30. No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.(s) Art. 1. Sect. 9. Direct taxes. 31. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.(t) No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of State exports. one state over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be Port duties. obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another.(u) 32. No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropria- Receipts and tions made by law;(v) and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures. expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time. hibited. 33. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person Titles and receipt holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the of presents procongress, accept of any present, emolument, office (w) or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince or foreign state. Limitations of the 34. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation; grant letters Art. 1. Sect. 10. of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit;(x) make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, (y) powers of the ex post facto law, (z) or law impairing the obligation of contracts, (a) or grant any states. title of nobility. (8) Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 320-1. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533. (t) A state law imposing a stamp duty on bills of lading is unconstitutional. Almy v. California, 24 How. 169. This clause does not apply to the imposition of tonnage duties on foreign vessels. Aguirre v. Maxwell, 3 Bl. C. C. 140. (u) A state law requiring the payment of pilotage fees does not infringe this clause. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 314-15. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 Ibid. 421. (v) Whether the public moneys at the disposal of the postmaster-general be technically in the treasury or not, the spirit of this provision applies to them, and ought to be faithfully observed in their expenditure. 3 Opin. 13. No other remedy exists for a creditor of the government, than an application to congress for payment; he cannot have a lien on the public property in his possession or custody. United States v. Barney, 3 Hall L. J. 130; s. c. 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 513. Nor can a mandamus issue to the secretary of the treasury, to cause a credit to be entered on the books of the department, when there is no special law requiring such a credit to be entered. Ex parte Reeside, 11 Law Rep. 448. See Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524. (c) Thus, a marshal of the United States cannot, at the same time, hold the office of commercial agent of France. 6 Opin. 409. (z) To constitute a bill of credit within the constitution, it must be issued by a state, involve the faith of the state, and be designed to circulate as money, on the credit of the state, in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257. As to what are such bills of credit; see Craig v. Missouri, 4 Ibid. 410. Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Ibid. 40. Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 205. Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 Ibid. 12. Curran v. Arkansas, 15 Ibid. 317-18. McCoy v. Washington County, 3 Wall. Jr. C. C. 381. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270. (y) A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial; the states cannot, under the form of creating a qualification, in effect, inflict a punishment for a past act which was not punishable at the time it was committed. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Ibid. 234. (z) See supra, note r. The constitution does not prohibit the states from passing retrospective laws generally, but only ex post facto laws. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; s. c. 1 Watts 356. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R. 364. Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 23. Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts 300. Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172. Retrospective laws divesting vested rights are impolitic and unjust; but they are not ex post facto laws within the meaning of the constitution, nor repugnant to its provisions, Albee v. May, 2 Paine 74, unless they impair the obligation of a contract. Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 401. Lane v. Nelson, 79 P. S. 407. Should a statute declare, contrary to the general principles of law, that contracts founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration, whether in existence at the time of passing the statute, or which might hereafter be entered into, should nevertheless be valid and binding upon the parties, all would admit the retrospective character of such an enactment, but it would not be repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 412. See Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Abb. U. S. 356. A state legislature may, constitutionally, pass a private act authorizing a court to decree, on the petition of an administrator, a private sale of the real estate of an intestate, for payment of his debts, though it require no notice to the heirs, and though the subject be regulated by a general statute. Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210. (a) This provision has never been understood to embrace other contracts than those which respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629. A private charter is such a contract. Ibid. 518. Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10. See Aspinwall v. County of Daviess, 22 How. 365. Turnpike Co. v. Maryland, 3 Wall. 210. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814. Slaughter House Case, 1 Woods 32. Comm'th v. Transportation Co., 107 P. S. 112. An act incorporating a banking institution. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514. Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133. Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 Ibid. 301. Carran v. Arkansas, 15 Ibid. 304. Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225. A grant of land by the legislature of à state. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Ibid. 43. And so is a compact between two states. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1. Allen v. McKean, 1 Sum. 276. And see Pars. on Cont. 509. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5. An appointment to a salaried office, however, is not a contract, within the meaning of the constitution. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402. Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 418. Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322. Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 P. S. 49. All contracts are subject to the right of eminent domain existing in the several states; and the exercise of this power does not conflict with the constitution. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507. Rundle v. Delaware and Raritan Canal Co., 14 Ibid. 80. Nor does the exercise of the power of taxation. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514. See New York and Erie Railroad Co. v. Sabin, 26 P. S. 242. McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143. So, the states may pass limitation acts. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 289-90. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Ibid. 457. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 315. Phalen v. Virginia, 8 Ibid. 168. Bacon v. Howard, 20 Ibid. 23. Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668. Exemption laws. Bronson v. Kinzie, ut supra. Insolvent laws, discharging the person of a debtor from imprisonment. Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370. Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329. Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714. Recording acts, postponing an elder to a younger title, after a limited period. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 289. And laws relating to divorces. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the alterations do not impair the obligation of the contract; Holmes v. Lansing, 3 Johns. Cas. 75; Umbenhower v. Miller, 1 Woods 69; but if that effect be produced, it is immaterial whether it be done by acting on the Art. 1. Sect. 8. Exclusive legislation. Laws for carrying To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, (!) reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by congress: To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of the government of the United States;(m) and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other needful buildings:(n) And To make all laws which shall be necessary (o) and proper for carrying into execuout vested powers. tion the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Art. 1. Sect. 9. Slave trade. Ibid. Habeas corpus. Ex post facto laws. 27. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.(p) 28. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.(q) 29. No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.(r) tin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19. See Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall. 331. (1) The militia of the several states are subject to martial law, from the time they are called into the service of the United States. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19. So far as congress has provided for organizing the militia, the legislative powers of the states are excluded. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 51. Moore v. Houston, 3 S. & R. 164. But a state legislature may lawfully provide for the trial by courts-martial, of drafted militia, who shall refuse or neglect to march to the place of rendezvous, agreeable to the orders of the governor, founded on the requisition of the president of the United States. Ibid. (m) This includes the power of taxation. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317. The charter of the city of Washington did not authorize the corporation to force the sale of lottery-tickets in states whose laws prohibited such sale. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264. (n) The right of exclusive legislation carries with it the right of exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. Cornell, 2 Mas. 60, 91. 6 Opin. 577. But the purchase of lands by the United States for public purposes, within the territorial limits of a state, does not, of itself, oust the jurisdiction or sovereignty of such state, over the lands so purchased. United States v. Cornell, 2 Mas. 60. The constitution prescribes the only mode by which they can acquire land as a sovereign power, and, therefore, they hold only as an individual when they obtain it in any other manner. Commonwealth v. Young, Bright. 302. People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225. See United States v. Travers, 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 490. People v. Lent, Ibid. 548. It seems, however, that the states have not the right to tax lands purchased by the United States for public purposes, although the consent of the legislature may not have been given to the purchaser. United States v. Weise, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 72. Elliott v. Van Voorst, 3 Ibid. 299. 7 Opin. 628. 9 Ibid. 291. 117 U. S. 151. See Act 13 June 1883, P. L. 118. (0) This does not mean absolutely necessary, nor does it imply the use of only the most direct and simple means calculated to produce the end. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 270-1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 413. But it requires that the means used in the exercise of an express power should be appropriate to the end. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603. 1 Story Const. § 1253. Therefore, congress had power to charter the bank of the United States, as a necessary and useful instrument of the fiscal operations of the government. 4 Wheat. 