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§§ 5197, 5198 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.
3493] .............................. . 233
§ 5438 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3674]. 919
Page 279 ....................... . ..... 428
CIVIL CODE 1896.
§1_800 .............. ...............49E ALASKA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
§§ 93,504....... ..... .. ...... . ...... 1 PENAL CODE.
§ 1 ..... . ..... . ....................... 35
§ 128 .............................. 50, 52
§§ 0... ................ 00000.0 35 CALIFORNIA.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. §385.... ..... .. .......... ...... 14( CITY CHARTERS.
Los Angeles, art. 3, §§ 12, 31..... 554
1901 p. 267, ch. 103.................... 554
MILLS’ ANNOTATED STATUTES. § 1508
ANNOTATED POLITICAL CODE 1901. § 1318
LAWS. 1901, pp. 238, 247, 11, 31.00.000.000... 63
GENERAL STATUTES 1901. § 0000.00.00.000000
1874 p. 143, ch. 93. Amended by Laws 1963, p. 599, ch. 393 .................. 1903, p0 00000 000.000.00.000.
REVISED STATUTES. Ch. 113, §
MICHIGAN. COMPILED LAWS 1897. §3846............ ........ ..... 9 0.00.00000.00.00.00.00000000000
com: or CIVIL PROCEDURE.
§ 1. \ Establishment,
§ 1066, 1082, 1099, 1106, 1113, 2567 ..... 756
p. 675, ch. 469, § 7 .................... 756
'Point annotated. See syllabus.
the selections made have been finally approved by the Land Department or the Secretary of the Interior, and until such time the lands are not taxable.—Clearwater Timber Co. v. Shoshone County, Idaho (C. C.) 612.
*A deed to public lands of the United States which had been selected by the grantor in lieu of forest reserve lands, but whose selection had not at the time been approved, held not to render such lands taxable.—Clearwater Timber Co. v. Shoshone County, Idaho (C. C.) 612.
Under the Revenue Law of Idaho (Sess. Laws 1901, p. 238, 247, §§ 11, 31), and Ann. " Code 1901, g 1318, real estate exempt from taxation on the second Monday of January in any given year does not become subject to taxation during that year, even though transferred to a person in whose hands it is no longer ex~ empt.—Clearwater Timber Co. v. Nez Perce County (C. C.) 633. '
i 2. Collection and enforcement against persons or personal property.
That a complainant was not the owner of lands at the time of an illegal levy of taxes thereon does not deprive it of the right to maintain a suit in equity to enjoin the enforcement of such taxes by a sale of the lands after it has become the owner.——Clearwater Timber Co. v. Shoshone County, Idaho (C. C.) 612.
A complainant is not debarred from main— taining a suit to enjoin the enforcement of taxes illegally levied upon lands because its bill did not allege it to be the owner of such lands, where no objection was taken to the pleading, and the proofs, taken by stipulation, establish its ownership.—-Clearwater Timber Co. v. Shoshone County, Idaho (C. C.) 612.
The mere fact that a complainant accepted and recorded a deed purporting to convey to it lands, the legal and equitable title to which were both in fact in the United States, does not estop it to maintain a suit in equity to enjoin the collection of taxes levied on said lands by the taxing officers of the county who had actual knowledge of the condition of the title and of the claim of complainant that the land was not taxable, and were not misled by such deed or record.—Clearwater Timber Co. v. Nez Perce County (C. C.) 633.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.
Arbitration between railroad company and railroad telegraphers, see “Arbitration and Award,” § 1.
Ordinances fixing telephone rates as denying due process of law, see “Constitutional Law,”
Ordinances fixing telephone rates as .denying equahprotection of law, see “Constitutional Law’
Ordinances fixing telephone rates as impairing obligation of contract, see “Constitutional Law,” § 4. _
Restraining enforcement of ordinance fixing telephone rates, see “Injunction,” § 2.
See “Customs Duties”; “Internal Revenue.”
Jurisdiction of United States court to restrain revenue officers of state from prosecuting proceeding under state statutes, see “Courts,” § 2.
Right 0 educational corporation to raise con-
Tax statement as privileged communication, see
I 1. Nature and extent of power in
Lands which have not been officially surveyed by the United States are not as a rule taxable, nor are they under the statutes of Idaho, and such a survey is not completed until it has been accepted by the Land Department.—Clcarwater Timber CO. v. Shoshone County, Idaho (C. C.) 612.
*The equitable title to public lands selected in lieu of lands in a forest reserve relinquished under Act June 4, 1897, c. 2, 30 Stat. 34 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1538], or under Act March 2, 1899, 30 Stat. p. 993, c. 377, establishing the Mt. Rainier reservation, does not pass until
'Point annotated. See syllabus.
Const. art. 4, § 33, providing for the regula-
Under Los Angeles City Charter, art. 3, §
Under Const. art. 4, § 33, and Los Angeles
A state has power to regulate charges for
A city held not to have surrendered its power
Of patents, see “Patents,” § 3.
Removal of as waste, see “Waste.”
For particular acts in or incidental to judicial
For particular acts not judicial.
