, supported in whole or in part by fines and forfeitures. And the said point librarians. officers shall be paid such compensation as the said judges shall allow, out of the Compensation. moneys belonging to the said law library. LIENS. See COMMON CARRIERS; FACTORS; INNS AND TAVERNS; JUDGMENT; Verdict. 1. Proceedings to enforce lien of commission-merchants, factors, carriers, &c. Sales. Publication of notice. And of 2. Sales of goods of unknown owners. perishable goods. Notice. Powers of justices of the peace. 3. Disposition of overplus. P. L. 1127. mission-merchants, factors, 1. In all cases in which commission-merchants, factors and all common carriers, 14 Dec. 1863 § 1. or other persons shall have a lien, under existing laws, upon any goods, wares, merchandise or other property, for or on account of the costs or expenses or carriage, Proceedings to enstorage or labor bestowed on such goods, wares, merchandise or other property, if force lien of comthe amount pay the owner or consignee of the same shall fail or neglect or refuse to of charges upon any such property, goods, wares or merchandise, within sixty days carriers, &c. after demand thereof, made personally upon such owner or consignee, then and in such case, it shall and may be lawful for any such commission-merchant, factor, common carrier or other person having such lien as aforesaid, after the expiration of said period of sixty days, to expose such goods, wares, merchandise or other Sales. property to sale, at public auction, and to sell the same, or so much thereof as shall be sufficient to discharge said lien, together with costs of sale and advertising:(n) Provided, That notice of such sale, together with the name of the person or persons Publication of to whom such goods shall have been consigned, shall have been first published, for notice. three successive weeks, in a newspaper published in the county, and by six written or printed handbills, put up in the most public and conspicuous places in the vicinity of the depot where the said goods may be. Ibid. § 2. 2. Upon the application of any of the persons or corporations having a lien upon goods, wares, merchandise or other property, as mentioned in the first section of sale of goods of this act, verified by affidavit, to any of the judges of the courts of common pleas unknown owners. of this commonwealth, setting forth that the places of residence of the owner and consignee of any such goods, wares, merchandise or other property are unknown, or that such goods, wares, merchandise or other property are of such perishable And of perishable nature, or so damaged, or showing any other cause that shall render it impracti- goods. cable to give the notice as provided for in the first section of this act, then and in such case, it shall and may be lawful for a judge of the city or county in which the goods may be, to make an order, to be by him signed, authorizing the sale of such goods, wares, merchandise or other property, upon such terms as to notice, as Notice. (n) See Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 P. S. 414. P. L. 1127. 14 Dec. 1863 § 2. the nature of the case may admit of, and to such judge shall seem meet :(0) Provided, That in cases of perishable property, the affidavit and proceedings required by this section may be had before a justice of the peace. Powers of justices of the peace. Ibid. § 3. Disposition of overplus. 3. The residue of moneys, arising from any such sales, either under the first or second sections of this act, after deducting the amount of the lien as aforesaid, together with costs of advertising and sales, shall be held subject to the order of the owner or owners of such property. LIGHTING COMPANIES. See GAS AND Water CompANIES; GAS, Light, Heat aND FUEL COMPANIES. LIME. See WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See CORPORATIONS; MINING RIGHTS; SLANDER. I. ACTIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF REAL ESTATE. 1. Seven years' quiet possession to give title. 3. Entry to be barred after twenty-one years. And right of action to recover lands. 4. Provision for existing rights. 5. Provision in favor of persons under legal disabilities. 6. Not to extend to persons without the United States. 7. Six years' possession to validate prior sheriff's deeds. 