Perry v. Phillips, 4 Ves. 108. 17 Ves. 173. Conveyance without Consideration. It was referred to the Master to inquire whether the estate was purchased with 250% of the testator's money, or not. 49. Although a trustee for a purchase should buy land, yet it will not be liable to the trust, unless there are circumstances affording a strong presumption that the land was bought with the trust money. 50. T. Lockyer having a considerable property devised to him, in trust to lay it out in the purchase of lands, bought several real estates, but died without personal assets. A bill was filed by those who would have been entitled to the estates directed to be purchased, praying that the deficiency of the personal estate of Lockyer should be made good out of the real estates which he had purchased. There was no evidence that the lands were purchased with the trust money. It was contended, on behalf of the plaintiffs, that where a man is bound to do an act, and does what may enable him to do it, he shall be taken to have done that, in pursuance of what he was bound to do; and that between representatives. Lord Rosslyn declared that the plaintiffs had no lien on the estates purchased by Lockyer; being creditors by simple contract only. If there had been any ground to presume that the purchase had been made with the trust money, it would have been otherwise. On a bill of review, the decree was affirmed by Lord Eldon. 51. Where the legal estate in lands is conveyed to a stranger, without any consideration, there is a resulting trust to the original owner; in conformity to the old doctrine, that where a feoffment was Tit. 11. c. 4. made without consideration, the use resulted to the feoffor. Prec. in Cha.. 52. The Duke of Norfolk executed a grant of the Norfolk v. Browne, next avoidance of a church to a clergyman, who was 1 Ab. Eq. much employed by him: but the grantee knew 381. nothing of it; and being examined in a cause, deposed 80. that he did not purchase it of the duke. It was decreed to be a resulting trust for the grantor; there being no trust declared. 53. In the case of voluntary settlements and wills, 1 Atk. 191. if there is no declaration of the trust of a term, it results to the settlor : otherwise where it is a settlement for a valuable consideration, and in the nature of a contract for the benefit of a wife, or children. declared 2 Atk. 150. 54. Where the legal estate in lands is conveyed to A Trust a trustee, and a trust is declared, as to part only, no- in Part. thing being said of the rest; what remains undisposed Lloyd v. Spillett, of results to the original owner. 55. Lord Foley devised his estates to trustees for Davidson v. Foley, a term of 99 years, remainder to his eldest son for 2 Bro. R. life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, re- 203. mainder to his second son in the same manner. The trust of the term for years was to pay off certain scheduled debts, and to make an annual allowance to his two sons for their support. The scheduled debts being stated to be paid; a bill was filed by other creditors of the sons of the testator, against the trustees, praying that the term might be declared to be attendant on the inheritance, and the trustees restrained from setting up the term to defeat any ejectment or other remedy which the plaintiffs might be advised to pursue for recovery of their debts. Lord Thurlow said, the rule of law was, that where the trusts of a term were exhausted, a trust resulted, for want of a further dispositon, to the legal tenants. In his judgement these must be resulting trusts, and Habergham therefore must go to the tenant for life. Hh3 v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jun. 204. Or which cannot take Effect. 56. In the same manner, where the whole of an estate is conveyed for particular purposes, or on parPrec. in Cha. ticular trusts only, which by accident or otherwise 162-541. 3 P. Wms. 20. Digby v. Legard, 3 P. Wms. 22. n. Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Bro. R. 503. 2d Edit. Exception. Hill v. Epis. London, cannot take effect, a trust will result to the original It was decreed by Lord Bathurst, that this was a resulting trust, as to the share of the person who died in the lifetime of the testatrix, for the benefit of the heir. 58. The rule, that where lands are devised for a particular purpose, what remains after that purpose is satisfied, results to the heir, admits of several exceptions. 59. R. Smith devised an advowson to Grace Smith, 1 Atk. 618. willing and desiring her to sell and dispose of the same to Eton College; and on their refusal, to Trinity College, Oxford, &c. Soon after the death of the testator, Grace Smith presented a person to the living; upon which the heirs at law of the testator filed their bill, praying that the Bishop might be enjoined from accepting the presentee of Grace Smith; insisting that the testator did not intend the then avoidance should go to Grace Smith; but that she ought to be considered altogether as a trustee for the heirs at law of the testator. Lord Hardwicke said, the general question was, whether there was a resulting trust or not: on the first hearing he inclined to think there was, but he had changed his opinion entirely. The general rule, that where lands were devised for a particular purpose, what remained resulted, admitted of several exceptions. If J. S. devised lands to A. to sell them to B. for the particular advantage of B., that advantage is the only purpose to be served, according to the intent of the testator; and to be satisfied by the mere act of selling, let the money go where it will. Yet there was no precedent of a resulting trust, in such a case. Nor was there any warrant from the words or intent of the testator to say, the devise severed the beneficial interest, but was only an injunction on the devisee to enjoy the thing devised in a particular manner. A. devised lands to J. S., to sell for the best price to B., or to lease for three years at such a fine; there was no resulting trust. So that the devise here amounted to no more than this: the testator gave the advowson to G. Smith; but if such or such a college would buy it, then he laid an injunction upon her to sell; King v. therefore there were two objects of the testator's Dennison, benevolence; Grace Smith, and the Colleges. If 1 Ves. & Beam. 260. is made. 60. Where a person makes a conveyance of the legal Where no estate to trustees, upon such trusts, and for such Appointment intents and purposes as he shall appoint, and never Fitzg. 223. makes an appointment, there will be a resulting trust to him and his heirs. For the trust in equity must Clere's Case, follow the rules of law in the case of a use. Tit. 11. c. 4. 61. It has been long settled, that where a trustee Renewal of a takes a renewal of a lease in his own name, the Lease by a renewed lease shall, in equity, be subject to the Trustee. former trust. 1 Cha. Ca. 191. This doctrine is founded on general policy, to pre 1 Vern. 276. vent fraud: for as the trustee's situation in respect to 484. Keech v. Blewett v. Millett, the estate, gives him access to the landlord, it would be dangerous to permit him to make use of that access for his own benefit. 62. A lease of the profits of Rumford market was devised to a trustee, in trust for an infant; before the expiration of the term, the trustee applied to the lessor for a renewal, for the benefit of the infant, which he refused; in regard that it being only the profits of a market, there could be no distress; and the only security for payment of the rent would be a covenant, which the infant could not enter into. The trustee then took a lease for his own benefit. It was decreed by Lord King, that the lease should be assigned to the infant that the trustee should account for the profits, since the renewal, and be indemnified from the covenants in the lease. He said he must consider this as a trust for the infant; for if a trustee, on a refusal to renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust estates would be renewed 7 Bro. Parl. by the cestui que trust. That the trustee should rather have let it run out, than have taken a lease himself. It might seem hard that the trustee was the only person of all mankind who could not have the lease; but it was very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed. For it was very obvious what would be the consequence of letting trustees take leases, on a refusal to renew to the cestui que trust. Ca. 367. Killick v. Flexney, 4 Bro. R. 161. James v. Dean, 11 Fitzgibbon v. Scanlan, Ves. 383. 1 Dow. 261. Or by a Person having a particular Estate. 63. This doctrine has been extended to the case of persons having only a particular and limited interest in a leasehold. |