Argument for the appellant. complainants and Levison, it appeared that the sale having been made on the 9th, Levison was arrested on the 10th upon the affidavit of a brother-in-law to one of the complainants; that on the 11th, complainant came to Chicago; that he staid until the 14th; that while here he discharged the warrant of arrest of Levison, and employed Levison's previously retained counsel, to collect his debt out of the goods sold to Kempner; that on the 16th (Sunday intervening), Levison confessed judgment to the complainants; that on the 17th he confessed judgments to seven other of the credi tors, now complainants, and on the same 17th April this bill was filed as a creditor's bill, on executions returned unsatisfied as against Levison; that none of these demands were due at the time under three months, except one, which rested in open account; that those judgments were confessed in the office of Levison's attorneys; and, that the bill waived an answer on oath. The parties defendant were Jews. The court below, on view of all the evidence, decreed the sale fraudulent, and Kempner appealed. Mr. S. A. Goodwin, for the appellant : We charge that the bill has been filed by collusion between the complainants and Levison, and we think that the dates at which, and the circumstances wherein the judgments were obtained show that. But passing to the complainants' case, it is certain that they must establish affirmatively, that the sale was fraudulently intended by Levison, and, as a fact, that Kempner conspired with Levison to cheat and defraud the creditors by having such sale made with the design of keeping the merchandise beyond the reach of process of law; and that the sale was in fact made for such purpose, that is to say, to hinder and delay creditors.* These are the allegations of their bill. * Cadogan v. Kennett, 2 Cowper, 434; United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch, 88; Clements v. Moore, 6 Wallace, 299. Argument for the appellant. The bona fides of the purchase by Kempner is affirmatively established. Levison's whole indebtedness on the 9th of April, 1866, was within $15,000. He had full $13,000 money and chattels. The complainants do not allege nor show, nor did Levison, as a witness, pretend that he had not notes, claims, and choses in action, or other moneys to meet the balance of $1100 in full. His wife had money. It is incumbent on the complainants to show affirmatively that Levison was bankrupt, before they can charge that the sale was fraudulent. The complainants do not show anywhere in the case, that Levison has not now, nor that he has not always had money enough to pay these creditors all he owes. The answer which the complainant's solicitors drew for him does not deny that he has such money. Kempner could not know of a fraudulent purpose which Levison did not entertain, so far as shown, for he (Levisou) substantially negatives that. In the absence of that main necessary fact, the complainants have attempted to prove some remarks, which, if substantiated, they seem to suppose would show Kempner cognizant of some wrong intention. But they are all unsatisfactory for the conclusion, and every one of them denied by Kempner and disproved. Besides, if considered proved, they would not indicate knowledge or intent on Kempner's part, that the money paid would not be applied to satisfy creditors. If the sale was honest and fair, and for a fair price, it could make no difference that the creditors might not be paid in full. Purchases are often made of the stocks of insolvents, and rightly and honestly, although such consequences necessarily ensue. As to the value of the goods there is a difference of opinion, but the preponderance is with the defendant. Inadequacy of consideration is thus exploded, either as a badge of fraud per se, or as a motive for a fraudulent collusion with Levison. Kempner's purpose of going into trade was a legitimate one. The right to sell was perfect in Levison, either at wholesale or retail. The right to buy and make a good, or even a hard bargain, cannot be denied to a purchaser, there being no fraudulent conspiracy between vendor and vendee. Argument for the appellant. The debts of Levison were not due. No suit had been commenced, or even threatened. Kempner could therefore have had no design to place these goods beyond the reach of an execution in behalf of these creditors. Levison's creditors had no lien on them fixed or inchoate. Nor had they begun, or threatened to begin any proceedings to mature a lien. The full price paid put Levison in funds to pay his creditors. The Supreme Court of Illinois say, in Waddams v. Humphrey,* "No matter how much a man may be indebted, he may sell his property for a fair price, or even for a price below the market value, if done honestly and with no view to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors of their just dues. A debtor may sell his property for a fair price, even if he sells it with the avowed intention of defeating an honest claim, if no lien exists to forbid it." It was reasonable prudence for Kempner to remove the goods at once into his own possession after the inventory was made. Prompt possession has never before been urged as a badge of fraud. On the contrary, possession left with the vendor has always been considered ground of suspicion.