8. All persons to be barred after forty years. 10. Thirty years' possession to be evidence of title out of the commonwealth. Twenty-one years' possession to perfect defeasible estate. 11. Limitation of claim for ground-rent. Evidence of payment may be recorded. 12. Limitation of claim for apportioned groundrent. Common pleas may decree extinguishment. 13. Persons under disabilities to bring suit within thirty years. 14. Suits for specific performance, or for damages for non-performance, or to enforce an equity of redemption, or an implied or resulting trust, to be brought within five years, unless, &c. Limitation in cases of fraud. 15. Not to run in favor of an attorney at law. 16. Suits to be brought within one year after entry. Second ejectment. 17. Statute to run against remaindermen, &c., unless arrested by act of tenant in tail. II. ROAD CASES. 18. Petitions for damages in road cases. 1705. 1 Sm. 48. III. PERSONAL ACTIONS. 19. Actions on the case. Account. Trespass. Debt. Detinue. Replevin. Trespass to the person. Slander. 20. Libel. 21. Action may be brought within one year after reversal or arrest of judgment. 22. Proviso in favor of persons under disabilities. 23. Limitation not to run in favor of defendants beyond the sea. 24. To run against plaintiffs beyond the sea, unless citizens. 25. Not to run in favor of insolvent corporations. 26. On promissory notes. 27. In suits for fees, by public officers. 28. Actions against stockholders of corporations. 29. Suits for negligence against passenger railway companies, in Philadelphia. 30. Certiorari to suspend the running of the statute. 31. Suits on refunding bonds to be brought in five years. 32. Bonds heretofore given. IV. ACTIONS ON OFFICIAL BONDS. 33. Bonds of public officers. 34. Bonds of administrators, &c. 35. Constables' bonds. V. PENAL ACTIONS AND CRIMES. 36. Penal actions. 37. Act against circulating small notes. 38. Fines payable for the use of the county. 39. Whether in whole or in part. 40. Criminal prosecutions. 41. Misdemeanors by bank-officers. 42. Forgery. 43. Embezzlement by administrators. I. Actions for the recovery of real estate. 1. Seven years' quiet possession of lands within this province, which were first entered on, upon an equitable right, shall for ever give an unquestionable title to Seven years' quiet the same against all, during the estate whereof they are or shall be possessed, except in cases of infants, married women, lunatics and persons not residing within this province or territories. (p) possession to give title. (0) Such order does not authorize a sale, without opening the packages, and exposing the contents to purchasers. Adams Express Co. v. Schlessinger, 75 P. S. 246; s. c. 9 Phila. 70. (p) See 5 Sm. 416, pl. 16. Eakin v. Raub, 10 S. & R. 340, 369. In Kirk v. Smith, 9 Wheat. 317, this act is declared not to have been obsolete, but to have been repealed by the subsequent act of 1785. And see McCoy v. Trustees of Dickinson College, 4 S. & R. 302. 2. No person or persons that now(9) hath or have any claim to the possession 26 March 1785 § 5. of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, or the pre-emption thereof, from the 2 Sm. 300. commonwealth, founded upon any prior warrant, (r) whereon no survey (s) hath Qualification been made,(t) or in consequence of any prior settlement, improvement or occupa- thereof. tion, without other title, (u) shall hereafter enter or bring any action for the recovery thereof, unless he, she or they, or his, her or their ancestors or predecessors, have had the quiet and peaceable possession of the same within seven years next before such entry, or bringing such action :(v) Provided always, That if any person or persons so claiming as aforesaid, hath been forced or driven away from his, her or their possessions, by the savages, or by the terror of them, or any other persons, or by any other means, except by the judicial authority of the state, hath quitted the same during the late war, then such person or persons, and his, her or their heir or heirs, shall or may, notwithstanding the said seven years be expired, bring his, her or their action, or make his, her or their entry, within five years from the passing of this act. Ibid. § 2. after twenty-one 3. From henceforth no person or persons whatsoever (w) shall make