There is purpose in both, but the more specialized the process the higher our admiration. So with adaptations. The special adaptations of the hand to its uses are "more available as evidence of design than the adaptations of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means of excavating."

In view of this one "eternal act of creation-a never-ceasing process of divine energy," LeConte says: "There is still design in every object, but no longer a separate design, only a separate manifestation of one infinite design."

Whether Development and design find acceptance or rejection, the primary purpose of this presentation concerns only their relations. The only change wrought is to purge teleology from the untenable hypotheses of immediate creation and fixity of species, and to rest the argument on the facts of nature and not on imaginative assumptions. Science has demolished all probability of this "carpenter theory" of the universe. In place of mechanical origin is substituted the nobler conception of dynamic creation. Mediate creation supplants immediate and a process replaces a chimera.

The processes of Development discover a reason for increased admiration of divine wisdom, an overwhelming sense of the glory of the infinite One-of the majesty of the Eternal, an immeasurable exaltation of the Christian's God. Increasing through the ages, divine Development realizes divine Design. processes are the grand attestation to the wisdom and fore

Its

thought of formative Intelligence.

Neither Development nor teleology directly concern the creation (origination) of matter and force, but their use, the creation (formation) of adaptations of species and organs and instincts. Being truths, each harmonizes with the other. In nature's temple they walk hand in hand, and it is well that truth-seekers imitate their example. The fabled shield should not separate the teleologist and the evolutionist.

Materialism finds no support in Development. She can not shut out an intelligent Designer until she makes processes account for beginnings by which alone processes are possible. Until then, away with her cloak of imposture from the new

science!

Oberlin Seminary.

ARTICLE V. THE EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS.

ALL our problems of extradition arise out of the conflict of the claims of the several national groups in regard to fugitives from justice, who have escaped from the territory of one group to that of another. For instance, a citizen of a particular State commits a crime within its territory and betakes himself to the territory of another State, having a different form of government, laws, and customs. Is he still, in view of both States amenable to the tribunals of the State from which he has fled? And if so, by what means can the claim to jurisdiction best be enforced? The subject is of such a comprehensive nature that we shall have to confine ourselves to the answer to the first only of these questions.

The strict doctrine of jurisprudence teaches that between residents of two independent States, no legal relations whatsoever exist; but notwithstanding this theory the practice has grown up of regarding citizens of different States, for purposes of jurisdiction, as members of the same political community; treaties of international copyright and postage, the German Zollverein and treaties of reciprocity in trade give proof that the old system of national exclusiveness is fast falling into decay; and it is this feeling of international citizenship that has given rise to the extradition of criminals.

Extradition, as known to the ancients, was conducted without treaties, and for the purpose of retaking refugees accused of political crimes, chiefly; as, for instance, the extradition of Themistocles demanded of the king of the Molossi by the Athenians and Spartans, or of Hannibal obtained by the Romans from the king of Bithynia. The modern usage, however, has been to regulate extradition by treaties, curiously enough reversing the custom of the ancients by expressly excepting all political offences. The subject is one the development of which has been confined almost exclusively to modern times, and the steadiest and most rapid progress in it

has been made in the comparatively peaceful years that have elapsed since 1815.

The motive for extradition, as set down by international jurists, is two-fold: first, it is for the common interest of mankind that offenses against person and property, offenses against the well-being of society, and, if I may so use the term, against the common law of nations, should be repressed by punishment; and, secondly, it is for the interest of the State into which the refugee has fled that he should be immediately apprehended, since no State wishes to add to the number of its own unimprisoned criminals by offering itself as a refuge for the malefactors of foreign countries. For the first of these reasons, viz: that it is for the common benefit of all, it seems as if we might reasonably expect that all civilized nations would concede reciprocity in regard to the matter; and for the second, viz: that we do not wish any addition to our criminal classes, even if other States refuse to grant reciprocity, it is for our own self-interest to deliver up to justice the escaped criminals of other nations. It would seem to me, then, that treaties such as have hitherto been concluded by United States, in which are specified certain crimes, for other than which extradition will not be granted, are quite unnecessary; and should be concluded for the purpose only of making sure of the fulfillment of conditions under which the extradition is conceded. It should be our general policy to surrender to any civilized State, whether we have a treaty on the subject with it or not, any refugee from that State against whom has been made out a prima facie case that he has been guilty of committing some offense by us regarded as against the well-being of society.

