A Bequest Dower. Ayres v. 1 Ves. 230. 34. A bequest of the residue of personal estate generally, will not be considered as a bar or satisfaction of dower. 35. A man by his will, taking notice of his wife's title to dower, made a provision for her out of his personal estate by way of residue. This was insisted on to be an implication to bar dower. Lord Hardwicke rejected the idea; because, by the claim of dower, the wife did not break in on the will; and this was the stronger as it was only a residue; which accidental benefit he might intend she should have, as well as dower. TITLE VII. JOINTURE. CHAP. I. Of the Origin and Nature of Jointures. CHAP. II. In what Cases a Jointress is entitled to the Aid of a Court of Equity. CHAP. III. What will operate as a Bar or Satisfaction of a CHAP. I. Of the Origin and Nature of Jointures. 1. Origin of Jointures. 5. Definition of. 6. Circumstances required. 7. Must take Effect on the Death of the Husband. 10. And be for the Life of the Wife. 22. Jointures which require the 26. Cases where the Widow takes 27. Equitable Jointures. 15. Must be limited to the Wife 36. An Infant is barred by a Join ture. 40. Nature of this Estate. SECTION 1. IN consequence of two maxims of the common Origin of Vernon's law-1. That no right can be barred till it áccrues: 2. That no right or title to an estate of Case, 4 Rep. 1. Gilb. Uses, 147. freehold can be barred by a collateral satisfaction; it was found impossible to bar a woman of dower by any assurance of lands, either before or during the marriage. For a wife having acquired a right to be endowed of a third part of all her husband's lands at the moment of her marriage, this right like, all others, could only be extinguished by a release. And no such release of the wife either before or during the marriage, would be valid. For if before the marriage it was no bar, because at the time of making it the woman had no title to dower; and therefore a release Tit. 32. c. 6. from her then, would be no bar to a right which accrued to her after. If it was made during the mar riage it was absolutely void, the wife not being then sui juris. And no estate limited to the wife during the marriage could bar her of dower, because no right or title to a freehold estate can be barred by a collateral satisfaction. 2. Every woman therefore became entitled upon her marriage to one-third of all her husband's real estates, however small her fortune might be. Such an inequality was one of the reasons why so much land was conveyed to uses, a widow not being dowable of a use; when the practice of vesting estates in feof3 Rep. 58 b, fees to uses became general, it was usual, on all marriages, for the friends of the woman to procure the intended husband to take an estate from his feoffees, and limit it to himself and his intended wife for their lives, in joint-tenancy or jointure; from whence arose the word jointure; lest the wife should be totally unprovided for, at the death of her husband. 4 1 b. Tit. 11. c. 3. 3. When the statute of uses transferred the legal estate to those who were entitled to the use of lands, all women then married would have become dowable of such lands as had been held to the use of their husbands; and would also be entitled to any particular lands that were settled on them in jointure. As this would have been a manifest wrong, the following clause was inserted in the statute of uses, 4. "Whereas divers persons have purchased or St. 27 Hen. 8. have estate made and conveyed of and in divers lands, c. 10. § 6. tenements, and hereditaments, unto them and to their wives, and to the heirs of the husband; or to the husband and to the wife, and to the heirs of their two bodies begotten, or to the heirs of one of their bodies begotten; or to the husband and to the wife, for term of their lives, or for term of life of the said wife; or where any such estate or purchase of any lands, &c. hath been or hereafter shall be made to any husband and to his wife in manner and form above expressed; or to any other person or persons, and to their heirs and assigns, to the use and behoof of the said husband and wife, or to the use of the wife, as is before rehearsed, for the jointure of the wife; that then and in every such case, every woman married having such jointure made, or hereafter to be made, shall not claim nor have title to have any dower of the residue of the lands, &c. that at any time were her said husband's, by whom she hath any such jointure; nor shall demand nor claim her dower, of and against them that have the lands and inheritances of her said husband. But if she have no such jointure, then she shall be admitted and enabled to pursue, have, and demand her dower, by writ of dower, after the due course and order of the common laws of the realm." 5. This statute has given rise to the modern jointure, Definition of. 1 Inst. 37 a. which Lord Coke defines to be "a competent livelihood of freehold for the wife, of lands or tenements, &c., to take effect presently, in possession or profit, after the decease of her husband, for the life of the Circumstan wife, at the least; if she herself be not the cause of its determination or forfeiture." 6. As this statute contradicts the common law, it ces required. has always been construed strictly. Lord Coke has laid it down that no estate limited to a woman shall be deemed a good jointure, and a bar to dower, under this act, unless it is attended with the following cir Must take Effect on the cumstances. 7. It must take effect, in possession or profit, immeDeath of the diately from the death of the husband; for otherwise it will not be so beneficial as dower. Husband. I Inst. 36 b. 4 Rep. 2 a. Wood v. Caruthers v. 5 Ves. 192. And be for the Life of 8. If therefore an estate is conveyed to the husband for life, remainder to J. S. for life, remainder to the wife for life, in satisfaction of dower, this is not a jointure within the statute; because by the first limitation it is not to take effect in possession or profit, presently after the death of her husband. And although in this case J. S. should die in the lifetime of the husband, still it would be no bar of dower. 9. So where a person covenanted to stand seised to the use of himself in tail, remainder to the use of his wife for life. This was held not to be a jointure, because it was to begin after the determination of an estate tail. And though the estate determined by the death of the husband, without issue, so that the wife's estate began immediately upon the death of her husband, yet as it was not a good jointure at the beginning, whatever happened afterwards could not make it good. 10. The second circumstance is, that it be for the wife's life, or for some greater estate. So that if an estate be limited to a woman, for the life or lives of one or more persons, or for a hundred, or a thousand years, if she lives so long, it is not a jointure. 11. Although the statute recites five modes of |