Mechanics that animal and vegetable bodies are subject to the same mechanical laws as other bodies, in Chemistry the division between Organic and Inorganic Chemistry is being done away with, and in Biology theories of evolution are propounded which apply equally well to animate and inanimate nature. To acknowledge universal finality is not, however, it seems to us, to acknowledge universal equality of finality. Finality per se may be derived equally from any concatenation; but this is not to affirm that there is as much finality in the stone as in the eye. We see in the eye a more complex concatenation than in the stone, a circumscription and constraining of a greater number of efficient causes to the given function, and a greater particularity and speciality in the func tion itself. M. Janet throughout his work insists that finality is peculiarly noticeable in organisms, and one reason for this, different from the ones we have just mentioned, he puts very strongly as follows:

"The reason why final causes will always be sought by preference in the sphere of living beings is, that there alone a fact is met with which may be considered as having a veritable interest, and which may consequently be an end-namely, sensibility. There only, where the possession, the preservation of being is felt, can existence be considered as a good, and conse quently as an end to which a system of means is subordinated. What does it really matter to a crystal to be or not to be? What does it matter to it whether it have eight angles in place of twelve, or be organized geometrically rather than in any other way? Existence having no value for it, why should nature have taken means to secure it? Why should it have been at the expense of a plan and a system of combinations to produce a result without value for any one, at least in the absence of living beings? So, again, however beautiful the planetary and sidereal order may be, what matters this beauty, this order, to the stars themselves that know nothing of it? And if you say that this fair order was constructed to be admired by men, or that God might therein contemplate His glory, it is evident that an end can only be given to these ob jects by going out of themselves, by passing them by, and rising above their proper system, to doubt it is the same as re

gards living beings, if one would rise to the absolute end, the final and last end, but in themselves and for themselves they have already a sufficient though relative end, namely, to exist and to feel it; this is for them a good, and one can understand that nature has taken precaution to assure it to them. It is not the same with inorganic beings." (pp. 190, 191.)

M. Janet thus briefly states his conclusion as to the relations. of physical science and teleology:

"To sum up. There is no contradiction between our principles and the most recent scientific conceptions. No fact, no law of nature warrants us to eliminate the final cause from the human mind. Science, so far as it is science, is mute on the problem." (p. 145.)

We have thus endeavored to give an exposition of the chief fundamental ideas in the first book of the Final Causes together with some reflections on the subject which have been stimulated by the study of M. Janet's work. We have said nothing with reference to the chapters on the Facts and Contrary Facts, as there is nothing of very great newness or interest to be noted in connection with them. They are as remarkable for clearness, candor, and thoroughness as is the rest of the discussion. The weakest portion of the book, as it seems to us, is the discussion of evolution in the last three chapters. While there is much here that is suggestive and valuable, yet it did not satisfy us as some other parts of the book did, as revealing perfect mastery. Any worthy consideration of these chapters would itself call for an Article, and cannot be compressed into a few words at the close of this review. The writer has, moreover, an Article on this subject in the New Englander for September, 1883, in which M. Janet's position is

to some extent considered.

We must say in conclusion that we think that every one, of whatever opinions, who really loves candid and thorough thinking, cannot but be interested in this work; and we believe that it will do more to put Teleology on a truly scientific basis than any other work of this century has done.

ARTICLE V.-OEHLER'S OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

Oehler's Old Testament Theology. With the translation revised, an Introduction and Notes, by GEORGE E. DAY, Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature, and Biblical Theology, in Yale College. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.