† It is idle to say that the possession was in haste to avoid seizure by creditors. There was not only no such thing threatened, but not one of Levison's creditors was in a position, legally, to touch these goods by attachment, replevin, execution, or other process. These parties were all Jews, and with them Sunday is always a secular and convenient day for any extra work. Will it be said that the receipt on the invoice of goods sold, was taken for the whole sum fraudulently? The charge is without foundation. All the parties connected with the sale well knew the amount Kempner was to give. It was openly and notoriously known, and talked about by near a dozen witnesses. How then could Kempner expect to keep it a secret by the form of the receipt? * 22 Illinois, 663; and see Hessing v. McCloskey, 37 Id. 342. † Twyne's Case, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 1. Opinion of the court. Deeply as the law abhors fraud and crime, it equally abhors the imputation of either, except upon clear and controlling evidence. And the onus is therefore upon the creditor who assails a sale to show the fraud which he relies on. Levison's testimony is worth very little, situated as he is, interested to pay his debts with property which he once sold, while he keeps the $10,000 consideration-money in his pocket, and proclaims his own turpitude. Mr. Gillet, contra. Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. It has been frequently held that fraud ought not to be presumed, but must be proved. But the evidence of it is almost always circumstantial. Nevertheless, though circumstantial, it produces conviction in the mind often of more force than direct testimony. It would be a troublesome, as well as an unprofitable task, to examine all the very astute arguments, founded on the large mass of testimony contained in the record, to show that the court below have come to a wrong conclusion. It suffices to say that it sufficiently appears that the evidence before the court fully justified their conclusion. It is true that mere inadequacy of consideration, unless extremely gross, does not per se prove fraud. But the direct testimony here confirms the fact that Kempner urged the acceptance of his offer to purchase with arguments such as this: "There is some pretty rough talk in town about you. You had better not delay this matter. You had better let me have the goods and put the money in your pocket, and let the creditors go to the devil." The circumstantial evidence amply confirms this direct evidence of fraud. 1st. The false receipts given for full value on Saturday. 2d. The account of stock made out on Sunday. 3d. The removal of the goods into a cellar on Monday. The defendant's endeavor to prove by experts, that the price Statement of the case. given was sufficient, tends only to confirm the correctness of the decree of the Circuit Court, which is AFFIRMED WITH COSTS. MATTINGLY v. NYE. 1. The statute of 13 Eliz., ch. 5, which is in force in the District of Columbia, does not affect, in favor of subsequent creditors, a voluntary settlement made by a man, not indebted at the time, for his wife and children, unless fraud was intended when the settlement was made. Sexton v. Wheaton (8 Wheaton, 229; S. C. 1 American Leading Cases, 1), approved and affirmed. 2. A judgment for money due, at a certain time, against the party making the settlement, is conclusive in respect to the parties to it. It cannot be impeached collaterally, and it cannot be questioned upon a creditor's bill. APPEAL from the District of Columbia; the case being thus: Nye, a man not very provident, bought a city lot of no great value in Washington, with some money that he had, and on the 25th June, 1857, had it conveyed in trust for his wife and children, to one Harkness as trustee. The purchase and conveyance in trust was made, as it seems by Harkness's own account of it, by Nye at the suggestion of Harkness, "who, living in the neighborhood of Nye, and having frequent opportunities of seeing the destitution and need of the family, and the infirm and broken health of the wife, interested himself in securing a home for herself and children, proposed a conveyance by which the property should be secured against the contingencies of any future recklessness or want of care in the said Nye." On the 21st July, 1860-that is to say a little more than three years after this transaction-Nye obtained money of one Mattingly, a person with whom he had had frequent money dealings, and sometimes as it seemed at exorbitant rates (including some dealings before the purchase), making, for the money now got, an assignment of a certain claim, but whether in satis |