entry(x) into any manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, (y) after the expiration of twenty-one years next after his, her or their right(z) or title to the same first Entry to be barred descended or accrued;(a) nor shall any person or persons whatsoever have or years. maintain any writ of right, or any other real or possessory writ or action, for any And right of action manor, lands, tenements or hereditaments, of the seisin or possession of him, her to recover lands. or themselves, his, her or their ancestors or predecessors, nor declare or allege any other seisin or possession of him, her or themselves, his, her or their ancestors or (2) It is confined to existing claims. Brice v. Curran, 3 Y. 403. Deal v. McCormick, 3 S. & R. 345. Gilday v. Watson, 5 Ibid. 274. Mickle v. Lucas, 10 Ibid. 293-5. (r) This includes a prior application or location. Irwin v. Nicholls, 1 Y. 294. But this section does not extend to the case of one who was in possession under a descriptive warrant, and had been ejected; in such case, the party has twenty-one years to bring his action. Brice v. Curran, 3 Y. 403. Gonzalus v. Hoover, 6 S. & R. 123-4. (8) A survey by the other party will not avail the plaintiff. Ecing v. Barton, 2 Y. 318. Simpson v. Williams, 3 Ibid. 402. But if the survey have been prevented by the frand or violence of the party, or the misfeasance of the surveyor, the statute will not apply. Irwin v. Nicholls, 1 Y. 294. Caruthers v. Caruthers, 3 Ibid. 175. Or by a caveat. Bell v. Levers, 2 Y. 23. (1) And returned. Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. 166. And see Caruthers v. Caruthers, 3 Y. 174. (u) A careat, and decision of the board of property thereon, will not take the case out of the act. Sturgeon v. Waugh, 2 Y. 476. Wallace v. Dickey, 3 Ibid. 283. Nor a pending indictment for forcible entry and detainer. Neilly v. McCormick, 2 Y. 447. (e) The statute runs against infants. Mobley v. Oeker, 3 Y. 200. Clark v. Hackethorn, Ibid. 269. (w) It does not bar the commonwealth. Johnston v. Irwin, 3 S. & R. 291. McCoy v. Trustees of Dick inson College, 4 Ibid. 305. Bagley v. Wallace, 16 Ibid. 245. Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 1 W. 56. Commonwealth v. Miltenberger, 7 Ibid. 450. McKeehan v. Commonwealth, 3 P. S. 151. Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Harris, 101 Ibid. 80. But it runs against a county or municipal corporation. Evans v. Erie County, 66 P. S. 222. () An entry by the owner suspends the running of the statute. Altemas v. Campbell, 9 W. 29. Hinman v. Cranmer, 9 P. S. 40. Ingersoll v. Lewis, 11 Ibid. 212. But such entry must be made animo clamandi. Miller v. Shaw, 7 S. & R. 133. Altemas v. Campbell, 9 W. 28. Lawrence v. Hunter, Ibid. 80. Holtzapple v. Phillibaum, 4 W. C. C. 357. The entry of one tenant in common is the entry of all. Watson v. Gregg, 10 W. 296. The entry of any other person than the legal owner is a mere trespass, and without effect on the operation of the statute. Hole v. Ritten house, 19 P. S. 305. By act 13 April 1859, infra 16, an' action must be brought within one year after entry. (y) The statute is applicable to all corporeal hereditaments, including sub-surface rights. Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 P. S. 284. See Pipher v. Lodge, 4 S. & R. 310. McCall v. Coover, 4 W. & S. 151. Clark v. Dougan, 12 P. S. 87. (2) A title by warrant and survey, without patent, is within the act, and is bound by an adverse possession of twenty-one years. McCoy v. Trustees of Dickinson College, 4 S. & R. 302. (a) The statute does not begin to run, until a right of entry or of action accrues. Hall v. Vandegrift, 3 Binn. 374. Shepley v. Lytle, 6 W. 500. Poe v. Foster, 4 W. & S. 355. Martle v. Myers, 12 P. S. 125. Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S. & R. 84. Thus, notwithstanding the next heir in tail release to the tenant in tail in possession, the statute does not run against the releasor, until the death of the tenant in tail, without issue. Hall v. Vandegrift, 3 Binn. 374. And where the father makes a lease and dies, the statute does not begin to run against his children, until the end of the term, and a subsequent adverse holding by the tenant. Shepley v. Lytle, 6 W. 500-6. It does not run against parties in remainder, until after the death of tenant for life, who has aliened in fee. Gernet v. Lynn, 1 P. S. 94. Wolford v. Morgenthal, 91 Ibid. 30. So, where husband conveys without the wife joining in the conveyance, the statute does not begin to run against her right, until the death of her husband. Culler v. Motzer, 13 S. & R. 356. And where adverse possession is taken of the lands of a feme covert, who dies, leaving her husband surviving, the statute does not begin to run against her children, until the expiration of the tenancy by the curtesy. Marple v. Myers, 12 P. S. 122-5. Miltenberger v. Croyle, 27 Ibid. 170. But it applies to an action of dower for property aliened by the husband in his lifetime. Case v. Keller, 77 P. S. 487. And if a lunatic make a conveyance, the statute immediately commences to run against him and his heirs. Bensel v. Chancellor, 5 Wh. 371. And it runs against those claiming an estate-tail, from the time that a right of entry accrues to any one tenant in tail, without regard to the rights of the subsequent issue in tail, as they arise. Tiernan v. Roland, 15 P. S. 429. S. P. Hollinshead's Appeal, 103 Ibid. 158. An adverse possession of twenty-one years, during the life of the tenant in tail, bars a recovery by the issue in tail. Baldbridge v. McFarland, 26 P. S. 338. And see infra 17. The disability of marriage cannot be added to the prior disability of infancy, to avoid the operation of the statute. Carlisle v. Stitler, 1 P. & W. 6. Rankin v. Tenbrook, 6 W. 388. Thomp-' son v. Smith, 7 S. & R. 209. In case of fraud, the statute commences running from the time of its discovery. Rush v. Barr, 1 W. 110. Ferris v. Henderson, 12 P. S. 49. And between trustee and cestui que trust, it only runs from the time of actual ouster, or notice of adverse possession. Offerman v. Packer, 26 L. I. 205. And see Scott v. Gallagher, 14 S. & R. 333. Ripka v. Sergeant, 7 W. & S. 13. Dikeman v. Parrish, 6 P. S. 210. McDowell v. Potter, 8 Ibid. 189. Peppard v. Deal, 9 Ibid. 140. Musselman v. Eshelman, 10 Ibid. 394. Coulter v. Philips, 20 Ibid. 154. Warn v. Brown, 102 Ibid. 347. The statute does not begin to run in favor of one who entered in subservience to the title of another, until the privity between them is severed by some unequivocal act. Cadwala der v. App, 81 P. S. 194. 26 March 1785 § 2. predecessors, (b) than within twenty-one years next before such writ, action or suit so hereafter to be sued, commenced or brought.(c) 2 Sm. 300. Ibid. § 3. Provision for existing rights. Ibid. § 4. Provision in favor of persons under legal disabilities. 4. Provided, That any person or persons now having right, title of entry as aforesaid, and the heir or heirs of such person or persons may, within fifteen years from this time, enter or commence any action or suit, as he, she or they, or his, her or their ancestors or predecessors might have done, before the passing of this act. (d) 5. Provided also, That if any person or persons having such right or title be or shall be, at the time such right or title first descended or accrued (e) within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert,(g) non compos mentis, imprisoned, [or beyond the seas, or from and without the United States of America,](h) then such person or persons, and the heir or heirs of such person or persons, shall and may, notwithstanding the said twenty-one years be expired, bring his or their action, or make his or their entry, as he, she or they might have done before the passing of this act, so as such person or persons, or the heir or heirs of such person or persons, shall, within ten years next after attaining full age, discoverture, soundness of mind, enlargement out of prison, [or coming into the said United States,] take benefit of or sue for the same, and no time after the said ten years.