Sections 1840-1842 provide for the appointment by the Secre· tary of State of a committee consisting of one Senator and two Representatives to examine and verify the accounts of the Auditor and Treasurer, and make to each house of the General Assembly a report thereof. Information may be obtained by you, or investigations may be made by you, in the manner provided by the above cited constitutional and statutory provisions. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes provide for the appointment by you of such a committee or board as you suggest; nor do they specify the powers, duties or compensation of such a committee or board. Except as specified in the above cited constitutional and statutory provisions, such a committee or board, if appointed by you, would be without authority to enforce its investigation of any Executive Department against the objection of the head of that department. The conclusions arrived at herein are in accord with the views expressed in a former official communication to you from this office. Respectfully submitted, N. C. MILLER, By CALVIN E. REED, EXAMINING COMMITTEE. No compensation is allowed by statute to such committee except for a period not exceeding six days previous to the commencement of the session of the General Assembly. Double compensation not allowed. April 8, 1905. HON. FRANK PRYOR, Dear Sir-I am in receipt of a communication dated the 4th inst., signed by you and also by the Hon. J. F. Church and Hon. F. W. Frewen, requesting an opinion from this office as to the legality of certain claims enclosed therewith in favor of Messrs. Church, Frewen and yourself against the State of Colorado, for the sum of $609 each, for services from January 4, 1905, to April 1, 1905, inclusive, as members of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of the Fifteenth General Assembly, appointed by the Secretary of State to examine the accounts of the State Auditor and State Treasurer. Said committee was appointed under section 1840, Mills' Annotated Statutes, which is as follows: "Previous to each regular session of the General Assembly, the Secretary of State shall select and notify, by giving ten days' notice to one member elected to the Senate and two members elected to the House of Representatives, to attend at the seat of government six days before the commencement of the session, for the purpose of examining and verifying the accounts of the Auditor and Treasurer." Section 1842, M. A. S., provides that, after such examination, a report thereof shall be made to each house of the General Assembly. The compensation allowed said commissioners is fixed by section 1846, M. A. S., which provides that said commissioners "shall receive the same compensation as is allowed by law to the members of the General Assembly during the time they may be engaged in such service." According to my construction of the statute, it was intended that the services required by section 1840 should be performed within six days previous to the beginning of the legislative session. While it is true that section 1846 provides that the members of said committee shall receive compensation during the time they may be engaged in such service, it was not contemplated by said enactment that compensation should be made to a member of the General Assembly, as such, and that he should also receive compensation as a member of a committee during the legislative session-in other words, double compensation was not intended. Article V, section 6, of our State Constitution provides: "Each member of the General Assembly, until otherwise provided by law, shall receive as compensation for his services, seven dollars ($7.00) for each day's attendance, and fifteen (15) cents for each mile necessarily traveled in going to and returning from the seat of government, and shall receive no other compensation, perquisite, or allowance whatsoever." As your claim appears to be for balance due for services rendered as a member of the committee during a period wholly included within the legislative session, I presume you have received compensation for services performed during the six days previous to said session, and, as I understand it, that is all the law allows. Therefore, I am of the opinion that said claims are illegal, and should not be approved. Respectfully yours, N. C. MILLER, Attorney General. By W. R. RAMSEY, Assistant Attorney General. EXEMPTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM The exemption of personal property to the value of two hundred dol. lars now provided by law to the head of a family, is not in addition to that formerly provided by our Constitution as to household goods, but is in lieu thereof. April 5, 1905. MR. ALEX M. GORLA, Assessor, Dolores County, Rico, Colo. Dear Sir-I have your letter of March 31, in which you request information as to the present exemption law. In answer thereto I would say that formerly section 3, article X, of the Constitution of Colorado provided that the household goods of every person being the head of a family, to the value of $200, shall be exempt from taxation. But by a proposed amendment which was submitted to the qualified electors of this State, voted upon and carried at the November election, 1904, said section was so amended that instead of household goods to the value of $200 being exempt from taxation, as heretofore, it is now provided "that the personal property of every person being the head of a family, to the value of $200, shall be exempt from taxation." This exemption applies to any kind of personal property, and may include such property as you suggest, viz., cattle, horses, pianos, household furniture, etc., to the value of $200. You will observe that this exemption is not in addition to that formerly provided on household goods, but is in lieu thereof. Said law is now in full force and effect and applies to assessments for 1905. Yours truly, N. C. MILLER, Attorney General. By W. R. RAMSEY, Assistant Attorney General. EXTRADITION. The Governor has a right to recall a warrant issued for the extradition of a fugitive. Duty of Governor to deliver fugitive fixed by the federal Constitution and statutes enacted by Congress and the laws of the State. Extradition not a matter of comity between the States. His power to deny or allow the request should be decided judicially, and not arbitrarily. His decision is not subject to review. August 24, 1905. HON. JESSE F. McDONALD, Governor of Colorado, State Capitol. Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your communication requesting an opinion as to the power of the Governor to recall a warrant issued in the matter of the extradition of an alleged fugitive from justice. I am informed that one Alexander B. Funk has been arrested upon a charge of having obtained money under false pretenses in the state of Iowa. Application for his extradition has been made by the governor of the state of Iowa upon the chief executive of the State of Colorado, and, after consideration of the papers, a warrant has been issued commanding the sheriff of the county of Washington to arrest and deliver him to the agent of the governor of the state of Iowa, to be taken by the latter into the state of Iowa, for the purpose of trial for said offense. Representations of sufficient importance have since been made, which demand an investigation of the case, for the purpose of determining if the warrant should be withheld. The matter having come up suddenly, and requiring immediate action, I advised you to recall the warrant, inasmuch as the agent of the governor of Iowa had not yet arrived, and the writ was still in the hands of the sheriff of Washington county. I promised that I would look into the matter fully and report to you the decisions bearing upon the subject, so that they might be made of record for guidance on future occasions. EXTRADITION NOT A MATTER OF COMITY BETWEEN THE STATES. The right of a sovereign of one nation to demand the extradition of a fugitive from justice who has escaped into another nation is regulated and controlled by treaty. The right of extradition between the colonies, previous to the adoption of the Constitution, was regulated by one of the articles of confederation. At the time of the adoption of the federal Constitution it was of such importance that a special provision was inserted covering the matter, which reads as follows: "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." Article IV, section 2, sub-div. 2, Fed. Const. The history of this constitutional provision is so well presented in Hurd on Habeas Corpus (2d Ed.), 599-637, and in the lengthy opinion rendered in the case of Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. Dennison, 24 How., 66, and in the admirable discussion contained in the Brown Case, 112 Mass., 409, and citations con tained in those opinions, that it is not necessary to relate the history of it in this opinion. Reference is made to those cases, as well as to those which will be hereafter cited, as furnishing a full history of the act and statement of the principles on which extradition rests. It has been held that this provision of the Constitution is not entirely self-executing, and that it is necessary to support it by additional legislation on the part of Congress. For instance, the provision fails to provide how a person should be charged with treason, felony, or other offense; moreover, it provided that on demand of the executive of the state from which he fled, he should be delivered up and removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. No provision was made as to the person upon whom the demand was to be made, or upon whom the duty devolved to deliver him up. These defects led to much discussion of the meaning of the act, and the operation of it, and Congress, on February 12, 1793, passed an act to meet these deficiencies, and to render the constitutional provision fully operative. This legislation was afterwards slightly amended, and is now to be found in sections 52785279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. utes have never been altered, and read as follows: These stat "Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent |