Opinion of the court.

costs, against the stipulators and claimants.

Dissatisfied

with the decree, the claimants appealed to this court.

By the findings of the court it appears-(1.) That the cotton was grown on a plantation in the State of Alabama, and that it was purchased by the agent of the Bank of Louisiana during the period when both of those States were in rebellion against the United States. (2.) That the agent of the bank, in going from Louisiana to Alabama, passed through our military lines; and that he purchased the cotton in the latter State for the bank, and with the funds which he transported through our military lines. (3.) That neither the agent nor the bank had any license or permit from the President to trade or hold any commercial intercourse in that State or district, and that his acts in trading for, and making the purchase of, the cotton were contrary to the act of Congress prohibiting all such trade and commercial intercourse.

None of these matters, however, can be re-examined in this court, as the District Court had no jurisdiction of the cause in admiralty to render any decree upon the merits. Where the seizure is made on navigable waters, within the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, the case belongs to the instance side of the District Court; but where the seizure was made on land, the suit, though in the form of a libel of information, is an action at common law, and the claimants are entitled to trial by jury.*

Seizures, when made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, are exclusively cognizable in the District Courts, subject to appeal, as provided by law; but all seizures on land or on waters not navigable, and all suits instituted to recover penalties and forfeitures incurred, except for seizures on navigable waters, must be prosecuted as other common-law suits, and can only be removed into this court by writ of error.†

Want of jurisdiction in the court below, however, does not prevent this court from assuming jurisdiction on appeal

* Confiscation Cases, 7 Wallace, 462; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Id. 769. Insurance Co. v. United States, 6 Wallace, 765; United States v. Hart, Ib. 772.

Opinion of the court.

for the purpose of reversing the decree rendered by that court, and of vacating any unwarranted proceedings of that court, which necessarily stand in the way of a new trial there, in a case where, in the judgment of this court, a new trial ought to be granted. Where the court below has no jurisdiction of the case, in any form of proceeding, the course of this court is to direct the cause to be dismissed, if the judgment or decree was for the defendant or claimant, but if the judgment or decree was for the plaintiff or libellant, the court here will reverse the judgment or decree, and remand the cause, with directions to the court below to dismiss the proceeding.

Unless the practice were as explained, great injustice would be done in all cases where the judgment or decree was in favor of the party who instituted the suit, as he would obtain the full benefit of a judgment or decree, rendered by a court in his favor, which had no jurisdiction to hear aud determine the controversy. Hence, this court will, in all such cases, reverse the judgment or decree, and direct the proceedings to be dismissed, or remand the cause, with directions to allow the pleadings to be amended, and to grant a new trial, according to law. But the fund in this case, having been distributed, a new trial would be useless, unless the fund is restored to the registry of the court, where it was deposited before the decree of distribution was executed. Although the District Court has no jurisdiction in such a case, still, this court has full jurisdiction on appeal to reverse the action of that court, and to dismiss the proceedings; or, in a case where a new trial is required, to remand the cause, and give directions to that effect, and also, to direct that a writ of restitution issue to the proper parties, to cause the fund to be restored to the registry of the court, from which it was erroneously withdrawn.

DECREE REVERSED, and the cause remanded, with directions to allow the pleadings to be amended, and to grant a new trial, and issue a writ of restitution,

IN CONFORMITY TO THE OPINION OF THE court.

Syllabus.

CARPENTER v. Dexter.

1. A justice of the peace was not authorized by the laws of Illinois, in 1818, to take the acknowledgment or proof, without the State, of deeds of land situated within the State; but this want of authority was remedied by a statute passed on the 22d of February, 1847.

2. In aid of the certificate of acknowledgment, or proof of a deed, reference may be had to the instrument itself, or to any part of it. Thus, where a law of Illinois, in force in 1847, provided that no officer should take the acknowledgment of any person, unless such person should be personally known to him to be the real person who executed the deed, and in whose name such acknowledgment was proposed to be made, or should be proved to be such by a credible witness, and that such personal knowledge or proof should be stated in the certificate; and the certificate of the officer following immediately after the attestation clause of the deed, stated that the "above-named grantor, who has signed, sealed, and delivered the above instrument of writing, personally appeared" before the officer, and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed, but omitted to state that the person making the acknowledgment was personally known to the officer to be the person who executed the deed; Held, that the omission was supplied by reference to the attestation clause, which declared that the instrument was "signed, sealed, and delivered," in presence of the subscribing witnesses, of whom the officer taking the acknowledgment was one.

