had destroyed the term for a time, yet by the recovery it was revived; because then but one conveyance ab initio ; so here. No judgement appears to have been given; but Lord C. B. Gilbert says it seemed reasonable that the lease for 99 years should not be merged, or at least but for a moiety; and even in that case, equity would set up the moiety, or the whole term again. WE SECTION 1. of the Sta HEN the statute of uses first became a subject Construction of discussion in the courts of law, it was held tute. by the Judges, that no uses should be executed by 1 Rep. 129 b. the statute, which were limited against the rules of the common law; for it appeared by the preamble, that it was the intent of the makers of the act to restore the ancient law; and to extirpate and extinguish such subtle practised feoffments, fines, recoveries, abuses, and errors, tending to the subversion of the good and ancient common law of the land. So that it was plain this act was never intended to execute any use which was limited against the rules of the common law; the object of the act was to extinguish and extirpate, not the feoffment, fine, or 1 Rep. 87 b. Tit.32. c. 19. 1 Atk. 591. Of contingent Uses. ante, c. 2. § 28. recovery; for these were laudable and good conveyances of lands and tenements, by the common law, as in effect recited in the beginning of the preamble; but those uses which were abuses and errors, therefore mischievous, because they were against the rules of the common law: the statute was a law of restitution, namely, to restore the good ancient common law, which was in a manner subverted by abusive and erroneous uses, not to give more privilege to the execution of uses, than to estates which were executed by the ancient common law. 2. The courts have so far adhered to this construction of the statute, that the same technical words of limitation are now required in the creation of estates through the medium of uses, as in the creation of estates at common law. But, in many other instances, this doctrine was departed from, and advantage was taken of an expression in the statute of uses, in order to support several of those limitations which had been allowed by the Court of Chancery, in declarations of uses, when they were distinct from the legal estate. 3. The statute of uses enacts, that the estate of the feoffees to uses, shall be in the cestuis que use "after such quality, manner, form, and condition, as they had before, in or to the use, confidence, or trust that was in them." Now, the Court of Chancery having permitted a limitation of a use in fee, or in tail, to arise in futuro, without any preceding estate to support it; and also that a use might change from one person to another, by matter ex post facto, though the first use were limited in fee; the courts of law in process of time admitted of limitations of this kind, in conveyances to uses; and held, that in such cases, the statute would transfer the possession to the cestui que use, after such quality, form, and condition, as he had the use.-An account of the nature of these limitations will be given in Title XVI. Remainder. on the Exe 4. By the rules of the common law, no restriction Uses arising or qualification could be annexed to a conveyance of cution of lands, except a condition. In consequence of this Powers. principle, a fine or feoffment, with a power of revo- 1 Inst. 237 a. cation annexed to it, was void at common law ; because the fine or feoffment transferred the whole property and right of disposal, to the cognizee or feoffee; therefore the power of revocation was repugnant to the force of the preceding words. Besides the admission of such a clause would have introduced a double power, vested in different persons, over the same thing, which was contrary to the rules of the common law. 5. We have however seen, that before the statute ante, c. 2. $ 30. of uses, if a feoffment was made to uses, the feoffor might reserve a power, either to himself or to some other person, to revoke the uses declared on the feoffment; and to appoint the feoffees to stand seised to other uses. For the principle on which uses were originally founded being, that the feoffee to uses was bound in conscience to pursue the directions of the feoffor, this obligation was equally binding; whether the agreement was, that the feoffor should receive the rents and profits himself, or some stranger; or whether they were to be paid in such manner as the feoffor, or any other person, to whom he delegated his power, should at any future time appoint. 6. The statute of uses vests the legal estate in the cestui que use, after such quality, manner, and form as he had in the use: from which the courts conclu ded, that in all conveyances to uses, a power might 1 Inst. 237 a. be reserved, of revoking a former limitation of a use, and of appointing a new use to some other person. * 7. In an opinion of the late Mr. Booth, which has been published by Mr. Hilliard at the end of Sheppard's Touchstone, is the following account of contingent uses and powers :-" By the old law, no fee simple could be limited upon or after a fee simple; but, since the statute of uses, executory fees by way of use have not only been allowed, but are become frequent, in all conveyances operating by way of transmutation of possession. The uses are served out of the seisin of the feoffees, grantees, releasees, &c. In all future or executory uses there is, the instant they come in esse, a sufficient degree of seisin supposed to be left in the feoffees, grantees, &c. to knit itself to and support those uses; so as that it may be truly said the feoffees or grantees stand seised to those uses, and then, by force of the statute, the cestui que use is immediately put into the actual possession. It is wholly immaterial how, or by what means, the future use comes in esse: whether by means of some event provided for, in case it happened in the creation of the uses, which event may be called the act of God; or by means of some work performed by any certain person, for which provision was likewise made in the creation of the uses, which may be called the act of man; in either case the statute operates the same way; for the instant the future use comes in esse, either by the act of God or the act of man, the statute executes the possession to the use, and the cestui que use is deemed to have the same estate in the land, as is marked out in the use, by the deed that created it. When the use arises from an event provided for by the deed, it is |