« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
BANKS AND BANKING.
Recovery Of usurious interest received by national bank from bankrupt, see “Bankruptcy.” § 6
5 1. National banks.
*One who was notified that shares of stock in a national bank had been transferred into his name, although he had in fact no interest therein, and who indorsed the certificates in blank, but took no steps to have the stock transferred to the name of the true owner, cannot avoid liability for an assessment thereon made by the comptroller to meet the debts of the bank after i1t57insolvency.——Kenyon v. Fowler (0. O. )
See “Disorderly House.”
BILL OF EXCHANGE.
See “Bills and Notes.”
BILL OF LADING.
See “Shipping,” § 3.
BILL OF REVIEW.
BILLS AND NOTES.
§ 1. Presentment, demand, notice, and protest. *A notice of protest held sufficient—Derham v. Donohue (C. C. A.) 385.
Board of general appraisers, see “Customs Duties,” 3.
Multifariousness in_ pleading in suit by bondholder, see “Equity,” § _ , Municipal bonds, see “Municipal Corporations, ’
Of mail carriers, see “Post Office,” § 1.
Liability of sleeping car company for breach
*Point annotated. See syllabus.
Cséngage of goods by vessels, see “Shipping,’
Carriage of passengers by vessels, see “Ship
ping. ’ § 4
Enforcement of railroad rate laws by attorne; general, see “Attorney General.”
Jurisdiction of United States court to determin constitutionality of state statutes regulatiny railroad rates, see “Courts,” § 2.
Laws authorizing carriers to establish rates a conferring legislative powers, see “Constitu tional Law,” § 2.
Laws fixing passenger rates as denying equ grrétection of law, see “Constitutional Law,
Laws requiring shippers to pay published rate as denying due process of law, see “Constit tional Law,” § 6.
Restraining enforcement Of freight and passe
Right of action for death of passenger, se
Supplemental pleading in suit to restrain en
§ 1. Contrpl and regulation of commo earners.
In so far as Elkins Act Feb. 19, 1903, c. 70 32 Stat. 847, § 1 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905 p. 599], providing for punishment of corporat carriers in granting, and corporate shippers i knowingly accepting, rebates or discriminatio from legal rates and tariffs, it was not re pealed by Hepburn Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591 34 Stat. 584, but, so far as it provided for th punishment of such acts when not knowingl done, it was repealed—Great Northern Ry. Co v. United States (C. C. A.) 945.
The special saving clause in Hepburn Ac June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, § 10, hel not to supersede the general saving clause '
ev. St. 5 13 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 6], as > the effect on existing penalties, forfeitures, 1d liabilities of a repealing act—Great North'n Ry. Co. v. United States (C. C. A.)-945.
Preliminary injunctions to restrain the putng into eifect of a statute fixing maximum .tes of passenger fare on railroads denied to wait a demonstration of the reasonableness or nreasonableness of such rates by actual trial »r a reasonable length of time—St. Louis & . F. R. Co. v. Hadley (C. C.) 220.
A preliminary injunction granted restraining ie putting into efiect of Act Minn. April 18, )07 (Laws 1907, p. 313. c. 232), fixing rates for ie carrying of commodities by railroads within l8 state on the ground that such rates, if enirced, in connection with reductions in both immodity and passenger rates made by prior :ts, would on the showing made be confiscatory. Perkins v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 445; ennedy v. Great Northern Ry. C0., Id.; \Voodard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. C0., Id.; Liv— igston v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. C0., Id.; Brewer v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. C0., Id.; hillaber v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. C0., Id.; :umbird v. Chicago Great Western Ry. C0., 1.; Barrows v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. [. Ry. C0., Id.; Carle v. Chicago, R. I. & P. 1,v. C0., Id.; James v. Great Northern Ry. C0.,
Where a state enacted successive regulations 5 rates to be charged by railroads on intrastate isiness, each of which necessarily affected the trnings of the railroad companies, the validity f such regulations, as to whether they are unmstitutional as confiscatory, is to be considered aparately, the first without reference to the ibsequent ones and the latter with reference > the effect of those previously enacted—Perins v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 445; Iennedy v. Great Northern By. 00., Id.; Woodard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. C0., Id.; ivingston v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. 00., Id.; rewster v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. C0., 1.; Shillaber v. Minneapolis & St. L. By. 00., 1.; Humbird v. Chicago Great Western Ry. 0., Id.; Barrows v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. . M. Ry. C0., Id.; Carle v. Chicago, R. I. & . 00., Id.; James v. Great Northern Ry. 0., .
