Opinion of the court reforming the decree.

versy, but that the title to the same, as acquired under the concession, still remained in the donee of the tract, by virtue of the reservation contained in the deed.

6. That the survey made by the Spanish surveyor did not have the effect to impair the incomplete title of the donee, nor to convey, assign, or transfer any interest whatever in the tract of four by four arpents to the grantee in that deed.

7. That the tract of four by four arpents was confirmed to the donee by the decree of the commissioners of September 10, 1810, and that the same was never confirmed to Louis Labeaume.

8. That the survey of Joseph C. Brown, in which he certified that he had surveyed for the applicant "two tracts in one," was in that particular erroneous, and that the survey so made did not have the effect to impair in any way the incomplete title held by the donee of the tract.

9. That Louis Labeaume did not acquire the legal title to the tract of four by four arpents under the patent granted to him, as the saving clause in the same reserved any valid adverse right which may exist to any part of the tract.

10. That the patent granted to Joseph Brazeau at the same time never became operative, as he refused to accept the same, and promptly returned it to the land department.

11. That the subsequent action of the Secretary of the Interior in cancelling the same, and in ordering a new survey, was authorized by law.

12. That Joseph Brazeau, oy virtue of that survey and the patent granted to him, June 10, 1862, acquired the legal title to the tract of four by four arpents, notwithstanding the saving clause in the patent, as he was the rightful owner of the incomplete title to the same as acquired by the concession granted under Spanish rule.

13. That the tract as granted by the governor was bounded on the north by Rocky Branch, and on the south by the concession to one Esther, a free mulatto woman, and the reservation in the deed was of a tract of four arpents of land, to be taken at the foot of the hillock in the southern part of the land.

14. That the land reserved is bounded on the south by the concession to the mulatto woman, and north by the south line of the "sixteen arpents in depth" conveyed by the deed, and lies north of the ditch.

Opinion of the court reforming the decree.

15. That the legal title to the tract of four by four arpents remained in the United States until June 10, 1862, when the patent was granted to the donee of the incomplete title under the former sovereign.

16. That the title of the donee before he obtained his patent was incomplete and attached to no land, and could not be converted into a complete title except by legal survey and by a patent, as required by law-because it stood as it existed in 1810, when the board of commissioners confirmed it as valid.

17. That the title of the donee, as perfected by the last survey and patent, is wholly unaffected by the judgment of this court in the case of Maguire v. Tyler et al.,* as this court in that case had no jurisdiction of the merits and did not decide any question, except that the action of the Secretary of the Interior, in setting aside the survey therein described, was a rightful exercise of authority.

Based upon these conclusions of law, the court gave the directions recited in the order passed at the regular session of this term, for an oral argument on the motion now pending before the court. In conformity to that order, the question involved in the motion, and therein recited, has been argued by counsel, and the court has reconsidered that part of the decree, and has come to the conclusion that a different direction would be more in accordance with the usual practice of the court in such cases than the one contained in the decree.

Governed by that consideration the court will modify the particular direction specified in the order for an oral argument; but the court adheres to the several propositions of law here recited, and refers to the opinion of the court delivered at the time the decree was entered for further explanations, as to the grounds upon which these conclusions rest.

The decree of reversal will stand unchanged; but the directions, as modified, will be, that the cause be remanded for further proceedings, in conformity to the opinion of the court.

NELSON, J., took no part in these directions; and GRIER, J., dissented from the judgment even as thus modified. The modification was ordered at the close of December Term, 1868.

1 Black, 195.

INDEX.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEEDS. See Illinois.

1. In aid of the certificate of acknowledgment, or proof of a deed, reference may be had to the instrument itself, or to any part of it. Carpenter v. Dexter, 513.

2. It will be presumed that a commissioner of deeds, in a particular State, whose authority to act was limited only to his county, exercised his office within the territorial limits for which he was appointed, although the only venue given to his certificate of acknowledgment be that of the "State" where he lived. Ib.

3. If such were not the presumption, the defect was held in this particular to be supplied in this case by reference to the deed and the previous certificate of acknowledgment by the same person; in the first of which the grantor designated the county in which he had affixed his hand and seal to the instrument, and in the second of which the county was given in its venue.

Ib.

4. When a deed showed that one Wooster was a subscribing witness with the officer, and the certificate of proof given by the officer stated that "Wooster, one of the subscribing witnesses," to the officer known, came before him, and being sworn, said, that he saw the grantor execute and acknowledge the deed; Held, that there was a substantial compliance with the statute, requiring the officer to certify that he knew the affiant to be a subscribing witness. Ib.

5. Unless the statute of a State requires evidence of official character to accompany the official act which it authorizes, none is necessary. And where one State recognizes acts done in pursuance of the laws of another State, its courts will take judicial cognizance of those laws, so far as it may be necessary to determine the validity of the acts alleged to be in conformity with them. Ib.

ADMIRALTY. See Pleading, 7, 8; Practice, 15, 16.

1. The District Courts of the United States, upon which admiralty jurisdiction was exclusively conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789, can take cognizance of all civil causes of such jurisdiction upon the lakes and waters connecting them, the same as upon the high seas, bays, and rivers navigable from the sea. The Eagle, 15

2. The clause (italicized in the lines below) in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which confers exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty jurisdiction upon the District Courts, "including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, within their respective 43 ( 673 )

VOL. VIII.

