CHAPTER V THE DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY § 19. PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY THE DUTY OF MAINTAINING A CONDITION OF NEUTRALITY (Westlake) "THERE is no general duty of maintaining the condition of neutrality. On the contrary, the general duty of every member of a society is to promote justice within it, and peace only on the footing of justice, such being the peace which alone is of much value or likely to be durable. Thus in a state the man would be a bad citizen who allowed a crime to be committed before his eyes without doing his best to prevent it, or who refused to assist the magistrates in punishing crime; and in the society of states the action of all the members in upholding its laws is the more required since an organized government is wanting. . . . We may sum up by saying that neutrality is not morally justifiable unless intervention in the war is unlikely to promote justice, or could do so only at a ruinous cost to the neutral." (Westlake: International Law, Part II, War [2d ed., Cambridge, 1913], pp. 190–91.) PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL TO THE CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC (1914) PRESIDENT WILSON, in an appeal to the citizens of the United States requesting their assistance in maintaining a state of neutrality during the European war, defined' the true spirit of neutrality," and alluded to the variety of sympathy and desire among the people of the United States in regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. He warned them against being "divided into camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other," thus becoming "involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action." The consequences of such a course would, he said, be fatal to the national peace of mind, and seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of their duty as the one great nation at peace, holding itself "ready to play a part of impartial mediation and [to] speak counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.” "We must," the President declared, "be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another." (Presented in the Senate by Mr. Chilton, August 19, 1914; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, July, 1915, pp. 199-200; extracts pieced together from the original. — Ed.) § 20. RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY THE RECOGNITION OF CONFEDERATE IN recognizing the belligerency of parties to a civil war within a state, the difficulty for other states is to ascertain the fact of war itself, especially the date of its commencement. How necessary this is appears from the discussion which arose over the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate States by Great Britain through its proclamation of neutrality issued on May 13, 1861. Was Great Britain justified, in fact and in law, in so prompt a recognition? The opinion of the Government of the United States at the time and later was that she was not.1 In the Prize 1 "The principal danger in the present insurrection which the President has apprehended is that of foreign intervention, aid, or sympathy; and especially of such intervention, aid, or sympathy on the part of the Government of Great Britain. "The justice of this apprehension has been indicated by the following facts, namely: "4. The issue of the Queen's proclamation, remarkable, first, for the circumstances under which it was made, namely, on the very day of your arrival in London, which had been anticipated so far as to provide for your reception by the British secretary, but without affording you the interview promised, before any decisive ac Cases, however, the Supreme Court of the United States expressed itself as follows: "A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents the number, power, and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a war." (Black: Reports, vol. II, pp. 666-67.) How far did the situation on May 13, 1861, conform to these conditions? As early as February several States had seceded and organized into the Confederacy. Fort Sumter had been attacked on April 11. On April 15, Lincoln, by proclamation, had called upon the state militia. Two days later, Jefferson Davis invited applications for letters of marque and reprisal. On April 19, a blockade of the ports of seven of the Confederate States had been proclaimed by the President and extended on April 27 to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. On May 2, the news of the blockade reached London, but the official copy of the proclamation was not received by Lord Russell until May 14. (Correspondence Concerning Claims against Great Britain, vol. 1, p. 23.)1 On May 13 the British proclamation of neutrality was issued, the French, on June 10, followed by those of other states in the course of the summer. On August 6, Congress ratified the President's acts, as a measure of legal precaution, though later the courts decided that the President, by virtue of his office as commander-in-chief of the forces, had the right to institute the blockade clearly an act of war by the law of nations. The Supreme Court, in the cases cited, held that the legal commencement of the Civil War dated from the two proclamations of blockade,2 the minority opinion holding that tion should be adopted; secondly, the tenor of the proclamation itself, which seems to recognize, in a vague manner, indeed, but still does seem to recognize, the insurgents as a belligerent national power." - Seward to Adams, June 3, 1861 (Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, p. 91). 1 Bernard says the proclamation was specially communicated to Lord Russell by Mr. Dallas on May 11. So does the British Case before the Geneva Tribunal. 2 "It would seem, then, that if the British Government erred in thinking that the war began as early as Mr. Lincoln's proclamation in question, they erred in company with our Supreme Court." (Woolsey: International Law [6th ed.], p. 294.) it began July 13, 1861, on which date an Act of Congress "recognized a state of civil war . . . and made it territorial." At first the Government of the United States, though disapproving of the action of Great Britain, was not inclined to criticize it unduly. The proclamation of neutrality, ipso facto, closed British ports to Confederate warships and accepted without question the legitimacy of the blockade with its accompanying right to interfere with British commerce, both facts of great benefit to the North. But later, when British opinion in many quarters revealed a sympathy with the South and British neutrality was compromised by the exploits of Southern cruisers, emphatic protest was made against the British proclamation as having been premature and to a large extent responsible for the prolongation of the struggle. The most thorough-going exponent of this view was Charles Sumner (Senator from Massachusetts and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations), who, in his formulation of the so-called "indirect claims," charged Great Britain "with the widespread consequences which ensued" from the war. In 1865, after the suppression of the rebellion, Mr. Charles Francis Adams (American Minister at London) and Lord Russell (Secretary for Foreign Affairs) traversed the question in a series of diplomatic exchanges. Mr. Adams recognized that occasion may demand recognition, but contended that the action of Great Britain had been "precipitate and unprecedented." (Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, Part 1, pp. 375-83, 554-60.) Lord Russell maintained that the situation was unusual in that the rebellion was fully matured and had exhibited belligerent proportions from its inception, necessitating that the position of neutrals be defined at once. It was the Government of the United States, he argued, that first recognized the belligerency by instituting the blockade; "had they not been belligerents the armed ships of the United States would have had no right to stop a single British ship upon the high seas." These respective positions were maintained before the Geneva tribunal, but no damages were awarded on the ground of "indirect claims." (See The Alabama Claims Arbitration, p. 341.) (Correspondence Concerning Claims against Great Britain [Sen. Ex. Doc., 41st Cong., 1st Sess., No. 11], vols. I, IV, passim; Diplo matic Correspondence, 1865, Part 1, passim; Letters by Historicus, pp. 1-37; Bernard: Neutrality of Great Britain during the Civil War, pp. 106-70; Moore: Digest of International Law, vol. 1, pp. 184-93; Moore: International Arbitrations, vol. 1, pp. 560-63, 594-95.) § 21. RECOGNITION OF A CONDITION OF INSURGENCY THE THREE FRIENDS The Supreme Court of the United States, March 1, 1897 THE steamer Three Friends was seized November 7, 1896, by the collector of customs for the district of St. John's, Florida, as forfeited to the United States under section 5283 of the Revised Statutes, and, thereupon, November 12, was libeled on behalf of the United States in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The decision of the case turned upon whether the statute would apply in a case where the acts enumerated for the purposes specified had been undertaken with the intent that the vessel in question should be employed in the service of a people whose belligerency has not been recognized. In other words whether section 5283 of the Revised Statutes relating to the enforcement of neutrality would apply in the case of an insurrection when there had been no recognition of belligerency to bring into existence a state of neutrality. Chief Justice Fuller, delivering the opinion of the Court, reviewed the history of the Neutrality Act and of the English and American cases. After discussing the meaning of certain words ["people," etc.] in the act he concluded in relation to the recognition of belligerency and the application of the act: "If the necessity of recognition in respect of the objects of hostilities, by sea or land, were conceded, that would not involve the concession of such necessity in respect of those for whose service the vessel is fitted out. "Any other conclusion rests on the unreasonable assumption that the act is to remain ineffectual unless the Government incurs |