The North Carolina railroad commission being quired by Revisal 1905, § 1106. to make rail)ad rates subject only to the limitation pre:ribed by Laws N. C. 1907, p. 252, c. 217, held ecessary parties to a suit to restrain the enIrcement of such chapter for unconstitutionaly.-—Southern Ry. Co. v. McNeill (C. C.) 756.
Revisal N. C. 1905, § 1082, held not to interere with a railroad’s remedy by injunction in ises where rates fixed by the corporation comiiSSiOIl, etc., were claimed to be invalid as con§%atory.—Southern Ry. Co. v. McNeill (C. C.) a .
In a suit to restrain the enforcement of Laws 1'. C. 1907. p. 252, c. 217, providing for railiad rates alleged to be confiscatory, the court, a a prima facie case being made in favor E complainant, held authorized to continue a
‘Point mutated. See syllabus.
ule published and filed by the company is unlawful and void, and the company cannot maintain a suit in equity based thereon to enjoin transfers of such tickets—Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Hamburger (C. C.) 849; Merchants’ & Miners’ Transp. Co. v. Same, Id.; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Same, Id.
A shipper is chargeable with knowledge of the lawful rate on his shipment, where it has been published and filed as required by law, and where it is accessible to the public, unless he was misled after using proper diligence to ascertain such rate—United States v. Standard Oil CO. (D. C.) 305. .
The number of offenses committed by a shipper under Elkins Act Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708. 32 Stat. 847 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 599], through agreements for illegal concessions in rates. determined—United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C.) 305.
_ On the trial of a shipper charged with having .Obtained a concession from the lawful published rate on interstate shipments, in violation of the federal statute, the fact that another railroad may have had a published rate approximately as low as that received is immaterial.—United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C.) 305.
§ 2. Carriage of goods.
*A contract by a railroad company to lease the use of its tracks, motive power, and operating employés for the transportation of a circus train, stipulating that the railroad company shall not be liable for any injuries from whatsoever cause to any person using the train, held not contrary to public policy.—Clough v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. (C. C. A.) 81.
*A carrier or a warehouseman is liable in trover for the wrongful delivery of goods Intrusted to it for shipment or storage, but such right of action may be waived by any action which ratifies the delivery, and thereby deprives the carrier or warehouseman of the right to recover over against the person to Whom the delivery was made—A. D. Blowers & CO. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. CO. (C. C.) 935.
*A shipper held to have ratified the unauthorized delivery of goods by a carrier made without collecting drafts for the price, by Obtaining part payment from the consignee and accepting his notes for the remainder, which precluded a recovery against the carrier for conversion.—A. D. Blowers & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 935.
§ 3. Carriage of passengers.
A sleeping car company which sells accommodations in its cars between points on a railroad to passengers of the railroad company, the cars being hauled by the railroad company in its trains under a contract between the two companies is not liable to a passenger for breach of contract because the car in which such passenger is riding is diverted by the railroad company on account of a wreck. and does not reach the passenger’s point of destination, in consequence of which he is compelled to change into
*Point annotated. See syllabus.
Requiring passengers to change cars d-uri the night, made necessary on account of the o struction of the road by a wreck ahead, whic necessitated the removal of the passengers fro a sleeper into an ordinary day coach, held 11 to render a railroad company liable in damag for breach of contract—Louisville & N. R. § Bgsher (C. C. A.) 68; Scott v. Louisville
*A railroad company cannot be held answe able to a passenger in damages because of ma ters which are ordinary incidents of travel, su as exposure to drafts from windows opened b or at request of. other passengers.——Louisvil & N. R. Co. v. Fisher (C. C. A.) 68; Scott Louisville & N. R. Co., Id.
*A passenger who had alighted from a rai road train at a station and was killed by a other train on a side track after his own tra' had departed held to have ceased to be a pa senger prior to his death—Payne v. Cent. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 73.
*The relation of carrier and passenger he not to exist between a carrier and an emplo of a circus company so as to entitle the latt to recover for injuries sustained in_ a collisi
*Where a passenger was put Off from a rai road train of defendant at a place half a mi from a station and between two tunnels, a walked back through one of the tunnels unt near the station, when he turned the other w and was killed while passing through the seco tunnel, which was long and dark, the proxima cause of his death was not the negligence
place, conceding such negligence, voluntary act in turning back after he had pas ed such danger to a place of safety, for whi defendant could not be held liable—Gwyn Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 8
*In an action for death of a passenger, ev dence that she was a passenger, and that h death resulted from an accident to the trai held sufficient to establish a prima facie cas of negligence on the part of the carrier’ servants—Hopper v. .Denver & R. . R. (C. C. A.) 273.
CAUSE OF ACTION.
Construction of national agreement for the gogernment of base ball clubs, see “Contracts,”
Of taxes, see “Taxation,” § 2.
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES.