(i) And in case such person or persons shall die within the said term of ten years, under any of (b) One who enters on land as a trespasser, clears it, builds a house, and lives in it, acquires something which he may transfer by deed or descent; and if the possession of such person, and others claiming under him, added together, amount to 21 years, and were averse to him who had the legal title, the statute is a bar to a recovery. Overfield v. Christie, 7 S. & R. 173. Cunningham v. Patton, 6 P. S. 355. But in order to give title, under the statute, the possession of the claimant cannot be tacked to that of a former possessor, under whom the party does not show title. Overfield v. Christie, 7 S. & R. 177. Sheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 P. S. 126. Schrack v. Zubler, 34 Ibid. 38. Potts v. Gilbert, 3 W. C. C. 475. The statute does not run in favor of one who is in possession under a claim of purchase, by a parol contract. Harris v. Richey, 56 P. S. 395. (c) A complete title is gained by the statute of limitations. Watson v. Gregg, 10 W. 295. Hollingshead v. Nauman, 45 P. S. 140. Mead v. Leffingwell, 83 Ibid. 187. Graham v. Craig, 32 Sm. 459. Which is not only sufficient to support a defence, but to recover as plaintiff in ejectment. Pederick v. Searle, 5 S. & R. 240. Hole v. Rittenhouse, 19 P. S. 306. The possession, however, must be adverse. Morris v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 67. Cluggage v. Duncan, 1 S. & R. 111. Burns v. Swift, 2 Ibid. 436. McCoy v. Trustees of Dickinson College, 4 Ibid. 302. Hall v. Powel, Ibid. 465. Hawk v. Senseman, 6 Ibid. 21. Gonzalus v. Hoover, Ibid. 118. Miller v. Shaw, 7 Ibid. 134, 142–3. Munshower v. Patton, 10 Ibid. 338. Carlisle v. Stitler, 1 P. & W. 8. Allen v. Getz, 2 Ibid. 310. Marsh v. Weckerly, 13 P. S. 250. Hood v. Hood, 2 Gr. 230. Wheeler v. Winn, 53 P. S. 122. It must be actual, visible, exclusive and notorious. Johnston v. Irwin, 3 S. & R. 291. Hawk v. Senseman, 6 Ibid. 21. Miller v. Shaw, 7 Ibid. 129. Mackentile v. Savoy, 17 Ibid. 104. Mercer v. Watson, 1 W. 338. Brown v. MeKinney, 9 Ibid. 565. Long v. Mast, 11 P. S. 189. Hole v. Rittenhouse, 19 Ibid. 309; s. c. 25 Ibid. 491. Washabaugh v. Entriken, 34 Ibid. 74. And continuous and uninterrupted. Pederick v. Searle, 5 S. & R. 240. Overfield v. Christie, 7 Ibid. 173. Cooper v. Smith, 9 Ibid. 26. Parker v. Southwick, 6 W. 378. Sorber v. Willing, 10 Ibid. 141. Graffius v. Tottenham, 1 W. & S. 488. Sheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 P. S. 126. Cunningham v. Patton, 6 Ibid. 355. Hughs v. Pickering, 14 Ibid. 297. Stephens v. Leach, 19 Ibid. 262-5. Groft v. Weakland, 34 Ibid. 304. But residence is not necessary. Porter v. McGinnis, 6 W. & S. 502. Hoey v. Furman, 1 P. S. 301. Stephens v. Leach, 19 Ibid. 262-5. Nor payment of taxes. Hockenbury v. Snyder, 2 W. & S. 250. Groft v. Weakland, 34 P. S. 304. Bear Valley Coal Co. v. Dewart, 95 Ibid. 72. Goodman v. Sanger, 85 Ibid. 37. The widow of a tenant for life, who continues in possession, without contract, does not hold adversely to the legal title; nor does her subsequent marriage change the character of her possession. Bannon v. Brandon, 34 P. S. 263; s. c. 38 Ibid. 63. One who enters under color of title, has a possession co-extensive with his claim. Lawrence v. Hunter, 9 W. 76. Wright v. Guier, Ibid. 176. Burns v. Swift, 2 S. & R. 436. Hall v. Powel, 4 Ibid. 456, 465. McCall v. Neely, 3 W. 69. Hopkins v. Robinson, Ibid. 205. Bell v. Hartley, 4 W. & S. 32. McCall v. Coover, Ibid. 151. Hole v. Rittenhouse, 19 P. S. 307. Barnhart v. Pettit, 22 Ibid. 139. But the possession of a mere intruder is confined to the land actually occupied by him. Cluggage v. Duncan, 1 S. & R. 111. Hall v. Powel, 4 Ibid. 456, 465. Miller v. Shaw, 7 Ibid. 129. Farley v. Lenox, 8 Ibid. 392. McCall v. Neely, 3 W. 69. Sweeney v. McCulloch, Ibid. 345. Heiser v. Riehle, 7 Ibid. 35. Lawrence v. Hunter, Ibid. 76. Wright v. Guier, Ibid. 176. McCaffrey v. Fisher, 4 W. & S. 181. Bishop v. Lee, 3 P. S. 214. Hughs v. Pickering, 14 Ibid. 297. Collins v. Benedict, 5 W. N. C. 549. Unless by his declarations and acts, he evince an unintermitted purpose to hold the whole tract. Clarke v. Dougan, 12 P. S. 87. As by having the whole assessed in his name, and payment of taxes for 21 years, where the owner had paid no taxes; the disseisor, in such case, assumes color of title. McCall v. Neely, 3 W. 69. Criswell v. Altemus, 7 Ibid. 566. Kelsey v. Murray, 9 Ibid. 113. Sorber v. Willing, 10 Ibid. 142. McCall v. Cover, 4 W. & S. 151. This doctrine, however, does not, in general, apply to contiguous tracts. Hole v. Rittenhouse, 25 P. S. 491. But a party in possession may, by using the woodland of an adjoining tract, acquire title to both, under the statute. Baker v. Findley, 20 P. S. 163. Ament's Executor