The principle, often put forth and in fact contained in our treaties with Norway, Sweden, Austria, and most of the German States, that, if the fugitive be a subject of the State in which he is found, his extradition will not be granted for a crime committed in the foreign State, is carrying to an extreme the principle of national sovereignty; and, as is readily seen, is contrary to the principle of both the motives for extradition already set forth; and, too, is contrary to the whole system of the criminal law of this country, which has at its foundation the principle that a criminal should be tried in the place where

VOL. VII.

the crime was committed, in the forum delicti. The trial of the criminal in the country in which the crime was committed is manifestly more just, not only because the evidence is more trustworthy and more easily obtained, but also because it is the laws of that particular country that he has violated, and by these same laws should he be tried, and suffer such penalties as these laws impose. To put forward as the reason for not sur rendering a criminal, the fear that justice would not be done by a foreign tribunal to one of our citizens, would be to offer a serious insult to the nation making the demand; for extradition is based on mutual confidence, and there is no more reason to distrust the fair administration of justice in such a case than in any other. This doctrine has especial force in such a country as United States, in which the principle of trial in loco quo is so strong, and which, unlike Bavaria and other German States, takes no cognizance of a crime committed by one of its citizens outside of its own boundaries.

The

In all the treaties of United States with foreign powers the offenses for which extradition will be granted have been specified to the exclusion of other offenses not so specified. Ashburton treaty between United States and England negotiated in 1842 covers only seven specified crimes and expressly excludes all crimes of a political nature. If we review the general progress of our extradition policy, as exhibited in our treaties subsequently concluded with foreign powers, we should see that the tendency has been steadily in the direction of enlarging the meagre list of extraditable crimes, accompanied by the exclusion of crimes of a political nature.

Notwithstanding the high authority of Grotius, modern jurists are unanimous in thinking that extradition should not be granted for political offenses; for, although it is undoubtedly for the interest of every nation that its subjects should submit to the constituted government for the maintenance of internal peace and order, yet one country can scarcely be expected to have such an interest in the particular form of government or particular ruler of another, that it should aid in bringing to trial political offenders, who, it may be, are rather voluntary exiles than escaped criminals. Though the rebel who causes bloodshed from interested motives may be worthy

of the severest punishment, yet resistance to usurpation or tyranny may be inspired by the noblest motives, and in such political crises, failure renders him a criminal, success a hero. There is a wide divergence of opinion as to what constitutes treason, in different countries; in some dissent from the established church; in some freedom of the press; so it would be very difficult for a foreign nation to judge between the contending parties, and it may itself be divided in its views as to the merits of the particular case. It is then a safer rule to exclude crimes of a purely political nature; but this principle must not be carried to an extreme. Far different from such crimes are those of assassination and murder by weapons or explosives even when committed for the furtherance of some political or pretended political purpose. The making of such a distinction was the object of the recent extradition convention between United States and Belgium, which recognizes as a specific crime "the assassination or attempted assassination of the chief of State;" and it was agreed by European jurists that no European State would have refused to surrender to United States any of the parties concerned in the murder of President Lincoln, or to extradite Guiteau, had he escaped from this country. In regard to the proposed extradition of the Irish agitators, Sheridan from United States and Byrne from France, the Pall Mall Gazette says: "What is and what is not a political offense are questions the answer to which vary with the temper of the times, the prejudices of the judges and the political tendencies of the governments of the day. It has been our custom in England to give a very liberal interpretation to the term and we need not be surprised if the authorities in United States, if not in France" do the same; implying that, even if Sheridan and Byrne could have been proved to have actively engaged in organizing the Assassination Society in Dublin, England, from her past policy in regard to the extradition of Orsini, the would-be assassin of Napoleon III., could have had no cause for complaint, if extradition were refused on the ground of political motive. It is an essential characteristic of a political crime that it takes place openly and without attempt at concealment; but such a dastardly, skulking crime as assassination loses none of its atrocity