Right of educational corporation to raise constitutional question as to taxation of its lands, see “Constitutional Law,” § 1
§ 1. Vessels in tow.
*One of two tugs meeting, each with tows, held solely in fault for collisions caused by her failing to make allowance for the sagging of her tows, in consequence of which a schooner which was overtaking the other tow was pocketed and compelled to change her course in extremis.—The Richmond (C. C. A.) 112; The Boswell (Id.;; The Iowa (Id.); The James W. Elwell Id. ; The Powell (Id.).
*A tug with a schooner in tow on a hawser held on the evidence solely in fault for a collision between her tow and a meeting schooner in Delaware Bay at night—The Marie Palmer (D. C.) 894; The James McCaulley, Id.; The Blanche Hopkins, Id.
*A collision between a steamship passing down the Delaware river and a tow which was coming up, but started to cross the channel. held due to the fault of both the steamship and tug for negligent and improper navigation. —_The Algeria (D. C.) 902; The Ellen S. Jennings, Id.; The Bailey, Id.; The Majestic. Id.
§ 2. Lights, signals, and lookouts.
*A schooner held in fault for a collision with a steamer in Chesapeake Bay in the night, on the ground that, While becalmed, she had been drifted from her course by the tide, and failed to exhibit a white or flare-up light astern to the steamer which, in her then position, was an overtaking vessel and could not see her side lights. —The Baltimore (C. C. A.) 405. § 3. Narrow channels, harbors, rivers,
and canals. _
A steamship which attempted to pass through a channel which was obstructed by another steam— er engaged in pulling her tow oi the ground, without the latter’s assent, held solely in fault £031éa resulting collision—The Waverley (D. C.)
COLOR OF TITLE.
To sustain adverse possession, see “Adverse Possesswn.”
See “Monopolies,” § 1.
gaiinst estate of bankrupt, see “Bankruptcy,”
gainst school district, see “Schools and School
'Point mutated. See syllabus.
Between courts, see “Courts,” § 3.
between the states, and between the states an foreign nations, to their employés, is within th constitutional power of Congress to regulate i
terstate and foreign commerce, and applies t carriers engaged in foreign commerce by sea making such a carrier liable for an injury to a: employé resulting from the negligence of hi féléow servants—Lancer v. Anchor Line (D. C.
See “Bills and Notes.”
Jurisdiction of United States court to restrair corporation commission from enforcing Still] law as suit against state, see “Courts,” § 2.
Railroad commission, see “Carriers,” § 1.
Restraining enforcement of order of interstati commerce commission, see “Injunction,” § 3.
Special commissioner in bankruptcy, see “BankI ruptcy,” § 5. I
Special commissioners in proceedings for dis charge of bankrupt, see “Bankruptcy,” § 14.
Verification of bill for injunction before comi missioner of deeds, see “Injunction,” § 3.
common CARRIERS. ‘
Arbitration, see “Arbitration and Award,” § 1.
Arbitration between interstate carrier and employés, see “Arbitration and Award,” §§ 1. 3.
Carriage of goods and passengers, see “Carriers”; “Shipping.”
Restraining enforcement of order of interstate commerce commission, see “Injunction,” § 3.
1. Power to regulate in general.
Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154], and Elkins Act Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 599], held constitutional.—United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C.) 305.
§ 2. Subjects of regulation.
Where a railroad company published and filed a schedule of rates between points on its line within a state, and also procured and filed as its own the schedules of rates of a terminal company for the carriage of property from one of such points into another state. and made contracts for through carriage, and collected the freight therefor, it was an interstate carrier as to such shipments, and the lawful rate was the sum of the rates shown by the two schedules—United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C.) 305.
*That a defendant made contracts for the through carriage of interstate shipments, and settlements therefor, solely with one railroad company, although such shipments passed over the lines of other companies also, sufficiently proves a common arrangement between the carriers for a continuous carriage—United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C.) 305.
*A connecting railroad carrier, over whose line an interstate shipment passes, is engaged in interstate commerce with respect to each shipment and subject to the law regulating the same, although its line may lie wholly within one state—United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D 305.
3. Means and methods of regulation.
I"Under its constitutional power to regulate commerce, Congress may lawfully impose conditions upon the granting of clearance to vessels as a means of enforcing immigration regulations. —International Mercantile Marine Co. v. Stranahan (C. C.) 428; Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Same, Id.
A city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills or circulars on the streets held not an interference with interstate commerce as against a concern doing business in another state and desiring to distribute circulars advertising such business—International Text-Book v. Inhabitants of City of Auburn (C. C.)
The federal employers’ liability act of June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232, c. 3073, relating to the liability of common carriers engaged in commerce
*Point annotated. See syllabus.