v. Wolf, 33 Ibid. 331; s. c. 1 Gr. 518. O'Hara v. Richardson, 46 P. S. 386. See Washabaugh v. Entriken, 36 Ibid. 513. Wheeler v. Winn, 53 Ibid. 122. Declarations are evidence to show that the possession was not adverse. Long v. Mast, 11 P. S. 189. See Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Wilson, 10 W. 261. And an admission of title to part, affects the whole. Ingersoll v. Lewis, 11 P. S. 212. So, admission of title by tenant, will stop the running of the statute. Sailor v. Hertzogg, 2 P. S. 184. But if the statute have already closed upon the title, a parol admission will not revest it. Ibid. See Moore v. Collishaw, 10 P. S. 224. Sailor v. Hertzogg, Ibid. 308. Wray v. Miller, 20 Ibid. 111. And as to the adverse possession of co-tenants, see Culler v. Motzer, 13 S. & R. 356. Lodge v. Patterson, 3 W. 74. Galbreath v. Galbreath, 5 Ibid. 146. Mehaffy v. Dobbs, 9 Ibid. 363. Hart v. Gregg, 10 Ibid. 185. Gregg v. Blackmore, Ibid. 192. Watson v. Gregg, Ibid. 289. Law v. Patterson, 1 W. & S. 184. Hall v. Mathias, 4 Ibid. 331. Dikeman v. Parrish, 6 P. S. 224–5. houn v. Cook, 9 Ibid. 226. Keyser v. Evans, 30 Ibid. 507. Longwell v. Bentley, 3 Gr. 177. Davis v. Dickson, 92 P. S. 365. (d) See Penn v. Ingham, 3 W. C. C. 90. Cal (e) The act gives a feme covert the same time, when adverse possession is taken of her lands, while she is covert, as it would have given her, if there had been adverse possession, and the lands had descended to her, when she was covert. Carlisle v. Stitler, 1 P. & W. 6-9. (g) See Dexter v. Billings, 110 P. S. 135. (h) The part within brackets repealed; infra 6. (i) Infants are entitled to 21 years from the period of adverse possession; they can in no case have more than 31, nor less than 21 years. Weddle v. Robertson, 6 W. 486. In Philadelphia county, persons under disabilities are bound by 40 years' adverse possession; see infra 8-9 2 Sm. 300. the disabilities(k) aforesaid, the heir or heirs of such person or persons shall have 26 March 1785 § 4. the same benefit that such person or persons could or might have had, by living until the disabilities should have ceased or been removed. And if any abatement happen in any proceeding or proceedings upon such right or title, such proceeding or proceedings may be renewed and continued within three years from the time of such abatement, but not afterward. 6. The provision contained in the fourth section of the act to which this is a sup- 11 March 1815 § 1. plement, so far as the same relates to persons beyond the seas, and from and with- 6 Sm. 277. out the United States of America, is hereby repealed; and the limitation contained Not to extend to in the second section of the said act is hereby extended to persons residing beyond persons without the seas, and from and without the United States of America, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.(1) the United States. 8 July 1885. P. L. 270. vendee. 7. No deed, grant, conveyance or assurance, heretofore (m) or hereafter given by any sheriff or coroner of any of the counties within the state, bonâ fide and for a valuable consideration, of any lands, tenements or hereditaments whatsoever, (n) Six years' posseswhere quiet and peaceful possession hath been had of the same for the space of sion of sheriff's six years, shall be adjudged or taken to be defective, avoided or prejudiced for not producing in court upon trial or otherwise any writ of fieri facias, levari, venditioni exponas, or any returns thereupon or for want of proof that due and legal notice of the sales of the same was given, or for not having been recorded in the proper office for recording such deeds, and any judgment shall be primâ facie evidence of the regularity of the publication of any original or other writ upon which such judg ment is founded where quiet and peaceable possession hath been had for the space of six years under a deed, grant or conveyance in pursuance of proceedings thereon.(0) years. 