to such equitable assignment as vested the interest in the assignee, and prevented the insurers from availing themselves of the defence of suicide. Halford vs. Kymer, 10 Barn. & Cress., 724.

Although, as in this case, an assignment without notice. may be good as between the original parties, yet as matter of prudence the assignee should, upon a transfer, require the immediate delivery of the policy, and should also give early notice to the insurers; otherwise, one taking by subsequent assignment who should, without notice of the prior transfer, perfect his title as assignee by notice to the insurers, would acquire a superior title, and in case of death the representatives of the assignor might collect the amount and discharge the insurer.

Notice to the insurers would also be necessary, to prevent the assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency from acquiring rights, which would impair or destroy the title of the assignee.

No special form of notice would be necessary, but a letter,' or even an oral communication, would be sufficient, if it communicated the information and could be proved.

In this matter of the assignment of policies of insurance, we have an instance of the manner in which commercial law has grown out of, and been conformed to, the customs and convenience of merchants and other business men.

There seems to be no special reason, in the nature of the instruments, why marine policies and fire and life policies should not stand upon the same footing as to transferability; but we find that, as to marine policies, they have always been transferable by custom, with the bills of lading; life policies have also been held to be assignable, though with less freedom; while fire policies have never been held to be assignable, without the special consent of the insurers.

The reason lies, as we have seen, not in the nature of the contract, or of the instrument, but in the fact that in fire insurance more reliance is placed upon the character of the insured, from the ease with which property on land can be burned without danger to the incendiary, who if he lacks

moral integrity may easily over insure and destroy his own property. This is not true in the same degree as to property on the sea, or as to human life.

Of the effects of an assignment of a life policy payable to a married woman, we have spoken under the preceding head. (See ante," Fifth," and cases Eadie vs. Slimmon, 26 N. Y., 9; Swan vs. Snow, 11 Allen, 224; Conn. Life Ins. Co. vs. Burroughs, 24 Conn., 305; and Burroughs vs. State Ass. Co., 97 Mass., 379.)

The suit upon a policy of insurance issued by a mutual company should, in case of loss, be in the name of him who is at the time a member of the company. Blanchard vs. Atlantic Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 33 N. H., 9.

It seems that an action may be maintained in the name of a widow, on a policy of insurance on her husband's life, which was effected for her benefit, although there be an executor. Myers vs. Keystone Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 Penn. St., 268.

An administratrix has the right of action, to recover insurance on the real estate of the deceased burned after his death, and is the trustee of the amount recovered for the heirs, who are entitled to the indemnity. Wyman vs. Wyman, 26 N. Y., 253.

Where, in a suit to recover insurance by an assignee of a policy, the complaint omitted to aver any interest of the plaintiff or his assignor in the subject insured, it was held to be a fatal defect. Fowler vs. New York &c. Ins. Co., 26 N. Y., 422.

A policy purported to insure S. upon certain property described as his the amount in case of loss to be paid to W. In an action of assumpsit on the policy, brought by W. against the insurance company, it was held, that parol evidence was not admissible, to show that W. was the real party to the contract; that the defendants had agreed to insure a mortgage interest held by him, and undertook to do so by the policy; and that they contracted with him by the name of S. Woodbury Savings Bank vs. Charter Oak &c. Ins. Co., 29 Ct., 374.

Proof of an application for insurance and of a policy is

suing thereon, both of which describe the property insured as the property of the plaintiffs, is prima facie evidence of title and of an insurable interest in the plaintiffs, in an action upon the policy. Nichols vs. Fayette &c. Insurance Co., 1 Allen, 63.

In an action upon a policy of insurance upon property which is admitted to have been owned by the plaintiff when the policy was issued, the burden of proof was upon the defendants, to show a subsequent alienation of the property. Orrell vs. Hampden Fire Ins. Co., 13 Gray, 431.

In an action on a policy of life insurance, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show any interest in the life of the assured. Trenton Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Johnson, 4 Zabriskie, (N. J.,) 576.

The assignee of a life policy, in trust for the wife of the assured, may upon the death of the assured recover the amount of the policy in an action in his own name, without joining the wife or personal representatives of the deceased. St. John vs. American Life Ins. Co., 2 Duer, (N. Y.,) 419.

SECTION 18.

Of Insurance against Accidents.

This form of Insurance has become quite common, and is becoming more so from year to year.

The general principles which regulate it, as to interest in the subject, warranty, representation and concealment, &c., &c., are much the same as in life insurance; and, indeed, the two forms of insurance are not unusually combined in the same policy, with general stipulation somewhat as follows:

"The

of

against accidental loss of life in the principal sum of $ , to be paid to his family or their legal representatives, within ninety days after sufficient proof that the insured, at any time within the term of the policy, shall have sustained bodily injuries, effected through violent and accidental

means, within the intent and meaning of this contract and the conditions hereunto annexed, and such injuries shall have occasioned death within ninety days from the happening there

of:

: or, if the assured shall sustain bodily injuries by means as aforesaid, which shall absolutely and totally disable and prevent him from the prosecution of any and every kind of business, then, on satisfactory proof of such injuries, he shall be indemnified against loss of time, in a sum not exceeding dollars per week, for a period of continuous total disconsecutive weeks from the time of the accident and injuries as aforesaid.

ability, not exceeding

An interesting case arising under this form of policy was heard before Hon. W. D. Shipman, judge of the U. S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, in July 1868. The case was William L. Southard vs. The Railway Passengers' Assurance Company.

A policy insured the holder against death or injury "by violent and accidental means, within the meaning of the contract and conditions annexed." The condition specified sundry modes of violent injury and death, which were excluded from the scope of the policy. Held that these specific exclusions did not operate to make the principal terms more largely inclusive, but that the death or injury, though violent, must still fall strictly within the principal terms and be caused by means that were accidental as well as violent.

Where a person insured by such a policy was injured internally, by jumping in great haste from a railroad car at a station, and running a considerable distance, which action was not necessary to his safety, but was voluntarily undertaken to effect an important object, which required haste : it was held that the injury was not caused by "accidental means," within the meaning of the policy. Upon this case the opinion of Judge Shipman was as follows:

"This is a claim made by William L. Southard against the above named company, for bodily injuries alleged to have been received by him, and by reason of which he avers that he was totally disabled for a considerable time, and prevented

from the prosecution of any and every kind of business. The claim is founded upon a policy of insurance issued to the claimant by an agent of the company, dated the 21st day of February, 1867, and having, three months to run. The company not agreeing to the claim made upon them, both parties have submitted the following questions to the undersigned as arbitrator.

"1. Did the alleged injury result from an accident within the meaning and intention of the contract?

“2.

Was the disability a consequence of disease existing prior or subsequent to the contract?

"3. Is it a case of total disability from all kinds of business?

"The contract of insurance made with the claimant is as follows:

"The Railway passengers' Assurance Company of Hartford insures William L. Southard, of Portland, Maine, against accidental loss of life, in the principal sum of Five Thousand Dollars, to be paid to his family or their legal representatives, within ninety days after sufficient proof that the insured, at any time within the term of this policy, shall have sustained bodily injuries, effected through VIOLENT AND ACCIDENTAL MEANS, within the intent and meaning of this contract and the conditions hereunto annexed, and such injuries shall have occasioned death within ninety days from the happening thereof; or if the insured shall sustain bodily injuries, by means as aforesaid, which shall absolutely and totally disable and prevent him from the prosecution of any and every kind of business, then, on satisfactory proof of such injuries, he shall be indemnified against loss of time, in a sum not exceeding twenty-five dollars per week, for a period of continuous total disability not exceeding twenty-six consecutive weeks from the time of the accident and injuries as aforesaid.'

"To this main clause of the policy, there are attached certain provisions and conditions, among which are the following:

"Provided always, that this insurance shall not extend