SCHOLARLY candor, generous and accurate learning, carefulness of statement, and a pious, fervid but not bitter spirit, characterize the treatise of Oehler on Old Testament theology. These qualities of the original work, in connection with the faithful revision and valuable notes of its American editor, Professor Day, fully justify the claim of this book to be the best one as yet obtainable for the instruction of theological students in its subject. For mature students, however, it is in some important respects inferior to the "Old Testament Theology" of Hermann Schultz. The latter often shows more of intellectual pith and of ethical grasp than does Oehler; moreover, the positions of Schultz with respect to those questions of Old Testament Introduction and Criticism which underlie the systematic treatment of the theology of the Hebrew writers, are, if not always so "safe", yet more clearly defined and more intelligible. In reading Oehler, one who reads between the lines is frequently led to wonder what the final answer of its author would be to some of these fundamental questions. One is sometimes led to inquire how Oehler himself would reconcile his own position as a critic with his treatment of certain points in Biblical theology. None the less true is the persuasion that Oehler's book for the purpose of opening the subject before beginners is a better book than that of Schultz. For in certain very important respects the theological position of Oehler was such as to give a just additional value, in the minds of his American readers and admirers, to his opinion on critical and historical inquiries. That position, in its relation to these inquiries, it is the purpose of this Article very briefly to set forth.

In discussing the doctrine of Sacred Scripture, I have elsewhere called attention to this fact of history and of present experience: "It has come about that certain works on hermeneutics, and certain commentaries, are much used and highly praised by men who reject with horror the very principles which give all their value to these works, as soon as the principles are expressed in dogmatic form." In the same connection I have also ventured to speak of "the stolid predisposition," which so many show, "to maintain the post-Reformation dogma of inspiration, while enjoying the fruits of the very research which has quite undermined that dogma.” The truth of these statements is now being illustrated in an instructive way by the reception given to Oehler's "Old Testament Theology." Its good service, as rendered against a truly "destructive criticism," and its pious spirit, have called forth a due reward of praises from nearly all quarters. The praises are well deserved; but are they always intelligently rendered? We wish that those who have uttered them would ask themselves this question seriously, and would then try conscientiously to think out the import of their answer. On the other hand, at least one or two of those newspaper theologians who are by nature or long practice alarmists, have made the absurd discovery of "rationalism" even in the conservative and pious Oehler. "Rationalism !" indeed: When will such theologians learn the alphabet of theological and critical terminology? When will they begin to school themselves so as not to fling epithets upon the winds so aimlessly?

The "position" of Oehler toward questions which are on fire, and which will in time burn themselves into the consciences and minds of even the most stolid in the midst of our land and day, may be learned (sufficiently for our purpose) from the following brief statement. The statement will include certain facts from his life and certain quotations from his work on "Old Testament Theology."

There are some interesting, and perhaps not altogether superficial, resemblances between the forces which shaped the character of Oehler and those which shaped the character of the philosopher Kant nearly a whole century earlier. Both were of weak physical constitution; both suffered much from

physical pains and physical limitations. Both received from their parents, and especially from the mother, an inheritance of conscientiousness, and a strong development of that inheritance through early "Pietistic" training. Both had the disposition to carry this conscientiousness into the inquiry for truth. Both had a strong ethical desire to acquire for themselves, and to impart to others, a thirst for scientific knowledge, and a willingness to pay the full price for such knowledge, in careful, painstaking inquiry. Both waited many years, and suffered repeated disappointments, before reaching the place of professor in the department of learning which they coveted. Of course, beyond these resemblances no parallel would hold. But it cannot fail to be observed that the early pietism of Oehler was a determining factor in his subsequent theological and critical position, as the early pietism of Kant was a factor in his ethical and philosophical development.

The two teachers who had most to do with shaping the garlier scholarly tendencies of Oehler, were C. F. Schmid and C. F. Steudel. Schmid taught him what Biblical Theology is, and gave him an impetus, and ideas concerning its method, which were determinative of his future inquiries. Steudel was always his admired teacher, and was subsequently his beloved friend, as well as father-in-law. But we are assured by his biographer that the young Oehler was not blind to the great faults and gaps which lay in those "premises of the old supernaturalism" which Steudel believed and taught.

The treatment which Oehler received during the early years of his professional career at the hands of the rationalistic party in Tübingen, undoubtedly had some influence in confirming his native conservatism. It amounted almost to persecution; if the effort to prevent cherished hopes of position and influence as a teacher of the young can be called persecution. For some time Baur and his followers prevented the promotion of Oehler. But the course of these Rationalists compares very favorably in this regard with that of the ultraOrthodox. For who does not know that the name of Hengstenberg must remain as the synonym of theological bitterness and acrimony?-a warning, if such men would take warning, to his theological descendants in the present generation. It is