Color of title, see “Adverse Possession."
Of statute, see “Statutes,” § 2.
To trade-mark or trade-name, see “Trade-Marks
Causing death, see “Death,” § 1.
Remedies for torts.
Removal of cause from state to United States
Collisions with tugs and vessels in tow, see
*A steamer taken in tow by a tug to be moved
*A tug which undertook to tow a schooner
F'tgr 1transportation of passenger, see “Carriers,”
*Point annotated. See syllabus.
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES.
§ 1. Marks and names subjects of ownership.
*The name “thite House,” and the picture of the White House at “’ashington, held to constitute a valid trade-mark and trade-name for plaintiff’s cofiee.—Dwinell-Wright Co. v. Co-operative Supply Co. (C. C.) 909.
§ 2. Title, conveyances, and contracts.
*A complainant held not entitled to a preliminary injunction to restrain the use of a name by defendant as an infringement of a trade-mark; it appearing from the showing made that defendant’s use was prior to that of complainant’s assignor.-—Deitsch v. George R. Gibson Co. (C. C.) 383.
*Complainant held on the evidence to have succeeded to the right to the use of the name “Old Crow” as a trade-mark for its whisky made according to a special formula, and to be entitled to protection in such exclusive use.— W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Kahn (C. C.) 639.
§ 3. Infringement and unfair competition.
*The proprietor of a medicine or remedy made in accordance with a secret formula, which knowingly makes false and fraudulent representations as to the ingredients of such remedy to the public through its advertisements and labels, cannot maintain a suit in equity to protect its business of selling or administering such remedy from invasion and injury by another.— Memphis Keeley Institute v. Leslie E. Keeley Co. (C. C. A.) 964.
*That a complainant comes into a court of equity with unclean hands, in that he is chargeable with fraudulent misrepresentations to the public in respect to the subject-matter of the suit, is not, strictly speaking, a defense, and need not be pleaded; but upon such fact appearing it will be given effect by the court in the interest of the public by refusing to grant relief to the complainant.—Memphis Keeley Institute v. Leslie E. Keeley Co. (C. C. A.) 964.
Evidence considered, and held to establish the claim that a complainant was chargeable with fraudulent misrepresentations to the public as to the ingredients of a medicine which it manufactured and sold.—-Memphis Keeley Institute v. Leslie E. Keeley Co. (C. C. A.) 964.
While mere delay or acquiescence will not defeat the right to an injunction to restrain infringement of a trade-mark, it may afford good ground for denying a preliminary injunction to put a stop to an established business prior to a final hearing—Havana Commercial Co. v. Nichols (C. C.) 302.
*The name “La Carolina,” as a trade-mark for cigars, is not invalid as either the name of an individual or a geographical name, and is infringed by the name “La Coralina” used also for cigars—Havana Commercial Co. v. Nichols (C. C.) 302.
*One who uses the trade-mark of another on spurious goods for the purpose of deceiving purchasers acquires thereby no right ’to such trade
mark as against another who subsequently sucé ceeds to the manufacture of the genuine goods so des1gna9ted.—W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Kahn'
Treaties and statutes of the United States have always been practically put in the same class so far as judicial action is concerned, and a later treaty has the same effect on a prior statute that a later statute has, and may supersede it as a later statute may supersede a prior treaty. Nor is there any practical dis~ tinction as between a statute and a treaty with regard to its becoming presently effective without awaiting further legislation, which depends entirely upon its terms—United Shoe Machineryv. Duplessis Shoe Machinery Co. (C. C. A.)
See “Reference”; “Witnesses.”
Trial of actions by or against particular classesof persons See “Railroads,” § 2.
Trial of particular civil actions or proceedings.
For causing death by operation of railroad, see “Railroads,” § 2. '
For causing death in general. see “Death,” § 1.
For personal injuries, see “Electricity.”
On insurance policy, see “Insurance,” § 2.
§ 1. Taking case or question from jury.
*While questions of negligence are ordinarily for the jury in federal courts, a case may bewithdrawn from the jury and a verdict directed for plaintiff or defendant, as may be proper, where there is no conflict in the evidence, or where it is so conclusive in its character that the court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, would be obliged to set aside a verdict rendered in opposition to such QVldenCG.—‘ gtzussell v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (C. C. A.)-:
*Under the rule of the federal courts, a court should direct a verdict where the evidence produced by the party on whom rests the burden of proof is insufficient to sustain a verdict in hisl fawn—National Ass’n of Ry. Postal Clerks v. Scott (C. C. A.) 92. ‘
Combinations to monopolize trade, see “Monopolies,” § 1.
Trust deed, see “Chattel Mortgages”; “Mortgages.”
§ 1. Creation, existence. and validity. Under St. Wis. 1898, § 1114, a county, to which a city has turned over for collection delinquent special assessments on real estat pledged by the city for the payment of improvement bonds, does not become a statutory trustee for the bondholders who have no standing in a court of equity to require an accounting from it. —Olmsted v. City of Superior (C. C.) 172. ‘
See syllabus. ,