ADMIRALTY (continued).

districts, as well as upon the high seas," is inoperative since the decision
(A D. 1851) in the Genesee Chief (12 Howard, 443), which decided
that admiralty jurisdiction was not limited in this country to tide
waters, but extended to the lakes and the waters connecting them.
The Eagle, 15.

3. Nautical rules require, that where a steamship and sailing vessel are
approaching from opposite directions, or on intersecting lines, the
steamship, from the moment the sailing vessel is seen, shall watch
with the highest diligence her course and movements, so as to be able
to adopt such timely measures of precaution as will necessarily pre-
vent the two boats coming in contact. The Carroll, 302.

4. Porting the helm a point, when the light of a sailing vessel is first ob-
served, and then waiting until a collision is imminent, before doing
anything further, does not satisfy the requirements of the law. 1b.
5. Fault on the part of the sailing vessel at the moment preceding collision
does not absolve a steamer which has suffered herself and a sailing
vessel to get in such dangerous proximity, as to cause inevitable alarm
and confusion, and collision as a consequence. The steamer, as having
committed a far greater fault in allowing such proximity to be brought
about, is chargeable with all the damages resulting from the col-
lision. Ib.

6. Although the duty of vessels propelled by steam is to keep clear of
those moved by wind, yet these latter must not, by changing their
course instead of keeping on it, put themselves carelessly in the way
of the former, and so render ineffective their movements to give the
sailing vessels sufficient berth. The Potomac, 590.

7. The confessions of a master, in a case of collision, are evidence against
the owner. Ib.

8. Restitutio in integrum is the leading maxim as to the measure of damages
in cases of libel in admiralty, for injury to vessels, for collision. In
other words, where repairs are practicable, the general rule is, that
the damages shall be sufficient to restore the injured vessel to the
condition in which she was at the time the collision occurred. And
this rule does not allow deduction, as in insurance cases, for the new
materials furnished in the place of the old. The Baltimore, 377.
9. Although, if a vessel be sunk by collision in so deep water, or otherwise
so sunk, that she cannot be raised and repaired, except at an expense
equal to or greater than the sum which she would be worth when
repaired, the rule cannot apply, still the mere fact that a vessel is
sunk is not, of itself, sufficient to show that the loss is total, nor to
justify the master and owner in abandoning her and her cargo. Ib.
BILL OF ATTAINDER. See Constitutional Law, 14.

BILL OF EXCHANGE. See Negotiable Paper.

BILL OF EXCEPTION. See Practice, 2, 3.

Unless exceptions be drawn up so as to present distinctly the ruling of the
court upon the points raised, and unless signed and sealed by the pre-

BILL OF EXCEPTION (continued).

siding judge, they cannot be considered by an appellate court. Young
v. Martin, 354.

BILL OF LADING.

1. May be explained by parol evidence in so far as it is a receipt, as dis-
tinguished from a contract. The Lady Franklin, 325.

2. One given by a person who was agent of several vessels all alike en-
gaged in transporting goods brought to certain waters by a railway
line, but having separate owners, and not connected by any joint un-
dertaking to be responsible for one another's breaches of contract-
the bill, through mistake of the agent, acknowledging that certain
goods had been shipped on the vessel A., when, in fact, they had been
previously shipped on vessel B., and a bill of lading given accord-
ingly-will not make the vessel A. responsible, the goods having been
lost by the vessel B., and the suit being one by shippers of the mer-
chandise against the owner of the vessel A., and the case being thus
unembarrassed by any question of a bonâ fide purchase on the strength
of the bill of lading.

Ib.

3. An explosion of the boiler on a steam vessel is not a "peril of naviga-
tion" within the meaning of. Propeller Mohawk, 153.

BURDEN Of proof.

1. In a suit brought by the assignee of a chose in action in the Federal
court on a contract assigned, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff,
when the instruments and assignment are offered under the plea of
the general issue, to show affirmatively that the action could have
been sustained if it had been brought by the original obligee. Brad-
ley v. Rhine's Administrator, 393.

2. A court having fairly submitted to a jury, the evidence in a case, and
charged as favorably to a party, as he could properly have asked, may,
in the exercise of its discretion, refuse a request by that party to
charge as to which side the burden of proof belongs. Chicopee Bank
v. Philadelphia Bank, 641.

CALIFORNIA LAND CLAIMS.

1. Where a Mexican grant of land in Calfornia designates the land granted
by a particular name, and specifies the quantity, but does not give any
boundaries, the grantee is entitled to the quantity specified within the
limits of his settlement and possession, if that amount can be obtained
without encroachment upon the prior rights of adjoining proprie-
tors. Alviso v. United States, 337.

2. When the evidence upon a boundary line, between two Mexican grants,
is conflicting and irreconcilable, this court will not interfere with the
decision of the court below. Ib.

3. Parties not claiming under the United States, who are allowed to in-
tervene in proceedings of the District Court to correct surveys of
Mexican land grants in California, under the act of June 14th, 1860,
must claim under cessions of the former Mexican government. The
order of the District Court, allowing a party thus claiming to inter-
vene, is a determination that he possesses such interest derived from