Marriot, 64. Thus where a tenant for life of a crown lease, Taster v. under a marriage settlement, got a reversionary Amb. 668. renewal of the lease; it was decreed by Sir T. Sewell, 734. M. R., that it should go to the uses of the settle- Vernon, ment; and the decree was affirmed by Lord 5 Bro. Parl. Camden. Lee v. Ca. 10. 65. Where any fraud is committed in obtaining a Where there conveyance, the grantee in such conveyance will be is Fraud. considered in equity as a trustee for the person who has been defrauded. 2 Atk. 150. 66. It has been stated that the statute of uses does Trusts of not extend to copyhold estates: therefore if a copy- Copyholds. hold is surrendered to A. to the use of B., the legal estate will not be transferred to B.; but he will be entitled in equity to the rents and profits, and to call upon A. for a surrender of the estate. 67. It appears to have been held in a modern case, Doe v. that copyholds are not within the seventh section of Danvers, 7 East, 299. the statute of frauds, for this applies only to cases where the legal and equitable estates are separated. But there may be a resulting or implied trust of a copyhold, as well as of a freehold estate. 1 Vern. 415.. 68. Thus where copyhold estates are granted for Howe v. lives, the person who pays the consideration will be Howe, deemed the real owner; and the other persons Right v. whose names are inserted in the grant, trustees for Bawden, him. 3 East, 260. 1 P. Wms. 69. Copyhold lands were granted to husband and Benger v. wife, and J. S., for their several lives, successive; but Drew, by the copy it appeared that the fine was the money 780. of the husband and wife. Lord Macclesfield said, the third person (J. S.) was but a trustee for the husband and wife, by whom the purchase money was paid. Withers v. Smith v. Baker, 1 Atk. 385. 2 Black. R. 694. A Purchase in the Name of a Child is ment. 70. By the custom of the manor of A., copyholds were grantable for three lives, successivè sicut nominantur. One Price being the last life in an old copy, the lord of the manor advised him to renew; upon that he inquired after two healthy young persons, and named the defendants Harris and Bowles; a copy was granted, to hold to them successive. It also appeared on the copy, that the fine, which was 120l. was paid by Price; and that the defendants were strangers to Price. Lord Hardwicke was of opinion, that resulting trusts of copyholds, as well as of freeholds, were within the eighth section of the statute of frauds; therefore that the representatives of Price were entitled to the copyhold, by operation of law. 71. In a modern case the Court of King's Bench observed, that in the West it was usual, upon copyholds for lives, for the cestuis que trust to take, in the order in which they stood in the copy: but the person who put in the lives, and paid the fine, had a power to dispose of the estate. 72. Where a father purchases lands in the name of his infant child, without any declaration of trust, and an Advance- takes the profits during the minority of the child, such purchase will be considered in equity as an advancement of the child, and not as a trust for the Grey v. Grey, father. Because between a father and his child, 1 Cha. Ca. blood is a sufficient consideration to raise a use. 296. And herein the law of trusts does, as it ought to do, agree with the law of uses. For if before the statute 27 Hen. VIII. a father had made a feoffinent to his son, without any consideration, no use would have resulted to the father, because blood was a sufficient consideration to have vested the use in the son. Besides, as a father is bound by the law of nature to Finch R. 341. provide for his child, the purchasing in his name will be construed in a court of equity to be a performance of that obligation; and the taking of the rents during the minority of the child, only implies that the father acted as guardian to his son. years old; Mumma, 73. J. Mumma purchased a copyhold in the name Mumma v. of his eldest son, an infant about eleven laid out 4007. in improvements, paid the purchase money and the fines, and enjoyed it during his life. He surrendered to the use of his will, devised it to his wife for life, remainder to his younger children; and made other provisions for his eldest son. Upon the death of the father, the eldest son recovered this copyhold in ejectment. The widow brought a bill to be relieved, upon the principle that the eldest son was a trustee for the father. Lord Chancellor Jefferies declared, that as the eldest son was but an infant at the time of the purchase, though the father did enjoy during his life, it must be considered as an advancement for the son; and not a trust for the father. 74. In the case of Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, it was ante, § 46. resolved, that if the purchase had been made in the younger son's name only, it had been plainly an advancement for him, and no trust. That the case did not differ, in regard the persons named by him did disclaim; especially since prudential reasons might be given why those persons were joined: namely, that they might help and protect the infant younger son; also to prevent the estates descending to a remote relation, in case the younger son died before his father. For in such case a court of equity would have said, if the father were to come for the estate; though this would have been an advancement, in case the younger son had lived to have enjoyed it, Taylor v. ante, § 73. yet the younger son dying, the trustees should, in equity, have conveyed it back to the father. And this might be the use and intention of naming these trustees. Besides, the younger son being but eight years old, was unfit to be a trustee; therefore must be intended to have been named for his own benefit. 75. A father purchased copyhold lands in his son's name, who was then eighteen years of age, and continued in possession till his death. Lord Hardwicke.-"I am of opinion that it should be considered as an advancement for the son; and found my opinion greatly on the case of Mumma v. Mumma: and though two receipts are produced under the son's hand, for the use of the father, I think that will not alter the case. For the son, being then under age, could give no other receipt in discharge of the tenants; who held by lease from the father. And in this case I am of opinion that parol evidence may be admitted, though indeed improper when Dyer v. Dyer, offered against the legal operation of a will, or an implied trust; but here it is in support of law, and equity too." 2 Cox's R. 92. Scroop v. 1 Cha. Ca. 27. Stileman v. 2 Atk. 477. 76. A purchase by a father in his own name and. that of his son, has, in some cases, been deemed an advancement for the son; not a trust for the father. But this doctrine has been altered; and it has been held, that in such a case, a moiety of the estate will be subject to the father's debts. 77. A father made a purchase of land in his own name, and that of his eldest son, and their heirs ; and a similar purchase in his own name and that of his younger son. The father paid the purchase money, and continued in possession till the time of his death. A judgement creditor of the father's brought his bill to have satisfaction of his debt out of those estates. It was insisted that the sons took them to their own use, as an advancement, and were not trustees for their father. Lord Hardwicke said,-The general rule had been admitted, and had been long the doctrine of the Court, that notwithstanding the father paid the whole money, yet if the purchase was made in the name of a younger son, the heir of the father should not insist it was a trust for the father. But this case differed from that rule, or any other that he remembered; and if he could find any material difference, he should, in his own judgement, be inclined to relieve the creditor. For though it might be proper stare decisis, yet he thought the cases had gone far enough in favour of advancements; and he ought not to carry it farther. It must be admitted, that in some cases which had been before the Court, the father had continued in possession, where the purchase had been made singly in the name of the son, and yet held an advancement for the son; and for this reason, because the father was the natural guardian of the sons, during their minority. Here the purchase was in the names of the father and sons, as joint tenants; now this did not answer the purpose of an advancement, for it entitled the father to the possession of the whole, till a division, and to a moiety absolutely, · even after a division; besides the father's taking a chance to himself of being a survivor of the other moiety. If the son had died during his minority, the father would have been entitled to the whole, by survivorship, and the son could not have prevented it by severance, he being an infant. Suppose a stronger case, that the father had taken an estate by purchase, to himself for life, with remainder to his son in fee, |