316, 422. So, also, they have power, under this general authority, to provide for the punishment of any offences which interfere with, obstruct or prevent commerce and navigation with foreign states, and among the several states, although such offences may be done on land. United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 78. (p) This section has no application to the state governments. Butler v. Hopper, 1 W. C. C. 499. (7) The president has no power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without an act of congress to authorize it. Ex parte Merryman, Tan. Dec. 248. McCall v. McDowell, 1 Deady 233. Ex parte Benedict, 4 West. L. Mo. 449. The effect of a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is to confer on the executive the power immemorially exercised by the British Crown, before the passage of the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II. (but which was thenceforth taken away by that statute), namely, the power to arrest by warrant, for treason in generality, or suspicion of treason or treasonable practices, without specially expressing the nature of the treasonable acts charged, as required by the habeas corpus act, and to imprison the party so arrested on such warrant, for an indefinite period, without bail or trial. See And. 297, pl. 305. 1 Hallam Const. Hist. 252. In the exercise of such a power, there must be a warrant, and it must be for treasonable practices. A suspension of the habeas corpus does not oust the civil courts of the right to inquire into the legality of the detention of a person claimed to have been enlisted into the army through fraud or duress. Such power is inconsistent with the existence of a free government; it is without precedent to justify it; it is against the spirit of the constitution, and of all the foundations on which it is erected. Binney on Habeas Corpus, Part III. And it has been held, that a soldier illegally enlisted, and not charged with an offence against the government, could not be held against a writ of habeas corpus, under the act of 1863, suspending the privilege of the writ. People v. Gaul, 44 Barb. 98. See Ex parte Keeler, Hemp. 306. Ex parte Fagan, 2 Spr. 191. Ex parte Field, 5 Bl. C. C. 63. Commonwealth v. Frink, 13 Am. L. R. 700. Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525. Chicago, R. I. and P. R. W. Co. v. McGlinn, Ibid. 542. A suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself; the writ issues as a matter of course; and on its return, the court decides whether the applicant is denied the right of proceeding any further. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 4. (r) Where no other time is fixed for the operation of a penal statute, it takes effect from the time of its passage; and ignorance of the existence of such act forms no legal excuse for a violation of it. The Brig Ann, 1 Gall. 62. Ex post facto laws are such as create or aggravate crime, or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 278. King v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221. Hoyt v. Utah, 110 Ibid. 589. The phrase only applies to penal and criminal laws, which inflict for feitures or punishments, and not to civil proceedings which affect private rights retrospectively. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; s. c. 1 Watts 356. Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 463. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 138. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 138. United States v. Hall, 2 W. C. C. 366. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 271. Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Ibid. 363-4. Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R. 364. There is nothing in the constitution which forbids congress to pass laws violating the obligations of contracts, though such a power is denied to the states. Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C. 323. 30. No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.(s) Art. 1. Sect. 9. Direct taxes. 31. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.(t) No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of State exports. one state over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be Port duties. obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another. (u) 32. No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropria- Receipts and tions made by law; (v) and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures. expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time. hibited. 33. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person Titles and receipt holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the of presents procongress, accept of any present, emolument, office (w) or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince or foreign state. Limitations of the 34. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation; grant letters Art. 1. Sect. 10. of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit;(x) make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, (y) powers of the ex post facto law, (z) or law impairing the obligation of contracts, (a) or grant any states. title of nobility. (8) Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 320-1. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533. (t) A state law imposing a stamp duty on bills of lading is unconstitutional. Almy v. California, 24 How. 169. This clause does not apply to the imposition of tonnage duties on foreign vessels. Aguirre v. Maxwell, 3 Bl. C. C. 140. (u) A state law requiring the payment of pilotage fees does not infringe this clause. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 314-15. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 Ibid. 421. (c) Whether the public moneys at the disposal of the postmaster-general be technically in the treasury or not, the spirit of this provision applies to them, and ought to be faithfully observed in their expenditure. 3 Opin. 13. No other remedy exists for a creditor of the government, than an application to congress for payment; he cannot have a lien on the public property in his possession or custody. United States v. Barney, 3 Hall L. J. 130; s. c. 