Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint before the Commission the railway company reduced its rate to the amount claimed by the complainant. The Commission nevertheless ordered the defendant to maintain the reduced rate for a period of two years. The railway company contended before the court that since the rate had been voluntarily reduced the Commission had no jurisdiction to compel its maintenance. The bill was dismissed, and up to the present time no appeal had been taken by the petitioner.

Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The order of the Commission required the Milwaukee Company to establish joint through rates upon coal to certain points upon its line from Cardiff, Ill. The case has been argued and submitted. The rates ordered are in effect.

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The Commission ordered the reduction of rates from Chicago and St. Louis to Denver. A preliminary injunction was granted.

Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. District of Minnesota. The Union Pacific lines and the Northern Pacific Company were ordered to establish a through route via Portland, Oreg., between eastern destinations and points on the line of the Northern Pacific, like Seattle and Tacoma, north of Portland. A preliminary injunction was granted.

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. This case involves the proportional rates of the petitioner from the Mississippi River to Des Moines upon traffic originating at points east of the Illinois-Indiana state line. No hearing has been had. A preliminary injunction was at first prayed for, but the petitioner did not bring its application on for hearing and did file the rates ordered. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co. et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Commission ordered the petitioners to reduce rates on certain kinds of coal from the Georges Creek Basin to various destinations. Bill dismissed.

Thompson Lumber Co. et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The petitioners applied to the Commission to reduce the rate on hard-wood lumber from Memphis to New Orleans and to award them reparation with respect to past shipments. The rate was reduced but the reparation was denied. The carriers complied with the order reducing the rate. The petitioners bring this suit asking that the court

either enter a decree for the amount of the reparation claimed or require the Commission to do so. The case has not yet been heard.

Russe & Burgess et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. This case is like the preceding, except that the rates involved are those upon hard-wood lumber from Chicago and Mississippi River points to Pacific coast terminals.

Decisions have been rendered by circuit courts under the expediting act in six cases since our last report, viz:

New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Southern District of New York. Injunction refused.

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Injunction granted.

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Injunction granted.

Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission. District of Minnesota. Injunction granted.

Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Bill dismissed.

Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Bill dismissed. Appeals have been taken in behalf of the Commission in the first three cases above named. No appeal has yet been taken by the complainants in either of the three last cases.

SAFETY APPLIANCES.

The statistical reports of the Commission show that in 1893 the number of men employed in coupling and uncoupling cars for each one killed was 349, while in 1908 the number employed for each one killed was 983. The number of men employed in coupling and uncoupling cars for each one injured in 1893 was 13, while in 1908 it was 62. Stated in another way, the number of men killed in coupling and uncoupling cars for each 1,000 employed was 3 in 1893 and 1 in 1908. The number of injuries for each 1,000 men employed in this service was 77 in 1893 and 16 in 1908.

That it is in no sense impossible for a carrier to keep its car couplers in complete repair as contemplated by the statute is evidenced by the fact that inspectors of the Commission have gone over a large railway system without finding any defective couplers.

As pointed out in previous reports of the Commission, however, the law is too limited in its scope to afford that full measure of

protection to which railroad employees are entitled. All the appliances included in the standards for the protection of trainmen are examined by our inspectors and their condition noted, but as the majority of such appliances are not covered by the law and no penalty is attached to their use in a defective condition, it is not possible to exercise the same supervision over them that can be exercised over the particular appliances covered by the law. Such appliances as sill steps, ladders, roof hand holds, running boards, and hand brakes are vitally necessary for the safety of employees, and it is of the highest importance that they be properly applied and maintained in the best possible condition; but as these appliances are not covered by the law, proper attention is not always given them and they are often permitted to run in an unsafe condition. A bill (H. R. 26725) calculated to remedy this defect in the law was passed by the House at the first session of the present Congress, but failed to be reported in the Senate, probably on account of lack of time due to the expiring session. This bill in no way advanced the interest of any inventor or proprietor of a particular device, and it is earnestly recommended that a similar measure be passed by the Congress at its present session.

The strongest argument for the extension of the law here recommended is found in the necessity to secure uniform equipment. It is of vital importance to employees that the appliances designed for their safety shall be placed alike on all cars of the same class, so that they may know with certainty, night or day, that they will always find them in like positions and locations. The Master Car Builders' Association prescribes standard locations and forms of application for the various appliances here enumerated, but as optional methods of application are permitted, and the rules are not compulsory, the result is confusion, which has been disastrous to hundreds of switchmen and other railroad employees.

Many years' experience has demonstrated the impossibility of securing the desired uniformity through voluntary action of those responsible for the equipment of cars. It therefore becomes necessary that the question should be dealt with in the same manner as the Congress has already dealt with couplers, grab irons, and power brakes.