8. From henceforth no person or persons whatsoever shall make entry into any 14 April 1851 § 15. P. L. 615. manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, after the expiration of forty years next after his, her or their right or title to the same first descended or accrued; nor shall All persons to be any person or persons whatsoever have or maintain any writ of right or any other barred after forty real or personal writ or action for any manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, of the seisin or possession of him, her or themselves, his, her or their ancestors or predecessors, than within forty years next before such writ, action or suit so hereafter to be sued, commenced or brought: Provided, That any person never having right or title of entry as aforesaid, and who is now by law excepted from the general provisions of the act of the 26th of March 1785, for the limitation of actions, and the heir or heirs of such person, may, within five years from this time, enter, or commence any action or suit, as he, she or they, or his, her or their ancestors or predecessors might have done, before the passage of this act. 9. The fifteenth section of an act, entitled " An act relative to the commencement of actions, and for other purposes," approved the 14th day of April A.D. 1851, is hereby construed to extend to and apply only to writs of right and other writs pertaining to manorial lands in the city and county of Philadelphia. 4 May 1852 § 7. P. L. 570. Restricted to Philadelphia county. 10. In all cases where there has been a continuous possession of lands or tene- 27 April 1855 § 6. ments for thirty years, it shall be presumed, as between the parties litigant, other P. L. 369. than the commonwealth, that the title thereof shall have been parted with by the Thirty years' poscommonwealth.(p) And whenever the title to real estate might have been claimed session to be eviby the commonwealth, as unlawfully held by any corporation, and the same shall dence of title out have passed into the hands of a purchaser, who shall have held the same for twenty- Twenty-one years' one years, without inquisition made in behalf of the commonwealth, the title of possession to persuch purchasers, their heirs and assigns, shall be deemed indefeasible, as to any such claim by the commonwealth. of commonwealth. fect defeasible estate. Ibid. § 7. Limitation of claim 11. In all cases where no payment, claim or demand shall have been made (q) on account of, or for any ground-rent, annuity or other charge(r) upon real estate, for twenty-one years, or no declaration or acknowledgement of the existence thereof for ground-rent. shall have been made, within that period, by the owner of the premises, subject to such ground-rent, annuity or charge, a release or extinguishment thereof shall be presumed, and such ground-rent, annuity or charge shall thereafter be irrecover (k) A plaintiff cannot avail himself of successive v. McVeagh, 2 Y. 87. Gilday v. Watson, 5 S. & R. disabilities. Carlisle v. Stitler, 1 P. & W. 6. Rankin 267. v. Tenbrook, 6 W. 388. Therefore, if title accrue to a female infant, and she marry, the period of ten years is counted from her majority, and not from the death of her husband. Thompson v. Smith, 7 S. & R. 209. See Marple v. Myers, 12 P. S. 122. If a person under disability when his right first accrues, die before it has ceased, his heirs have the same time to make entry, or bring suit, as he would have had, if he had survived the disability. Henry v. Carson, 59 P. S. 297. And see Hollinshead's Appeal, 103 Ibid. 158. (1) This act was not an immediate bar, by retrospection; but persons beyond the seas were allowed fifteen years from its passage, for bringing their actions, according to the provisions of § 3 of the act of 1785, supra 4. Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330. Moore v. Collisha, 10 P. S. 229. (m) This section is retrospective only. Wilson (n) It does not apply to a sheriff's deed under a commissioner's sale for taxes. Wistar v. Kammerer, 2 Y. 100. (0) This act is an amendment of the act 26 March 1785, §7, 2 Sm. 301; it is a full answer to any objections founded on the process and its execution, under which the party acquired title. Morrell v. Craefe, 2 W. C. C. 380. (p) See Wilson v. Horner, 59 P. S. 155. Pratt v. Eby, 67 Ibid. 396. (2) This section is retrospective. Korn v. Browne, 64 P. S. 55. (r) This act is constitutional; a release or extinguishment of a ground-rent is presumed where there has been no payment or a demand for payment within twenty-one years. Biddle v. Hooven, 120 P. S. 221. This act is a conclusive bar to a charge upon real |