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 513. Nor can a mandamus issue to the secretary of the treasury, to cause a credit to be entered on the books of the department, when there is no special law requiring such a credit to be entered. Ex parte Reeside, 11 Law Rep. 448. See Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524. (c) Thus, a marshal of the United States cannot, at the same time, hold the office of commercial agent of France. 6 Opin. 409. (z) To constitute a bill of credit within the constitution, it must be issued by a state, involve the faith of the state, and be designed to circulate as money, on the credit of the state, in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257. As to what are such bills of credit; see Craig v. Missouri, 4 Ibid. 410. Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Ibid. 40. Woodruff v. Trupnall, 10 How. 205. Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 Ibid. 12. Curran v. Arkansas, 15 Ibid. 317-18. McCoy v. Washington County, 3 Wall. Jr. C. C. 381. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270. (y) A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial; the states cannot, under the form of creating a qualification, in effect, inflict a punishment for a past act which was not punishable at the time it was committed. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Ibid. 234. (z) See supra, note r. The constitution does not prohibit the states from passing retrospective laws generally, but only ex post facto laws. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; s. c. 1 Watts 356. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R. 364. Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 23. Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts 300. Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172. Retrospective laws divesting vested rights are impolitic and unjust; but they are not er post facto laws within the meaning of the constitution, nor repugnant to its provisions, Albee v. May, 2 Paine 74, unless they impair the obligation of a contract. Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 401. Lane v. Nelson, 79 P. S. 407. Should a statute declare, contrary to the general principles of law, that contracts founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration, whether in existence at the time of passing the statute, or which might hereafter be entered into, should nevertheless be valid and binding upon the parties, all would admit the retrospective character of such an enactment, but it would not be repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 412. See Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Abb. U. S. 356. A state legislature may, constitutionally, pass a private act authorizing a court to decree, on the petition of an administrator, a private sale of the real estate of an intestate, for payment of his debts, though it require no notice to the heirs, and though the subject be regulated by a general statute. Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210. (a) This provision has never been understood to embrace other contracts than those which respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629. A private charter is such a contract. Ibid. 518. Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10. See Aspinwall v. County of Daviess, 22 How. 365. Turnpike Co. v. Maryland, 3 Wall. 210. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814. Slaughter House Case, 1 Woods 32. Comm'th v. Transportation Co., 107 P. S. 112. An act incorporating a banking institution. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514. Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133. Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 Ibid. 301. Carran v. Arkansas, 15 Ibid. 304. Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225. A grant of land by the legislature of a state. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Ibid. 43. And so is a compact between two states. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1. Allen v. McKean, 1 Sum. 276. And see Pars. on Cont. 509. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5. An appointment to a salaried office, however, is not a contract, within the meaning of the constitution. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402. Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 418. Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322. Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 P. S. 49. All contracts are subject to the right of eminent domain existing in the several states; and the exercise of this power does not conflict with the constitution. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507. Rundle v. Delaware and Raritan Canal Co., 14 Ibid. 80. Nor does the exercise of the power of taxation. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514. See New York and Erie Railroad Co. v. Sabin, 26 P. S. 242. McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143. So, the states may pass limitation acts. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 289-90. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Ibid. 457. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 315. Phalen v. Virginia, 8 Ibid. 168. Bacon v. Howard, 20 Ibid. 23. Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668. Exemption laws. Bronson v. Kinzie, ut supra. Insolvent laws, discharging the person of a debtor from imprisonment. Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370. Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329. Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714. Recording acts, postponing an elder to a younger title, after a limited period. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 289. And laws relating to divorces. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the alterations do not impair the obligation of the contract; Holmes v. Lansing, 3 Johns. Cas. 75; Umbenhower v. Miller, 1 Woods 69; but if that effect be produced, it is immaterial whether it be done by acting on the 35. No state shall, without the consent of the congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports (b) or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the congress. No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty of tonnage, (c) keep troops or ships of war, in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact (d) with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. ARTICLE II. 36. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.(e) He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the vice-president, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows: 37. Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state may be entitled in the congress; but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. 38. [The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the president of the senate. The president of the senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the house of representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for president; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said house shall, in like manner, choose the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members remedy or directly on the contract itself. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 Ibid. 608. Howard v. Bugbee, 24 Ibid. 461. The extent of change is not material, any postponement or acceleration of the performance of the contract impairs its obligation. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 75. MeCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608. And see Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203. United States v. Conway, Hemp. 313. Johnson v. Bond, Ibid. 533. Moore v. Fowler, Ibid. 536. Erie and N. E. Railroad Co. v. Casey, 26 P. S. 287. Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Ibid. 324. Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Ibid. 313. Clark v. Martin, 49 Ibid. 299. This clause does not affect the laws of Texas passed before its admission into the Union. League v. De Young, 11 How. 185. Herman v. Phalen, 14 Ibid. 79. A contract, to be within the protection of this clause, must be one of perfect obligation. Aspinwall v. County of Daviess, 22 How. 365. It has been decided by the supreme court of the United States, that a state legislature may, by contract, surrender the right of taxation, as to the property of a corporation; and that a succeeding legislature has not the power to pass a law impairing the obligation of such a contract. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Ibid. 331. Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Debolt, Ibid. 380. Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Thomas, Ibid. 384. Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Bl. 436. Franklin Branch Bank v. Ohio, Ibid. 474. Wright v. Sill, 2 Ibid. 544. Railroad Co. v. Gaines, 3 Fed. Rep. 266. This doctrine, however, has been repudiated by the supreme courts of Pennsylvania and Ohio. Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 30 P. S. 9. Debolt v. Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co., 1 Ohio St. 563. Toledo Bank v. City of Toledo, Ibid. 623. Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Debolt, Ibid. 591. Plank Road Co. v. Husted, 3 Ibid. 578. Norwalk Plank Road Co. v. Husted, Ibid. 586. Sandusky City Bank v. Wilber, 7 Ibid. 481. But see Iron City Bank v. Pittsburgh, 37 P. S. 340, where it is held, that if a state legislature, in creating a corporation, prescribe a law of taxation, and expressly release the power to impose further taxes, or do not reserve such power, a subsequent tax law does impair the obligation of the con tract, and is void. And see Erie Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 P. S. 84. A state legislature cannot, by dissolving a municipal corporation, and erecting another in its stead, release the people of the new municipality from the obligation of a judgment recovered against its predecessor. United States v. Mobile, 4 Woods 536. (b) The term 'imports" embraces only articles from foreign nations, subject to the payment of duties to the United States, and not merchandise carried from one state to another. State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich. 474. Waring v. Mayor of Mobile, 8 Wall. 110. Woodruff v. Parham, Ibid. 123. Hinson v. Lott, Ibid. 148. See Biddle v. Commonwealth, 13 S. & R. 408. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. People v. Maring, 3 Keyes 374. (c) See Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Ibid. 577. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 Ibid. 423. Vicksburg v. Tobin, Ibid. 430. Leathers v. Aiken, 9 Fed. Rep. 679. (d) These words are used in their broadest sense; they were intended to cut off all negotiation and intercourse between the state authorities and foreign nations. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 572, 574. And therefore, no state can, without the consent of congress, enter into any agreement or contract, express or implied, to deliver up fugitives from justice from a foreign state, who may be found within its limits. Ibid. 3 Opin. 661. This prohibition is political in its character, and has no reference to a mere matter of contract, or to the grant of a franchise which in nowise conflicts with the powers delegated to the general government by the states. Union Branch Railroad Co. v. Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Co., 15 Ga. 327. A compact entered into between two states, with the assent of congress, is binding on those states, and the citizens of each. Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185; s. c. 1 McLean 185. (e) An act done by one president, vesting a right in a citizen, is not subject to review or reversal by his successor. 