The Master Car Builders' Association has justified its standardization of the uncoupling lever, brake-step bracket, and hand rail as substitutes for grab-irons by a decision of the federal district court in the district of Massachusetts, in the case of United States v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company, decided January 5, 1909. In his instructions to the jury in this case Judge Dodge said:

If at any place in the end of this car there was not a grab-iron or handhold, properly speaking, but some other appliance, such as a ladder or brake lever or whatever else you please, which afforded equal security with a grab-iron or a

handhold at that point, then I instruct you that the law has not been violated so far as a grab-iron or handhold at that point is concerned. Having something there which performs all the functions of a grab-iron or handhold is just the same thing as having what is properly called a grab-iron or a handhold at that point.

The jury evidently came to the conclusion on the question of fact that the appliances offered in this particular case as substitutes for the grab-iron did not afford the security to employees demanded by the law, as it rendered its verdict against the railroad company. This illustrates one of the grave objections to permitting appliances of any character to be used as substitutes for grab-irons. It leaves the matter open to question as to whether the law is complied with, and refers it to the determination of a jury on the question of fact.

Judge Dodge also held in the case before referred to that a man engaged in connecting or disconnecting the air hose between the cars is engaged in coupling or uncoupling cars within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act, if it is necessary for him to connect or disconnect that hose in order to connect or disconnect the cars.

The decisions of the lower courts on the application of grab-irons are conflicting. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, in the Taylor case, has decided that the safety appliance law supplants the common-law rule of reasonable care on the part of the employer as to providing appliances defined and specified therein, and imposes upon interstate carriers an absolute duty. This decision must be taken as authoritative, and the Commission can only conclude that when the Congress specified grab-irons in section 4 of the law it meant grab-irons and not other appliances. The Commission therefore can not accept the rule of the Master Car Builders' Association, which permits certain appliances to be used as substitutes for the grab-iron, and will insist that grab-irons be applied wherever the law requires them.

The Commissions' inspectors have been conducting standing tests of air brakes in trains at the various railroad terminals to determine the efficiency of the brakes in use. These tests have served to disclose the actual condition of the brakes in ordinary service, and by bringing their condition directly to the attention of those responsible for the maintenance of air-brake equipment have led to excellent results. The tests have shown that freight trains have been permitted to leave terminals with about 15 per cent of their power brakes in a defective and inoperative condition. Of course, it was impossible to obtain any benefit from these defective brakes.

On May 5, 1909, the Commission held a hearing on the question of increasing the minimum percentage of power brakes to be used in trains. This hearing developed that approximately 97.5 per cent of the freight cars owned by the railroads of the country were then

equipped with air brakes, and that equipment was proceeding at such a rate as to make it practically certain that all freight cars in ordinary service would soon be equipped with power brakes. In view of these conditions, the Commission has not yet taken further action looking to an increase in the minimum percentage of brakes to be used in trains for the reason that section 2 of the amended safety appliance law distinctly requires that all powerbraked cars which are associated together with the minimum required by law shall have their brakes used and operated. This can only be construed to mean that when trains are composed entirely of power-braked cars, all cars in such trains must have their brakes used and operated. In short, it means 100 per cent of brakes to be used and operated on every train having all its cars equipped with power brakes. The law provides that the Commission may increase the minimum percentage of cars required to be operated with power brakes from time to time, but grants the Commission no authority with respect to the further provision that "all power-braked cars in such train which are associated together with said 50 per centum shall have their brakes so used and operated." It is therefore evident that the Commission has no power to make an order permitting the operation of any percentage of brakes less than 100 per cent on trains that are 100 per cent equipped, as the effect of such an order would be to decrease the percentage required by law and the Commission's power extends only to the matter of increasing such percentage.

Previous to the date of the hearing above referred to a general misunderstanding seems to have prevailed concerning that portion of the law which requires that all power-braked cars associated together with the minimum shall have their brakes used and operated, the belief evidently being that if 75 per cent of the cars in a train had their brakes in condition to be used and operated the law was complied with. This erroneous view led to the interchange of cars between various roads which a reasonable inspection would have shown to have their brakes in such a defective condition as to render them inefficient and unsafe for use on heavy grades. Since the hearing above noted, and the terminal tests which have been conducted by our inspectors, a different view has become prevalent, and now in many cases cars with defective brakes are being treated at interchange points the same as cars having other safety appliance defects. This can not fail to produce results which will enable the railroads to obtain the maximum efficiency from the brakes which they have been at such great expense to install.

The American Railway Association recommends that all cars on freight trains shall be equipped with power brakes, and the rules of the Master Car Builders' Association now require that all cars offered in interchange must be equipped with air brakes. As the result,