Opinion of the court. The appeal given by the act of 1867 extended, indeed, to cases within the former acts; and the act, by its grant of additional authority, so enlarged the jurisdiction by habeas corpus that it seems, as was observed in the McCardle case, "impossible to widen" it. But this effect does not take from the act its character of an additional grant of jurisdiction, and make it operate as a repeal of jurisdiction theretofore allowed. Our conclusion is, that none of the acts prior to 1867, authorizing this court to exercise appellate jurisdiction by means of the writ of habeas corpus, were repealed by the act of that year, and that the repealing section of the act of 1868 is limited in terms, and must be limited in effect to the appellate jurisdiction authorized by the act of 1867. We could come to no other conclusion without holding that the whole appellate jurisdiction of this court, in cases of habeas corpus, conferred by the Constitution, recognized by law, and exercised from the foundation of the government hitherto, has been taken away, without the expression of such intent, and by mere implication, through the opera tion of the acts of 1867 and 1868. The suggestion made at the bar, that the provision of the act of 1789, relating to the jurisdiction of this court by habeas corpus, if repealed by the effect of the act of 1867, was revived by the repeal of the repealing act, has not escaped our consideration. We are inclined to think that such would be the effect of the act of 1868, but having come to the conclusion that the act of 1789 was not repealed by the act of 1867, it is not necessary to express an opinion on that point. The argument having been confined, by direction of the court, to the question of jurisdiction, this opinion is limited to that question. The jurisdiction of the court to issue the writ prayed for is affirmed. Statement of the case. NAILOR V. WILLIAMS. 1. Where a question is asked of a witness, which is illegal only because it may elicit improper testimony, and the court permits it to be answered. against the objection of the other party, if the witness knows nothing of the matter to which he is interrogated, or if his answer is favorable to the objecting party, it is not error of which a revising court can take notice. It works him no injury. 2. If it does work the objecting party injury, he can show it by making the answer a part of the bill of exceptions, and unless he does this there is no error of the sort mentioned. 3. Where there is nothing in the bill of exceptions which enables a revising court to say that questions objected to have exceeded the reasonable license which a court, in its discretion, may allow in cross-examination, no error is shown. APPEAL from the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, the case being this: Several negroes had been convicted in Virginia of heinous crimes and sentenced to death; but being reprieved by the governor of Virginia, were sold by that State to two persons, Williams and Davis, upon Williams's giving bond to transport them beyond the limits of the United States. Williams did not so transport them, but took them to Louisiana, and was there indicted, convicted, and sentenced to a heavy fine, under a statute of Louisiana, for bringing negroes convicted of crimes into that State. The negroes themselves, however, were not confiscated, but were sold by Williams for a large sum, to be thereafter received. In this state of facts, Davis (his partner in the purchase from the State of Virginia) assigned, in 1847, by instrument of writing, all his interest in the slaves to one Nailor, party to this suit, and Williams having received the purchase-money for the slaves, Nailor thereupon sued him below in assumpsit to recover his share of the proceeds, and called two witnesses to prove the genuineness of Davis's signature to the instrument of assignment, and Williams's acknowledgment of the claim now set up by Nailor. One of them testified that the assignment was shown in Argument for the plaintiff in error. the latter part of the year 1867 by the plaintiff to Williams, and that Williams, after reading it, said that when the claim for the negroes was allowed, and the money obtained for them, he (the plaintiff) should receive one-half thereof by virtue of said assignment. This witness, on cross-examination, was asked: "Was not the said plaintiff, at the date of said assignment, engaged in trading in negroes?" The question was objected to, and the objection was overruled. This was the ground of an exception. The next witness was asked on cross-examination: "Was not he (the witness), at the date of the said assignment, engaged in aiding the plaintiff in trading in negroes?" This question too was objected to, and the objection was overruled; and this constituted a second exception. On these two exceptions the case was brought here. The bills of exception did not show what answers the witnesses gave to the questions above-mentioned, or whether, in fact, they answered the questions at all. Messrs. Brent and Phillips, for the plaintiff in error : Nothing could be more irrelevant than the general inquiry made of the witness, which is the subject of the first exception. At the date of the transaction, the buying and selling of slaves as chattels was lawful, and the inquiry did not propose to connect, itself with the consideration of the assignment from Davis to Nailor in any way or with any matter testified to in chief. The only tendency and object of the inquiry was to excite in 1867, the prejudices of the jury against a plaintiff who, twenty years before, might have dealt in slaves. The same objections exist with increased force to the similar inquiry regarding the business of the witness, and his aiding the plaintiff in negro trading, and which makes the subject of the second exception. The purpose of the question was, really, to impeach the credibility of the witness Opinion of the court. by a collateral inquiry into his business twenty years ago, in matters irrelevant to the subject before the jury, and by means unknown to any legitimate or recognized mode of impeaching a witness in a court of justice. Mr. Bradley, contra. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. If a question is asked of a witness on the stand, the answer to which is pertinent and legal testimony, and the court refuses to permit the witness to answer, this is error which a revising court will correct, because the injury to the party consists in the refusal of the court to permit the answer to be given, and he can do nothing more to prove the wrong done him than to show that he asked a legal question, the answer to which, by the action of the court, was denied him. But where a question is asked which is illegal only because it may elicit improper testimony, and the court permits it to be answered against the objection of the other party, the injury done the party is by the answer, and notwithstanding the erroneous ruling of the court, if the witness knows nothing of the matter to which he is interrogated, or if his answer is favorable to the objecting party, it works him no injury. If it does, he can show it by making the answer a part of the bill of exceptions, and unless he does this there is no error of which a revising court can take notice.' For this reason, and also because there is nothing in the bill of exceptions which enables us to say that the questions themselves exceeded the reasonable license which a court, in its discretion, may allow in cross-examination, we are of opinion that no error is shown by these bills of exception. As they constitute the only matters alleged against the judgment of the court below, it is AFFIRMED. Statement of the case. WARING V. THE MAYOR. The Bay of Mobile being included within the statutory definition of the port of Mobile, contracts for the purchase of cargoes of foreign merchandise before or after the arrival of the vessel in the said bay, where the goods by the terms of the contract, are not to be at the risk of the purchaser until delivered to him in said bay, do not constitute the purchaser an "importer," and the goods so purchased and sold by him, though in the original packages, may be properly subjected to taxation by the State. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Alabama; the question involved arising upon that clause of the Constitution which ordains that "no State shall lay any imposts on imports, or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws." The facts were these: The city of Mobile is situated on the west bank of the Mobile River, a short distance above its entry into the Bay of Mobile. The bay stretches about thirty miles below the city, and is connected with the Gulf of Mexico by a narrow strait. The town of Mobile, by an act of Congress passed 22d July, 1813,* was designated as the only port of entry for a collection district bounded by West Florida on the east, and Louisiana on the west, and comprising the bays, inlets, and rivers emptying into the gulf. The Bay of Mobile is a part of this district. Vessels anchor twenty-five miles below the city, and are unladen there upon lighters, which bring their cargoes to the town. Those coming from Great Britain frequently bring a cargo of salt, and cargoes of this kind are generally sold in advance of their arrival, or as soon as they reach the bay, before bulk is broken, or they are unloaded. In this state of commercial practice one Waring was in the habit of buying and selling salt thus imported. His custom was to purchase the entire cargo, which came in sacks, before the goods were entered at the custom-house, and usually before the arrival of the vessel, or while it was * 8 Stat. at Large, 35. |