5 Opin. 603. It has been held, however, that a conditional pardon, granted by one president, may be revoked by his successor, before delivery to the prisoner. Ex parte De Puy, 3 Ben. 307. from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the president, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the vice-president; but if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the senate shall choose from them by ballot the vice-president.](g) 39. The congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, (h) and the day on which they shall give their votes ; (i) which day shall be the same throughout the United States. Art. 2. Sect. 1. Ibid. Time of election. 40. No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of Qualifications of president; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have the president. attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years resident within the United States. Ibid. supplied. 41. In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-president, and the congress may by law provide for the case of Vacancy, how removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring what officer shall then act as president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a president shall be elected. 42. The president shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive, within that period, any other emolument from the United States, or any of them. 43. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear, (or affirm,) that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States." 44. The president shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States,(k) and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States;(1) he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices: and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons(m) for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.(n) Ibid. His compensation. Ibid. Oath of office. Art. 2. Sect. 2. Powers and duties. Ibid. 45. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall Treaties. (g) This clause is altogether altered and supplied by the 12th amendment. (h) On the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November. 1 R. S. § 131. (i) On the first Wednesday in December. 1 R. S. § 135. (k) If a state of war exist, the president, as commander-in-chief, has the authority without any act of congress, to exercise all belligerent rights, such as to institute a blockade. The Tropic Wind, 24 Law Rep. 141. The F. W. Johnson, 18 Leg. Int. 334. The Sarah Starr, Blatch. Pr. Cas. 69. Or to levy contributions on the enemy. Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 615. Cross v. Harrison, 16 Ibid. 164, 190. (1) The president is not obliged to take, personally, the command of the militia, when called into the service of the general government, but he may place them under the command of officers of the army of the United States, to whom, in his absence, he may delegate the powers vested in him by the constitution. Any officer of the army may, therefore, be required, by orders emanating from the president, to perform the appropriate duties of his station in the militia, when in the service of the United States, whenever the public interest shall so require. But this power must be exercised in strict accordance with the right of appointment of militia officers, which is expressly reserved to the states. 2 Opin. 711-12. See 2 Story Const. $$ 1490-2. (m) He may pardon as well before trial and conviction as afterwards. 6 Opin. 20. And after the expiration of the imprisonment, which forms a part of the sentence. Stetler's Case, 1 Phila. 302. 9 Opin. 478. And he may remit a fine, after the death of the offender. 11 Opin. 35. He may grant a conditional pardon: Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307; 1 Opin. 341; provided the condition be compatible with the genius of our constitution and laws. Ibid. 482. Where the condition is such that the government has no power to carry it into effect, the pardon will be, in effect, unconditional. 5 Opin. 368. See Flavell's Case, 8 W. & S. 197. United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 161. People v. Potter, 1 Parker C. R. 47. People v. Pease, 3 Johns. Cas. 333. A conditional pardon is not complete, until delivery. Ex parte De Puy, 3 Ben. 307. The pardoning power includes that of remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures under the revenue laws; 2 Opin. 329; the passenger laws; 6 Ibid. 393; the laws prohibiting the slave trade; 4 Ibid. 573; fines imposed on defaulting jurors; 3 Ibid. 317; 4 Ibid. 458; for a contempt of court; 3 Ibid. 622; Ex parte Mullee, 7 Bl. C. C. 23; and in criminal cases; 3 Opin. 418. And the same power is possessed over a judgment, after security for its payment shall have been given, as before. Ibid. But the president has no power to remit the forfeiture of a bail-bond. 4 Opin. 144. Nor a condemnation as prize of war; 10 Opin. 452; nor a forfeited recognizance; 11 Opin. 124. Nor, it seems, can he, by a pardon, defeat a legal interest or right which has become vested in a private citizen; as, for example, the vested right of an officer making a seizure. United States v. Lancaster, 4 W. C. C. 64. 4 Opin. 576. 6 Ibid. 615. And see 5 Ibid. 532, 579. The effect of a pardon cannot be restricted by subsequent legislation. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128. The grant of the pardoning power neither requires nor authorizes the president to re-examine the case upon new facts; nor to grant a pardon upon the assumption of the new facts alleged. 1 Opin. 359. A pardon is a private though official act; it must be delivered to and accepted by the criminal; and cannot be noticed by the court, unless brought before it judicially by motion or otherwise. United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150. The president alone can pardon offences committed in a territory, in violation of acts of congress. 7 Opin. 561. He has power to order a nolle prosequi in any stage of a criminal proceeding in the name of the United States. 5 Opin. 729. (n) As to the effect of a pardon, see Hoffman v. Coster, 2 Wh. 453. United States v. Lukins, cited, 1 Chitty Cr. L. 770 n. 12 Opin. 81. Armstrong v. United States, 13 Wall. 154; Pargoud v. United States, Ibid. 156. Gay's Goods, Ibid. 358. |