8. It will be presumed, that a commissioner of deeds, in New York, whose authority to act is limited only to his county, exercised his office within the territorial limits for which he was appointed, although the only venue given to his certificate of acknowledgment be "State of New York." If such were not the presumption, the defect in this particular held to be supplied in this case by reference to the deed and the previous certificate of acknowledgment by the same person; in the first of which the grantor designated the county in which he had affixed his hand and seal to the instrument, and in the second of which the county is given in its venue.

4. When a deed showed that one Wooster was a subscribing witness with the officer, and the certificate of proof given by the officer stated that "Wooster, one of the subscribing witnesses," to the officer known, came before him, and being sworn, said, that he saw the grantor execute and acknowledge the deed; Held, that there was a substantial compliance with the statute, requiring the officer to certify that he knew the affiant to be a subscribing witness.

5. Unless the statute of a State requires evidence of official character to accompany the official act which it authorizes, none is necessary. And where one State recognizes acts done in pursuance of the laws of another State, its courts will take judicial cognizance of those laws, so far as it

Statement of the case.

may be necessary to determine the validity of the acts alleged to be in conformity with them.

Thus, where a statute of Illinois provided that deeds of land within the State, which had been, or might thereafter, be executed without the State and within the United States, and which had been, or might be acknowledged or proved, in conformity with the laws of the State where executed, were admissible to record in the counties of Illinois, in which the property was situated; and a deed executed in New York was acknowledged before a judge of a court of record of that State-an officer authorized by the laws of New York to take the acknowledgment and proof of deeds; and the certificate of this judge was not accompanied by any evidence of his official character, or that his certificate was in conformity with the laws of that State; Held, that no such certificate of conformity was necessary for the reasons given above.

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

୮

The action was ejectment to recover the possession of certain real property, situated in the county of Bureau, in the State of Illinois. Both parties claimed title from the same source,―a patent of the United States, issued to William T. Davenport, in May, 1818. The points in dispute arose upon the deraignment of title from the patentee.

The plaintiff produced in evidence the patent; a deed from the patentee to one Hawley, dated in September, 1818; a deed from Hawley to Thaddeus Munson, dated in December, 1818; and a deed from Munson to William James, dated in February, 1819; all of which embraced the demanded premises. The deeds were inscribed upon the record, in the proper register's office, in May, 1819. Those from Davenport to Hawley, and from Hawley to Munson, contained this indorsement (unsigned by the recorder) of the fact:

"RECORDER'S OFFICE, EDWARDSVILLE, May 17th, 1819.

"I certify the within deeds, together with the certificates of acknowledgment, are this day recorded and examined in my office, in Book V, p. 353 and 354."*

William James died in 1832, leaving several heirs-at-law. The premises in controversy were allotted in severalty to

*See infra, p. 520.

Statement of the case.

John B. James, by a decree of one of the Circuit Courts of the State, in a suit for partition between him and his coheirs. John B. James died in 1844, leaving a will, by which he devised the premises to the plaintiff. The record of partition, and the record of the will and of its probate were produced in evidence.

The defendants, also relying upon the patent of the United States to Davenport, introduced in evidence a conveyance of the premises, from the patentee, to one De Witt, bearing date in August, 1818, and a conveyance from the heirs of De Witt to himself, bearing date in July, 1861. The first of these deeds was recorded in December, 1861, and the other was recorded in February, 1862.

Beginning with the plaintiff's case. The deed from Davenport to Hawley concluded with the following attestation clause:

"In witness of all the foregoing, I have hereunto fixed my hand and seal, at Albany, in the county of Albany, and State of New York, this first day of September, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen.

"WM. T. DAVENPORT, [L. 8.]

The certificate of acknowledgment following immediately after the above clause, was thus:

"STATE OF NEW YORK,

COUNTY OF ALBANY, SS.

"Be it remembered, that on the first day of September, 1818, the above-named William T. Davenport, who has signed, sealed, and delivered the above instrument of writing, personally appeared before me, the undersigned justice of the peace, and acknowledged, in due form of law, the same to be his free act and decd, for the purposes therein set forth, and also gave his con-. sent, that the same should be recorded wherever it might be deemed necessary. In witness of all of which, the said justice